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  1. Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate. By Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. [REVIEW]Vernon J. Bourke - 1980 - Modern Schoolman 57 (3):259-261.
  2. What is Wrong with “What is Wrong with Rational Suicide”.Michael Cholbi - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):285-293.
    In “What is Wrong with Rational Suicide,” Pilpel and Amsel develop a counterexample that allegedly confounds attempts to condition the moral permissibility of suicide on its rationality. In this counterexample, a healthy middle aged woman with significant life accomplishments, but no dependents, disease, or mental disorder opts to end her life painlessly after reading philosophical texts that persuade her that life is meaningless and bereft of intrinsic value. Many people would judge her suicide “a bad mistake” despite its meeting “robust” (...)
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  3. Nonconsensual Neurocorrectives and Bodily Integrity: A Reply to Shaw and Barn.Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-12.
    In this issue, Elizabeth Shaw and Gulzaar Barn offer a number of replies to my arguments in ‘Criminal Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity’, Journal of Ethics. In this article I respond to some of their criticisms.
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  4. Providing for Rights.Donald C. Hubin & Mark B. Lambeth - 1988 - Dialogue 27 (3):489-.
    Gauthier's version of the Lockean proviso (in Morals by Agreement) is inappropriate as the foundation for moral rights he takes it to be. This is so for a number of reasons. It lacks any proportionality test thus allowing arbitrarily severe harms to others to prevent trivial harms to oneself. It allows one to inflict any harm on another provided that if one did not do so, someone else would. And, by interpreting the notion of bettering or worsening one's position in (...)
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  5. Arendt on Resentment.Grace Hunt - 2015 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (3):283-290.
    This article develops an Arendtian conception of resentment and shows that resentment as a response to injustice is in fact only possible within a community of persons engaged in moral and recognitive relations. While Arendt is better known for her work on forgiveness—characterized as a creative rather than vindictive response to injury—this article suggests that Arendt provides a unique way of thinking about resentment as essentially a response to another human's subjectivity. But when injury is massive, so beyond the pale (...)
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  6. Feminism, Democracy and the Right to Privacy.Annabelle Lever - 2005 - Minerva 2005 (nov):1-31.
    This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...)
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  7. Abortion and the Right to Not Be Pregnant.James Mahon - 2016 - In Allyn Fives & Keith Breen (eds.), Philosophy and Political Engagement. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 57-77.
    In this paper I defend Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'Good Samaritan Argument' (otherwise known as the 'feminist argument') for the permissibility of abortion, first advanced in her important, ground-breaking article 'A Defense of Abortion' (1971), against objections from Joseph Mahon (1979, 1984). I also highlight two problems with Thomson's argument as presented, and offer remedies for both of these problems. The article begins with a short history of the importance of the article to the development of practical ethics. Not alone did (...)
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  8. Coercion and the Neurocorrective Offer.Jonathan Pugh - forthcoming - In David Rhys Birks & Thomas Douglas (eds.), reatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice. Oxford, UK:
    According to what Douglas calls ‘the consent requirement’, neuro-correctives can only permissibly be provided with the valid consent of the offender who will undergo the intervention. Some of those who endorse the consent requirement have claimed that even though the requirement prohibits the imposition of mandatory neurocorrectives on criminal offenders, it may yet be permissible to offer offenders the opportunity to consent to undergoing such an intervention, in return for a reduction to their penal sentence. I call this the neurocorrective (...)
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  9. Da impossibilidade de uma relação de self-ownership: o dualismo ontológico na ilusão da auto-propriedade.Diego Ramos Mileli - 2018 - Revista Trágica: Estudos de Filosofia da Imanência 11 (2):105-126.
    O conceito de self-ownership é frequentemente utilizado nos campos da Ética e da Filosofia Política para justificar ou negar a justeza de determinadas situações, atos ou práticas. As críticas a tal conceito são predominantemente focadas em seus corolários. No presente artigo a análise se concentra sobra as condições de possibilidade da existência de uma relação de propriedade de si mesmo – auto-propriedade – procurando-se demonstrar a impossibilidade de tal relação pela ausência de multiplicidade de elementos que possam constituir um proprietário (...)
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