Fournissant une nouvelle edition ainsi que la premiere traduction francaise integrale du celebre decret parisien de 1277, cet ouvrage comprend egalement un commentaire qui entend montrer que, par-dela l'opposition entre orthodoxie et heterodoxie, la condamnation de l'eveque Tempier implique des enjeux epistemologique et ethique d'une grande importance pour l'histoire de la pensee en Occident. Providing a new edition and the first complete French translation of the famous 1277 Parisian decree, this book also includes a commentary which intends to show that, (...) beyond the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the condamnation promulgated by the bishop Tempier involves epistemological and ethical issues of great importance for the history of Western thought. (shrink)

Gli A. esaminano le risposte che l'anonimo magister artium fornisce alle domande iniziali poste da Porfirio nell'Isagoge, relativamente, in special modo, alla questione degli universali. Ne risulta uno studio dottrinale che fa luce sui punti seguenti: l'anonimo pone un universale in rebus, sottoscrivendo la coeva posizione realista; l'universale reale non è affatto confinato in uno spazio-tempo determinato; all'interno del Compendium è posto in luce il concetto di virtus, a cui si lega una peculiarità nel pensare l'universale in re, cioè da (...) una parte viene pensato come ontologicamente immanente, dall'altra come separato per il rapporto con le molteplici realtà corporee; la dottrina dell'universale sembra portare un'impronta avicenniana , in quanto per il magister l'universale può essere considerato per naturam o per essentiam; altra distinzione cruciale è quella instaurata fra esse essentiae e esse actuale o esse existentiae. Sulla base del ms. Barcelona, ACA, Ripoll 109 gli A. presentano l'edizione dei punti relativi agli universali , accompagnati da note esplicative sui luoghi isagogici e sulle fonti del testo. Gli A. forniscono i dettagli relativi alla loro edizione alle pp. 293-6. (shrink)

David Piché | : Problème majeur dans l’histoire de l’ontologie, la question de la cause de l’individuation se pose, notamment, à tout lecteur de l’Isagoge de Porphyre. En dépit de son importance historique, aucune étude n’a été consacrée spécifiquement au traitement que ce problème a reçu de la part de ceux qui furent à l’avant-garde de la réception du péripatétisme gréco-arabe dans l’Occident latin, à savoir les philosophes qui oeuvrèrent à la Faculté des arts de l’Université de Paris entre (...) 1230 et 1260. Cet article entend remédier à cette lacune en offrant la première traduction en langue moderne — elle-même réalisée principalement à partir des manuscrits des originaux latins — d’extraits pertinents de Commentaires isagogiques émanant de figures significatives de ce milieu. Ces textes traduits et annotés sont précédés d’une étude qui en dégage les thèses essentielles après avoir posé les termes du problème de l’individuation tel qu’il se pose dans le cadre épistémique que dessine l’opuscule de Porphyre. | : A major problem in the history of ontology, the question of the cause of individuation comes across any reader of Porphyry’s Isagoge. Despite its historical importance, no study has been devoted specifically to the treatment that this problem has received on the part of those who were at the forefront of the reception of the Graeco-Arabic Peripatetic Corpus in the Latin West, namely the philosophers who taught at the Parisian Faculty of arts between 1230 and 1260. This article intends to fill this gap by offering the first translation into French — translation made mainly from manuscripts of the original Latin texts — of relevant excerpts from Isagoge Commentaries written by significant masters belonging to that milieu. These translated and annotated texts are preceded by a study that expounds their essential theses after having spelled out the terms of the problem of individuation as it arises within the epistemic framework of Porphyry’s Isagoge. (shrink)

After a presentation of the main onto-theological theses contained in the Liber de causis, the author explains how they were received and interpreted by Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant in their respective commentaries on the short treatise “de primis causis rerum.” Starting from a mistranslation of the word “yliathim,” Thomas “injects” into the De causis his own doctrine of the distinction between being and essence. As for Siger, while he is often regarded as an adversary of Thomas Aquinas, his (...) ideas about the ontological difference between the Prime Cause and the created beings are on the very lines of the Thomasian lecture of the Liber de causis. (shrink)

The following paper shows that prior to Ockham’s doctrine on the intuition of non-existents, two Parisian theologians had already developed, in opposition to Duns Scotus, their own theories on the possibility of having intuitive cognition of non-existent or absent things. The article uses the editions of the two theologians’ Quodlibeta prepared by the author.

Cet article offre la toute première édition critique du Quodlibet IV, q. 11, d’Hervé de Nédellec (Hervaeus Natalis ; c. 1250/60-1323), laquelle est précédée d’une étude du contenu doctrinal de cette question quodlibétique qui traite essentiellement de trois choses : une définition de la connaissance intuitive ; une explication de ce que signifie la présence d’une chose ; une analyse des modalités selon lesquelles la connaissance – et en particulier l’intuitive – dépend de la présence de la chose connue.

La narration de l’histoire du problème des universaux souffre d’une importante lacune : on ne sait rien du traitement que ce problème a reçu de la part de ceux qui faisaient profession de philosopher à l’Université de Paris entre 1230 et 1260. C’est à ce deficit de savoir que le présent ouvrage s’attaque. Il se déploie en trois dimensions. En premier lieu, nous offrons une édition critique et une traduction française sectorielles d’un commentaire latin sur l’Isogoge de Porphyre ayant pour (...) auteur un dénommé Robertus Anglicus qui, comme nous le montrons, fut magister artium à Paris aux alentours de 1250. En deuxième lieu, nous sondons l’architectonique de ce texte et des écrits parallèles que rédigèrent des philosophes contemporains, nommément Jean le Page, Nicolas de Paris et Robert Kilwardby. Finalement, par l’entremise d’une étude comparative qui met à profit des œuvres inédites de ces artiens, nous explicitons, interprétons et évaluons les schèmes de lecture, les séquences argumentatives et les composantes doctrinales qui forment la “moelle” philosophique du commentaire isagogique de Robertus Anglicus. (shrink)

Notre connaissance de l'histoire du probleme des universaux, tel qu'il fut initialement formule par Porphyre, souffre d'une importante lacune: nous ne savons strictement rien concernant le traitement que ce probleme a recu de la part de ceux qui faisaient profession de philosopher a l'Universite de Paris entre 1230 et 1260. Notre these s'attaque a ce deficit de savoir en suivant une demarche heuristique qui se deploie en trois phases: premierement, nous editons, selon les regles de l'ecdotique, une partie substantielle du (...) commentaire du Pseudo-Robertus Anglicus sur l'Isagoge de Porphyre et nous en offrons une traduction francaise; deuxiemement, nous sondons l'architectonique de ce texte et des ecrits paralleles rediges par des contemporains---nommement Jean le Page, Nicolas de Paris et Robert Kilwardby; troisiemement et finalement, par l'entremise d'une etude comparative qui met a profit ces documents inedits qui composent notre corpus, nous procedons a une etude historico-philosophique du commentaire isagogique du Pseudo-Robertus Anglicus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’David PichéLuca Bianchi. Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’. Conférences Pierre Abélard. Paris: Vrin, 2008. Pp. 192. Paper, €18.00.Since the publication of the work of the Belgian medievalist Fernand Van Steenberghen, a solid consensus seems to have emerged in the community of historians of medieval philosophy: no scholar in the Middle Ages defended the so-called “doctrine of the double truth” (...) that the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had denounced in the prologue of his 1277 Condemnation. Moreover, how could a professional philosopher or theologian seriously contend that two contradictory statements are simultaneously true, one due to natural reason, and the other through the authority of faith? Therefore, the matter seemed settled and the file definitely closed: the double truth is nothing more than a “legend.” Yet the Italian medievalist Luca Bianchi’s in-depth critical analysis of the pseudo-historical evidence has now changed this. Without wanting to propose an entirely new interpretation of the historical ins and outs of this famous doctrine, Bianchi carries out a re-examination of the subject through a meticulous study of certain key texts that he has read in the light of a three-fold question: What impact did passages from Tempier’s decree on the “double truth” have on the medieval scholars themselves? Does the expression itself, ‘duplex veritas’, appear in some medieval documents? What were medieval thinkers’ attitudes in the face of philosophical arguments leading to conclusions contradicting the teachings of the Catholic faith?Due to space constraints, I will limit my discussion to Bianchi’s most crucial results. The answer to the first question (ch. 1) leads us in a surprising fashion to the famous Disputatio of Luther (1539). In this text, the father of the Reformation opposes the principle according to which what is true in theology must also be true in philosophy—a thesis whose paternity he attributes to Parisian theologians. Wanting to ensure the pre-eminence of faith-based teachings over all forms of human rationalization, Luther came to subscribe to a certain form of the double truth, since he claimed that what is absolutely true according to faith can be false and impossible from the perspective of philosophy. This explains his radical opposition to the “Parisian” principle that Bianchi calls “the principle of the oneness of truth.” We learn that some theologians in fifteenth- century Paris, notably Jean Gerson and Guillaume Baudin, were actually inspired by Tempier’s decree to defend some form of this principle.To respond to the second question (ch. 2), Bianchi first researched the electronic database Library of Latin Texts (CLCLT-6), and came up with “disappointing results”: no author uses the expression ‘duplex veritas’ in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, as imposing as it is, this database is not exhaustive, and Bianchi, well aware of this, extended his research by consulting other documents on paper, allowing him ultimately to reach a positive conclusion: the expression ‘duplex veritas’ appears in the course of a debate that took place around [End Page 99] 1470 on the subject of the truth-value of statements about future contingents. This debate involved a master of arts from Louvain, Pierre de Rivo, who considered it essential to distinguish between the truth of philosophers and the “popular” truth upheld by the churchmen, and a Parisian theologian whom we have already encountered, Guillaume Baudin, who invoked the “principle of the oneness of truth” to denounce the “double truth” that his adversary was promoting.From Bianchi’s multifaceted response to the third question (chs. 3–4), I can only present the groundswell. From the statutes promulgated by the Parisian Arts Faculty in 1272 up to the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, including the constitution Apostolici regiminis issued by the Fifth Lateran Council (1513), a significant evolution may be observed in the requirements academic and religious authorities imposed on professors of philosophy (as well as on scientists) in the western Christian world. Indeed, we may observe that these requirements correspond, first, to the obligation to counter, as far as possible, arguments that contradict faith, and then transform into the duty to commit to a strong... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’David PichéLuca Bianchi. Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’. Conférences Pierre Abélard. Paris: Vrin, 2008. Pp. 192. Paper, €18.00.Since the publication of the work of the Belgian medievalist Fernand Van Steenberghen, a solid consensus seems to have emerged in the community of historians of medieval philosophy: no scholar in the Middle Ages defended the so-called “doctrine of the double truth” (...) that the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had denounced in the prologue of his 1277 Condemnation. Moreover, how could a professional philosopher or theologian seriously contend that two contradictory statements are simultaneously true, one due to natural reason, and the other through the authority of faith? Therefore, the matter seemed settled and the file definitely closed: the double truth is nothing more than a “legend.” Yet the Italian medievalist Luca Bianchi’s in-depth critical analysis of the pseudo-historical evidence has now changed this. Without wanting to propose an entirely new interpretation of the historical ins and outs of this famous doctrine, Bianchi carries out a re-examination of the subject through a meticulous study of certain key texts that he has read in the light of a three-fold question: What impact did passages from Tempier’s decree on the “double truth” have on the medieval scholars themselves? Does the expression itself, ‘duplex veritas’, appear in some medieval documents? What were medieval thinkers’ attitudes in the face of philosophical arguments leading to conclusions contradicting the teachings of the Catholic faith?Due to space constraints, I will limit my discussion to Bianchi’s most crucial results. The answer to the first question (ch. 1) leads us in a surprising fashion to the famous Disputatio of Luther (1539). In this text, the father of the Reformation opposes the principle according to which what is true in theology must also be true in philosophy—a thesis whose paternity he attributes to Parisian theologians. Wanting to ensure the pre-eminence of faith-based teachings over all forms of human rationalization, Luther came to subscribe to a certain form of the double truth, since he claimed that what is absolutely true according to faith can be false and impossible from the perspective of philosophy. This explains his radical opposition to the “Parisian” principle that Bianchi calls “the principle of the oneness of truth.” We learn that some theologians in fifteenth- century Paris, notably Jean Gerson and Guillaume Baudin, were actually inspired by Tempier’s decree to defend some form of this principle.To respond to the second question (ch. 2), Bianchi first researched the electronic database Library of Latin Texts (CLCLT-6), and came up with “disappointing results”: no author uses the expression ‘duplex veritas’ in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, as imposing as it is, this database is not exhaustive, and Bianchi, well aware of this, extended his research by consulting other documents on paper, allowing him ultimately to reach a positive conclusion: the expression ‘duplex veritas’ appears in the course of a debate that took place around [End Page 99] 1470 on the subject of the truth-value of statements about future contingents. This debate involved a master of arts from Louvain, Pierre de Rivo, who considered it essential to distinguish between the truth of philosophers and the “popular” truth upheld by the churchmen, and a Parisian theologian whom we have already encountered, Guillaume Baudin, who invoked the “principle of the oneness of truth” to denounce the “double truth” that his adversary was promoting.From Bianchi’s multifaceted response to the third question (chs. 3–4), I can only present the groundswell. From the statutes promulgated by the Parisian Arts Faculty in 1272 up to the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, including the constitution Apostolici regiminis issued by the Fifth Lateran Council (1513), a significant evolution may be observed in the requirements academic and religious authorities imposed on professors of philosophy (as well as on scientists) in the western Christian world. Indeed, we may observe that these requirements correspond, first, to the obligation to counter, as far as possible, arguments that contradict faith, and then transform into the duty to commit to a strong... (shrink)

Cet article fournit la toute première édition critique de la deuxième des quatre Questiones ordinarie qui ont été débattues par le maître carme Gérard de Bologne : est-ce que l’ habitus de foi se trouve dans l’intellect spéculatif, l’intellect pratique ou la partie affective de l’âme? Notre édition est précédée d’une étude qui analyse la doctrine de Gérard en la situant dans son contexte historique grâce à l’identification de ses interlocuteurs. En affirmant que la théologie détient un double statut épistémologique, (...) spéculatif et pratique, Gérard soutient une position qui n’est pas sans rappeler celle que Godefroid de Fontaines avait défendue avant lui. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : The scientific character of theology was hotly debated among theologians of the 13th and 14th century. In what follows I expound the singular views of Hervaeus Natalis, a thinker who lived in the first quarter of the 14th century. According to him, the solution to this problem lies in the notion of abstraction. I offer a historical and philosophical analysis of his position based on the first French translation of a significative portion of one of his Quodlibets. I (...) made the translation from my own edition of its Latin text. (shrink)

Cet article est destiné à montrer qu’antérieurement au développement par Ockham d’une doctrine de l’intuition du non-existant, deux théologiens parisiens avaient déjà construit, chacun à sa manière, une théorie de la connaissance intuitive qui établissait, contre Duns Scot, la possibilité de l’intuition d’une chose non-existante ou absente : Gérard de Bologne et Hervé de Nédellec. L’étude philosophique de ce thème chez ces deux penseurs s’appuie sur l’édition critique de leurs Quodlibeta qu’a réalisée l’auteur de l’article.

In the commentary on the Isagoge ascribed to John Pagus, one of the major figures in the mid-thirteenth century Parisian Faculty of Arts, we encounter a statement according to which uniuersale per continentiam et ambitum is the sort of universal that is relevant in the context of the Porphyrian question about the ontological status of genera and species. The aim of this article is to decode this enigmatic phrase. We proceed in two steps, first examining some thirteenth-century texts in which (...) this phrase is found, and second providing a careful analysis and original interpretation of decisive passages in Pagus’ commentary. By means of this hermeneutical analysis, we develop a more precise understanding of the nature and significance of the realist teaching about universals, which was promoted by the vast majority of mid-thirteenth-century Latin thinkers. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Cet article offre la première édition du début des Communia logic e, une substantielle compilation didascalique issue de la Faculté des arts de l’Université de Paris au milieu du xiiie siècle et contenue dans un manuscrit légué par maître Pierre de Limoges à l’ancienne bibliothèque de la Sorbonne. Après une présentation générale et avant des précisions sur la Ratio edendi, l’étude doctrinale qui précède cette édition montre comment l’auteur-compilateur des Communia logic e répond — en le reformulant — au (...) célèbre questionnaire porphyrien relatif aux universaux. ABSTRACT This article offers the first edition of the beginning of the Communia logic e, a substantial didascalical compilation emanating from the Arts faculty of the University of Paris during the first half of the thirteenth century and preserved in a manuscript bequeathed by master Peter of Limoges to the old library of the Sorbonne. After a general presentation and before some clarifications on the Ratio edendi, the doctrinal study which precedes this edition shows how the author-compiler of the Communia logic e answers — while reformulating it — to the well known porphyrian set of questions about the universals. (shrink)

This is a critical examination of a recent book by David Piche, which contains a new edition of the sweeping and influential condemnation by Bishop Stephen Tempier of 219 (or now, 220) propositions on March 7,1277 at the University of Paris. In addition to the Latin text, Piche's book includes a French translation of the text of the condemnation, an introduction to the Latin text and translation, and his historico-doctrinal interpretation of the condemnation and the events leading (...) up to it. This condemnation has deservedly received considerable attention from scholars during the past twenty-five years or so, and Piche's new edition of the text is a valuable contribution to this ongoing research. His historico-doctrinal commentary on the condemnation incorporates and builds upon much of this more recent material. Without agreeing with his interpretation on every point, my overall evaluation of his book is quite positive. (shrink)

In this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance, David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and then a (...) form of realism that he calls conceptualist realism. In a final chapter he advocates a human being-based conception of the identity and individuation of persons, arguing that any satisfactory account of personal memory must make reference to the life of the rememberer himself. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Lipsey and Lancaster's "general theory of second best" is widely thought to have significant implications for applied theorizing about the institutions and policies that most effectively implement abstract normative principles. It is also widely thought to have little significance for theorizing about which abstract normative principles we ought to implement. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I show how the second-best theorem can be extended to myriad domains beyond applied normative theorizing, and in particular to more abstract theorizing about the normative (...) principles we should aim to implement. I start by separating the mathematical model used to prove the second-best theorem from its familiar economic interpretation. I then develop an alternative normative-theoretic interpretation of the model, which yields a novel second best theorem for idealistic normative theory. My method for developing this interpretation provides a template for developing additional interpretations that can extend the reach of the second-best theorem beyond normative theoretical domains. I also show how, within any domain, the implications of the second-best theorem are more specific than is typically thought. I conclude with some brief remarks on the value of mathematical models for conceptual exploration. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence has historically been conceptualized in anthropomorphic terms. Some algorithms deploy biomimetic designs in a deliberate attempt to effect a sort of digital isomorphism of the human brain. Others leverage more general learning strategies that happen to coincide with popular theories of cognitive science and social epistemology. In this paper, I challenge the anthropomorphic credentials of the neural network algorithm, whose similarities to human cognition I argue are vastly overstated and narrowly construed. I submit that three alternative supervised learning (...) methods—namely lasso penalties, bagging, and boosting—offer subtler, more interesting analogies to human reasoning as both an individual and a social phenomenon. Despite the temptation to fall back on anthropomorphic tropes when discussing AI, however, I conclude that such rhetoric is at best misleading and at worst downright dangerous. The impulse to humanize algorithms is an obstacle to properly conceptualizing the ethical challenges posed by emerging technologies. (shrink)

A collection of 14 essays honoring the life and work of Oxford philosopher Wiggins touching on topics from ancient philosophy to ethics, metaphysics and the theory of meaning. The contributing scholars debate many of the seminal issues of Wiggins' work, including the determinancy of distinctness, relative identity, naturalism in ethics, logic and truth in moral judgments, and the practical wisdom of Aristotle. The collection uniquely features replies by Wiggins to each of the papers. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, (...) OR. (shrink)

Drawing on work of the past decade, this volume brings together articles from the philosophy, history, and sociology of science, and many other branches of the biological sciences. The volume delves into the latest theoretical controversies as well as burning questions of contemporary social importance. The issues considered include the nature of evolutionary theory, biology and ethics, the challenge from religion, and the social implications of biology today (in particular the Human Genome Project).

According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition <p> is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and <p> is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as <2+2=4>, nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come out both (...) necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T), it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that <p> is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for <2+2=4>, without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for <2+2=4>. (shrink)

Why study notations, diagrams, or more broadly the variety of nonverbal “representations” or “signs” that are used in mathematical practice? This chapter maps out recent work on the topic by distinguishing three main philosophical motivations for doing so. First, some work (like that on diagrammatic reasoning) studies signs to recover norms of informal or historical mathematical practices that would get lost if the particular signs that these practices rely on were translated away; work in this vein has the potential to (...) broaden our view of the specific normativity of mathematics beyond logical proof. Second, some work focuses on signs to highlight the open-ended and “nonrigorous” aspects of mathematical practice, and the role of these aspects in the historical development of mathematics. The third motivation is based on the following observation: the reason differences in signs matter in mathematics is that humans are finite agents, with cognitive and computational limitations. Accordingly, studying signs can be a way to study how human computational constraints shape the mathematics that we do, and to tackle the topic of mathematical understanding. (shrink)