Zeugnisse eines engagierten und um Freundschaft werbenden Philosophen Der Philosoph und judische Denker Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) zeigt sich in den Briefen an seinen schweizerischen Schuler und spateren Professor am Zurcher Polytechnikum, August Stadler (1850-1910), als impulsiver, mitteilsamer, Vertrauen schenkender und um Freundschaft werbender Philosoph. Seine zahlreichen Bemerkungen zu systematischen Problemen, zur damaligen Wissenschaftslandschaft und zur allgemeinen politischen Lage sind eine unschatzbare Quelle fur das intellektuelle Profil jener Zeit und besonders fur die Begegnung mit den Personlichkeiten Cohens und Stadlers. Der (...) Schwerpunkt der Ausgabe liegt auf den in Zurich aufbewahrten Schriftstucken von 1872 bis 1881. Kurz vor Beginn der Korrespondenz hatte Cohen in Berlin einen Kreis von Studenten um sich versammelt, dem sich auch August Stadler anschloss. Die personliche Nahe zwischen beiden war sofort gross und blieb trotz mancher Meinungsverschiedenheiten ungetrubt. Neuneinhalb Jahre spater, im letzten Brief dieser Reihe, erscheint erstmals der Name des neuen Marburger Privatdozenten Paul Natorp. Damit beginnt die Geschichte der sogenannten Marburger Schule. Der vorliegende Band beinhaltet somit den Ruckblick auf die Vorgeschichte dieser einflussreichen, stilbildenden Denkrichtung im wilhelminischen Deutschland. Inhaltlich nicht weniger interessant sind die spateren, nicht dem Zurcher Corpus angehorigen Briefe aus den Jahren zwischen 1886 und 1905. In ihnen aussert sich Cohen zu seinen Begegnungen mit Gottfried Keller in Zurich, zu dessen Tod und zuletzt zur Sorge um Stadlers Gesundheit. Im Anhang findet sich eine Liste samtlicher Lehrveranstaltungen Cohens in Marburg und an der Berliner Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft des Judentums. Ein detailliertes Namen- und Sachregister bildet den Abschluss. (shrink)

Von der Sinneserfassung.--Von der Sinnesverwirklichung: Grundsätzliches. Einführung in die Schule der Weisheit.--Anhang. Die Schule der Weisheit in Darmstadt.

This is the first volume of a magnum opus in four volumes dedicated to the “evolutionary theory of knowledge.” Just a glance for comparison with some standard books on this subject, is sufficient, however, to point out the peculiarity of the approach chosen by Schüling. This is not a book on biology and physics, nor on models and hierarchies, nor does it deal with retentions, selections, or reductions. It is first of all a book on the anthropological settings conditioning the (...) process of human cognition. The title’s mention of a “system of human knowing,” does not, and this is important, imply a system of human cognition. Schüling maintains the distinction between knowing as an actus exercitus and cognition as an actus signatus, or as Heidegger says, between the “process of thought” and the “content of thought”. Within a judgment, Heidegger acknowledges, one has to distinguish between “the judgment as a real psychical procedure and what is judged as an ideal content”. (shrink)

Der Band versammelt einen Großteil der Beiträge, die internationale Experten anlässlich der Tagung „Philosophie und Wissenschaft bei Hermann Cohen“ im November 2014 am Institut Wiener Kreis der Universität Wien präsentiert haben. Mit der Tagung zu Hermann Cohen, der zusammen mit Paul Natorp die Marburger Schule begründete, wurden zwei Ziele verfolgt: erstens die Aspekte in der Philosophie des Kantianers Cohen herauszuarbeiten, die an die Idee einer Einheitswissenschaft anknüpfen und zweitens Divergenzen und Übereinstimmungen Cohens mit der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, der Programmatik (...) des Wiener Kreises um Rudolf Carnap und Moritz Schlick zu identifizieren. Der Tagungsband ist in drei Teile gegliedert. Die Aufsätze im ersten Teil beschäftigen sich mit der Bedeutung von Erfahrung und Empirismus für das Philosophieverständnis Hermann Cohens. Im zweiten Teil gehen die Autoren der Frage nach, welche Rolle Theorien aus den Bereichen Mathematik, Naturwissenscha ften und Psychologie für Cohens Denken gespielt haben – unter anderem Hermann von Helmholtz‘ Theorie des Messens und die Bedeutung der Infinitesimalrechnung für die Philosophie der Marburger Schule. Die Beiträge im dritten Teil des Bandes stellen die Philosophie Cohens und der Marburger Schule den Vertretern des Wiener Kreises und der Berliner Gruppe um Hans Reichenbach gegenüber. Dabei wird Reichenbachs Rezeption der Relativitätstheorie in den Kontext einer Relativierung Kants bei Cohen und Ernst Cassirer gestellt und „versteckte Verwandtschaften“ zwischen Cohen und dem Logischen Empirismus aufgedeckt. Der Band richtet sich an Wissenschaftler auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Philosophie. (shrink)

Analyzes the philosophical ideas of two famous neo-Kantian philosophers, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, who worked together in the Marburger Schule research institute from 1880 to 1912. In volume 1, mentions differences of opinion between them, partly due to Cohen's Jewishness, noting that Cohen resented the prevalence of antisemitism and discrimination. Cohen felt that Natorp's opposition to his ideas was motivated by antisemitism. The second volume is a collection of documents and correspondence between the two and others, where antisemitism (...) is frequently mentioned (see the index). (shrink)

Hermann Cohen, der Begründer der Marburger Schule des Neukantianismus, hat einen bis dato unterirdischen Einfluss auf den Logischen Empirismus ausgeübt. Seine Konzeption der transzendentalen Methode sowie seine scharfe Polemik gegen den Psychologismus wurden insbesondere von Rudolf Carnap und Hans Reichenbach zum Teil angenommen, aber zugleich auch umgewandelt. Reichenbach’s Analyse der Wissenschaft und Carnaps logische Analyse wissenschaftlicher Sätze sind mit Cohens Ansatz in dem Sinne noch verbunden, dass die Kritik der Vernunft Kantischer Prägung durch die Eruierung der begrifflichen Struktur wissenschaftlicher (...) Theorien ersetzt wird. Trotz offensichtlicher Differenzen handelt es sich doch um einen Zusammenhang, auf den die Forschung weiter einzugehen hat. (shrink)

Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg war einer der akademischen Lehrer Hermann Cohens und die Debatte zwischen Trendelenburg und Kuno Fischer über die Interpretation der transzendentalen Ästhetik gilt gemeinhin als Anlass für Cohens Kantstudien und seine Abwendung von der Völkerpsychologie und damit als Geburtsstunde des Marburger Neukantianismus. Über die nähere persönliche Beziehung Cohens zu Trendelenburg ist allerdings wenig bekannt und auch die Frage, ob und inwiefern Cohen als „Schüler“ Trendelenburgs bezeichnet werden kann ist nicht eindeutig zu beantworten, zumindest scheint Cohens Verhältnis zu (...) Trendelenburg eher distanziert gewesen zu sein und es ist nicht klar, ob nicht Cohens Trendelenburg gegenüber teilweise auch kritische Haltung in seiner Stellungnahme zur Kontroverse zwischen Trendelenburg und Fischer auch zum Scheitern seiner Habilitationsversuche in Berlin beigetragen hat. Andererseits wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass sich Cohen durch die von Trendelenburg aufgeworfene Frage, ob Kant die ausschließliche Subjektivität von Raum und Zeit bewiesen habe, vor das für seine Philosophie und Kantkritik zentrale Problem einer nicht bloß „subjektiven“ Begründung des Idealismus gestellt sah und diesbezüglich (in Abgrenzung von Kuno Fischer und Friedrich Albert Lange) im wesentlichen Trendelenburgs Absicht, „das Ideale im Realen zu befestigen“, weiterverfolgte (Klaus Christian Köhnke). Kurt Walter Zeidler hat diese These vor kurzem insofern zugespitzt, als er zu dem Schluss kommt, dass Cohen „seine eigene systematische Position – und damit die Grunddoktrin der Marburger Schule – an dem Leitfaden einer Kantinterpretation entwickelt, die Trendelenburgs latenten Platonismus, seine Lehre von der ursprünglichen Tätigkeit und konstruktiven Bewegung sowie den wissenschaftstheoretischen Ansatz seiner Logischen Untersuchungen gleichsam als Hebel einsetzt, um Kants Lehre von allen Anmutungen eines empirischen oder subjektiven Idealismus zu befreien.“ Diese These wird mit Blick auf Cohens frühe Kant- und Platon-Interpretation überprüft und der historische und biographische Kontext von Cohens Berliner Studienzeit skizziert. (shrink)

Carnaps Denken wurde während seines Studiums und der Arbeit an seiner Dissertation von Neukatianischen Motiven beeinflusst, von denen er sich nach seiner Habilitation in Wien (1926) zunehmend distanzierte. Er besuchte in Freiburg bei Heinrich Rickert (1911/1912) und in Jena (1913/14) bei Bruno Bauch Lehrveranstaltungen zur Philosophie. Außerdem besuchte er in Freiburg bei Jonas Cohn Lehrveranstaltungen zur experimentellen Psychologie. Bei Bauch reichte er 1920 eine Arbeit mit dem Titel Welche philosophische Bedeutung hat das Problem der „Grundlegung der Geometrie“ für die Lehramtsprüfung (...) und 1921 seine darauf aufbauende Dissertation Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre ein. Rickert war das Haupt der von Wilhelm Windelband begründeten Südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus, zu der auch Cohn und Bauch gezählt werden. Bauch war jedoch auch von der von Hermann Cohen begründeten Marburger Schule des Neukantianismus, deren herausragenste Vertreter Paul Natorp und Ernst Cassirer sind, beeinflusst. Vor allem Natorps Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften (1910a) und Cassirers Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910) beeinflussten Carnaps Verständnis der methodischen Grundlagen der Mathematik und der Physik (Richardson 1998, 115-117, 138-139; Mormann 2000, 44-46). In persönlichem Kontakt war Carnap seit seinem Umzug nach Buchenbach Anfang der 1920er Jahre auch mit dem Rickert-Schüler Broder Christiansen. (shrink)

The founders of the Marburger Schule of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, laid an emphasis upon a Platonic understanding of mathematics and logic as the paradigmatic epistemological basis of philosophy. Their successors, namely Ernst Cassirer and Nicolai Hartmann, made obvious, however, that new biological thinking can have a strong influence on ontology as well as on the theory of knowledge. They could show that biology was no longer to be treated as a metaphysical system in that pejorative meaning (...) of metaphysics which Kant had so severely been opposing. Against the anti-realistic approach of the older neo-Kantians who wanted to eliminate Kant's thing-in-itself (Ding an sich), both Cassirer and Hartmann returned to a form of realism by way of Hegel's philosophical results and reflections on his method. This makes clear that their realism is still to be taken as a more of less monistic idealism. However, considering that modern biology as an antimetaphysical force became influential in their system for the first time and that it did so in two different but - on second thoughts - complementary ways, it becomes clear that it was necessary to change the paradigms of any neo-Kantian philosophy. Cassirer proved this by his development as a philosopher with a strong historical impetus while Hartmann as a more systematical philosopher only pointed in that direction. (shrink)

ver since the traditional criteria for medical decision-making capacity (understanding, appreciation, reasoning, evidencing a choice) were formulated, they have been criticized for not taking sufficient account of emotions or values that seem, according to the critics and in line with clinical experiences, essential to decision-making capacity. The aim of this paper is to provide a nuanced and structured overview of the arguments provided in the literature emphasizing the importance of these factors and arguing for their inclusion in competence evaluations. Moreover, (...) a broader reflection on the findings of the literature is provided. Specific difficulties of formulating and measuring emotional and valuational factors are discussed inviting reflection on the possibility of handling relevant factors in a more flexible, case-specific, and context-specific way rather than adhering to a rigid set of operationalized criteria. (shrink)

The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published (...) in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society. (shrink)

Als ich meine Schrift "Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie" veröffentlichte, fanden sich viele Kritiker, die mir in den Schlußfolgerungen, die ich aus der Entwicklung der neuen Physik gezogen hatte, zwar zustimmten, die aber an diese Zustimmung die Frage knüpften, ob ich, als "Neu-Kantianer", derartige Folgerungen hätte ziehen dürfen. Die vorliegende Schrift ["Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik"] wird vielleicht in noch weit höherem Grade solchen Fragen und Zweifeln ausgesetzt sein. Aber ich glaube, daß derartige Einwände das Wesen und die historische Tendenz (...) des "Neukantianismus", wie er von den Begründern der "Marburger Schule", von Hermann Cohen und Paul Natorp verstanden worden ist, verkennen. Natorp hat in einem Aufsatz "Kant und die Marburger Schule" ausdrücklich erklärt, daß es niemals die Meinung der "Marburger Schule" gewesen sei, an den Lehrsätzen Kants unbedingt festhalten zu sollen oder zu wollen. "Die Rede von einem orthodoxen Kantianismus"- so betont er - "war niemals begründet; sie hat mit der Weiterentwicklung der Schule auch jeden fernsten Schein von Berechtigung verloren" [Auszug aus dem Buch]. (shrink)

First published in 1749, Hartley's great work was abridged by Priestley in 1775 and reissued as a whole by Joseph Johnson in 1791. To Priestley, who founded his Unitarianism on the Observations, it seemed that Hartley was the greatest of human beings with the single exception of Jesus. Coleridge adopted his associationist theology in the mid 1790s, naming his eldest son David Hartley Coleridge, and passing on to Wordsworth the theory of mind that underlies 'Tintern Abbey', the early Prelude and (...) the 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads. An indispensable book. (shrink)

Recent advances in neuroscience lead to a wider realm for philosophy to include the science of the Darwinian-evolved computational brain, our inner world producing organ, a non-recursive super- Turing machine combining 100B synapsing-neuron DNA-computers based on the genetic code. The whole system is a logos machine offering a world map for global context, essential for our intentional grasp of opportunities. We start from the observable contrast between the chaotic universe vs. our orderly inner world, the noumenal cosmos. So far, philosophy (...) has been rehearsing our thoughts, our human-internal world, a grand painting of the outer world, how we comprehend subjectively our experience, worked up by the logos machine, but now we seek a wider horizon, how humans understand the world thanks to Darwinian evolution to adapt in response to the metaphysical gap, the chasm between the human animal and its environment, shaping the organism so it can deal with its variable world. This new horizon embraces global context coded in neural structures that support the noumenal cosmos, our inner mental world, for us as denizens of the outer environment. Kant’s inner and outer senses are fundamental ingredients of scientific philosophy. Several sections devoted to Heidegger, his lizard debunked, but his version of the metaphysical gap & his doctrine of the logos praised. Rorty and others of the behaviorist school discussed also. (shrink)

Was bringt einen Menschen dazu, sich auf das einzulassen, was man "Glauben" nennt, sein Leben also auf anderes zu setzen als auf das, dessen man sich verfügend sicher sein kann? Hermann Pius Siller macht deutlich: In der Theologie ist die Beachtung der eigenen Lebenserfahrung und der Lebenserfahrung des Gesprächspartners unverzichtbar. Für das, was das Wort "Gott" benennen soll, muss eine bestimmte Erfahrung beschrieben werden können. Mit "Gewissen", "Geheimnis" und "reine Gabe" benennt er dabei exemplarisch drei elementare Zugänge zu "letzten (...) Erfahrungen", wie sie im Leben von John Henry Newman, Karl Rahner und Paulus von Tarsus gemacht, gelebt und theologisch durchdacht wurden. Vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen Gottes- und Kirchenkrise, also der fehlenden Glaubwürdigkeit kirchlicher Rede von Gott in der Gesellschaft, leistet er damit einen wichtigen Beitrag verantworteter, die lebensgeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen berücksichtigender Gottesrede. (shrink)

Hierocles of Alexandria was a Neoplatonic philosopher of the fifth century AD. Hermann S. Schibli surveys his life, writings, and pagan and Christian surroundings, and succintly examines the major points of his philosophy, both contemplative and practical. He includes the first modern English translations, with helpful notes, of Hierocles' Commentary on the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans and of the remnants of his treatise On Providence.

Leucippo -- Democrito -- Nessa -- Metrodoro di Chio -- Diogene di Smirne -- Anassarco -- Ecateo di Abdera -- Apollodoro -- Nausifane -- Diotimo -- Bione di Abdera -- Bolo.

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): A Philosophy of the Exact Sciences -/- Shortened version of the article of the same name in: Tabula Rasa. Jenenser magazine for critical thinking. 6th of November 1994 edition -/- 1. Biography -/- Jakob Friedrich Fries was born on the 23rd of August, 1773 in Barby on the Elbe. Because Fries' father had little time, on account of his journeying, he gave up both his sons, of whom Jakob Friedrich was the elder, to the Herrnhut Teaching (...) Institution in Niesky in 1778. Fries attended the theological seminar in Niesky in autumn 1792, which lasted for three years. There he (secretly) began to study Kant. The reading of Kant's works led Fries, for the first time, to a deep philosophical satisfaction. His enthusiasm for Kant is to be understood against the background that a considerable measure of Kant's philosophy is based on a firm foundation of what happens in an analogous and similar manner in mathematics. -/- During this period he also read Heinrich Jacobi's novels, as well as works of the awakening classic German literature; in particular Friedrich Schiller's works. In 1795, Fries arrived at Leipzig University to study law. During his time in Leipzig he became acquainted with Fichte's philosophy. In autumn of the same year he moved to Jena to hear Fichte at first hand, but was soon disappointed. -/- During his first sojourn in Jenaer (1796), Fries got to know the chemist A. N. Scherer who was very influenced by the work of the chemist A. L. Lavoisier. Fries discovered, at Scherer's suggestion, the law of stoichiometric composition. Because he felt that his work still need some time before completion, he withdrew as a private tutor to Zofingen (in Switzerland). There Fries worked on his main critical work, and studied Newton's "Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica". He remained a lifelong admirer of Newton, whom he praised as a perfectionist of astronomy. Fries saw the final aim of his mathematical natural philosophy in the union of Newton's Principia with Kant's philosophy. -/- With the aim of qualifying as a lecturer, he returned to Jena in 1800. Now Fries was known from his independent writings, such as "Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling" (1st edition in 1803), and "Systems of Philosophy as an Evident Science" (1804). The relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Fries did not develop favourably. Hegel speaks of "the leader of the superficial army", and at other places he expresses: "he is an extremely narrow-minded bragger". On the other hand, Fries also has an unfavourable take on Hegel. He writes of the "Redundancy of the Hegelistic dialectic" (1828). In his History of Philosophy (1837/40) he writes of Hegel, amongst other things: "Your way of philosophising seems just to give expression to nonsense in the shortest possible way". In this work, Fries appears to argue with Hegel in an objective manner, and expresses a positive attitude to his work. -/- In 1805, Fries was appointed professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. In his time spent in Heidelberg, he married Caroline Erdmann. He also sealed his friendships with W. M. L. de Wette and F. H. Jacobi. Jacobi was amongst the contemporaries who most impressed Fries during this period. In Heidelberg, Fries wrote, amongst other things, his three-volume main work New Critique of Reason (1807). -/- In 1816 Fries returned to Jena. When in 1817 the Wartburg festival took place, Fries was among the guests, and made a small speech. 1819 was the so-called "Great Year" for Fries: His wife Caroline died, and Karl Sand, a member of a student fraternity, and one of Fries' former students stabbed the author August von Kotzebue to death. Fries was punished with a philosophy teaching ban but still received a professorship for physics and mathematics. Only after a period of years, and under restrictions, he was again allowed to read philosophy. From now on, Fries was excluded from political influence. The rest of his life he devoted himself once again to philosophical and natural studies. During this period, he wrote "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" (1822) and the "History of Philosophy" (1837/40). -/- Fries suffered from a stroke on New Year's Day 1843, and a second stroke, on the 10th of August 1843 ended his life. -/- 2. Fries' Work Fries left an extensive body of work. A look at the subject areas he worked on makes us aware of the universality of his thinking. Amongst these subjects are: Psychic anthropology, psychology, pure philosophy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, politics, religious philosophy, aesthetics, natural philosophy, mathematics, physics and medical subjects, to which, e.g., the text "Regarding the optical centre in the eye together with general remarks about the theory of seeing" (1839) bear witness. With popular philosophical writings like the novel "Julius and Evagoras" (1822), or the arabesque "Longing, and a Trip to the Middle of Nowhere" (1820), he tried to make his philosophy accessible to a broader public. Anthropological considerations are shown in the methodical basis of his philosophy, and to this end, he provides the following didactic instruction for the study of his work: "If somebody wishes to study philosophy on the basis of this guide, I would recommend that after studying natural philosophy, a strict study of logic should follow in order to peruse metaphysics and its applied teachings more rapidly, followed by a strict study of criticism, followed once again by a return to an even closer study of metaphysics and its applied teachings." -/- 3. Continuation of Fries' work through the Friesian School -/- Fries' ideas found general acceptance amongst scientists and mathematicians. A large part of the followers of the "Fries School of Thought" had a scientific or mathematical background. Amongst them were biologist Matthias Jakob Schleiden, mathematics and science specialist philosopher Ernst Friedrich Apelt, the zoologist Oscar Schmidt, and the mathematician Oscar Xavier Schlömilch. Between the years 1847 and 1849, the treatises of the "Fries School of Thought", with which the publishers aimed to pursue philosophy according to the model of the natural sciences appeared. In the Kant-Fries philosophy, they saw the realisation of this ideal. The history of the "New Fries School of Thought" began in 1903. It was in this year that the philosopher Leonard Nelson gathered together a small discussion circle in Goettingen. Amongst the founding members of this circle were: A. Rüstow, C. Brinkmann and H. Goesch. In 1904 L. Nelson, A. Rüstow, H. Goesch and the student W. Mecklenburg travelled to Thuringia to find the missing Fries writings. In the same year, G. Hessenberg, K. Kaiser and Nelson published the first pamphlet from their first volume of the "Treatises of the Fries School of Thought, New Edition". -/- The school set out with the aim of searching for the missing Fries' texts, and re-publishing them with a view to re-opening discussion of Fries' brand of philosophy. The members of the circle met regularly for discussions. Additionally, larger conferences took place, mostly during the holidays. Featuring as speakers were: Otto Apelt, Otto Berg, Paul Bernays, G. Fraenkel, K. Grelling, G. Hessenberg, A. Kronfeld, O. Meyerhof, L. Nelson and R. Otto. On the 1st of March 1913, the Jakob-Friedrich-Fries society was founded. Whilst the Fries' school of thought dealt in continuum with the advancement of the Kant-Fries philosophy, the members of the Jakob-Friedrich-Fries society's main task was the dissemination of the Fries' school publications. In May/June, 1914, the organisations took part in their last common conference before the gulf created by the outbreak of the First World War. Several members died during the war. Others returned disabled. The next conference took place in 1919. A second conference followed in 1921. Nevertheless, such intensive work as had been undertaken between 1903 and 1914 was no longer possible. -/- Leonard Nelson died in October 1927. In the 1930's, the 6th and final volume of "Treatises of the Fries School of Thought, New Edition" was published. Franz Oppenheimer, Otto Meyerhof, Minna Specht and Grete Hermann were involved in their publication. -/- 4. About Mathematical Natural Philosophy -/- In 1822, Fries' "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" appeared. Fries rejects the speculative natural philosophy of his time - above all Schelling's natural philosophy. A natural study, founded on speculative philosophy, ceases with its collection, arrangement and order of well-known facts. Only a mathematical natural philosophy can deliver the necessary explanatory reasoning. The basic dictum of his mathematical natural philosophy is: "All natural theories must be definable using purely mathematically determinable reasons of explanation." Fries is of the opinion that science can attain completeness only by the subordination of the empirical facts to the metaphysical categories and mathematical laws. -/- The crux of Fries' natural philosophy is the thought that mathematics must be made fertile for use by the natural sciences. However, pure mathematics displays solely empty abstraction. To be able to apply them to the sensory world, an intermediatory connection is required. Mathematics must be connected to metaphysics. The pure mechanics, consisting of three parts are these: a) A study of geometrical movement, which considers solely the direction of the movement, b) A study of kinematics, which considers velocity in Addition, c) A study of dynamic movement, which also incorporates mass and power, as well as direction and velocity. -/- Of great interest is Fries' natural philosophy in view of its methodology, particularly with regard to the doctrine "leading maxims". Fries calls these "leading maxims" "heuristic", "because they are principal rules for scientific invention". -/- Fries' philosophy found great recognition with Carl Friedrich Gauss, amongst others. Fries asked for Gauss's opinion on his work "An Attempt at a Criticism based on the Principles of the Probability Calculus" (1842). Gauss also provided his opinions on "Mathematical Natural Philosophy" (1822) and on Fries' "History of Philosophy". Gauss acknowledged Fries' philosophy and wrote in a letter to Fries: "I have always had a great predilection for philosophical speculation, and now I am all the more happy to have a reliable teacher in you in the study of the destinies of science, from the most ancient up to the latest times, as I have not always found the desired satisfaction in my own reading of the writings of some of the philosophers. In particular, the writings of several famous (maybe better, so-called famous) philosophers who have appeared since Kant have reminded me of the sieve of a goat-milker, or to use a modern image instead of an old-fashioned one, of Münchhausen's plait, with which he pulled himself from out of the water. These amateurs would not dare make such a confession before their Masters; it would not happen were they were to consider the case upon its merits. I have often regretted not living in your locality, so as to be able to glean much pleasurable entertainment from philosophical verbal discourse." -/- The starting point of the new adoption of Fries was Nelson's article "The critical method and the relation of psychology to philosophy" (1904). Nelson dedicates special attention to Fries' re-interpretation of Kant's deduction concept. Fries awards Kant's criticism the rationale of anthropological idiom, in that he is guided by the idea that one can examine in a psychological way which knowledge we have "a priori", and how this is created, so that we can therefore recognise our own knowledge "a priori" in an empirical way. Fries understands deduction to mean an "awareness residing darkly in us is, and only open to basic metaphysical principles through conscious reflection.". -/- Nelson has pointed to an analogy between Fries' deduction and modern metamathematics. In the same manner, as with the anthropological deduction of the content of the critical investigation into the metaphysical object show, the content of mathematics become, in David Hilbert's view, the object of metamathematics. -/-. (shrink)

Hermann Pfütze und Christoph Menke stellen in dem Podiumsgespräch die Frage nach den widerständigen Potentialen der Kunst. Was ist das Spezifische der Kunst gegenüber anderen sozialen Feldern oder Praxisformen? Was lässt sich unter Ästhetischem Widerstand genau verstehen? Auch wenn die Kunst nicht über Gewaltmittel verfügt, so könnte es doch einen Wettstreit um die Idee der Kunst geben. Ästhetischer Widerstand ist dann der Widerstand einer Kunstform gegen eine andere. Oder ist die ästhetische Erfahrung gerade nicht antagonistisch organisiert? Dann könnte Kunst (...) als eine heilende Praxis erscheinen, die anderen Antagonismen entgegenwirkt und so Angst und Schrecken bannt. Nach Hermann Pfütze weist das Ästhetische eine Nähe zur Demokratie auf, da Kunst wie Demokratie die Unabgeschlossenheit der Welt betonen und von Angst und Schrecken befreien wollen. Dieser an Judith Shklar gewonnene Demokratiebegriff ist für Christoph Menke zu defensiv. Kunst scheint für Menke in unserer Gegenwartsgesellschaft eher der spezifische Ort eines utopischen Potentials zu sein, denn die Kunst kritisiert durch ihren Versuch der Darstellung von Lebendigkeit unbelebte Praxisformen, wie etwa die entfremdete Arbeit. (shrink)

Hierocles of Alexandria was a Neoplatonic philosopher of the fifth century AD. Hermann S. Schibli surveys his life, writings, and pagan and Christian surroundings, and succinctly examines the major points of his philosophy, both contemplative and practical. He includes the first modern English translations, with helpful notes, of Hierocles' Commentary on the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans and of the remnants of his treatise On Providence.

Starting from the current debate on work and recognition, the article describes how shifts within the cultural frames of work, the transformation of hierarchies into internal markets and the development of a service economy lead to problems which can take the form of a 'paradox of recognition'. This paradox cannot be dissolved simply by a conceptual distinction between equal respect for persons and qualifying esteem of performance and efficiency, at least as long as we are interested in a matching of (...) empirical analysis and normative critique. The normative claims for visibility and transparency of work are described as a paradigmatic case for the entanglement of questions of respect and esteem. With respect to recent developments within critical theory, the article argues that the idea of immanent critique needs further elaboration in order to accentuate the relation between normative critique and functional analysis. (shrink)