O presente artigo insere-se no quadro da Didática da Matemática, alicerçando na Teoria Antropológica do didático, uma teoria que tem o objeto de saber como seu foco, analisando-o a nível epistemológico e institucional e tem entre os seus elementos primitivos de analise, a abordagem ecologia, praxeológica e a noção de relação ao objeto. É sobre a relação ao objeto que o artigo concentra a sua discussão, a nível teórico, objetivando mostrar como a DM pode contribuir para um debate sobre a (...) decolonização epistemológica de saberes no ensino da Matemática. Em nossa analise, destacamos a abordagem ecológica como o principal elemento de análise na TAD que, ao se situar na análise das condições e restrições de vida do objeto em seu ambiente conceitual, procura compreender como o objeto está posto nos currículos, ao questionar sobre o que existe? o que não existe? o que desapareceu e porquê? o que existe em outros ambientes de vida e não estão aqui? Porque que não estão aqui? Etc. A DM procura por este meio, questionar e denunciar as práticas de ensino que tem as epistemologias do pensamento moderno colonial, eurocêntrico/ocidental como únicas formas de produção do conhecimento matemático, e que por via disso, tendem a subjugar, subalternizar, primitivizar sabedorias outras, não eurocêntricas/ocidentais. Ao mesmo tempo que denuncia, por meio da abordagem praxeológica, propõe ações, mecanismos que possibilitem trazer e discutir as sabedorias não eurocêntricas/ocidentais em espaços escolares, para participarem do processo de produção do conhecimento científico, através do processo de circulação de saberes ou praxeologias entre instituições. (shrink)

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B (...) even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of (...) knowledge is correct, these are not good analyzes for understanding group knowledge. For, in such framework, knowledge is not analyzed in terms of belief and justification, and the same should apply to group knowledge. Thus, we propose to analyze which consequences Williamson’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. The questions that will guide this article are the following: What is a knowledge-first approach to group knowledge? And what does a knowledge-first approach teach us with regard to one of the most pressing issues of social epistemology, namely the dispute between summativists and non-summativists accounts of groups? We claim that a knowledge-first account of group knowledge can be offered and that it favors non-summativism. (shrink)

In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a response to the problem of religious diversity or disagreement.

O objetivo deste artigo, que se insere no âmbito da filosofia da religião, é tratar o problema lógico do mal e mais concretamente a teoria da defesa do livre-arbítrio de Alvin Plantinga. Quero examinar se esta é uma teoria plausível e se resiste a algumas objeções. Pretendo defender que esta teoria parece resistir a certas objeções.

In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be no epistemically justified belief without evidence. However, there are other kinds of justification beyond the epistemic justification, such as prudential or moral justification; (...) therefore, there is room for justified beliefs (in a prudential or moral sense) without evidence. (shrink)

Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...) conclui, por modus tollens, que não há identidade entre dor e estimulação das fibras C. Por isso, a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo não é uma solução bemsucedida para o problema da mente-corpo. Este artigo tem duas partes. Na primeira parte, que é expositiva, apresento o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Subsequentemente, ponho em causa o argumento de Kripke, argumentando que não é procedente, pois a nossa situação epistémica atual não nos permite determinar se é metafisicamente possível a dor não ser idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. Assim, Kripke não refuta a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Palavras-chave : designação rígida, filosofia da mente, identidade tipo-tipo, Kripke, necessidade da identidadeMy aim in this paper is to critically assess Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. Assuming the thesis of the necessity of identity, as well as the thesis of rigid designation, Kripke holds that if pain is identical with C-fibre firing, then pain is necessarily identical with C-fibre firing. However, precisely because the proposition expressed by the sentence “pain is not identical with C-fibre firing” is a metaphysical possibility, Kripke concludes, by modus tollens, that pain and C-fibre firing are not identical. Therefore, the type-type identity theory is not a successful solution to the mind-body problem. So this paper has two parts. In the first part, which is expositive, I present Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. After that, I will dispute Kripke’s argument, arguing that it is not sound, for our current epistemic situation does not allow us to determine whether it is a metaphysical possibility that pain is not identical with C-fibre firing. Thus, Kripke does not refute the type-type identity theory. Keywords : Kripke, necessity of identity, philosophy of mind, rigid designation, type-type identity. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...) of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony. (shrink)

I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that (...) the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt-type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC). (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because (...) belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted. (shrink)

Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is (...) with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement. (shrink)

A epistemologia da crença religiosa é uma área da filosofia da religião que procura responder ao seguinte problema: haverá justificação para se ter fé sem provas, argumentos ou indícios? Ou formulando de outra forma: será epistemicamente legítimo acreditar em Deus sem provas, argumentos ou indícios? Além das respostas tradicionais de William Clifford e de William James a esse problema, há uma resposta mais contemporânea e filosoficamente prometedora: a epistemologia reformista de Alvin Plantinga (n. 1932). Chama-se “reformista” à sua epistemologia porque (...) este filósofo se identifica com o pensamento reformista, tradição protestante que remonta a João Calvino. (shrink)

Our main aim in this paper is to develop two solutions or exorcisms to ward off the new evil demon problem against epistemic reliabilism. The first solution is designated as “indexical reliabilism” and the second as “normal-conditions reliabilism”. We will argue that the second solution is more plausible than the first. We will also argue that this second solution, if properly developed, can respond well to several recent objections. Therefore, reliabilism has good ways of dealing with the new evil demon (...) problem. (shrink)

The aim of this paper, which isframed within philosophy of religion, is todeal with the logical problem of evil andmore specifically with the theory of freewill defense of Alvin Plantinga. I wantsurvey whether this is a plausible theoryand whether it resists to some objections. Iintend to hold that this theory seems resistto some objections.

Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...) of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony. (shrink)

In this paper I want to dispute Plantinga’s claim that there is no viable de jure objection to theistic belief that does not presuppose that such belief is false. So, contrary to Plantinga, I argue that there is at least one viable de jure objection, i.e., an objection to justification or warrant of theistic belief which does not previously depend nor presuppose the falsehood of theism.

In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have (...) a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating. (shrink)

O naturalismo metafísico é a perspetiva de que não há uma pessoa como Deus, nem algo semelhante a Deus. Alvin Plantinga tem argumentado que esta perspetiva é auto-refutante e, por isso, irracional. Isto porque se o naturalismo metafísico fosse verdadeiro (em conjunção com a teoria da evolução), então teríamos fortes razões para duvidar da fiabilidade das nossas faculdades cognitivas e, por conseguinte, teríamos fortes razões para duvidar da verdade de qualquer das nossas crenças, inclusive do naturalismo metafísico. O meu objetivo (...) neste artigo é examinar criticamente este argumento de Plantinga contra o naturalismo metafísico e analisar se é capaz de lidar com algumas objeções. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity”. Plantinga tries to show that this argument is valid and it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of (...) modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God. (shrink)

Edition of the opuscules by D. Báñez on De auxiliis controversy. There is the critical edition of three manuscripts and the first Spanish annotated translation of the opuscules. The Latin text is disposed together with the translation. An introduction situates the opuscules in its systematic and historical context.

David Hume’s historical thought was shaped before he even began writing the History of Great Britain in 1752. This article shows how Hume developed his historical thought in an attempt to combine two historical structures: the natural-jurisprudential conjectural history of the Treatise of Human Nature and the early eighteenth-century historical narratives of modern Europe that featured in his Essays. The Treatise’s conjectural history used the developmental categories “rude” and “civilised” to explain the origins of justice, government and the moral sentiment. (...) The narratives of modern Europe, in contrast, revolved around the historical categories “ancient” and “modern.” Hume’s historical thought was shaped by the attempt to merge those two structures into a single, coherent structure. The critical question concerned the relation between the ancient and the modern: was modern Europe merely a “revival” of classical antiquity? Or did it have new, “post-ancient” dimensions? The article shows how Hume gradually distanced classical antiquity from modern Europe, thereby creating space for exclusively modern concepts such as “civilised monarchies” and the narrative of modern civilisation that structured his History of England (1754–1762). The paper concludes by suggesting that this structure defined Enlightenment philosophical history, not just Hume’s version of it. (shrink)

Parenting is a transforming experience for the life of parents that brings joy and satisfaction as well as challenges, frustration, and demands. The aim of this study was to determine the relationship between “parental stress and satisfaction” and work-home conflict, perceived social support, and global satisfaction with life, and to determine the moderating role of the parent's gender. A sample of 244 participants was studied: 49.6% (121) mothers and 50.4% (123) fathers with children between 2 and 12 years of age. (...) The data was analysed by means of multiple linear regression models and Beta regression for stress and parental satisfaction, respectively, and they were complemented with general and conditional dominance analyses to estimate the relevance of the predictors. Mothers presented higher levels of parental stress and satisfaction than fathers. Being female, having two children, and home-work conflict were predictors of a higher parental stress. Age was also a predictor, as younger parents and also those older than 37 years of age showed more parental stress. Having no partner and being male was associated to lower parental satisfaction. In conclusion, parental stress and satisfaction emerge as clearly differentiated dimensions of parenting experience. The gender gap in parental stress could be linked to the persistence of traditional roles regarding the care of the children, in agreement with the findings in other research. (shrink)

O artigo propõe uma análise da política de drogas no Brasil à luz das teorias biopolíticas de Michel Foucault. A análise elege dois aspectos da genealogia foucaultiana que são centrais para entender a relação entre guerra às drogas, racismo e encarceramento em massa: a coextensividade entre guerra e política e o racismo como dispositivo de seleção da população. Entendemos, entretanto, que a perspectiva de Foucault não é sufi ciente para uma genealogia das relações de poder aplicada ao Brasil. É preciso (...) assumir uma crítica de estilo decolonial. Nesse sentido invocamos a noção de necropolítica, de Achille Mbembe, que pensamos ser mais adequada ao enquadramento da biopolítica produzida em nosso país. No que diz respeito à política de drogas, estudaremos o caso da maconha no Brasil. Nosso objetivo principal é revelar os interesses do proibicionismo brasileiro, entendendo a guerra às drogas como um fracasso político que, no entanto, mostra-se bem-sucedido no quadro geral do projeto histórico do Brasil. Palavras-chave: Biopolítica. Guerra às drogas. Racismo. Encarceramento. (shrink)

Viruses have generally been thought of as infectious agents. New data on mimivirus, however, suggests a reinterpretation of this thought. Earth’s biosphere seems to contain many more viruses than previously thought and they are relevant in the maintenance of ecosystems and biodiversity. Viruses are not considered to be alive because they are not free-living entities and do not have cellular units. Current hypotheses indicate that some viruses may have been the result of genomic reduction of cellular life forms. However, new (...) studies relating to the origins of biological systems suggest that viruses could also have originated during the transition from First to the Last Universal Common Ancestor. Within this setting, life has been established as chemical informational system and could be interpreted as a macrocode of multiple layers. The first entity to acquire these features was the First Universal Common Ancestor that evolved to an intermediate ancestral that could be named T-LUCA and be equated to Woese’s concept of progenotes. T-LUCA may have remained as undifferentiated subsystems with viruses-like structures. The net result is that both cellular life forms and viruses shared protein synthesis apparatuses. In short, virus is a strategy of life reached by two paths: T-LUCAs like entities and the reduction of cellular life forms. (shrink)

La apertura al cognitivismo ético representa la principal línea argumental en defensa del positivismo jurídico. A partir de ella se han examinado las relaciones entre derecho y moral para ver en qué medida se puede seguir manteniendo la tesis de la separación. En este trabajo se sostiene que el problema del positivismo radica en su concepto de derecho y se plantea como alternativa una indagación que exige recuperar la filosofía del derecho como actividad orientada a comprender la raíz del fenómeno (...) jurídico. Esta aproximación alternativa permite, entre otras cosas, examinar la tesis de la separación entre derecho y moral desde una perspectiva no normativista. (shrink)

Dos sentidos del término conciencia han convivido desde que tenemos constancia del uso del mismo: el psíquico y el moral. Un rasgo distintivo del pensamiento moderno consiste en considerar que el primero ha de prevalecer sobre el segundo. Sin embargo, la propia evolución del concepto parece exigir en nuestros días una apelación a lo social para completar su determinación.

Os signos e as classes dos signos estão entre os tópicos mais importantes do sistema filosófico de Charles S. Peirce. As 10, 28, e 66 classes de signos são classificações desenvolvidas especialmente a partir de 1903 e representam um grande refinamento da divisão fundamental de signos – ícone, índice, símbolo. Nossa abordagem aqui define uma estratégia de visualização das classificações dos signos, com especial atenção para as 10 e 66 classes de signos. O livro está dividido em duas partes: (i) (...) bases teóricas, (ii) diagramas para as classes de signos. Na Parte I (bases teóricas), são apresentadas introdutoriamente as noções fundamentais das categorias fenomenológicas, classes de signos, as tricotomias e diagramas, assim como implicações gerais de nossa abordagem, metodologia e aplicações. Na Parte II (diagramas para as classes de signos), são apresentados e discutidos os modelos das classes, propostos por Peirce e seus comentadores, incluindo uma introdução detalhadamente documental de nossos modelos, 10cubes e 3N3, diagramas dinâmicos para as classes de signos. (shrink)

Viruses have generally been thought of as infectious agents. New data on mimivirus, however, suggests a reinterpretation of this thought. Earth’s biosphere seems to contain many more viruses than previously thought and they are relevant in the maintenance of ecosystems and biodiversity. Viruses are not considered to be alive because they are not free-living entities and do not have cellular units. Current hypotheses indicate that some viruses may have been the result of genomic reduction of cellular life forms. However, new (...) studies relating to the origins of biological systems suggest that viruses could also have originated during the transition from First to the Last Universal Common Ancestor. Within this setting, life has been established as chemical informational system and could be interpreted as a macrocode of multiple layers. The first entity to acquire these features was the First Universal Common Ancestor that evolved to an intermediate ancestral that could be named T-LUCA and be equated to Woese’s concept of progenotes. T-LUCA may have remained as undifferentiated subsystems with viruses-like structures. The net result is that both cellular life forms and viruses shared protein synthesis apparatuses. In short, virus is a strategy of life reached by two paths: T-LUCAs like entities and the reduction of cellular life forms. (shrink)

Conhecido pela sua defesa da sociedade aberta, Karl Popper inseriu no seu pensamento uma atitude de combate ao historicismo, identificado como a raiz dos totalitarismos ao longo da história do Ocidente. Propôs também uma forma de intervenção na sociedade que estaria atrelada a essa conduta, a engenharia social parcelar. Essas noções podem ser contextualizadas a partir de um dos debates da filosofia contemporânea, a dicotomia moralismo político x realismo político. Considerando as premissas que dão origem ao debate, percebe-se que os (...) conceitos popperianos dialogam com a corrente realista. (shrink)

Resumen. La presente investigación pretende analizar los costos y beneficios económicos de una dolarización oficial en México, tomando como punto de referencia los casos de Panamá, El Salvador y Ecuador, quienes han tenido un éxito significativo con la dolarización, como una medida para mejorar su estabilidad macroeconómica y erradicar las devaluaciones de sus monedas con respecto al dólar. Abstract. This research aims to analyze the economic costs and benefits of official dollarization in Mexico, taking as reference the case of Panama, (...) El Salvador and Ecuador, who have had significant success with dollarization, as a measure to improve its macroeconomic stability and eradicate the devaluations of their currencies against the dollar. (shrink)

Although religious belief is often claimed to help with physical ailments including pain, it is unclear what psychological and neural mechanisms underlie the influence of religious belief on pain. By analogy to other top-down processes of pain modulation we hypothesized that religious belief helps believers reinterpret the emotional significance of pain, leading to emotional detachment from it. Recent findings on emotion regulation support a role for the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region also important for driving top-down pain inhibitory circuits. (...) Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in practicing Catholics and avowed atheists and agnostics during painful stimulation, here we show the existence of a context-dependent form of analgesia that was triggered by the presentation of an image with a religious content but not by the presentation of a non-religious image. As confirmed by behavioral data, contemplation of the religious image eneabled the religious group to detach themselves from the experience of pain. Critically, this context-dependent modulation of pain specifically engaged the right VLPFC, whereas group-specific preferential liking of one of the pictures was associated with activation in the ventral midbrain. We suggest that religious belief might provide a framework that allows individuals to engage known pain-regulatory brain processes. (shrink)