Este estudo teve como objetivo estimar a Qualidade de Vida (QV) em pacientes com transtorno depressivo maior antes e após tratamento antidepressivo eficaz. Participaram do estudo 26 indivíduos (18 a 65 anos) com episódio agudo de Transtorno Depressivo Maior, segundo critérios do DSM-IV. A duração do..

Female sex steroids can affect the motor system, modulating motor cortex excitability as well as performance in dexterity and coordination tasks. However, it has not yet been explored whether FSS affects the cognitive components of motor behavior. Mu is a sensorimotor rhythm observed by electroencephalography in alpha and beta frequency bands in practices such as motor imagery and action observation. This rhythm represents a window for studying the activity of neural circuits involved in motor cognition. Herein we investigated whether the (...) alpha-mu and beta-mu power in the sensorimotor region and the alpha and beta power over frontal, parietal, and occipital regions are modulated differently in the menstrual, follicular, and luteal phases of menstrual cycles in right-handed dominant women. To do so, these women underwent MI and AO in the three menstrual cycle phases. The spectral activity of the cortical regions for the alpha and beta bands were compared between phases of the menstrual cycle and a correlation analysis was also performed in relation to estrogen and progesterone levels. For the hypothesis-based approach, beta-mu event-related desynchronization was significantly stronger in the C3 channel in the follicular phase than in the menstrual and luteal phases. For the data-driven approach, beta ERD during MI was higher in the follicular phase than in the menstrual and luteal phases in the frontal region. These findings suggest the effect of FSS on executive movement control. No effect of menstrual cycle phases was observed in cortical areas investigated during OA, but alpha and beta bands correlated positively with the follicular phase plasma estradiol level. Thus, the attenuation of alpha and beta bands referring to mirror neuron activities appears to be associated with inhibition of cortical activity when estradiol levels are lower, improving cognitive processing of motor action. (shrink)

Partindo do tratamento da questão sobre a função social do filósofo, constroem-se os aportes teóricos para direcionar alguns apontamentos para uma temática semelhante: a função social do professor de filosofia. Serão propostas quatro funções sociais para o filósofo como aportes para a discussão a respeito do papel social do professor de filosofia. É para chegar a esses aportes que a investigação é dividida em dois momentos. No primeiro a função social do filósofo é discutida com amparo das reflexões de Franklin (...) Leopoldo e Silva. Serão extraídas quatro funções sociais do filósofo. No segundo momento é discutida a relação entre filosofia e educação. As quatro funções sociais do filósofo serão aplicadas no contexto da atividade do professor de filosofia. O artigo se encerra com as Considerações Finais. (shrink)

Eric Weil, Karl Jaspers e Martin Heidegger são três filósofos alemães, um deles, judeu: Weil apresenta na categoria do finito uma possibilidade entre os discursos filosóficos que compreende Heidegger e Jaspers. O presente artigo propõe uma compreensão parcial de Jaspers e Heidegger por meio da categoria do finito weiliana e da retomada operada por essa possibilidade do discurso – a finitude – da categoria da obra, cuja fenomenologia é o nazismo. Para esse objetivo, dividiu-se o artigo em três seções, seguidas (...) de uma introdução. Na Introdução apresentamos a relação entre os três pensadores dada por meio de dois textos de Weil. Também elencamos os motivos da escolha das obras de Heidegger e Jaspers que serão discutidas. A primeira seção do artigo contém uma apresentação dos conceitos weilianos que são a base para as seções seguintes. Na segunda seção, esses conceitos são cotejados com o pensamento heideggeriano. Na terceira seção, aplicamos o mesmo método ao pensar de Jaspers, mostrando as limitações que o pensamento de Heidegger encontra no plano político. Encerramos com um pequeno balanço da discussão. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Eric Weil’s Logic of Philosophy, the work appears as a rupture with the absolute, an attitude of pure violence, whose opposition is realized by acting, therefore, it is mute. And yet, this attitude has a language. This paper seeks to understand how this contradiction is possible, characterizing the language that the work makes use of. To this end, we have divided this paper into three sections. In the first section, we present the distinction between language and discourse as (...) understood by Weil. Thus arises the resource through which the loan of a discourse to violence is understood, which allows access to its language. In the second section we propose a division of the language of the work into three levels: phenomenon, formality and form. In this section we also discuss an example of the formality with the condition category. In the last section, we propose six features that constitute the third level of the language of the work: myth, metaphor, feeling, usefulness, proposition and imperative. The paper concludes with a review of the aspects worked in the light of the lie and with the proposal of an imperative that is opposed to the imperative of the work, therefore, to its language. (shrink)

Uma apresentação da categoria weiliana da obra Resumo: No presente artigo propomos uma apresentação da categoria weiliana da obra, a categoria da violência pura. Para tanto, dividimos o artigo em três seções. Na primeira, descrevemos a atitude e a categoria da obra. Trata-se da categoria weiliana da rejeição consciente da razão e do indivíduo que vive a sua atitude. Na segunda, mostramos como se dá a compreensão da obra pela filosofia weiliana. Essa compreensão só é possível emprestando à obra uma (...) linguagem que ela rejeita, a linguagem filosófica. Na terceira, concluímos com uma descrição do chamado homem da obra, conforme visto na categoria da obra. Utilizamos também a tipologia do líder das multidões desamparadas presente no ensaio Masses et individus historiques. Palavras-chave: Obra; Categoria; Violência; Eric Weil. A presentation of the Weilian category of the work Abstract: In this paper we propose a presentation of the Weilian category of the work, the category of pure violence. To this end, we divided the paper into three sections. In the first, we describe the attitude and the category of the work. It is the Weilian category of conscious rejection of reason and the individual who lives his attitude.In the second, we show how the category of the work is understood by Weilian philosophy. This understanding is only possible by lending the work a language that it rejects, the philosophical language.In the third, we conclude with a description of the so-called man of the work, as seen in the category of the work. In the last section, we also used the typology of the leader of the helpless crowd present in the essay Masses et individus historiques. Keywords: Work; Category; Violence; Eric Weil. Une présentation de la catégorie weilienne de l'œuvre Résumé: Dans cet article, nous proposons une présentation de la catégorie weilienne de l'œuvre, la catégorie de la violence pure. Pour ce faire, nous avons divisé l'article en trois différentes sections. Dans le premier, nous décrivons l'attitude et la catégorie de l'œuvre. C'est la catégorie weilienne du rejet conscient de la raison et de l'individu qui vit cette attitude. Dans la deuxième section, nous montrons comment l'œuvre est comprise par la philosophie weilienne. Cette compréhension n'est possible qu'en prêtant à l'œuvre un langage qu'elle rejette, le langage philosophique. Dans la troisième section, nous concluons par une description du soi-disant homme du travail, vu dans la catégorie travail. Nous avons également utilisé la typologie du chef de la foule désemparées présente dans l'essai Masses et individus historiques. Mots clés: Œuvre ; Catégorie ; Violence ; Eric Weil. Data de registro: 29/04/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

Nosso propósito é utilizar a figura do literato-filósofo cunhada por Margutti para a compreensão do específico da filosofia brasileira, cujo caso-exemplo tomado por nós no presente artigo é Machado de Assis. Para tanto, o trabalho será dividido em três momentos. No primeiro faremos a apresentação de outras formas de expressão filosófica que não a forma tradicional de sistema, estabelecendo assim uma primeira relação entre filosofia e literatura. O segundo consiste na caracterização geral da filosofia brasileira tendo por premissa a apresentação (...) contida no momento inicial. Destacamos três elementos que serão apresentados para caracterizar a filosofia brasileira: o procedimento do caminho inverso, a dependência das características culturais dos povos ibéricos e o uso do paralelo. A partir desses elementos será possível introduzir na discussão a figura do literato-filósofo. Finalizamos então com a discussão se existe ou não uma filosofia em Machado de Assis, consoante com o exposto nas etapas anteriores. Para tanto, sintetizamos duas leituras de Machado como um autor em que não há uma densidade propriamente filosófica, a de Benedito Nunes e a de Miguel Reale, para em seguida contrapormos duas leituras opostas, em que o veio filosófico do Bruxo do Cosme Velho corre mais vigoroso: as de Maia Neto e Margutti. (shrink)

O mal radical em Eric Weil compreende a suspeita a respeito das paixões: encontra-se nelas o motivo da ação? As paixões, entretanto, podem ser domesticadas. É nessa perspectiva que o mal radical se relaciona com a instrução. Para abordar essa relação, nosso estudo desenvolve um tratamento do mal, desafio para a filosofia, que em Weil tem como resposta o conceito de violência. Após situarmos o desafio do mal como violência, é possível entender no que Weil se difencia de Kant ao (...) apresentar o conceito de mal radical. Apresentarmos brevemente a leitura de Weil do mal radical kantiano, para em seguida comparar as semelhanças e diferenças entre ambos. Encerramos apresentando o modo como a instrução pode educar as paixões. (shrink)

A sociedade moderna weiliana se caracteriza entre outras coisas pela sua sua concepção de ciência. Ambas fundadas no princípio do cálculo eficaz, a compreensão de seu funcionamento e de suas limitações caminham juntas. Assim, analisar a sociedade moderna contempla uma discussão da instância que funciona como sua autoconsciência: a concepção de ciência que lhe é própria, as ciências sociais, cuja matriz é a ciência da natureza. Ciência e sociedade moderna são compreendidas no âmbito da categoria weiliana da condição. Aqui não (...) existe apelo a um princípio incondicionado. Desse modo, a questão do sentido não pode ser feita. Não se trata com isso de renunciar às conquistas da ciência moderna. Na visão de Weil, entretanto, deve-se reconhecer que a questão do sentido pode ser feita adequadamente. Isso porque ela deve ser posta pela filosofia. Nosso objetivo no presente trabalho é discutir a relação entre sociedade moderna, ciência moderna e o sentido. Isso porque se existe uma ciência de uma sociedade eficaz também existe uma ciência do sentido: essa é a filosofia. (shrink)

Entendendo a violência como a negação do sentido e da razão, bem como a recusa daquilo que compõe a essência do mundo do homem que vive em uma determinada atitude, nosso objetivo no presente trabalho é analisar esse conceito na Lógica da Filosofia de Eric Weil, que apresenta o conjunto dos discursos filosóficos no seu itinerário na forma de categorias, nos detendo naquelas nas quais a violência aparece na forma de mal. Tenciona-se tratar do mal na sua especificidade conforme ele (...) é apresentado pelo autor nas categorias selecionadas, constituindo assim um panorama segundo as variadas possibilidades discursivas. Levamos em conta para isso tanto a sucessão das várias categorias bem como a relação das mesmas com as suas respectivas atitudes. Finalmente, procuramos entender o mal não como um falso problema, mas como uma dificuldade real que se apresenta para a elaboração de um sentido para o mundo do homem. (shrink)

While this is not the first study of reception histories of Indian and European ideas across East-West boundaries, Thomas J. Green's distinctive contribution is to show–via a microscopic focus on two thinkers whose intellectual trajectories cannot be fully understood within the history of any single nation–how the macroscopic processes of modernity and secularisation in the long nineteenth-century must be seen as transnational phenomena. The argument is centred on the German scholar of comparative religion, Friedrich Max Müller and the Bengali advocate (...) for Hindu socio-religious reform, Swami Vivekananda. Green masterfully brings to light the surprising convergences between these two figures... (shrink)

We shall revisit a debate which has been going on at least since pioneering British Indologists like William Jones first encountered the ‘Brahmanic theology’ we now know as Vedānta, namely, the nature of the relationship—if any—between certain forms of ‘western’ and ‘Indian’ idealisms, and how these metaphysical systems have influenced Christian theology. Specifically, we look at the question of possible thematic and conceptual convergences between Neoplatonism and Advaita Vedānta, and argue that significant parallels can be found in their common conception (...) of the Absolute as Being. Rather than attempt a comprehensive overview of the two systems, we take the divine ‘I AM’ revealed to Moses in Exodus 3.14 as the locus classicus of Christian philosophical interpretations of God as Being itself, and explore how four seminal figures read this passage in light of Neoplatonic and Vedāntic influences. We shall see that similarities and divergences in the readings of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart and Henri Le Saux can be understood in terms of how they negotiate the relation between the One and the many, or between ‘being’ and ‘knowing’. The more these figures allow themselves to be influenced by Neoplatonism and Advaita Vedānta, the more we see any clear ontological distinction between creature and Creator start to break down. This verse, therefore, proves to be an unusually fruitful test case for exploring the relation between the underlying Neoplatonic and Vedāntic metaphysics which structure varying Christian interpretations of it. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a brief analysis of spirituality in the Christian perspective from Luke 10.25-37, emphasizing the existing elective affinities between the notion of spirituality expressed in this narrative and the Ethics of Alterity in Emmanuel Levinas. The method used in this research is the literature review. For methodological reasons, this reflection was developed from the historical-critical exegetical process. The considerations found in this research line up to a prospect that the Other/Next assumes a vital place in the (...) spirituality of the Christian faith. Despite of the existing elective affinities between the Philosophy of Alterity and the Christian spirituality, the relationship between spirituality and ethics is a complex and essential drama for the search field of philosophy of religion. (shrink)

A visão de Hegel como um pensador conservador não é um fenômeno isolado. Para alguns críticos, Hegel é comumente considerado um apologeta do Estado prussiano e um filósofo daquilo que comumente se denomina estatismo. Eric Weil, contudo, não considera essa definição como condizente com uma retratação fiel do filósofo alemão, assemelhando-se mais a uma caricatura. Nesse sentido, Weil defende uma leitura do pensamento político hegeliano que põe em xeque essa visão, fazendo uma crítica da crítica que, tal como Kant é (...) o rigorista moral, ou Platão é o filósofo das Idéias, coloca Hegel como o filósofo do estatismo e para quem o indivíduo é nada e o Estado é tudo. Para determinar até que ponto essa perspectiva possui lastro, Weil advoga em favor de uma análise do pensamento político de Hegel, inquirindo sobre a real dimensão que o Estado possui no seio desse pensamento. É dessa maneira que é possível delimitar até que ponto esse retrato comumente traçado de Hegel corresponde com a realidade. (shrink)

O mal ocupa a condição de problema para a filosofia desde a Antiguidade. Passando pelas ponderações dos estóicos e de Santo Agostinho, tratado no contexto da teodiceia por Leibniz, o mal aporta como objeto de preocupação para a moral em Kant. Muito conhecido por sua definição como um kantiano pós-hegeliano, é com Kant, mas indo além dele que Weil trata do mal, pensando-o como formas de violência. Considerada como o outro do sentido e da razão, a violência se manifesta de (...) maneiras variadas. Nosso intuito é determinar o conceito de mal em Eric Weil enquanto forma de violência. Para isso, nos propomos a situar no esquema conceitual da violência duas formas de mal discutidas por Weil nos seus textos: o mal radical e o mal diabólico. (shrink)

A fim de celebrar o bicentenário da publicação d´ O mundo como vontade e representação, rememoraremos uma polêmica de grandes proporções na filosofia alemã ao final do século XIX: a Pessimismus-Frage. Originada pela recepção da filosofia schopenhaueriana, essa polêmica suscitou – sobretudo após a morte de Schopenhauer - extensos debates entre os partidários do pessimismo filosófico e seus críticos. Iniciaremos descrevendo algumas características do horizonte intelectual alemão da época. A seguir, apresentaremos traços do pensamento de três representantes da chamada escola (...) de Schopenhauer, defensores do pessimismo filosófico. Posteriormente, elencaremos algumas das principais críticas dirigidas contra Schopenhauer e seu pessimismo, oriundas sobretudo do movimento neokantiano, ora dominante na filosofia universitária alemã. Concluiremos mostrando como a Pessimismus-Frage tinha como pressuposto uma discussão acerca da natureza e dos limites da própria filosofia, ressaltando a influência da filosofia schopenhaueriana durante a segunda metade do século XIX na Alemanha. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente trabalho é oferecer uma via de acesso ao pensamento de Eric Weil por meio de uma apresentação de alguns dos seus principais conceitos. Trata-se dos conceitos de atitude, categoria e retomada, elementos que constituem o léxico próprio do pensamento weiliano e cuja compreensão é capital para o enfrentamento de sua principal obra, a Lógica da filosofia. Oferece-se no presente artigo uma explanação introdutória sobre algumas das ferramentas conceituais fundamentais para a pesquisa na filosofia weiliana. Para tanto, (...) dividiu-se o artigo em três seções. Na primeira, introduziu-se a discussão weiliana a respeito da filosofia e do seu outro, a violência, bem como de uma lógica da filosofia. Encerra-se essa etapa apresentando informações importantes sobre as categorias weilianas. Na segunda seção discute-se de modo mais detido as categorias e atitudes, sua dinâmica e a passagem entre elas. Diferenciam-se atitudes reais das atitudes puras, aquelas que geram as categorias. Na terceira seção, tratamos do conceito de retomada. Concluí-se essa seção com as categorias formais que esquematizam a lógica da filosofia e realizam a transição do formal para o concreto: sentido e sabedoria. (shrink)

Music can reduce stress and anxiety, enhance positive mood, and facilitate social bonding. However, little is known about the role of music and related personal or cultural variables in maintaining wellbeing during times of stress and social isolation as imposed by the COVID-19 crisis. In an online questionnaire, administered in 11 countries, participants rated the relevance of wellbeing goals during the pandemic, and the effectiveness of different activities in obtaining these goals. Music was found to be the most effective activity (...) for three out of five wellbeing goals: enjoyment, venting negative emotions, and self-connection. For diversion, music was equally good as entertainment, while it was second best to create a sense of togetherness, after socialization. This result was evident across different countries and gender, with minor effects of age on specific goals, and a clear effect of the importance of music in people's lives. Cultural effects were generally small and surfaced mainly in the use of music to obtain a sense of togetherness. Interestingly, culture moderated the use of negatively valenced and nostalgic music for those higher in distress. (shrink)

The main objective of the article is to understand the notion of power in Foucault as an action on action in a relationship of forces. In principle, the power of sovereignty and biopower in classical times are investigated. Where it is perceived that the former has negative and repressive connotations, while this one has positive and productive connotations of facts, happenings. Then, an analysis of Foucault's power is analyzed, where it is possible to verify that there is no construction of (...) a Theory of Power in Foucault, but only an ascending analysis of power, thus departing from specificity for general aspects. Finally, we will analyze the power relationship, seen as an action over action, in this action-reaction movement, there is its need, its becoming, its truth, which is the exercise of power, functioning. Thus, from the molecular to the complex composition, from the invisible to the visible, from the body to the population, power is understood, that is, power relations in the Foucaultian web. (shrink)

The indisputable success of the European integration project also prompted other regions of the world to follow suit. On the other side of coin, these regional blocs cultivated free trade within but remained protectionist vis-àvis the outside, thereby impeding the progress of the multilateral trade system. But also the soaring number of WTO member states accompanied by their incompatible interests, its ambitious agenda spanning over 20 diverse issues and, in particular, the single undertaking approach emerged as the Doha’s Round “stumbling (...) blocks”. The utter dismay over the Doha’s Round deadlock has provoked countries to opt for alternative for a outside the WTO in their endeavor to expedite far-reaching trade liberalization. Besides the vast economic growth in Asia and the rise of international production networks, this urge for deeper integration represents one of the central root causes for the most recent wave of PTAs which has been gathering force over the course of the 21st century and increasingly puts the WTO’s raison d’être under critical scrutiny. (shrink)

There has recently been a focus on the question of statue removalism. This concerns what to do with public history statues that honour or otherwise celebrate ethically bad historical figures. The specific wrongs of these statues have been understood in terms of derogatory speech, inapt honours, or supporting bad ideologies. In this paper I understand these bad public history statues as history, and identify a distinctive class of public history-specific wrongs. Specifically, public history plays an important identity-shaping role, and bad (...) public history can commit specifically ontic injustice. Understanding bad public history in terms of ontic injustice helps understand not just to address bad public history statues, but also understand the value of public history more broadly. (shrink)

What is a normative reason for acting? In this paper, I introduce and defend a novel answer to this question. The starting-point is the view that reasons are right-makers. By exploring difficulties facing it, I arrive at an alternative, according to which reasons are evidence of respects in which it is right to perform an act, for example, that it keeps a promise. This is similar to the proposal that reasons for a person to act are evidence that she ought (...) to do so; however, as I explain, it differs from that proposal in two significant ways. As a result, I argue, the evidence-based account of reasons I advance shares the advantages of its predecessor while avoiding many of the difficulties facing it. (shrink)

A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views (...) in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second-order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher-order evidence. If there are no second-order reasons, those views are mistaken. (shrink)

1 The Zero-Force Evolutionary Law 2 Randomness, Hierarchy, and Constraint 3 Diversity 4 Complexity 5 Evidence, Predictions, and Tests 6 Philosophical Foundations 7 Implications.

A large body of research in political science claims that the way in which democratic citizens think about politics is motivationally biased by partisanship. Numerous critics argue that the evidence for this claim is better explained by theories in which party allegiances influence political cognition without motivating citizens to embrace biased beliefs. This article has three aims. First, I clarify this criticism, explain why common responses to it are unsuccessful, and argue that to make progress on this debate we need (...) a more developed theory of the connections between group attachments and motivated reasoning. Second, I develop such a theory. Drawing on research on coalitional psychology and the social functions of beliefs, I argue that partisanship unconsciously biases cognition by generating motivations to advocate for party interests, which transform individuals into partisan press secretaries. Finally, I argue that this theory offers a superior explanation of a wide range of relevant findings than purely non-motivational theories of political cognition. (shrink)

Perception plays a central and wide‐ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the (...) interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does. (shrink)

The duty to protect patient welfare underpins undergraduate medical ethics and patient safety teaching. The current syllabus for patient safety emphasises the significance of organisational contribution to healthcare failures. However, the ongoing over-reliance on whistleblowing disproportionately emphasises individual contributions, alongside promoting a culture of blame and defensiveness among practitioners. Diane Vaughan’s ‘Normalisation of Deviance’ provides a counterpoise to such individualism, describing how signals of potential danger are collectively misinterpreted and incorporated into the accepted margins of safe operation. NoD is an (...) insidious process that often goes unnoticed, thus minimising the efficacy of whistleblowing as a defence against inevitable disaster. In this paper, we illustrate what can be learnt by greater attention to the collective, organisational contributions to healthcare failings by applying NoD to The Morecambe Bay Investigation. By focusing on a cluster of five ‘serious untoward incidents’ occurring in 2008, we describe a cycle of NoD affecting trust handling of events that allowed poor standards of care to persist for several years, before concluding with a poignant example of the limitations of whistleblowing, whereby the raising of concerns by a senior consultant failed to generate a response at trust board level. We suggest that greater space in medical education is needed to develop a thorough understanding of the cultural and organisational processes that underpin healthcare failures, and that medical education would benefit from integrating the teaching of medical ethics and patient safety to resolve the tension between systems approaches to safety and the individualism of whistleblowing. Data sharing not applicable as no datasets generated and/or analysed for this study. (shrink)

This is a reply by the author to the contributors to a symposium on the book, The Range of Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2021).

What is commonly referred to as the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the idea that the principles of logic can be rationally revised. The argument is based on a reconstruction of unpublished work by Saul Kripke. As the reconstruction has it, Kripke extends the scope of Willard van Orman Quine's regress argument against conventionalism to the possibility of adopting new logical principles. In this paper we want to discuss the scope of this challenge. Are all revisions of logic subject (...) to the Adoption Problem? If not, are there significant cases of logical revision that are subject to the Adoption Problem? We will argue that both questions should be answered negatively. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Frank Hofmann’s reply to my (2022) argument against “evidential minimalism” (EM). According to defenders of EM, there is a close connection between evidence and normative reasons for belief: evidence is either itself, or (under certain “minimal” conditions) gives rise to, a normative reason for belief. In my (2022), I argued against EM by showing that there are cases where: (i) S possesses strong evidence E for the truth of p at time t, (ii) all (...) minimal conditions for the normativity of E are met at t, (iii) S doesn’t believe p at t, yet (iv) S isn’t criticizable on account of (i)-(iii) at t. I then appealed to a linking claim connecting criticizability with the existence of normative reasons for belief. Hofmann’s reply invokes a distinction between two different kinds of epistemic criticism: a strong and a weak form. I will argue that Hofmann’s distinction fails to save EM from my argument. (shrink)

Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the (...) mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide. (shrink)

In this introduction, I explain the notion of higher-order evidence and explore its bearing on aesthetic judgement. I start by illustrating how reflection on cases involving higher-order evidence engages with well-established concerns in aesthetics—specifically, how it might reveal tensions within and between widely recognized aesthetic ideals governing aesthetic judgement. Next, I show how attention to higher-order evidence in relation to aesthetic judgement might expose limitations or assumptions of theories in epistemology, where the nature and significance of higher-order evidence with respect (...) to belief is the focus of much recent attention. The aim is not to resolve the issues but to demonstrate the significance of higher-order evidence in aesthetics and, in doing so, encourage work on the topic in and across aesthetics and epistemology. (shrink)

First-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a proposition is true. Higher-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a person is able to assess her evidence for or against a proposition. A widespread view is that higher-order evidence makes a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In this paper, I consider in what way higher-order evidence might do this. More specifically, I consider whether and how higher-order evidence plays a role in (...) determining what it is rational to believe distinct from that which first-order evidence plays. To do this, I turn to the theory of reasons, and try to situate higher-order evidence within it. The only place I find for it there, distinct from that which first-order evidence already occupies, is as a practical reason, that is, as a reason for desire or action. One might take this to show either that the theory of reasons is inadequate as it stands or that higher-order evidence makes no distinctive difference to what it is rational to believe. I tentatively endorse the second option. (shrink)

A large and growing body of research in computational psychiatry draws on Bayesian modelling to illuminate the dysfunctions and aberrations that underlie psychiatric disorders. After identifying the chief attractions of this research programme, we argue that its typical focus on abstract, domain-general inferential processes is likely to obscure many of the distinctive ways in which the human mind can break down and malfunction. We illustrate this by appeal to psychosis and the social phenomenology of delusions.

Evidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. What accounts for the normativity of evidence? According to the view that I’ll call “evidential minimalism”, there is a close connection between strong evidence for the truth of p and a normative reason to believe p: evidence is either itself a normative reason for belief, or evidence gives rise to such a reason when certain other minimal conditions are met. In this paper, I argue against evidential minimalism. I will argue (...) that there are cases where: (i) an individual S possesses strong evidence E for the truth of p at time t, (ii) all other minimal conditions for the normativity of E are met at t, (iii) S doesn’t believe p at t, yet (iv) S isn’t open to any form of criticism on account of (i)-(iii) at t. I will then formulate a plausible linking claim connecting openness to criticism and the existence of normative reasons for belief. The minimalist can either accept or reject this linking claim. I will argue that, either way, the minimalist view falters. (shrink)

Despite myriad controversies about reasons, two theses are frequently taken for granted: (i) reasons are sources of normative support for actions, attitudes, etc; and (ii) reasons, at least in simple, paradigmatic cases, consist in atomic facts. Call this conjunction “the atomic view.” Against this, we advocate what we call “the cluster view,” on which even in the simplest cases, the normative support for an action or attitude is typically provided by a whole cluster of facts. Moreover, many of these facts (...) are on an explanatory par—they each play the same kind of role in explaining why there is normative support for the action or attitude in question. We show that presupposition of the atomic view generates unnecessary (psuedo-)puzzles⁠—about topics such as rationality, moral worth, and doxastic justification⁠—that can be largely (dis)solved with the cluster view in place. The cluster view’s ability to do this constitutes an argument in its favor, beyond intuitive considerations that we also adduce. (shrink)

A number of authors have argued that, in order for S to be appropriately held morally responsible for some action or attitude (say, via moral blame), that action or attitude must somehow reflect or express a negative aspect of S’s (“true”, “deep”, or “real”) self. Recently, theorists of “epistemic blame” and “epistemic accountability” have also incorporated certain “self-disclosure” conditions into their accounts of these phenomena. In this paper, I will argue that accounts of epistemic responsibility which require disclosure of an (...) objectionable feature of a person’s self neglect central aspects of our responsibility practices. Specifically, I will argue that we can appropriately hold individuals epistemically responsible for things which do not reflect or express negative aspects of “who they are” in any way. While disclosure of an objectionable feature of (what I will call) a person’s “doxastic self” isn’t altogether irrelevant when it comes to holding that person epistemically responsible, it also isn’t necessary. One lesson I wish to draw is that, insofar as our epistemic responsibility practices are capable of shedding light on the nature of epistemic normativity itself, theorists interested in the latter should be focused on more than just accountability responses which track objectionable features of a person’s self. (shrink)

While the contemporary philosophical literature is replete with discussion of the control or freedom required for moral responsibility, only more recently has substantial attention been devoted to the knowledge or awareness required, otherwise called the epistemic condition. This area of inquiry is rapidly expanding, as are the various positions within it. This chapter introduces two major positions: the reasonable expectation view and the quality of will view. The chapter then explores two dimensions of the epistemic condition that serve as fault (...) lines along which these two views diverge. The first dimension concerns different kinds of ignorance. The second concerns what agents can be directly blameworthy for. The chapter closes by sketching a novel approach that incorporates advantages of opposing positions on this topic. (shrink)

Tony Milligan argues that some forms of covert non-human animal rescue, wherein activists anonymously and illegally free non-human animals from confinement, should be understood as acts of civil disobedience. However, most traditional understandings of civil disobedience require that the civil disobedient act publicly rather than covertly. Thus Milligan’s proposal is that we revise our understanding of civil disobedience to allow for covert in addition to public disobedience. I argue we should not. Milligan cannot justify using paradigm cases to expand the (...) scope of civil disobedience without justifying similar reasons to limit the scope, and he does nto give convincing reasons for discarding the communication requirement, according to which an action cannot count as civil disobedience unless it is communicative. The immediate conclusion is that animal rescue is not civil disobedience, while the broader conclusion is one about civil disobedience more broadly: an act must be public to count as civil disobedience. (shrink)

I argue that an act can be wrong _because_ it wrongs a particular person. I then show how this thesis serves as a constraint on moral theories, using Kantian ethics as a case study.

The generally agreed upon principle that legality and ethics can come apart is frequently overlooked in our professional ethics education and decision-making procedures. The crux of the issue is that we teach in our philosophy classes that the law can sometimes be unethical, but then clearly state in nursing codes of ethics that students should always follow the law. The law could no doubt give us some reason to choose action A over action B, but in professional contexts we frequently (...) treat the law as a side-constraint that limits the logical space of choices to exclude even consideration of action B. If B is the mandatory action, this in effect forces professionals to do something unethical by preventing them from ever seeing the ethical action as an option. This is a problem. Ultimately we concede that there might be an irresolvable tension in competing normative interests in ethics and the law, though we suggest that a more nuanced approach to ethical code formation could help alleviate the issue somewhat. (shrink)

Weighted voting involves weighting representatives’ votes by the populations that they represent. Such systems have been adopted in some legislative bodies as a remedy for malapportionment, and are sometimes used to elect candidates for the executive branch of government. But they receive little attention. This note observes the neglected vices of weighted voting systems: they violate intuitive conditions of monotonicity and participation. These vices count significantly against the use of weighted voting, and reflecting on why they arise improves our understanding (...) of axioms in social choice theory. (shrink)