The paper first examines the difference between Wolff’s demonstration of my present existence and Descartes’ intuitive connection of my thinking with my existence. The results of this investigation enable us to analyse two controversial answers to the question of the knowledge of existence in Wolff’s works. The first answer is from Jürgen Stolzenberg, who discusses Wolff’s proof of the statement: I am. The second is written by Luigi Cataldi Madonna, who investigates the concept of contingent existence in Wolff’s works. The (...) problems of the interpretations they propose are different. The first uses in his analysis meanings of central terms that were foreign to Wolff. The second does not pay attention to Wolff’s framework and aims. These difficulties in their interpretations distort what Wolff does and plans in his treatment of the knowledge of existence. Wolff builds a demonstration to prove how we know that we are, because for Wolff there is only science if we prove all that we claim. According to him, philosophy is a science. With this paper I plan to clarify the context of Wolff’s demonstration of my present existence as well as the demonstration itself, to which the analysis of the above two interpretations can contribute. (shrink)

The atomic hypothesis according to Ludwig Boltzmann. The scientific and philosophical importance of a controversial position at the close of the 19th century. This paper examines Boltzmann’s standpoint in the controversy over the existence of atoms between himself on the one hand and Mach, Ostwald, Helm and to some extent Duhem on the other hand. The latter wanted to develop a physics only constructed with perceptible phenomena. Because of the lack of empirical evidence of the atoms at that time they (...) did not accept them for the construction of physics. In contrast, Boltzmann found the acceptance of atoms to be a fruitful assumption, since for him the construction of physics required going beyond perceptible phenomena. Two different conceptions of nature and of the ways to know nature clashed in this disagreement between Boltzmann and his opponents. Op-posing one-sided positions, Boltzmann supported the hypothetical character of science, in which more than one basic hypothesis can be advanced: he was open to the possibility of fundamental revolutions in science. (shrink)

Es wird versucht, die Camapsche Definitions- und Begriffslehre darzustellen, die er bei der Entwicklung seiner Konstitutionstheorie aufstellte. Camap unterscheidet zwei Hauptteile der Definitions- und Begriffslehre: den Abschnitt, der zum Konstitutionssystem gehört, und den Abschnitt, der nicht dazu gehört. Die Definitionslehre besteht wiederum aus zwei zentralen Definitionsarten: der Strukturbeschreibung, mit der das Konstitutionssystem aufgebaut wird, und der impliziten Definition, die außerhalb des Konstitutionssystems steht. Auch die Begriffslehre läßt sich in zwei Hauptgruppen unterteilen: in die eigentlichen Begriffe, die die Begriffe des Konstitutionssystems (...) bilden, und in die uneigentlichen, die nicht zum Konstitutionssystem gehören. (shrink)

Es wird versucht, die Camapsche Definitions- und Begriffslehre darzustellen, die er bei der Entwicklung seiner Konstitutionstheorie aufstellte. Camap unterscheidet zwei Hauptteile der Definitions- und Begriffslehre: den Abschnitt, der zum Konstitutionssystem gehört, und den Abschnitt, der nicht dazu gehört. Die Definitionslehre besteht wiederum aus zwei zentralen Definitionsarten: der Strukturbeschreibung, mit der das Konstitutionssystem aufgebaut wird, und der impliziten Definition, die außerhalb des Konstitutionssystems steht. Auch die Begriffslehre läßt sich in zwei Hauptgruppen unterteilen: in die eigentlichen Begriffe, die die Begriffe des Konstitutionssystems (...) bilden, und in die uneigentlichen, die nicht zum Konstitutionssystem gehören. (shrink)

When one wants to use citizen input to inform policy, what should the standards of informedness on the part of the citizens be? While there are moral reasons to allow every citizen to participate and have a voice on every issue, regardless of education and involvement, designers of participatory assessments have to make decisions about how to structure deliberations as well as how much background information and deliberation time to provide to participants. After assessing different frameworks for the relationship between (...) science and society, we use Philip Kitcher's framework of Well-Ordered Science to propose an epistemic standard on how citizen deliberations should be structured. We explore what potential standards follow from this epistemic framework focusing on significance versus scientific and engineering expertise. We argue that citizens should be tutored on the historical context of why scientific questions became significant and deemed scientifically and socially valuable, and if citizens report that they are capable of weighing in on an issue then they should be able to do so. We explore what this standard can mean by looking at actual citizen deliberations tied to the 2014 NASA ECAST Asteroid Initiative Citizen forums. We code different vignettes of citizens debating alternative approaches for Mars exploration based upon what level of information seemed to be sufficient for them to feel comfortable in making a policy position. The analysis provides recommendations on how to design and assess future citizen assessments grounded in properly conveying the historical value context surrounding a scientific issue and trusting citizens to seek out sufficient information to deliberate. (shrink)

Cooperative learning (CL) is one of the pedagogical models that has had more application in the area of Physical Education (PE) in recent years, being highly worked in the initial training of teachers. The aim of the study is to check to what extent future PE teachers are able to apply in the classroom the PE training they have received at university, deepening their fears, insecurities and problems when carrying it out. Thirteen future PE teachers (7 girls and 6 boys) (...) aged 20.87±1.43 participated and, after having been trained in CL in various subjects, applied it in the classroom during their internship. A qualitative methodology was used, being the interviews, the teaching diaries and the seminars with the tutor the instruments of data collection used. Three categories of analysis were used: a) initial expectations in the application of the CL; b) problems encountered in its implementation; c) reflection about its application in the future. The results showed how the future teachers did not see their expectations of success fulfilled, encountering resistance from both students and teachers in PE. Furthermore, they reflect the need to continue training in a model that has infinite nuances so that it can be implemented satisfactorily. It is necessary to continue researching a pedagogical model with so many possibilities in the area of PE and with so much transversality on a social level. (shrink)

One of the major arenas for debate within generative grammar is the nature of paradigmatic relations among words. Intervening in key debates at the interface between syntax and semantics, this book examines the relation between structure and meaning, and analyses how it affects the internal properties of words and corresponding syntactic manifestations. Adapting notions from the Evo-Devo project in biology (the idea of 'co-linearity' between structural units and behavioural manifestations) Juan Uriagereka addresses a major puzzle: how words can be (...) both decomposable so as to be acquired by children, and atomic, so that they do not manifest themselves as modular to adults. (shrink)

The De concordia, published by Juan Luis Vives in 1529 and dedicated to the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, is a comprehensive analysis of the social and political problems which were then afflicting Europe. It is the only such analysis undertaken by any of the Renaissance humanists. The De concordia merits a much more important place in Vives' oeuvre than scholars have hitherto given it. It is structured around the Augustinian concept of concordia and its antithesis, discordia. As such, (...) it is an explicit attempt to understand current history in metaphysical terms. Vives' intention is not to give strategic or tactical advice to Charles V, but to examine the general disorder of Europe with a view to determining its fundamental nature and significance. This is the first critical edition of the De concordia and the first English translation. (shrink)

This article highlights two possible unnoticed acrostics in Ovid's Metamorphoses concerning the predictions of Calchas and Helenus.

In this paper I will critically assess a very popular interpretation of Heidegger’s early thought, according to which meaning (Bedeutung) is conceived as ontologically dependent on human existence (Dasein). In order to criticize this subjectivist understanding of meaning, I will offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis of signs in Being and Time (§17). This will reveal two main things: first, that the ubiquity of sign-phenomena is founded on the universality of the structure known as reference (Verweisung); second, that Heidegger’s idea (...) of reference offers a non-substantialist understanding of meaning and its relation to the world. (shrink)

Ethical, Religious and Legal Arguments in the Current Debate over Euthanasia in Spain In the last ten years, there have been several cases in Spain (Ramón Sampedro, Leganés, Jorge León that have led to an intense social debate on euthanasia. The recent case of Inmaculada Echevarría, a woman suffering from a serious disease that kept her immobilized in bed, has revived the debate on euthanasia in Spain. On 18 October 2006 she held a press conference and publicly asked to be (...) disconnected from the ventilator that kept her alive. After a long ethical, religious, legal, and social debate, the patient was disconnected on 14 March 2007 after being adequately sedated. As a consequence, the patient died. In our paper we defend the need for a radical and intercultural democracy and present the main ethical, religious and legal arguments on euthanasia that are being posed in Spain and in Europe as a debate that should help to build a radical and intercultural democracy at a European level. (shrink)

Scientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful theory ever made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most controversial theory. Its basic principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about reality, which are reflected in the metaphysical commitments of classical mechanics (CM). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that QM implies an ontological challenge, and not merely an “ontic” one, as it has been traditionally interpreted in the analytic tradition. Second, I suggest that positions known (...) as “ontological pluralism” exhibit an internal weakness due to its unwarranted compromise to a representational view of scientific theories. (shrink)

¿Qué es la mente humana? ¿Es un aspecto de la naturaleza? ¿O acaso la trasciende? ¿Se puede explicar enteramente al hombre en un lenguaje científico-natural? Desde que Aristóteles definió al hombre como un "animal racional", el pensamiento occidental ha erigido una distinción ontológica entre hombre y naturaleza. Sin embargo, el darwinismo nos ha legado una verdad ineludible: que somos organismos animales, cuyas capacidades conceptuales no escapan a los procesos propios de la naturaleza. ¿Se puede, entonces, pensar al hombre como un (...) ser mental, y al mismo tiempo como un organismo natural? Para ello, sin duda, será necesario reformular los conceptos tradicionales de "mente" y de "naturaleza" en busca de una reconciliación conceptual. El siguiente volumen recorre campos como la fenomenología trascendental, la lógica, la biología, la semiótica, la lingüística y la psicología con el fin de superar este dualismo tan antiguo como la filosofía. (shrink)

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that (...) computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence. To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care. (shrink)

We propose a characterization of mathematical experiments in terms of a setup, a process with an outcome, and an interpretation. Using a broad notion of process, this allows us to consider arithmetic calculations and geometric constructions as components of mathematical experiments. Moreover, we argue that mathematical experiments should be considered within a broader context of an experimental research project. Finally, we present a particular case study of the genesis of a geometric construction to illustrate the experimental use of hand drawings (...) and computers in mathematical practice. (shrink)

Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations :483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143:33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power of (...) computer simulations :277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31:27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations. (shrink)

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

Los últimos años del siglo XX han coincidido con el fin de unos procesos seculares en la historia de la humanidad, con la acentuación de algunos de sus problemas más acuciantes y con el nacimiento de desafíos nuevos que la especie humana ha de afrontar y a los que ha de responder. Este libro prentende contribuir a la clarificacíon y toma de conciencia de esta situación y aportar planteamientos e ideas para la respuesta a esos problemas y desafíos.

The aim of this article is to provide a critical examination of Berlin’s treatment of positive freedom by offering a review of his standard arguments against this concept. Throughout his essays and particularly in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin connects the idea of positive freedom with such notions as monism, rationalism, and determinism. Each of these connections will be discussed separately. I will argue that most of Berlin’s arguments against positive liberty are somehow flawed. Although Berlin valued positive freedom as (...) one of the ultimate ends of life, his critical view of the concept should be tempered and contextualized since it was mostly based not on logical or conceptual grounds but on historical and interpretative considerations. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)

En este trabajo defiendo que la distribución desigual de bienes que los individuos piensan que objetivamente debieran distribuirse de modo igualitario genera un cierto tipo de envidia o resentimiento que es característico de la igualdad democrática. Dado que esta formulación suena como una objeción en contra de las distribuciones igualitarias, mi principal defensa aquí será el revindicar un sentido de envidia o resentimiento que es específicamente social y político en su naturaleza. Argumentare que el ben social del autorrespeto une la (...) igualdad democrática con ese tipo de envidia. En efecto. Este tipo de envidia emerge en casos en que la inequidad amenace el mutuo reconocimiento que los ciudadanos se deben los unos a los otros. (shrink)

Many philosophical accounts of scientific models fail to distinguish between a simulation model and other forms of models. This failure is unfortunate because there are important differences pertaining to their methodology and epistemology that favor their philosophical understanding. The core claim presented here is that simulation models are rich and complex units of analysis in their own right, that they depart from known forms of scientific models in significant ways, and that a proper understanding of the type of model simulations (...) are fundamental for their philosophical assessment. I argue that simulation models can be distinguished from other forms of models by the many algorithmic structures, representation relations, and new semantic connections involved in their architecture. In this article, I reconstruct a general architecture for a simulation model, one that faithfully captures the complexities involved in most scientific research with computer simulations. Furthermore, I submit that a new methodology capable of conforming such architecture into a fully functional, computationally tractable computer simulation must be in place. I discuss this methodology—what I call recasting—and argue for its philosophical novelty. If these efforts are heading towards the right interpretation of simulation models, then one can show that computer simulations shed new light on the philosophy of science. To illustrate the potential of my interpretation of simulation models, I briefly discuss simulation-based explanations as a novel approach to questions about scientific explanation. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

Recently, Indigenous commentators have begun to analyse the way in which institutional Research Ethics Boards engage with Indigenous researchers and participants, respond to Indigenous peoples’ concerns with academic research activities, and scrutinise the ethics proposals of Indigenous scholars. Of particular concern for Indigenous commentators is that the work of REBs often results in the marginalisation of Indigenous approaches to knowledge construction and dissemination, especially in relation to the vexed issue of informed consent. Based on analysis of the results of research (...) with Indigenous researchers and research participants, this paper argues that institutionalised REBs’ preference for ‘universal’ and ‘individualised’ approaches for determining ethical research conduct marginalises Indigenous approaches to ethical research conduct. The paper concludes by calling for a decolonisation of REB processes through recognition of the validity of communal processes for attaining the informed conse... (shrink)

We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...) discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as well. We argue that this not the case. Our argument is based on the thesis that the best argument for the modal claim about violet is quite different from the best argument for the modal claim about reddish green. To argue for this disanalogy we propose a reconstruction of the best available justification for both claims. (shrink)

We would like to thank the authors of the commentaries for their critical appraisal of our feature article, Who is afraid of black box algorithms?1 Their comments, suggestions and concerns are various, and we are glad that our article contributes to the academic debate about the ethical and epistemic conditions for medical Explanatory AI. We would like to bring to attention a few issues that are common worries across reviewers. Most prominently are the merits of computational reliabilism —in particular, when (...) promoted as an alternative to transparency—and CR as necessary but not sufficient for delivering trust. We finalise our response by addressing concerns about the place and role of artificial intelligence in medical decision-making and the physician’s responsibilities. We understand the concerns and reservations that some of the reviewers express regarding the epistemic merits of CR. We believe that, in part, this is due to a practice too deeply rooted in transparency. But on …. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

A chronicled approach to the notion of computer simulations shows that there are two predominant interpretations in the specialized literature. According to the first interpretation, computer simulations are techniques for finding the set of solutions to a mathematical model. I call this first interpretation the problem-solving technique viewpoint. In its second interpretation, computer simulations are considered to describe patterns of behavior of a target system. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint of computer simulations. This (...) article explores these two interpretations of computer simulations from three different angles. First, I collect a series of definitions of computer simulation from the historical record. I track back definitions to the early 1960s and show how each viewpoint shares similar interpretations of computer simulations—ultimately clustering into the two viewpoints aforementioned. This reconstruction also includes the most recent literature. Second, I unpack the philosophical assumptions behind each viewpoint, with a special emphasis on their differences. Third, I discuss the philosophical implications of each viewpoint in the context of the recent discussion on the logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations. (shrink)

A chronicled approach to the notion of computer simulations shows that there are two predominant interpretations in the specialized literature. According to the first interpretation, computer simulations are techniques for finding the set of solutions to a mathematical model. I call this first interpretation the problem-solving technique viewpoint. In its second interpretation, computer simulations are considered to describe patterns of behavior of a target system. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint of computer simulations. This (...) article explores these two interpretations of computer simulations from three different angles. First, I collect a series of definitions of computer simulation from the historical record. I track back definitions to the early 1960s and show how each viewpoint shares similar interpretations of computer simulations—ultimately clustering into the two viewpoints aforementioned. This reconstruction also includes the most recent literature. Second, I unpack the philosophical assumptions behind each viewpoint, with a special emphasis on their differences. Third, I discuss the philosophical implications of each viewpoint in the context of the recent discussion on the logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations. (shrink)

This article presents three studies examining the importance of identification with characters in research on media entertainment. In Study 1 it was found that identification with characters was associated with spectators' degree of enjoyment of feature films of different genres. Study 2 showed that identification with characters predicts the affective impact of a dramatic film and, also, it was associated with greater cognitive elaboration and a more complex reflexive process during the viewing of the dramatic film. In Study 3 it (...) was observed that identification with characters predicted the incidental impact of a full length fictional film on attitudes and beliefs. These results support the centrality of the construct of identification with characters in narrative persuasion research. (shrink)

This article asks the question, ``what is reliable machine learning?'' As I intend to answer it, this is a question about epistemic justification. Reliable machine learning gives justification for believing its output. Current approaches to reliability (e.g., transparency) involve showing the inner workings of an algorithm (functions, variables, etc.) and how they render outputs. We then have justification for believing the output because we know how it was computed. Thus, justification is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm, (...) its properties, and its behavior. In this paper, I defend computational reliabilism (CR). CR is a computationally-inspired off-shoot of process reliabilism that does not require showing the inner workings of an algorithm. CR credits reliability to machine learning by identifying reliability indicators external to the algorithm (validation methods, knowledge-based integration, etc.). Thus, we have justification for believing the output of machine learning when we have identified the appropriate reliability indicators. CR is advanced as a more suitable epistemology for machine learning. The main goal of this article is to lay the groundwork for CR, how it works, and what we can expect as a justificatory framework for reliable machine learning. (shrink)