Johannes von Kries’s Spielraum-theory is regarded as one of the most important philosophical contributions of the nineteenth century to an objective interpretation of probability. This paper aims at a critical and contextual analysis of von Kries’s approach: It is contextual insofar as it reconstructs the Spielraum-theory in the historical setting that formed his scientific and philosophical outlook. It is critical insofar as it unfolds systematic tensions and inconsistencies which are rooted in this context, especially in the grave change of mechanism (...) which took place in the late nineteenth century. In this regard, the paper focuses on von Kries’s understanding of natural laws and nomological knowledge in relation to his concept of objective probability. While the formal approach of the Spielraum-theory—as far as developed by von Kries—seems sound, his epistemological claims with respect to nomological knowledge sustain classical mechanism and are hence difficult to substantiate from the point of view of modern science. (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) was the most prolific German philosopher of science in the nineteenth century who strived to synthesize Kant’s philosophical foundation of science and mathematics and the needs or practised science and mathematics in order to gain more comprehensive conceptual frameworks and greater methodological flexibility for those two disciplines. His original contributions anticipated later developments, to some extent, though they received comparatively little notice in the later course of the nineteenth century—a fate which partly can be explained by (...) the unfortunate development of the so-called ‘First Friesian School,’ founded by E. F. Apelt, M. J. Schleiden and O. X. Schlömilch. This situation changed temporarily when Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) arrived on the philosophical stage and founded a second, so-called, ‘New Friesian School’ in 1903. In the following two decades, Fries’ specific transformation of Kantian philosophy gained influence within the vigorous discussions about ‘new’ foundations of mathematics and, thus, also played a role within the Berlin Group surrounding Hans Reichenbach, though his work had no direct impact on the philosophy of physics being expounded therein. -/- This essay will first outline some characteristics of Fries’ development of the Kantian approach. Then it will point out the limited impact of the ‘New Friesian School’ on the Berlin Group, while highlighting some missed chances for fruitful exchange. As the originality of this school and its importance for the development of logic and philosophy of mathematics—by and large merits of its early members Walter Dubislav and Kurt Grelling —is dealt with in separate chapters of this volume, and elsewhere, this article will focus on what Fries called the ‘mathematical philosophy of nature’ (i. e. the philosophical foundations of physics). More specifically, it will show how the New Friesian School reacted to Einstein’s theories of relativity, in a way that contrasts with the approach of the Berlin Group. This discussion about relativity will also be used to reveal different understandings of the nature of ‘scientific philosophy’ in general, as well as different models of how philosophy and the empirical sciences should interact. (shrink)

Aus dem vielfältigen Werk von Hermann von Helmholtz versammelt diese Ausgabe die im engeren Sinne philosophischen Abhandlungen, vor allem zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Erkenntnistheorie, sowie Vorträge und Reden, bei denen der Autor seine Ausnahmestellung im Wissenschaftsbetrieb nutzte, um die Wissenschaften und ihre Institutionen in der bestehenden Form zu repräsentieren und zu begründen. Ein Philosoph wollte Helmholtz nicht sein, aber er legte der philosophischen Reflexion wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und wissenschaftlichen Handelns große Bedeutung bei. Vor allem bezog er, in der Regel ausgehend von seinen (...) fachwissenschaftlichen Forschungen, in den verschiedensten Kontexten zu erkenntnistheoretischen und methodologischen Problemen der Wissenschaften Stellung. Bereits »Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft« (1847) lässt erkennen, wie verwoben naturwissenschaftliche Grundlagenforschung und philosophische Grundlagenreflexion in seinem Werk sind. Die aus den frühen sinnesphysiologischen Forschungen hervorgegangene empiristische Wahrnehmungslehre trug ihm den Ruf ein, ein maßgeblicher Vertreter des Neukantianismus zu sein. Spätere Arbeiten v.a. zur Geometrie und Arithmetik – das zeigt die vorliegende Ausgabe – stellen jedoch eine radikale Absage an den konstitutiven Kern des Kantianismus (nämlich die Existenz synthetischer Urteile a priori) dar. Helmholtz’ philosophische Beiträge sind bisher in ihrer Vollständigkeit nicht annähernd so gut zugänglich wie sein naturwissenschaftliches Werk. Die Ausgabe enthält außerdem bibliographische Vorberichte zur Einordnung, detaillierte Namens- und Sachregister sowie mit 575 Einträgen für den Zeitraum zwischen 1842 und 2012 die erste umfassende Bibliographie von Helmholtz verfasster Werke überhaupt. »Ich glaube, dass der Philosophie nur wieder aufzuhelfen ist, wenn sie sich mit Ernst und Eifer der Untersuchung der Erkenntnissprocesse und der wissenschaftlichen Methode zuwendet. Da hat sie eine wirkliche und berechtigte Aufgabe.« Helmholtz in einem Brief um 1875. (shrink)

In the history of mathematics and natural philosophy Jacobi's contribution to theoretical mechanics is known as a part of the higher calculus in the tradition of Lagrange: accepted as mathematically important, it was denied to have any substantial physical or philosophical relevance. His last lectures on analytical mechanics, given in 1847–1848, three years before his death, and not yet published, show this view to be no longer tenable. These lectures are the most detailed and genuine source on Jacobi's views concerning (...) the foundations of mechanics. In particular, his criticism of the principles of mechanics is unprecedented for its time and anticipates some of Poincaré's views, published about fifty years later. The prehistory of Jacobi's Analytical Mechanics, a description of its content in general and an outline of his criticism, are presented in this paper. (shrink)

Discours prononcé par Helmholtz en 1862 pour la prise de fonction de prorecteur à l’université de Heidelberg. Le texte original de référence est : Hermann von Helmholtz, « Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesammtheit der Wissenschaft » (1862), in _Philosophische und populärwissenschaftliche Schriften_, 3 vol., Michael Heidelberger, Helmut Pulte und Gregor Schiemann (éds.), Hamburg : Felix Meiner Verlag, 2017, vol. 1, p. 181–207. Nous indiquons entre crochets dans la marge la pagination allemande de cette édition (NdT).

The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...) a global alternative. Hummell and Opp's research programme for the reduction of sociology to psychology is used as a starting?point and taken as the primary object of criticism. Following the introductory Section I, Section II analyses the three crucial notions of Hummell and Opp's research programme ? their explications of the notions of ?sociology?, ?psychology? and the concept of reduction itself ? and criticizes the authors? deficient ?logic of reduction?. Although the ?local? shortcomings of our authors? ?logic of reduction? do not affect reductionism as such, i.e. logically sound versions of reductionism as devised by Kemeny, Nagel, Oppenheim, Putnam, Woodger et al., it is argued that the logical soundness of sophisticated reductionism cannot compensate for its additional epistemological and methodological deficiencies. Section III analyses the ?dynamic? interpretation of reductionism as a particular developmental pattern of scientific growth. It is argued that even reductionism at its best can produce only cumulative progress, thus ?a priori? excluding scientific revolutions which are inevitably counter?inductive as well as counter?reductive. Section IV discusses the philosophical background of modern reductionism, and examines the effects both of reductionism and of anti?reductionistic pluralism on the autonomy of scientific fields. It is argued that pluralistic anti?reductionism undermines spurious claims for autonomy much more effectively than reductionism. As a ?local? improvement of the reductionistic research programme, the replacement of the predominant one?way reductionism by a less restrictive many?way reductionism is proposed. It is argued that the appropriate treatment for an allegedly backward science (say sociology) is not its reduction to an allegedly more advanced science (say psychology) but its non?reductive replacement by new theories (of the same or of another field) that do not incorporate the older ones. As a ?global? alternative to the reduction of sociology to psychology, the frontier?crossing direct application of psychological theories to sociological phenomena is proposed. A plea is made for a pluralistic science without reduction, based on intra? and interscientific criticism as the proper method for the advancement of knowledge. (shrink)

As Classical Propositional Logic finds its algebraic counterpart in Boolean algebras, the logic of Quantum Mechanics, as outlined within G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann’s approach to Quantum Theory (Birkhoff and von Neumann in Ann Math 37:823–843, 1936) [see also (Husimi in I Proc Phys-Math Soc Japan 19:766–789, 1937)] finds its algebraic alter ego in orthomodular lattices. However, this logic does not incorporate time dimension although it is apparent that the propositions occurring in the logic of Quantum Mechanics are depending (...) on time. The aim of the present paper is to show that tense operators can be introduced in every logic based on a complete lattice, in particular in the logic of quantum mechanics based on a complete orthomodular lattice. If the time set is given together with a preference relation, we introduce tense operators in a purely algebraic way. We derive several important properties of such operators, in particular we show that they form dynamic pairs and, altogether, a dynamic algebra. We investigate connections of these operators with logical connectives conjunction and implication derived from Sasaki projections in an orthomodular lattice. Then we solve the converse problem, namely to find for given time set and given tense operators a time preference relation in order that the resulting time frame induces the given operators. We show that the given operators can be obtained as restrictions of operators induced by a suitable extended time frame. (shrink)

Translations of Karl Jaspers' work into the English language have so far not been uniform in their choice of technical terminology. This scholarly renditionof Jaspers' ´Introduction´ to his seminal work "The Great Philosophers" stays to theoriginal German text as true possible by upholding its idiomatic cultural expressions, complex sentence structure, and nuanced particularities provided that clarity of communication can be maintained. The substantive contents and the significance of this text, whose principal topic is greatness, are outlined here. Communication with the (...) great philosophers can bring insight into their thought and can enable humans to transcend toward possible authentic Existenz. (shrink)

Due to the exponential growth of science and, recently, the explosive expansion of the extrascientific information of computerized 'Data' of all sorts, a New Cognitive Order of Society comes into existence. The invalidation of the 'Old Order' with its classical conditions for the production, processing, application and fairly equal social distribution of knowledge is a result of technological developments, especially of the rise of Information Technology. What may be called the Cognitive-Technological Complex is rapidly developing. This causes a fundamental change (...) of the situation of knowledge in the Information Society so-called. It confronts philosophy with the task, 'to climb up' the growing information mountains and to analyse its contents and structures, i.e., old and new sorts of knowledge in huge quantities and mixtures, with different rationality-structures, etc. This cannot be done without new theories of knowledge and rationality. What is practically needed, involves a new philosopher's comprehensive competence for handling the whole information stuff, ranging from classical theory-knowledge to modern data-knowledge. Technical competence for computers is not enough. Thus, information technology opens philosophy and philosophers an unexpected, perhaps undeserved chance to keep pace with the most progressive cognitive and technological developments. To take advantage of the new situation of knowledge and to explore the constitutive conditions of the New Cognitive Order is the first task of contemporary philosophy, in close cooperation with all cognitive sciences. (shrink)

A Kleene lattice is a distributive lattice equipped with an antitone involution and satisfying the so-called normality condition. These lattices were introduced by J. A. Kalman. We extended this concept also for posets with an antitone involution. In our recent paper (Chajda, Länger and Paseka, in: Proceeding of 2022 IEEE 52th International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic, Springer, 2022), we showed how to construct such Kleene lattices or Kleene posets from a given distributive lattice or poset and a fixed element of (...) this lattice or poset by using the so-called twist product construction, respectively. We extend this construction of Kleene lattices and Kleene posets by considering a fixed subset instead of a fixed element. Moreover, we show that in some cases, this generating poset can be embedded into the resulting Kleene poset. We investigate the question when a Kleene poset can be represented by a Kleene poset obtained by the mentioned construction. We show that a direct product of representable Kleene posets is again representable and hence a direct product of finite chains is representable. This does not hold in general for subdirect products, but we show some examples where it holds. We present large classes of representable and non-representable Kleene posets. Finally, we investigate two kinds of extensions of a distributive poset $${\textbf{A}}$$ A, namely its Dedekind-MacNeille completion $${{\,\mathrm{\textbf{DM}}\,}}({\textbf{A}})$$ DM ( A ) and a completion $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) which coincides with $${{\,\mathrm{\textbf{DM}}\,}}({\textbf{A}})$$ DM ( A ) provided $${\textbf{A}}$$ A is finite. In particular we prove that if $${\textbf{A}}$$ A is a Kleene poset then its extension $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) is also a Kleene lattice. If the subset X of principal order ideals of $${\textbf{A}}$$ A is involution-closed and doubly dense in $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) then it generates $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) and it is isomorphic to $${\textbf{A}}$$ A itself. (shrink)

It is well-known that intuitionistic logics can be formalized by means of Heyting algebras, i.e. relatively pseudocomplemented semilattices. Within such algebras the logical connectives implication and conjunction are formalized as the relative pseudocomplement and the semilattice operation meet, respectively. If the Heyting algebra has a bottom element |$0$|⁠, then the relative pseudocomplement with respect to |$0$| is called the pseudocomplement and it is considered as the connective negation in this logic. Our idea is to consider an arbitrary meet-semilattice with |$0$| (...) satisfying only the Ascending Chain Condition (these assumptions are trivially satisfied in finite meet-semilattices) and introduce the operators formalizing the connectives negation |$x^{0}$| and implication |$x\rightarrow y$| as the set of all maximal elements |$z$| satisfying |$x\wedge z=0$| and as the set of all maximal elements |$z$| satisfying |$x\wedge z\leq y$|⁠, respectively. Such a negation and implication is ‘unsharp’ since it assigns to one entry |$x$| or to two entries |$x$| and |$y$| belonging to the semilattice, respectively, a subset instead of an element of the semilattice. Surprisingly, this kind of negation and implication still shares a number of properties of these connectives in intuitionistic logic, in particular the derivation rule Modus Ponens. Moreover, unsharp negation and unsharp implication can be characterized by means of five, respectively seven simple axioms. We present several examples. The concepts of a deductive system and of a filter are introduced as well as the congruence determined by such a filter. We finally describe certain relationships between these concepts. (shrink)

Von den Sachen und vom Widerspruch. Der eigene Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften -- Steinzeit. Das Erwachen der Vernunft. Judaismus -- Ockhams Willkürgott in der Schleuse des Widerspruchsprinzips. Miniaturen -- Ockham in der Geschichte. Wissenschaftstheorie und Bewusstsein -- Mythos und Evidenz. Ockhams Rekalzitranz -- Kausalität und Affektbezug. Die Annäherung an Gott -- Die Subtilität in den Materien der Philosophie. Gott, wir und die Welt -- Die Brücke vom Diesseits zum Jenseits, oder, Der Abstand der Neuzeit zum Mittelalter -- Der Sinn bei Begriffen (...) und Schlüssen. Der Scharfsinnige und der mehr als Scharfsinnige -- Satz und Satzgefüge. Der Beweis ohne Gegenständlichkeit -- Am Torweg. Der nicht unabänderliche Wille Gottes. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis der Begriffe bei Ockham -- Suppositionslogische Identität und Kontingenz -- Zum Verhältnis der Satzformen -- Fides et scientia -- Aus dem innern Gottes -- Theologie und Logikbegriff -- Formbegriff und reale Wahrheit -- Glaube und Welt. Im Vorhof der Naturphilosophie -- Ontologie und Induktion -- Beweis, Satz, Akt -- Abstraktion und scholastischer Beweiszweck -- Verflechtung und Abgrenzung der Akte -- Naturgrund und Realerkenntnis -- Widerspruch und Accidens.

Als in der spätscholastischen Epoche der philosophische Ausdruck sich von der streng theologischen und religiösen Exegese entfernt und einer genuin humanen Selbstvertretung annähert, ist Ockham am ehesten und im Grunde allein erfolgreich in der Formulierung eines rationalen Formativs, worin der Mensch zur Gegenstellung gegen die göttliche Person, ihre Intellektion und Willenshaltung und die offenbarte Wahrheit gelangt. Er erweist sich als brillant und virtuos in der Handhabung von Induktion, persuasio und Reprobation, d.h. im Prinzip: der Widerlegung fremder Meinungen. Er ist weniger (...) erfolgreich bei der direkten Fixierung der Fehlgriffe anderer Scholastiker, wenn sie methodisch nicht ausgewiesenen Lösungen zuneigen, worin jede Problematik unterlaufen wird. Ockham hat da, ausser bei Duns Scotus, auch keine aristotelische Expertise mehr zur Verfügung. Das verweist darauf, dass neuzeitliche wissenschaftliche Antworten gefordert waren, die mit der scholastischen Einstellung nichts mehr gemein hatten. Das war in der mittelalterlichen Epoche aber nicht verhandelbar. Ebenso konnten Ockhams Abgrenzungsversuche nicht verstanden werden. Schon die Bestrebungen, Scholastiker umstandslos vor kirchliche Strafgerichte zu ziehen, offenbaren die Erschöpfung des Zeitalters"-- Back cover. (shrink)