Taking as a point of departure a recently published collection of representative contributions from various philosophers who claim to ?proceed from ordinary language?, this article examines ordinary language philosophy in the light of some of the claims made by these philosophers. The claims are criticized mainly for failing to account for the variability of the use of terms in respect both of depth of intention and special contexts. These factors are such as to render the claims in question false when (...) interpreted as significant assertions about language, but trivial when they are interpreted as reasonable and true. (shrink)

Preliminary summaries of a few empirio?semantical investigations1 concerning such sentences as: can we say x, should we ever (ordinarily) say x, x is self?evident (tautological, contradictory, nonsensical), P does not know what be is talking about, x is voluntary (involuntary) and: that is no excuse.

It is commonplace that whenever a metahistorian attempts to rule out some more or less general approaches to history, or certain methods, procedures as being impossible in history: “it just can’t be done!”—then, invariably, there is another metahistorian who will point to some historians who did just that, which allegedly could not be done. Equally predictable are the objections to such “contrary cases,” viz.: “That isn’t history!” What is it then? It may be religion, metaphysics, Spengler-ism, Toynbeeism,—or worse: social science, (...) sociology, and even: psychology! (shrink)

Our biological survival is often taken as an argument in favour of the validity of our present conceptual scheme and cognitive frame of reference. A twofold counterargument is offered: (1) Given any notion of ?knowledge?, ?insight?, etc. within our present scheme, it is possible, even plausible, that such ?knowledge? and ?insight? be extended and perfected beyond what is beneficial to the survival of mankind; (2) The alleged link between survival and veridicality is not logical but contingent and tenuously tangential. Since (...) the prevailing scheme may prove to serve ends not just other than, but opposed to survival, e.g. the end of unmasking the world and man's lot therein, survivalism may require a radical reconsideration of that scheme, including its prejudice in favour of survival. From the point of view of all current schemes or frames of reference, such a project appears inherently paradoxical. (shrink)

Otto Neurath's everyday "cabby"-language would only have preserved its appearance of a conceptual (etc.) system-neutrality to the extent at which it were to retain its semantic amorphousness as well as its user's shallow pragmatic mtentions. This (pseudo) neutrality would be irretrievably lost the moment the constituent parts of the everyday "cabby"-language were to be precised to a degree which transcended all conceivable pragmatic mtentions reasonably attributable to a cabman or to any other everyday speaker-. Dilemma: Either we settle for a (...) semantically and pragmatically unambitious, superficial chatter, typical of a cabman, whereby we shall gam conceptual (philosophical, theoretical etc....) neutrality, or we relinquish all aspirations towards system neutrality in favor of a higher level of preciseness, which might in turn open the possibüities for some sort of meaningful, even philosophically relevant, discourse. (shrink)

Further to Herman Tennessen's recent methodological criticisms of Linguistic philosophy, the present paper seeks to offer some theoretical criticisms. Two main claims of Linguistic philosophy are examined: (1) that the concept of ?use? satisfactorily explains how words and expressions are meaningful; and (2), that the correspondence theory of meaning has been successfully repudiated. After a brief exposition, the explanation is further specified as being analogical (words are like tools). Six objections (semantical, logical and psychological) are suggested. It is (...) concluded that not only is the explanation not satisfactory, but that some of the same problems of the older theory may also be implicit in the ?use? theory. (shrink)

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Most of us have been brought up on the idea that moral theories divide as they are, at the root, either deontological or consequentialist. A new point of division has been emerging that places deontological and consequentialist theories together against theories of virtue, or a conception of morality constrained at the outset by the requirements of the “personal.” In a series of important essays Bernard Williams has offered striking arguments for the significance of the personal in moral thought based on (...) the role of integrity in human activity and character. His criticisms of both Kantian and utilitarian theories for their deep-seated tendencies to undermine the integrity of persons brings to a new level of seriousness and subtlety long-standing complaints against these theories—the invasive do-gooding of utilitarianism, the coldness and severity toward normal human concerns of Kantian theory. Although Williams is inclined to find the sources of the attack on integrity in these different features of the two traditional theories, in the end his complaint against both of them turns on their demand that the moral agent submit himself to the authority of impartial value. (shrink)

Democracy, freedom of speech, and science The On Liberty arguments of John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor are still strong arguments for an unrestricted freedom of speech. For them, freedom of speech is closely linked to the idea of truth-finding, and truth-finding is crucial for a democratic society like ours and the development of its participants. In short, without freedom of speech, the tyranny of the majority looms. However, it is also reasonable to restrict freedom of action if expressions cause (...) pain to democratic citizens. Since the question whether expressions, including speech, cause pain requires a scientific study of psychological pain, the issue of democratic freedom of speech is intimately linked to, and even depends on scientific inquiry. (shrink)

The present paper examines how discursive representations and emotive constructions underpin an argumentative dynamic that emerges from apparently non-argumentative statements, like those found in newspaper headlines. Our data comes from Greek broadsheet newspapers in the polarized context of the Greek crisis. First, we outline an analytic synergy that scrutinizes representational meaning and the semiotization of emotions in headlines. We then move towards the reconstruction of the inferential passage, contained in the headlines, that unites the implicit standpoint with its supporting argument.

This paper began in the startled realization that little if anything is said in Kant’s ethics about the more violent forms of immoral action. There are discussions of lying, deception, self-neglect, nonbeneficence—but apart from suicide, a great silence about the darker actions. At the least, this should be an occasion for curiosity. Although the degree of concern with acts of violence in contemporary ethics may be in its own way curious, it does not seem unreasonable to expect a moral theory (...) to provide an account of what is wrong with acts of violence. (shrink)

The present paper studies the general implications of theprinciple of compositionality for the organization of grammar.It will be argued that Janssen''s (1986) requirement that syntax andsemantics be similar algebras is too strong, and that the moreliberal requirement that syntax be interpretable into semanticsleads to a formalization that can be motivated and applied more easily,while it avoids the complications that encumber Janssen''s formalization.Moreover, it will be shown that this alternative formalization evenallows one to further complete the formal theory of compositionality, inthat (...) it is capable of clarifying the role played by translation,model-theoretic interpretation and meaning postulates,of which the latter two aspects received little or no attention inMontague (1970) and Janssen (1986). (shrink)