Annabelle Dufourcq défriche des terrains glissants et instables avec méthode et rigueur, et aménage les conditions pour que de nouveaux concepts apparaissent. Elle est une sorte de permacultrice de la philosophie : elle laboure des textes classiques pour étayer des thèses inattendues ; elle bouture des concepts pour les laisser bourgeonner librement, elle mélange le compost et aère le terreau des problèmes encroûtés pour élargir le champ des relations entre humains et non-humains. Elle a publ...

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

The psychoanalyical notion of the unconscious is often considered as being out of reach for phenomenological thinking. When Merleau-Ponty refl ects on it, he takes the unconscious as the realm, in bodily life, that being not yet conscious, is likely to become conscious. He formulates it in his Résumés de cours with the famous sentence “The unconscious is the sensing itself”. Lacan, facing this interpretation, explains that Merleau-Ponty fails to recongnize the essential discontinuity between consciousness and the unconscious. From that (...) criticism, it is possible to follow the reflection of Félix Guattari who develops, both alone and in collaboration with Gilles Deleuze, a conception of the “machinic unconscious”, a notion that can be read as an attempt to articulate the merleau-pontian and the lacanian approaches and to sketch out a theory of the becoming-subject. My aim in this paper, in speaking about “Merleau-Ponty Tomorrow”, consists therefore in appropriating some of his suggestions in this regard and to detect them in an unexpected context, thereby also noting the differences between them. Through this dialogue, I get to a position where it is possible to outline a critique of the contemporary “theory of the self”, which in myview is unaware of the fact that the self is always already caught in power relations. Guattari’s “micropolitics of desire” allows precisely to account for that and thus to develop the phenomenological approach to the self. (shrink)

David Abram est l’un des protagonistes les plus influents de la philosophie environnementale, aux confluents de l’écosophie d’Arne Næss et de l’ontologie de la chair de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Cette brève contribution relève certains motifs et arguments centraux de la pensée d’Abram, en particulier son interprétation de la spécificité de l’animalité humaine et la perception du caractère animé du paysage. Elle ancre Abram dans une cosmologie animiste et donne une réponse à la question de la forme que pourrait prendre une sagesse (...) indigène contemporaine en Occident. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

In contemporary art, a growing number of artists experiment with non-humans in their actual artworks. This paper examines the issues related to such practices with reference to Jakob von Uexküll’s analyses of the configuration of meaningful worlds by non-human animals, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze-Guattari’s interpretations of Uexküll’s ideas. Uexküll maintained that every living being lives in a world with meaning; Merleau-Ponty understood this claim as situating the beginning of culture in the creativity of non-humans; Deleuze and Guattari emphasized (...) the melodic and rhythmic dimension of this creativity, mainly interpreted as territorialization processes. These elements are paramount to understanding what is at stake with artworks featuring non-humans: considering projects proposals from Agnes Meyer-Brandis, Tomas Saraceno, Ana Maria Lopez Gomez and other contemporary artists, the conclusion is that an artwork featuring an encounter between two territorializing movements has the potential to transform the human range of perception. (shrink)

Je cherche ici à renouveler la compréhension de l’esthétique merleau-pontienne en lisant les notes de son premier cours au Collège de France, « Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression ». Ce faisant, on peut voir certains films de Godard comme prolongeant la réflexion du philosophe, éclairer le rapport de Deleuze à la phénoménologie et enfin resituer Merleau-Ponty dans le contexte des pratiques artistiques contemporaines. La portée de cette phénoménologie du mouvement dépasse cependant le cadre de l’esthétique dans la (...) mesure où elle laisse entrevoir une solution au problème du passage du perceptif au conceptuel. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

This essay is a second attempt to reconcile the perspectives of Merleau-Ponty and Guattari, following on the examination of the unconscious in a previous issue of Chiasmi. Here the focus concerns an ontology that overcomes the dualistic heritage of Western metaphysics. More precisely, I compare the concept of flesh as Merleau-Ponty employs it in his later texts with that of the machine as Guattari uses this from the end of the 1960s until his last writings in the early 1990s. The (...) machine concerns the potential for transformation in a given social and political configuration, so that the ontology to be drawn from this concept is a thought of transformation. The position of individual subjectivity in this context is not so different from that granted to it by Merleau-Ponty in his last writings: a curvature of the flesh or, as Deleuze and Guattari write about the artisan in A Thousand Plateaus, “one who is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter.”Cet essai est une deuxième tentative de rapprochement des perspectives de Merleau-Ponty et de Guattari, après la problématique de l’inconscient traitée dans un précédent numéro de Chiasmi. Cette fois elle a lieu sous l’angle d’une ontologie qui surmonte l’héritage dualiste de la métaphysique occidentale. Plus précisément, je mets en comparaison la notion de chair telle que Merleau-Ponty la met en oeuvre dans ses textes tardifs et celle de machine telle que Guattari l’emploie depuis la fin des années 1960 jusqu’à ses derniers écrits du début des années 1990. La machine concerne le potentiel de transformation dans une configuration sociale et politique donnée, de sorte que l’ontologie qu’on peut tirer de cette notion est une pensée de la transformation. La position de la subjectivité individuelle dans ce contexte n’est pas très différente de celle que lui accorde Merleau-Ponty dans ses derniers écrits : une courbure de la chair, ou comme l’écrivent Deleuze et Guattari dans Mille plateaux à propos de l’artisan, « celui qui est déterminé à suivre un flux de matière ».Questo saggio è un secondo tentativo di avvicinare le prospettive di Merleau-Ponty e di Guattari, dopo quanto fatto in un precedente numero di Chiasmi attorno alla problematica dell’inconscio. Questa volta, tale raffronto sarà nella prospettiva di un’ontologia che superi l’eredità dualistica della metafisica occidentale. Più precisamente, intendo confrontare la nozione di carne, nel modo in cui essa prende corpo nei testi dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty, e quella di macchina di Guattari, nella maniera in cui è caratterizzata dall’autore a partire dalla fine degli anni Sessanta fino ai suoi ultimi scritti dell’inizio degli anni Novanta. La macchina riguarda il potenziale di trasformazione in una configurazione sociale e politica data, e quindi l’ontologia che ne deriva implica un pensiero della trasformazione. In questo contesto, la posizione della soggettività individuale non è molto diversa da quella caratterizzata da Merleau-Ponty nei suoi ultimi scritti: una curvatura della carne, o, come scrivono Deleuze e Guattari in Millepiani a proposito dell’artigiano, “colui che è determinato a seguire un flusso di materia”. (shrink)

My article examines the role played by the phenomenon of silence both in Merleau- Ponty’s thinking and in Lyotard’s. I show thereby the continuity between the two philosophers in spite of the distance taken by Lyotard towards the phenomenological tradition. The aim of phenomenology to express the pure sense of silent experience is in fact taken up in a peculiar way by Lyotard as the action of desire and can well be used as a key to understand the unity of (...) his thinking. The comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard also shows that silence is a central topic in order to understand the political dimension of works of art, not as participants in political struggles, but as tools made for the empowerment of our capacity to perceive. (shrink)

La sensation d'être soumis à une contrainte implacable peut déclencher une souffrance intense, une activité délirante, ou bien une créativité irrépressible. Elle peut prendre la forme d'une "machine" à influencer. Cette figure majeure de la maladie psychique depuis deux cents ans est le point de départ et le fil conducteur pour éclairer la structure complexe et paradoxale de la subjectivité. Loin d'être un outil technique, elle est un enjeu d'abord existentiel et esthétique. De Tausk à Szondi et Maldiney, de Merleau-Ponty (...) à Guattari et Deleuze, de Deligny à Nauman et Duchamp, de Sobchack à Epstein et Godard, et enfin, à nouveau, de Merleau-Ponty à Guattari, on voit émerger les contours d'une subjectivité en tension,toujours déjà habitée d'une altérité qui la garde en mouvement. Et l'ontologie de la chair apparaît finalement comme un champ essentiellement politique. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

Technical Delusions in Schizophrenia: productivity and Limits of an AnalogyIn the debates on psychosis, the cases of "technical delusions" or "influencing machines" are regularly coming back, both in phenomenological and psychoanalytical psychiatry. As Alfred Kraus points out in the 1990s, "Even if such delusions do not represent the most frequent content in schizophrenia, they receive relatively high consideration for the diagnosis of schizophrenia". And more recently, he notes that, "It is not by chance that people with schizophrenia so often use (...) technical metaphors to explain their schizophrenic experiences", but he then concludes that they are not in fact metaphors, at least... (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Eye and MindIn his commentary concerning Jean-Luc Godard’s film, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, the film critic, Alain Bergala, writes that certain sequences of this film are “at the same time cinema and philosophy of cinema, a philosophy not very far from that of Merleau-Ponty in Eye and Mind, but a joyful and actually cinematic philosophy.” Here I propose a reading of Godard’s certain works found in different periods (Deux ou trois choses que je sais (...) d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion et JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), according to this precise axis, namely, as a cinematic response to Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind. To do that presupposes that we open up the stakes of this famous text, which is at the limit of the philosophical and political, and that we grasp the work of the filmmaker as a movement of thought which continues and deepens Merleau-Ponty’s questions concerning the political dimensions of flesh.L’occhio e lo spirito di Jean-Luc GodardNelle sue osservazioni sul film di Jean-Luc Godard, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, il critico cinematografico Alain Bergala scrive che alcune sequenze del film sono “allo stesso tempo cinema e filosofia del cinema, una filosofia non troppo lontana da quella elaborata da Merleau-Ponty in L’occhio e lo spirito, una filosofia gioiosa e davvero cinematografica.” Propongo qui una lettura di alcune opere godardiane di periodi differenti (Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle, Ici et ailleurs, Passion e JLG – Autoportrait de décembre), muovendomi lungo questa stessa linea, dunque intendendo quelle opere come una risposta “cinematografica” a L’occhio e lo spirito. Fare questo significa, d’altra parte, rianimare la posta in gioco di questo celebre testo, situata al limite tra il filosofico e il politico, e assumere l’opera del regista come un movimento di pensiero che prolunga e approfondisce l’interrogazione merleau-pontyana sulle dimensioni politiche della carne. (shrink)

Avec son livre La machine sensible, Stefan Kristensen réalise, de façon magistrale, deux objectifs. D’abord, il met en lien la pensée de deux philosophes qui sont à première vue très éloignés l’un de l’autre. Il s’agit de Félix Guattari et de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Traditionnellement, Merleau-Ponty est considéré comme le philosophe du corps, tandis que Guattari est connu comme le philosophe du corps sans organes. Merleau-Ponty est un phénoménologue, tandis que Guattari prétend abandonner le point de vue du sujet. (...) Kristensen démontre avec succès quel est le terrain commun des deux auteurs : la critique de la conception psychanalytique du sujet.Le deuxième objectif du livre découle directement du premier : présenter au lecteur une alternative à la conception intimiste de la subjectivité, soit comprendre la subjectivité comme fondamentalement parcourue par une altérité. Merleau-Ponty a été l’un des premiers, à l’instar de Paul Schilder, à mettre l’accent sur le caractère collectif et intersubjectif de cette altérité. Guattari a compris que cette altérité possède des sédiments politiques et historiques.With his book La machine sensible, Stefan Kristensen accomplishes two goals in a masterly way. First, he links the works of two philosophers who are very different at first sight: Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Félix Guattari. Traditionally, Merleau-Ponty is considered the philosopher of the body, whereas Guattari is known as the philosopher of the body without organs. Merleau-Ponty is a phenomenologist, whereas Guattari pretends to abandon the point of view of the subject. Kristensen identifies the common ground of the two authors: the criticism of the psychoanalytical conception of the subject.The second goal of the book derives directly from the first: present the reader with an alternative for the intimate conception of subjectivity, that is, present him or her with the idea that subjectivity is always characterized by an alterity. Merleau-Ponty, following the example of Paul Schilder, has been one of the first to stress the collective and intersubjective nature of this alterity. Guattari has understood that this alterity has political and historical sediments.Con il suo libro La machine sensible, Stefan Kristensen realizza magistralmente due obiettivi. Innanzitutto, egli mette in relazione il pensiero di due filosofi a prima vista molto distanti tra loro: Félix Guattari e Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Se tradizionalmente Merleau-Ponty è considerato il filosofo del corpo, Guattari è invece noto come il filosofo del corpo senza organi. Merleau-Ponty è un fenomenologo, mentre il pensiero di Guattari intende abbandonare il punto di vista del soggetto. Kristensen propone allora di leggere la critica della concezione psicoanalitica del soggetto come terreno comune tra i due autori. Il secondo obiettivo del libro discende direttamente dal primo: presentare al lettore un’alternativa alla concezione intimista della soggettività, ovvero concepire la soggettività come fondamentalmente percorsa da un’alterità. Merleau-Ponty è tra i primi, sulla scorta di Paul Schilder, a porre l’accento sul carattere collettivo e intersoggettivo di questa alterità. Dal canto suo, Guattari ha compreso che questa alterità possiede dei sedimenti politici e storici. (shrink)

Der Körper hat Konjunktur. Als ausgestellter, verfüg- und verführbarer begegnet er uns täglichim Übermaß. Es war nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis im Spiel der sich in den Wissenschafteneinander ablösenden turns auch ein corporeal (oder body) turn ausgerufen würde. Dabeibleibt im genannten turn der Gegenstand der Untersuchung nicht selten reduziert auf das, wasman im deutschen Sprachgebrauch »Körper« nennt: ein physisches Substrat, das wie ein Dingunter Dingen beschreibbar ist. Gegen diese Verkürzung stellt der Begri des »Leibes«,spätestens seit Edmund Husserl, eine präzise (...) theoretische Intervention in die wissenschaftlicheund philosophische Diskussion um Körper und Körperlichkeit dar: Dem objektiv beobachtbaren Körper, den wir haben, wird der lebendige Leib, der wir sind, gegenübergestellt. Diesem »Leib«, seiner Geschichte, seinen Varianten und seinem Versprechen gehen dieAutoren der vorliegenden Beiträge nach. Inhaltsübersicht Emmanuel Alloa/Thomas Bedorf/Christian Grüny/Tobias Nikolaus Klass: Einleitung I. Der Leibbegriff in der Phänomenologie Emmanuel Alloa / Natalie Depraz: Edmund Husserl – „Ein merkwürdig unvollkommenkonstituiertes Ding“ – Stefan Kristensen: Maurice Merleau-Ponty I – Körperschema undleibliche Subjektivität – Emmanuel Alloa: Maurice Merleau-Ponty II – Fleisch und Dierenz – David Espinet: Martin Heidegger – Der leibliche Sinn von Sein – Thomas Bedorf: EmmanuelLevinas – Der Leib des Anderen – Karel Novotný: Körper, Leib, Aektivität in Jan Pato č kasPhänomenologie der natürlichen Welt – Julia Scheidegger: Michel Henry – TranszendentaleLeiblichkeit – Jörg Sternagel: Bernhard Waldenfels – Responsivität des Leibes – Kerstin Andermann: Hermann Schmitz – Leiblichkeit als kommunikatives Selbst- und Weltverhältnis II. Zur Geschichte des Leibbegris Emmanuel Alloa: Archaische Leiblichkeit. Die griechische Antike und die Entdeckung desKörpers – Theresia Heimerl: Der Leib Christi und der Körper des Christen: Körper und Leib alszentrale Problemzonen des Christentums – Marc Rölli: Philosophische Anthropologie im 19. Jahrhundert – Zwischen Leib und Körper – Tobias Nikolaus Klass: Friedrich Nietzsche – Denkenam „Leitfaden des Leibes“ – Andreas Cremonini: Sigmund Freud – Der gelebte vs. derphantasmatische Leib – Uta Noppeney: Kurt Goldstein und Frederik Buytendijk – Der Leib-Begri in der organismischen Biologie – Volker Schürmann: Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner– Leiblichkeit in der Philosophischen Anthropologie – Marion Lauschke: Ernst Cassirer und AbyWarburg – Kulturanthropologie III. Grenzen und Kritik des Leibbegris Christian Grüny: Theodor W. Adorno – Soma und Sensorium – Ulrich Johannes Schneider: Michel Foucault – Der Körper und die Körper – Burkhard Liebsch: Paul Ricoeur – Das leiblicheSelbst begegnet dem Widerstand des Anderen – Mirjam Schaub: Gilles Deleuze – Was weiß ein„Körper ohne Organe“ vom Leib? – Kathrin Busch: Jean-Luc Nancy – Exposition und Berührung– Shaun Gallagher: Embodiment: Leiblichkeit in den Kognitionswissenschaften – Marie-Luise Angerer: Gender und Performance – Ist leibliche Identität ein Konstrukt? – Thomas Bedorf/Selin Gerlek: Praxistheorien – Leibkörperliche Praktiken im Vollzug. (shrink)

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l’expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-PontyLe monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionLe cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l’année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées (...) concernant la relation entre monde sensible perceptif et monde de l’expression (non seulement linguistique). Il s’agit d’analyses importantes, possédant un caractère programmatique en vue des recherches effectuées ensuite par Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à l’époque de Le visible et l’invisible. Au sein de cette analyse une place importante est réservée au thème du mouvement, d’abord étudié en tant que médiateur entre perception et pensée, mais vite devenu question centrale du cours.Merleau-Ponty aborde le problème du mouvement par rapport à sa manifestation, considérée comme originale et non pas réductible à des éléments plus fondamentaux qu’elle, tels que l’espace et du temps. Il étudie ensuite le sujet du mouvement, en le liant avec le concept de schéma corporel, ce qui est amplement illustré et contient des développements intéressants à l’égard de la Phénoménologie de la perception. Enfin il étudie la question de la représentation du mouvement dans la peinture et le cinéma.Toutes ces approches au problème du mouvement esquissent, sans le dire ouvertement, la question de sa signification ontologique. Dans cet essai, j’ai essayé d’articuler cette question, en essayant d’en extraire les différentes valeurs: celle relative au statut du mouvement, celle portant sur la relation entre le mouvement et la manifestation, à savoir la manifestation comme mouvement, et enfin celle de la pluralité de sens ontologique inhérente à la conception de Merleau-Ponty, avec une attention particulière aux concepts d’altération, métamorphose, trace de l’être.De la discussion des ses remarques tout aussi pénétrantes que réticentes on est amené à conclure que Merleau-Ponty a vu la possibilité d’une ontologie «cinétique», c’est à dire d’une signification ontologique radicale du mouvement, mais sans arriver à une formulation explicite de cette perspective. Perspective qui semble refaire surface dans les oeuvres et dans les leçons suivantes, sans jamais recevoir une définition accomplie.I molti volti del movimento. Problemi fenomenologici e ontologici relativi alla relazione tra percezione, espressione e movimento nel corso su Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione di M. Merleau-PontyIl corso tenuto da Merleau-Ponty nell’anno accademico 1952-53 è ancora inedito ma grazie al lavoro di Emmanuel de Saint Aubert e Stefan Kristensen è ora divenuto possibile leggerne la trascrizione in vista della sua pubblicazione. Questo corso, inaugurale delle lezioni al Collège de France, contiene analisi dettagliate relative al problema del rapporto tra mondo sensibile percettivo e mondo dell’espressione (anche ma non soltanto linguistica). Si tratta di analisi importanti anche per il carattere programmatico che esse posseggono in riferimento alle successive indagini condotte da Merleau-Ponty fino all’epoca della redazione di Il visibile e l’invisibile. All’interno di tali analisi un posto importante è riservato al tema del movimento, inizialmente indagato nella sua valenza di mediazione tra percezione e pensiero, ma presto assurto a tema centrale della riflessione.Merleau-Ponty discute il problema del movimento in relazione alla sua manifestazione, ritenuta originaria e non riconducibile, o peggio riducibile, a elementi più fondamentali come lo spazio e il tempo. Indaga poi il soggetto del movimento, articolandolo in connessione alla nozione di schema corporeo, che viene illustrata ampiamente e contiene interessanti sviluppi rispetto a Fenomenologia della percezione. Infine studia la questione della rappresentazione del movimento in pittura e nel cinema.Tutti questi approcci al movimento delineano, senza esplicitarla apertamente, la questione della valenza ontologica del movimento. In questo saggio ho provato ad articolare tale questione cercando di estrarne le diverse valenze: quella relativa allo statuto del movimento, quella concernente il nesso tra movimento e manifestazione, ossia la manifestazione come movimento; infi ne quella della pluralità di sensi ontologici intrinseca alla trattazione di Merleau-Ponty, con un’attenzione particolare per le nozioni di alterazione, metamorfosi, traccia d’essere.Dall’analisi di queste osservazioni insieme penetranti e reticenti mi pare di poter concludere che Merleau-Ponty abbia intravisto la possibilità di una ontologia “cinetica”, cioè di un significato ontologico radicale del movimento, senza però arrivare ad una formulazione esplicita di tale prospettiva. Prospettiva che sembra a tratti riaffiorare nelle opere e nelle lezioni successive, senza mai ricevere una compiuta definizione. (shrink)

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l’expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-PontyLe monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionLe cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l’année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées (...) concernant la relation entre monde sensible perceptif et monde de l’expression (non seulement linguistique). Il s’agit d’analyses importantes, possédant un caractère programmatique en vue des recherches effectuées ensuite par Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à l’époque de Le visible et l’invisible. Au sein de cette analyse une place importante est réservée au thème du mouvement, d’abord étudié en tant que médiateur entre perception et pensée, mais vite devenu question centrale du cours.Merleau-Ponty aborde le problème du mouvement par rapport à sa manifestation, considérée comme originale et non pas réductible à des éléments plus fondamentaux qu’elle, tels que l’espace et du temps. Il étudie ensuite le sujet du mouvement, en le liant avec le concept de schéma corporel, ce qui est amplement illustré et contient des développements intéressants à l’égard de la Phénoménologie de la perception. Enfin il étudie la question de la représentation du mouvement dans la peinture et le cinéma.Toutes ces approches au problème du mouvement esquissent, sans le dire ouvertement, la question de sa signification ontologique. Dans cet essai, j’ai essayé d’articuler cette question, en essayant d’en extraire les différentes valeurs: celle relative au statut du mouvement, celle portant sur la relation entre le mouvement et la manifestation, à savoir la manifestation comme mouvement, et enfin celle de la pluralité de sens ontologique inhérente à la conception de Merleau-Ponty, avec une attention particulière aux concepts d’altération, métamorphose, trace de l’être.De la discussion des ses remarques tout aussi pénétrantes que réticentes on est amené à conclure que Merleau-Ponty a vu la possibilité d’une ontologie «cinétique», c’est à dire d’une signification ontologique radicale du mouvement, mais sans arriver à une formulation explicite de cette perspective. Perspective qui semble refaire surface dans les oeuvres et dans les leçons suivantes, sans jamais recevoir une définition accomplie.I molti volti del movimento. Problemi fenomenologici e ontologici relativi alla relazione tra percezione, espressione e movimento nel corso su Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione di M. Merleau-PontyIl corso tenuto da Merleau-Ponty nell’anno accademico 1952-53 è ancora inedito ma grazie al lavoro di Emmanuel de Saint Aubert e Stefan Kristensen è ora divenuto possibile leggerne la trascrizione in vista della sua pubblicazione. Questo corso, inaugurale delle lezioni al Collège de France, contiene analisi dettagliate relative al problema del rapporto tra mondo sensibile percettivo e mondo dell’espressione (anche ma non soltanto linguistica). Si tratta di analisi importanti anche per il carattere programmatico che esse posseggono in riferimento alle successive indagini condotte da Merleau-Ponty fino all’epoca della redazione di Il visibile e l’invisibile. All’interno di tali analisi un posto importante è riservato al tema del movimento, inizialmente indagato nella sua valenza di mediazione tra percezione e pensiero, ma presto assurto a tema centrale della riflessione.Merleau-Ponty discute il problema del movimento in relazione alla sua manifestazione, ritenuta originaria e non riconducibile, o peggio riducibile, a elementi più fondamentali come lo spazio e il tempo. Indaga poi il soggetto del movimento, articolandolo in connessione alla nozione di schema corporeo, che viene illustrata ampiamente e contiene interessanti sviluppi rispetto a Fenomenologia della percezione. Infine studia la questione della rappresentazione del movimento in pittura e nel cinema.Tutti questi approcci al movimento delineano, senza esplicitarla apertamente, la questione della valenza ontologica del movimento. In questo saggio ho provato ad articolare tale questione cercando di estrarne le diverse valenze: quella relativa allo statuto del movimento, quella concernente il nesso tra movimento e manifestazione, ossia la manifestazione come movimento; infi ne quella della pluralità di sensi ontologici intrinseca alla trattazione di Merleau-Ponty, con un’attenzione particolare per le nozioni di alterazione, metamorfosi, traccia d’essere.Dall’analisi di queste osservazioni insieme penetranti e reticenti mi pare di poter concludere che Merleau-Ponty abbia intravisto la possibilità di una ontologia “cinetica”, cioè di un significato ontologico radicale del movimento, senza però arrivare ad una formulazione esplicita di tale prospettiva. Prospettiva che sembra a tratti riaffiorare nelle opere e nelle lezioni successive, senza mai ricevere una compiuta definizione. (shrink)

Plusieurs générations de chercheurs internationaux interrogent l’esthétique de Merleau-Ponty suivant deux axes : d’une part, le dialogue constant et passionné avec des arts (peinture, littérature, cinéma) et ses protagonistes (Cézanne, Proust, Claude Simon) qui est à l’origine de l’esthétique de Merleau-Ponty, et dans d’autre part, l’impact de la pensée merleau-pontienne sur les arts, depuis le Minimal Art américain en passant par le Body Art et la danse contemporaine. Tandis que certaines contributions s’intéressent, en s’appuyant sur les inédits, au rapport jusqu’ici (...) moins étudié que Merleau-Ponty entretenait avec la musique, mais aussi avec la photographie, d’autres contributions jaugent l’héritage merleau-pontien dans des arts sur lesquels il n’a pas lui-même écrit (la sculpture, la danse ou le théâtre). Ce volume propose donc une première synthèse générale du rapport de Merleau-Ponty aux arts, tout en en indiquant les lignes de fuite et les horizons qui en font aujourd’hui, cinquante ans après sa mort, toute l’actualité. -/- Contributions d’Emmanuel Alloa, Ronald Bonan, Fabrice Bourlez, Mauro Carbone, Lambert Dousson, Eliane Escoubas, Barbara Formis, Paule Gioffredi, Adnen Jdey, Stefan Kristensen, Rosamaria Salvatore, Jenny Slatman, Bernhard Waldenfels, Benedetta Zaccarello. (shrink)

Research teams have used extra-uterine systems to support premature fetal lambs and to bring them to maturation in a way not previously possible. The researchers have called attention to possible implications of these systems for sustaining premature human fetuses in a similar way. Some commentators have pointed out that perfecting these systems for human fetuses might alter a standard expectation in abortion practices: that the termination of a pregnancy also entails the death of the fetus. With Biobags, it might be (...) possible, some argue, that no woman has the right to expect that outcome if the technology is able to sustain fetal life _after_ an abortion. In order to protect the expectation that the termination of a pregnancy always entails the death of the fetus, Elizabeth Romanis has argued that fetuses sustained in Biobags have a status different than otherwise ‘born’ children. In support of that view, she argues that these ‘gestatelings’ are incapable of independent life. This argument involves a misunderstanding of the gestational support involved, as well as a misapprehension of neonatology practice. Here, we argue that any human fetus sustained in a Biobag would be as ‘independent’ as any other premature infant, and just as ‘born’. Neonatologists would seem to have certain presumptive moral responsibilities toward any human fetus gestating in a Biobag. It remains a separate question whether the perfection and widespread application of Biobags for premature human beings would or should alter the expectation that ending a pregnancy also entails fetal death. (shrink)

How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)—the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM (...) is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it’s true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. (shrink)

Intuitively, we lack the standing to blame others in light of moral norms that we ourselves don't take seriously: if Adam is unrepentantly aggressive, say, he lacks the standing to blame Celia for her aggressiveness. But why does blame have this feature? Existing proposals try to explain this by reference to specific principles of normative ethics – e.g. to rule‐consequentialist considerations, to the wrongness of hypocritical blame, or principles of rights‐forfeiture based on this wrongness. In this paper, I suggest a (...) fundamentally different approach. Employing Timothy Williamson's idea of ‘constitutive rules’ of speech acts, I argue that this feature of blame is simply constitutive of any essentially moral form of disapproval. So if Adam had the standing to disapprove of Celia's aggressiveness in some form, necessarily, this disapproval couldn't be blame. If I'm right, this proposal thus not only answers our main question, but also sheds an interesting novel light on the very nature of blame. If we didn't have a form of disapproval with that feature, we wouldn't have our practice of holding each other to moral norms. (shrink)

Often denied scientific status, Völkerpsychologie was set forth as a psychological program endeavoring to find insights into the structure and content of the ‘mind’ of social groups, especially ‘peoples’, which were regarded as the prototypical manifestation of those groups. This article examines how Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal’s nineteenth-century Völkerpsychologie came to be regarded as having the status of a science, by analyzing its scientific program. I claim that these founders of Völkerpsychologie developed a moderate methodological materialism by embracing a (...) historical turn in psychology, which—to a degree—enabled a synthesis of the methodologies of the social and the natural sciences. This approach is correlated with their modus operandi, collaboration through the medium of a journal. (shrink)

This article shows how activists in the open data movement re-articulate notions of democracy, participation, and journalism by applying practices and values from open source culture to the creation and use of data. Focusing on the Open Knowledge Foundation Germany and drawing from a combination of interviews and content analysis, it argues that this process leads activists to develop new rationalities around datafication that can support the agency of datafied publics. Three modulations of open source are identified: First, by regarding (...) data as a prerequisite for generating knowledge, activists transform the sharing of source code to include the sharing of raw data. Sharing raw data should break the interpretative monopoly of governments and would allow people to make their own interpretation of data about public issues. Second, activists connect this idea to an open and flexible form of representative democracy by applying the open source model of participation to political participation. Third, activists acknowledge that intermediaries are necessary to make raw data accessible to the public. This leads them to an interest in transforming journalism to become an intermediary in this sense. At the same time, they try to act as intermediaries themselves and develop civic technologies to put their ideas into practice. The article concludes with suggesting that the practices and ideas of open data activists are relevant because they illustrate the connection between datafication and open source culture and help to understand how datafication might support the agency of publics and actors outside big government and big business. (shrink)

The fact that the standard probabilistic calculus does not define probabilities for sentences with embedded conditionals is a fundamental problem for the probabilistic theory of conditionals. Several authors have explored ways to assign probabilities to such sentences, but those proposals have come under criticism for making counterintuitive predictions. This paper examines the source of the problematic predictions and proposes an amendment which corrects them in a principled way. The account brings intuitions about counterfactual conditionals to bear on the interpretation of (...) indicatives and relies on the notion of causal (in)dependence. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is axiological uncertainty – the question of how you should evaluate your options if you are uncertain about which axiology is true. As an answer, I defend Expected Value Maximisation (EVM), the view that one option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. More precisely, I explore the axiomatic foundations of this view. I employ results from state-dependent utility theory, extend them in various ways and interpret (...) them accordingly, and thus provide axiomatisations of EVM as a theory of axiological uncertainty. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to propose a way to resolve a supposed dilemma currently troubling the debate about rational belief formation in cases of peer disagreement. In section 1, I will introduce the general debate in question as well as the kind of view figuring in the supposed dilemma. In section 2, I will describe how the supposed dilemma arises. In section 3, I will consider the replies that have hitherto been offered and explain in how far these (...) replies should be regarded as unsatisfying. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I will propose and defend a new reply to the supposed dilemma. This reply consists in rejecting the intuitively appealing view that one should be conciliatory in the relevant kind of case, and in endorsing a more careful position, which respects the intuitions behind conciliationism and which, in contrast to the latter, does not give rise to the kind of dilemma in question. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISMVolume 13, Issue 3Stefan ReiningDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.47Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISMVolume 13, Issue 3Stefan ReiningDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.47Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISMVolume 13, Issue 3Stefan ReiningDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.47Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)