This essay argues that modern demagogy can be understood as a symptom of a kind of social pathology, combining Wendy Brown's account of neoliberal subjectivity with elements of Robert Pippin's interpretation of Hegel to do so. I begin by focussing on Brown's contention that neoliberal society has bred forms of individual subjectivity that are inherently attuned to right-wing rhetoric. Drawing on Pippin's reading of Hegel, the essay casts these modes of individual subjectivity as aspects of a flawed mode of (...) collective subjectivity; the contemporary rise of demagogic politics is thereby presented as a symptom of a pathological failure of collective self-determinacy, caused by inadequacies within the normative structures that articulate social activity. (shrink)

Political thought has long identified demagogic leadership as one of the key pathologies of democracy. Unusually among political thinkers, Max Weber not only accepts the inevitability of demagogy in democratic politics but also appropriates the figure of the demagogue for democratic thought, praising certain kinds of ‘responsible’ demagogic leadership. This paper examines the role of demagogues in democracy through the lens of Weber's political thought. It critically reconstructs Weber's view of demagogy in terms of the kind of representation (...) charismatic leaders can offer. Demagogues articulate images of ‘the people’ that express a group's deep values and identities. However, Weber worried that demagogues often act irresponsibly, exacerbating dangerous divisions, given their ability to overcome legal and normative constraints. For Weber, democracy requires institutions that encourage an ‘ethic of responsibility’ in leaders while also holding them accountable. Weber's partial defence of demagogy provides useful perspectives on representation and on the institutional prerequisites for responsible leadership that neither deliberative nor minimalist models of democracy sufficiently appreciate. (shrink)

My paper aims to find potential elements of comparison between ancient oratoria popularis and modern populist oratory. I will consider case studies drawn from Gracchan speech style and from the oratory of Donald Trump.

This article discusses the way the ancient Greeks dealt with public and private debts, focusing on one specific aspect: debt cancellation. On the one hand, ancient Greeks were aware of the risks entailed in debt relief as a tool for fuelling civic strife: sources describe it as a demagogic or even criminal action often in association with the political agenda of tyrants. On the other hand, however, Greeks knew well also the benefic effects of debt cancellation in coping with financial (...) and political crisis. In late accounts of archaic history, debt relief is the solution to civic strife and the foundation act of political order. Some public decrees of the Hellenistic period attest debt relief as a communal decision of the polis, dictated by the necessity of preventing or solving ongoing or imminent crises. This second meaning and purpose of debt cancellation should perhaps urge us to reconsider from a different perspective the “politics of debt” in today’s Europe. (shrink)

Thucydidean politicians recognize the difficulty posed by the uncertainties of the future in times of war, yet they differ sharply in their conclusions about how best to respond. Thucydides’ analysis of the rhetoric of wartime decision-making focuses upon the deterioration of political culture under a major national crisis, as well as the role of effective leadership in countering this tendency. The dilemma of Thucydidean politics is how to ensure a deliberative process that will not be taken captive by the pressures (...) and emotions of war, and the demagogic leaders who seek to exploit such pressures and emotions for their own ends. By studying the failures and successes of the past (as documented and analyzed in his History), decision-makers in the future can better understand the political dynamics of wartime decision-making and the corrosive forces that crises too often produce. Thucydides’ narrative analyzes the political, social, and moral psychological dynamics that produce aggression, violence, and the desire for domination and revenge. On his view, these are not inevitable products of human nature, merely dispositions that normative institutions are designed to check. Rather he portrays human nature as running amok when such checks are weakened. What can restrain ‘human nature’ are the norms and institutions that promote communal as opposed to factional or individual interests. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an upsurge of inflammatory speech around the world. Understanding the mechanisms that correlate speech with violence is a necessary step to explore the most effective forms of counterspeech. This paper starts with a review of the features of dangerous speech and ideology, as formulated by Jonathan Maynard and Susan Benesch. It then offers a conceptual framework to analyze some of the underlying linguistic mechanisms at play: derogatory language, code words, figleaves, and meaning perversions. It gives a (...) hypothesis for assessing the moral responsibility of interlocutors in dangerous speech situations. The last section applies this framework to a case of demagogic discourse. The framework offered explains how public discourse has harmed social relations and institutions, and is an obstacle to rational resolutions to the political situation. (shrink)

This essay contributes to scholarly discussions on the affective politics of demagoguery, especially in relation to the rhetoric of white victimhood and resentment, by exploring how civics education could formulate an anti-demagogic pedagogical response. Contemporary understandings of demagoguery as a rhetoric that emphasizes in-group identity and frames solutions as a matter of punishing an out-group, while also converting the shared vulnerability of life into an affective politics of white victimhood, create a new urgency to reconsider how civics education may help (...) students identify and interrogate demagoguery. This essay discusses potential risks in pedagogical efforts of civics education to confront demagoguery and examines ways out of these pedagogical missteps. The essay joins other scholars who call for a reorientation in how educators promote and practice civics education so that it takes into consideration that we live in a culture that is already demagogic. (shrink)

A "good" arguer is like an architect with a penchant for civil and civic engineering. Such an arguer can design and present their reasons artfully about a variety of topics, as good architects do with a plenitude of structures and in various environments. Failures in this are rarely hidden for long, as poor constructions reveal themselves, often spectacularly, so collaboration among civical engineers can be seen as a virtue. Our logical virtues should be analogous. When our arguments fail due to (...) being uncivil and demagogic, since we inhabit the arguments we build, we are all crushed beneath our flawed reasoning. This mixed metaphor takes us to a self-referential analysis of argumentation, analogy, and humor. I argue that good argumentation strives to collaboratively convince rather than belligerently persuade. A convincing means toward this end is through humorous analogical arguments, whether the matter at hand is ethical, logical, theological, phenomenological, epistemological, metaphysical, political, or about baseball. (shrink)

In *How Propaganda Works* Jason Stanley argues that democratic societies require substantial material equality because inequality causes ideologically flawed belief, which, in turn, make demagogic propaganda more effective. And that is problematic for the quality of democracy. In this brief paper I unpack that argument, in order to make two points: (a) the non-moral argument for equality is promising, but weakened by its reliance on a heavily moralised conception of democracy; (b) that problem may be remedied by whole-heartedly embracing a (...) more realistic conception of democracy. That conception is at least compatible with Stanley’s argument, if not implicit in parts of it. (shrink)

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the (...) sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the simplicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of polutropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge. (shrink)

Pythagoreans dominated the political scene in southern Italy for nearly a century in the late 6th to 5th century BC. What was the secret of their political success and can their political, social and economic policies be assessed in the customary terms with which historians try to analyse ancient societies? I argue that they cannot, and that the Pythagorean approach to politics was sui generis, and successful because it was based on ideas, not force or popular demagogy.

This study presents the particular discursive strategies used by some Arabic newspapers to serve the Islamist fundamentalists’ goals and strengthen their hegemonic ideology in the Middle East. It also describes the move to create and sustain a new wave of Occidentalism, the doctrine of negatively representing the West, a counterpart to Edward Said’s Orientalism, the doctrine of negatively representing the East. Occidentalism is a retaliatory ideological strategy that rebuffs hegemonic Western ideas; it is used by some chauvinistic Arabs trying to (...) create a distorted image of the West in the minds of Middle Easterners. In this paper, I will investigate the negative side of the concept of Occidentalism, as exploited by today’s fanatics in their justification for attacking the West. Some Arabic newspapers contribute to fanaticism through antagonistic rhetoric that glorifies Pan-Arab brotherhood, chauvinistic Arab nationalism, and martyrdom. By glorifying these demagogic mottoes, such newspapers create an ideological polarisation against the West, in that they try to win their readers’ sympathy, control their emotions, and deepen their nostalgic feelings for the great Arab past. (shrink)

Plato inaugurated the Western tradition of political philosophy in his effort to vindicate the memory of Socrates and prevent future persecutions of philosophy. To attain this double objective, Plato embedded teachings and distributed themes with a view to appropriately revealing and withholding insights. The ultimate crucible for heuristically testing this Platonic method is Plato's distribution of themes of eros and force. Eros and force parallel the two cardinal features of the erotic Socrates who was suspected of guiding ambitious youths to (...) demagogic careers. Plato's metaphysics, dominated by his theory of Forms or Ideas, similarly originated in indignation at Socrates' legal murder and anguish about the future of philosophy. By positing fixed, eternal, and immutable standards, Plato seeks to preempt the litigious excesses, oratorical shenanigans and legalistic leeway that once made it possible to charge and convict Socrates. The reference of what is actual to a transcendent standard of truth served also to usher in the western tradition of textual embeddedness of meanings. This means that original political philosophy, understood as Platonic philosophy, is a relationship between form and content---between "how" something is articulated in writing and "what" is written. After the onslaught of the diagnostic critique of western thought, unleashed mainly by Nietzsche and Heidegger, the revival of esotericism in our century has been useful in unlocking Platonic interpretation and in showing Plato's text to be dependent on an inextricable interweaving between form and content. (shrink)

Discussions of demagoguery are, unfortunately, back in vogue in popular political discourse. Within the contemporary political landscape, the question of whether various world leaders should be considered demagogues abounds. In the American context, many perceive strong demagogic tendencies in President Donald Trump, and others see it in candidates like Bernie Sanders. This assessment, while perhaps not always stated in such specific terms, is prevalent throughout much of the rhetoric in public debate and deliberation, with Democrats and Republicans demonizing each other (...) with more frequency. While this discussion seems particularly relevant to the contemporary political climate, demagoguery as a term dates all the... (shrink)

Despite the unquestionable importance of technological progress in twenty-first-century society, the decision by many political leaders worldwide to treat natural sciences as an almost exclusive priority betrays a terrible misconception of the complexity of the contemporary world. As the Renaissance cannot be reduced to Copernicus’s or Galileo’s brilliant contributions, or Enlightenment to the works of such giants as Newton and Cavendish, contemporary society will hardly be remembered as just a series of amazing software and gadget updates. There are three categories (...) of questions today that only humanities are prone to answer. The first one, exploring the relations between subject and object mediated by the meaning of “property”, ultimately concerns the discussion between legality and legitimacy. Not long ago, teenagers were still being sued by the giants of the Entertainment Industry for downloading songs, and the practice of mash-ups or remixing even now arouses huge polemics. The second one, focused on the self-representations of the subject, concerns the changing meanings (and representations) of identity and cultural borders in a globalizing world. Finally, the inter-subjective interactions are the centre of the political tensions between democracy and demagogy, two opposed categories that have often been presented as hardly distinguishable from each other. (shrink)

The main assumption of analytical philosophy is very straightforward: the analysis of language in philosophy and in science is the only starting point which guarantees the solution to all the problems. In the so-called post-analytical philosophy this assumption becomes even more radical: substantial problems do not exist and even if they existed, their essence would vanish if one attempted to formulate them in language. The author tries to justify the view that these simple and attractive theses are not only demagogic (...) and decadent, but also destructive. (shrink)

Jason Stanley argues in his new book that propaganda is more prevalent within liberal democracies - and is of far greater concern - than is typically assumed. Indeed, Stanley suggests that the very idea that propaganda only proliferates within authoritarian regimes, which have ministries set aside for its production, is a central tenet of the propaganda of the West. Stanley's aim in this book is to outline the distinctive features of propaganda within a liberal democracy. On his account, the 'flawed (...) ideology' of vested and powerful interest groups undermines the genuinely valuable ideals at the heart of the democratic project; this is what he refers to as 'demagogic propaganda'. Although I am highly sceptical of the argumentative strategies Stanley employs, the book raises significant issues about the extent to which public debates in countries like the United States and Australia involve distorted conceptions of what democratic principles properly entail. Criticisms of the undemocratic and illiberal nature of political processes within liberal democracies are of course common on the left. Two key features set Stanley's work apart from much of that literature. First, he regards democratic principles as genuinely valuable and does not dismiss them as 'mere reactionary claptrap', as many in the New Left did forty years ago. Second, and more significantly, his intellectual background is highly unusual. Stanley is an analytic philosopher whose training was primarily in epistemology and formal semantics rather than in social theory or political philosophy. This is uncommon, since most analytic philosophers who are focused on epistemology and similar issues avoid political questions, a reticence of which Stanley does not approve. Indeed, the book is driven, as he says, by a profound sense of regret that analytic philosophy has surrendered many of its central questions to sociology and social theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We must, Isaiah Berlin argues, make tragic tradeoffs as we navigate the clash of incommensurable and irreconcilable values and ends of modernity. To deny this is to succumb to a politics of immaturity, and to the totalitarian temptation. The twentieth century taught that to resist final-solution fantasies, we must resist the allure, if not reject the value, of positive liberty, the liberty of self-mastery and self-rule. Two decades in, has the twenty-first century taught a different lesson? Have we learned (...) that negative liberty, liberty from rule, with its antipaternalistic ethic of ultra-individualism, harbors its own politics of immaturity, and a demagogic temptation? I argue that this is the more frequent, if less fatal, threat to human dignity and decency today, and that we therefore ought to rebalance the scales in the tragic tradeoff of positive for negative liberty. (shrink)

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the (...) sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the sim- plicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of polutropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge. (shrink)

Populists in the EU often call for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights. These calls are often demagogic and parochial. This paper aims to show what exactly is both distinct and problematic with these populist calls from a normative point of view while not necessarily reducible to demagogy and parochialism. The overall aim of the paper is not to argue that all populists call for such restrictions nor to claim that all calls for such restrictions are populist. (...) The purpose of the paper is rather humble. It only aims to show that populist calls for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights are characterised by two normatively problematic arguments that target two different subsets of the citizenry: what I dub for the purpose of this paper the moralists and the immoralists. It is the way populists address these two subsets of the citizenry, as well as the fact that they could simultaneously appeal to the concerns of both groups, that makes populist approaches to welfare rights both conceptually distinct to other approaches as well as potentially politically appealing to a more diverse population of voters. (shrink)

While early studies of populism, usually dated from the 1960s, were highly interdisciplinary, contemporary research in this field is dominated by political science and political theory. This current phase of research is narrowly focused on certain forms of political action and remarkably reluctant to pathologize the US case. Social theory plays at most a marginal role. Recent historicizations of this field have failed to recognize the significance of the prior ‘missing first phase’ of populism studies (1940–65) led by key sociological (...) figures among the New York Intellectuals and the Frankfurt School. Social theorization was prominent then and US populism’s contingent vulnerability to demagogic exploitation was a major research focus. This article provides an immanent critical reconstruction of these thinkers’ key social-theoretical insights, building to a schematization of ‘modern demagogy’. (shrink)

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the (...) sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the simplicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of polutropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge. (shrink)

How many citizens take part in moral and political decisions concerning the results obtained by the contemporary life sciences? Should they blindly follow skilled demagogues or false and deceptive leaders? Should they adhere to the voice of the majority, or should they take a different decisional path? Deliberative democracy answers these questions, but what is deliberative democracy? Can we really deliberate if we are completely ignorant of the relevant issue? What about ethical or political expertise, is it strictly necessary? Finally, (...) and most significantly, can a deliberative process take place if we ignore the techniques governing it; that is, the techniques required to be minimally skilled in rational argumentation? Giovanni Boniolo goes back to the historical and theoretical foundations of deliberation showing us, with some irony, that deliberation is a matter of competence, and not just a matter of a right to decide. His conclusion might not delight everyone: “anyone who is not sufficiently acquainted with the subject matter or lacks the sufficient deliberative competence ought not be admitted to deliberative discussions. This restriction makes both good deliberation and a proper deliberative democracy possible, otherwise debate degenerates into demagogy and hypocrisy”. (shrink)

In the philosophy of liberalism, freedom of speech is one of the fundamental rights of the individual, one that is guaranteed by the constitution of a liberal democratic state. Contemporary Western democracies are based on the political culture in which human rights, including the right to free speech, play an important role. This right, however, can be violated by demagogic propaganda both in totalitarian regimes and in democracies. The propaganda mechanism, reaching into the sphere of community values and concepts, presently (...) operates also through the Internet, in which expressions of anger and hatred are disseminated and can lead to the destruction of democracy. I will argue that, in today’s world, restrictions on the freedom of speech through legal norms are necessary, because the threat comes not only in the form of censorship, but also the manipulation techniques used by politicians in democratic regimes. Advances in modern technology can be of service to dictatorship when the media and the Internet are used for propaganda or surveillance purposes, but they also provide a support to freedom and democracy when they serve as the means of the transmission of reliable information, initiating public discussions. As such, they establish a framework for rational debates and peaceful activities that contribute to the maintenance of the democratic political culture. The basic elements of this culture, i.e. legal rules, pluralist media, and education systems are all necessary for the defence of its core value, namely the freedom of speech. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons Aristotle gives for being able to use rhetorical argumentation, which is obviously not a scientific mode of expression. This faculty which was condemned by Plato as lacking morality, is paradoxically regarded by Aristotle as necessary on moral grounds. For, according to him, it would be blameworthy to keep silent when being verbally assailed. The necessity of rhetoric is, however, more deeply founded. First, because justice has to be saved from (...) its enemies in the City's courts of law. Secondly, because everyone has to be convicted to follow in practice the rules of the City's laws and such a conviction, in the case of the multitude, cannot be obtained by the means of scientific arguments. Thirdly and above all, because, in forensic disputes, characteristics of free political societies, the demagogic power, which regularly leads to tyrannical regimes, can only be avoided by the weapons of rhetoric. From these explanations, one does see that rhetoric, for Aristotle, seems to be the necessary substitute for ancient and traditional instruments securing obedience to legal justice, i.e. myths and pure constraint or coercion. In civilized and free political communities, rhetoric is required for civilization and freedom. (shrink)

By employing Peirce’s semiotics, Totalitarianism is distinguished indexically from forms of Dictatorship and Authoritarianism. The former can be cast, as Arendt argued, to initiate a project for world domination dispensing with any sense of Authoritarianism in forwarding some purely fictitious conception where violence is manifested in terror. Alternatively, distortion of intellectual activity may issue within Populism so that the rule of Demagogy emerges initiating Despotism or a form of Dictatorship – either Commissarial or Sovereign form – where lawless violence (...) is sustained by secret police inducing fear but not terror. In the case of Authoritarianism induced iconically in a populace, violence may be tolerated accompanying either lawmaking or lawpreserving, both to be separated from Benjamin’s sense of pure violence. The latter – whether humanistically or spiritually understood – transcends both utilitarianism and sheer arbitrariness. (shrink)

Worries about “the rhetorical presidency” ultimately concern the danger of presidential demagoguery. As such, they echo an important theme of the Founders, who erected several barriers to the emergence of the president as demagogue in chief. In the ancient sources on which the Founders partly drew, the worry was the popular or pseudo‐popular leader who seizes on widespread envies, fears, or hopes in the service of his political career—in contrast to the statesman, who pursues the public good and is, therefore, (...) less interested in how to gain office than in how to use it. Later iterations emphasized the “superstitious,” “prejudiced,” or ideological nature of demagogic appeals. When Woodrow Wilson proposed that the president should seize the public‐policy initiative in the name of the people, he sought to insulate the presidency from charges of demagoguery by arguing that no leader who spoke falsely on behalf of the people could expect to win the office. True adepts of the “progress” of public opinion, hence of the public good, are non‐demagogic by definition. Although one is hard pressed to find an American president who can unambiguously be called demagogic, one does find demagoguery among presidential candidates, especially during their campaigns for party nomination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:278 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY What a revolution the past century has made in both the general idea of morality andin the practical attitudes of "moral sense"l The political and moral earthquakes that have cracked the solid ground of Wayland's "moral law" and "didactic" complacency have blown us all into a space whose air may be purer but whose endless visibility into the dark void is less assuring. HERBERT W. (...) SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Le Pluralisme Dramatique de Georges Sorel. By Georges Goriely. (Paris: Marcel Rivi~re et Cie, 1962. 244 pp. Price not given.) Professor Georges Goriely of the Free University of Brussels has made one more valiant attempt to rescue Sorel the thinker from the reputation fastened upon him by the title of his Rdflexions sur la Violence in 1906. For most readers he has been the author of that one book, which is seldom read in the light of his other works. It is significant that Goriely reaches it only upon his page 199, barely twenty pages before his study terminates. Also worthy of note is the fact that of the over one hundred critical books and articles about Sorel which are listed in his bibliography, only two are in English: Richard Humphrey's Georges Sorel: Prophet Without Honor (1954) and James M. Meisel's The Genesis of Georges Sorel (1951). In European discussions Sorel frequently shares the company of such names as Croce, Bergson, and Nietzsche. But in the Anglo-Saxon world he has had in general a bad press, or none at all. A far-from-systematic philosopher, his writings, most of them originally articles composed in the heat of European controversies, have seemed remote from transatIantic concerns. He has been reputed "the father of syndicalism" in a country where the adjective most often applied to syndicalism is "criminal." When Mussolini proclaimed at one time that the R~flexions was his favorite bedside book, Sorel seemed to add the paternity of Fascism to his list. All that was needed to complete his damnation by labels was the dread word "anti-intellectual," and that has been freely applied to him. Nevertheless, Professor Goriely finds it possible to take Sorel's ideas seriously, quite apart from the political misuses which have been made of them. He sees that Sorel was primarily a pragmatic moralist immersed in his times and intent upon finding some way to bring about a European ricorso, a rejuvenation of classic republican ethics. At the turn of the century he saw only mediocrity and decadence: democracy had become demagogy, and industrial capitalism a mess of corruption. Sorel's great search was for a moral lever, for something dynamic, some source of energy in men which could be tapped in order to restore virtue and dignity and morale in the common man. Being imbued with historical relativism, and played upon by vigorous and contradictory influences (Vico, Marx, Bergson, Nietzsche, P~guy), Sorel steadily revised his views. It is that fact which gives his contradiction-filled philosophy the character of a "dramatic pluralism." Of one thing, however, Sorel was always convinced: intellect alone could not re-invigorate European ethics. The feelings must be stirred by something which, as early as 1894, he called a "myth." He had no use for rationally planned utopias operated by savants in the manner of Saint-Simon or Comte (whom he constantly attacked). He groped for a moving, even an "infinite" goal to be generated from history by the creative activity of men, such as the famous "general strike." A Norman like Alexis de Tocqueville, his roots were in a mixed liberal-republican aristocracy on the classic model, calling for large numbers of "social heroes" adapted to the industrial age. This r corps has nothing in common with the BOOK REVIEWS 279 shirted gangsters of the totalitarian regimes. Only gradually did Sorel come to seek his paragons of virtue among the proletariat, partly because of his disillusionment with Jean Jaur~s over the Dreyfus case. Sorel had been one of the first to champion Dreyfus, but felt that demagogues had transformed the latter's cause into a new dogmatism and a new establishment. Sorel was genuinely concerned about some of the... (shrink)

In modern liberal democratic societies, freedom of speech is one of the fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the constitution. It is also the foundation of a democratic state. This right is sometimes abused for political purposes and demagogic propaganda, in both totalitarian systems and democracies, which adversely affects the stability of a state. Propaganda mechanisms negatively influence the sphere of community values and concepts which change their meanings through manipulation. The author examines the language of demagogic propaganda and (...) concludes that it disrupts the communication process in society. These destructive tendencies are opposed under the political culture of a democratic society, thanks to legal regulations protecting freedom from manipulation. (shrink)

Qualsevol que es llegeixi aquest llibre s'adonarà que molts d'aquests mites amb els quals ens han promès la felicitat no són ni tan sòlids, ni tan certs, ni tan "progres" com sembla. Amb lúcida ironia, Ignasi Riera reflexiona sobre algunes de les qüestions que actualment saturen els mitjans de comunicació i que, com a polític i periodista, l'han preocupat al llarg de la seva vida: la idealització del món rural, l'obsessió per la salut, però també el maniqueisme de certes actituds (...) pseudodemocràtiques, les paradoxes de la societat del benestar o el fals esquerrisme. La crítica de fons és doblement interessant: marcada pel to satíric i desenfadat que el caracteritza, Riera ens proposa la deconstrucció d'un concepte viciat com és el de la felicitat, enganyós, mercantil i utilitari, i d'aquestes formes de pensament dirigit que, segons ens diuen alguns, són el camí per arribar-hi. La conclusió és clara: els que pretenem lluitar contra la felicitat, hem de canviar de sentit tota la nostra vida així com el conjunt de les nostres creences: tirar al foc moltes de les que semblen veritats eternes.IGNASI RIERA, escriptor, articulista, comentarista radiofònic i polític, ha conreat tots els gèneres literaris. Ha estat guardonat amb els premis Octubre, Ramon Llull i Pere Quart d'Humor i Sàtira. És autor de llibres de narrativa breu, de novel·les, de pamflets, dels llibres de no ficció: El meu oncle Pere Quart, Un patriota exemplar, Els catalans de Franco, Viatgers de Barcelona, Jordi Pujol. Llums i ombres ; de la biografia, Lluís Llach: companys no és això i de Llibre d'hores del ben menjar. A Edicions 62 ha publicat: Pàries, sindicalistes, demagogs, Diccionari de la Cuina Catalana i Un català a Madrid. (shrink)

The article aims to shed light on the connection between rhetoric and politics, and its dissemination in the sophistic and philosophical tradition. The argumentation is based on the conceptions of two contemporary philosophers – Barbara Cassin and Hans Blumenberg, who appear as the protagonists of positions according to which rhetoric takes up a significant place in political life. Since Plato, the sophists were treated as other pre-Socratics, as demagogs, who do not hold the truth but spread a false opinion. The (...) philosophers share a conviction that speech immediately expresses reality, and they also prohibited following the way of non-Being (Parmenides). The sophists (Gorgias, Protagoras) shared the position that speech expresses only itself, but not reality. Two opposite (but related) ways of thinking are best seen in M. Heidegger’s and H. Arendt’s philosophies. Keeping in mind the main theme, Blumenberg’s philosophical position includes logos as the mean of distancing, the art of politics is determined by the ability to delay decisions and soften conflicts by rhetorical means, while Cassins’ logology is understood as the ontology. (shrink)

Students’ protests in 1968. were a traumatic topic for the entire later period of Yugoslav socialism. Firstly, because somebody for the first time en masse challenged exclusive monopoly of the Communist Party by using Marxist phraseology. Secondly, because protesters openly spoke, concerning serious and painful structural problems. Thirdly, because authorities euthanized students’ movement with repression and demagogy. Fourthly, because the issues students spoke of were not solved until the collapse of Yugoslav socialism, and to the extent, they contributed to (...) that collapse. The phenomenon of 1968 is part of the certain unclean conscience of the Yugoslav Communist nomenclature, and in this context, we need to understand direct and soft repression over the participants and sympathizers of 1968, including the “case” of the dissolution of the editorial board of the Zagreb Studentski list in 1978. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAnne C. Pluta’s reply to my critique perpetuates the errors that undermined the article I criticized. Pluta dismisses out of hand my suggestion that her mistakes are the result of the particular lens through which she and much of the political science community view the American presidency. Yet this suggestion has the merit of explaining why she contends that piling up nineteenth-century instances of presidential public “speech” undermines Jeffrey Tulis’s contention that the nature of presidential speech changed decisively at the (...) beginning of the twentieth century, such that rhetorical, often-demagogic appeals over the heads of Congress displaced public speech that affirmed the values of republican, constitutional government. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martha Nussbaum on Dickens's Hard TimesPaulette KidderAt the heart of Martha Nussbaum's work in capability ethics is a rejection of utilitarianism. Nussbaum has repeatedly recounted a pivotal moment in Dickens's Hard Times (1854), in which the young Sissy Jupe delivers an innocent but devastating critique of the utilitarian system.1 Nussbaum's most extended and compelling reading of Hard Times appears in Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.2 Nussbaum (...) convincingly shows that Dickens's novel is a "deep attack" on utilitarianism, going to the heart of the assumption that the human good consists in maximizing the satisfaction of preferences of the greatest aggregate of persons.In what follows, I will review Nussbaum's philosophical reading of the novel and its critique of utilitarianism, and then return to Hard Times to show that Nussbaum has systematically omitted references to the Biblical themes and references that pervade the novel. Arguing that Dickens's attack on utilitarianism draws much of its power from the resonance of these historically rooted symbols of transcendence, I will conclude with a reflection on the reasons for Nussbaum's avoidance of these themes in her own reading of the book.Hard Times, which focuses on a set of characters living in the polluted and class-divided manufacturing city of "Coketown," is known as Dickens's most polemical novel. The novel announces its central theme immediately in the opening speech by Thomas Gradgrind to the young students of the Gradgrind School: "Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach [End Page 417] these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else...."3From the youngest age, the children in Gradgrind's school are taught to avoid wonder and imagination and only to focus on science and mathematics—the study of what is observable and measurable. This education leaves his two eldest children, Tom and Louisa, miserably unequipped for the choices they face as adults. Young Tom Gradgrind grows up to be an undisciplined wastrel, incurring gambling debts that lead him to embezzle money and then to frame a factory worker, Stephen Blackpool, for the crime. Louisa Gradgrind endures a miserable marriage to her father's wealthy friend, Josiah Bounderby.At the moral center of the novel is Sissy Jupe, a girl who proves impervious to Gradgrind's educational system. Sissy, the daughter of a horse trainer who works for Sleary's Circus, is abandoned by her father and taken into the Gradgrind home. Sharing the moral center with Sissy is Stephen Blackpool, a weaver whose honesty and conviction cause him to run afoul of both his employer Bounderby and the demagogic Slackbridge, organizer for the trade union.In her reading of Hard Times, Nussbaum identifies four elements of utilitarianism: commensurability, aggregation, maximizing, and exogenous preferences, all of which are both dramatized in the novel and critiqued by it (PJ, p. 14). Commensurability means that "all the valuable things under consideration [are regarded as] valuable because they contain some one thing that itself varies only in quantity" (PJ, p. 14). Characters that Dickens presents as memorable individuals are seen by Gradgrind's system as "parcels of human nature." Students in Gradgrind's School are called by number instead of name, and the workers of Coke-town are seen as "hands and stomachs," and are likened to "ants and beetles." Individuality is erased by what Nussbaum terms Gradgrind's "abstracting mathematical mind" (PJ, p. 21).Aggregation, the second utilitarian element, means that data about individual lives is pooled, "without regarding the boundaries between lives as especially salient for the purposes of choice" (p. 14). Louisa Gradgrind is taught, for example, to view the working classes as "Something to be worked so much and paid so much, and there ended; something to be infallibly settled by laws of supply and demand; something that blundered against those laws, and floundered into difficulty; something that was a little pinched when wheat was dear, and overate itself when wheat was cheap... But, she had scarcely thought more of separating [End Page 418] [the people of Coketown] into units, than of separating the sea itself into its... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martha Nussbaum on Dickens's Hard TimesPaulette KidderAt the heart of Martha Nussbaum's work in capability ethics is a rejection of utilitarianism. Nussbaum has repeatedly recounted a pivotal moment in Dickens's Hard Times (1854), in which the young Sissy Jupe delivers an innocent but devastating critique of the utilitarian system.1 Nussbaum's most extended and compelling reading of Hard Times appears in Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.2 Nussbaum (...) convincingly shows that Dickens's novel is a "deep attack" on utilitarianism, going to the heart of the assumption that the human good consists in maximizing the satisfaction of preferences of the greatest aggregate of persons.In what follows, I will review Nussbaum's philosophical reading of the novel and its critique of utilitarianism, and then return to Hard Times to show that Nussbaum has systematically omitted references to the Biblical themes and references that pervade the novel. Arguing that Dickens's attack on utilitarianism draws much of its power from the resonance of these historically rooted symbols of transcendence, I will conclude with a reflection on the reasons for Nussbaum's avoidance of these themes in her own reading of the book.Hard Times, which focuses on a set of characters living in the polluted and class-divided manufacturing city of "Coketown," is known as Dickens's most polemical novel. The novel announces its central theme immediately in the opening speech by Thomas Gradgrind to the young students of the Gradgrind School: "Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach [End Page 417] these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else...."3From the youngest age, the children in Gradgrind's school are taught to avoid wonder and imagination and only to focus on science and mathematics—the study of what is observable and measurable. This education leaves his two eldest children, Tom and Louisa, miserably unequipped for the choices they face as adults. Young Tom Gradgrind grows up to be an undisciplined wastrel, incurring gambling debts that lead him to embezzle money and then to frame a factory worker, Stephen Blackpool, for the crime. Louisa Gradgrind endures a miserable marriage to her father's wealthy friend, Josiah Bounderby.At the moral center of the novel is Sissy Jupe, a girl who proves impervious to Gradgrind's educational system. Sissy, the daughter of a horse trainer who works for Sleary's Circus, is abandoned by her father and taken into the Gradgrind home. Sharing the moral center with Sissy is Stephen Blackpool, a weaver whose honesty and conviction cause him to run afoul of both his employer Bounderby and the demagogic Slackbridge, organizer for the trade union.In her reading of Hard Times, Nussbaum identifies four elements of utilitarianism: commensurability, aggregation, maximizing, and exogenous preferences, all of which are both dramatized in the novel and critiqued by it (PJ, p. 14). Commensurability means that "all the valuable things under consideration [are regarded as] valuable because they contain some one thing that itself varies only in quantity" (PJ, p. 14). Characters that Dickens presents as memorable individuals are seen by Gradgrind's system as "parcels of human nature." Students in Gradgrind's School are called by number instead of name, and the workers of Coke-town are seen as "hands and stomachs," and are likened to "ants and beetles." Individuality is erased by what Nussbaum terms Gradgrind's "abstracting mathematical mind" (PJ, p. 21).Aggregation, the second utilitarian element, means that data about individual lives is pooled, "without regarding the boundaries between lives as especially salient for the purposes of choice" (p. 14). Louisa Gradgrind is taught, for example, to view the working classes as "Something to be worked so much and paid so much, and there ended; something to be infallibly settled by laws of supply and demand; something that blundered against those laws, and floundered into difficulty; something that was a little pinched when wheat was dear, and overate itself when wheat was cheap... But, she had scarcely thought more of separating [End Page 418] [the people of Coketown] into units, than of separating the sea itself into its... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 279 shirted gangsters of the totalitarian regimes. Only gradually did Sorel come to seek his paragons of virtue among the proletariat, partly because of his disillusionment with Jean Jaur~s over the Dreyfus case. Sorel had been one of the first to champion Dreyfus, but felt that demagogues had transformed the latter's cause into a new dogmatism and a new establishment. Sorel was genuinely concerned about some of (...) the deepest problems facing modern industrial man. He could not believe that they could be solved, either by "demagogic plutocracy" or by orthodox Marxism. Hence he sought to synthesize Vico, Proudhon, Marx, and Bergson in a new movement that should be both liberal and revolutionary and heroically virtuous. The strongest influence upon his thinking, says Goriely, came from Vico, from whom he borrowed "the fundamental idea of his whole work: "Man does not know what he does' " (105). History can therefore be rational only after it has happened: "The future is the field in which we use our imaginations, not our understandings" (109). That Sorel anticipated many twentieth-century developments in philosophy and politics, there can be no doubt. The author says that he was "the first philosopher in France who sought not only to locate man in history and society, but also to locate history and society in man, to give them a significance which may be called existential" (148). Before William James's pragmatism reached European shores, Sorel had made such statements as "Science is a means of verifying the possibility of acting in a certain manner." 1Even some of his pessimistic fears anticipated such developments as Burnham's "managerial revolution," at the same time that he welcomed the growth of industrial techniques in other hands (155). Professor Goriely's careful tracing of Sorel's profusion of suggestions for the ethical redemption of mankind in a machine age reveals the unreconciled contradictions in his pluralism. In the R~[lexions he could resolve the conflicts of myth versus utopia, force versus violence, liberalism versus absolutism, says Goriely, only "'by a conceptual jugglery.., which sets the mind's teeth on edge rather than stimulates it" (200). Caught between the poles of an attachment to historical tradition and to liberty, Sorel celebrated the constant tension between the two. Man lives only to create; he "has no other end than the creative ~lan itself. Born of liberty, history can never block its course.., it is always a point of departure toward the future.... Human institutions, the products of an infinity of obscure causes, never realize any universal moral principle. They live in the relative, which man ought to accept with moderation and a sense of the limits of the possible, without ever losing the sense of the unlimited" (222). HAROLD A. LARRABEE Union College 1Georges Sorel, "Storia e scienza sociale," Rivista itallana di sociologia, March-June, 1902,p. 224. Storia Della Filosofia: La Filosofia del Novecento. By E. Paolo Lamanna. Intuizionismo, filosofia dell'azione e modernismo--Prammatismo--La problematica della scienza--La problematica della storla. (Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1963. 671 pp. 3800 L.) This first of three volumes describing the philosophies of the twentieth century, and the fifth volume in Lamanna's History of Philosophy, is truly a monumental and encyclopedic work. In this volume alone there are concise, clear, scholarly expositions of the important ideas of more than fifty philosophers, including biographical information and bibliographical references. The style is exceptionally intelligible and the organization of even complicated materials is well defined with good headings and with definitions that are intelligible 280 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY even to a layman. The work is not only very informative but amazingly objective and dispassionate. And despite its disinterestedness it is highly interesting, for it succeeds in presenting each philosopher's ideas as one imagines he would like to present them himself, sympathetically and persuasively. One leaves the book after reading about the achievements of our own little century marvelling at the variety and range of recent achievements. For over and above our follies and horrors, these thinkers emerge as men trying hard and ably to be sane and tell the truth. Lamanna himself emerges as a mind with an extraordinary critical ability to... (shrink)

This report seeks to discuss the threats to liberal democracy and explore how to devise a new path towards democratic transition and the challenges faced: civil war, sectarian and religious conflicts, ethnic and national tensions, international terrorism and regional wars, and societal violence. The impact on democratic transformation, especially the sense of threat, whether literal or theoretical, led to the tendency of demagogic towards a populist outlook in pluralistic societies, generating reactions across other societies suffering from external alienation and internal (...) tyranny. The world is currently faced with the decline of the core values of the concept of democracy at the global level which has led us to the following questions: the principle of the rule of law, peaceful trading of power, human rights, the principles of equality and sovereignty. The populists attempt to exploit the ideas of the stereotypical, especially on hatred of the other, and the xenophobia against foreigners when faced with the wave of asylum and migration seekers, diminishing freedoms and citizenship rights, coupled with the rejection of economic globalization, to the implementation of a protectionist policy. Victories such as Brexit or Donald Trump’s in the United States have brought forward scenes of fear and hatred of ‘the other’, encouraging intolerance and extremism. This led to a rise in policies against foreigners, migration, terrorism, Islam and protectionist economics. This report will look at a future beyond traditional democracy, discovering what the next stage in democracy will be, in terms of the survival of society, raising problematic questions: Is democracy, by virtue of their dynamics, able to respond to the changing realities, and whether it can renew itself and overcome some of its issues to invent new methods and literature? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Camus’s Meursault and Sartrian IrresponsibilityDavid ShermanIn the wake of poststructuralism, with its glorification of the libidinal play of unaccountable, fragmented subjectivities, the concept of personal responsibility has been rehabilitated. From the French fascination with various forms of neo-Kantianism to the American interest in homey (albeit demagogic) books on the virtues, personal responsibility is regaining currency. But what, exactly, does it mean to be personally responsible? When Albert Camus suggested (...) in “Neither Victims Nor Executioners” that non-violence was the “responsible” position for intellectuals to take on the Algerian crisis, he was reproached for legalistically evading responsibility by his erstwhile friend Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre, who offered up the concept of “absolute responsibility,” and viewed any attempt to obscure the nature of this ontological burden for oneself as “bad faith,” regarded Camus’s position as just such an attempt: “If you’re not victims when the government which you voted for, when the army in which your younger brothers are serving... have undertaken race murder, you are, without a shadow of a doubt, executioners.” 1 For Sartre, who tentatively advocated revolutionary violence, taking responsibility meant acknowledging that “bloodying one’s hands” is unavoidable.The concept of personal responsibility is well considered within the context of French existentialism, which made it one of its hallmarks. In this essay, however, I shall approach personal responsibility from the vantage point of its opposite, personal irresponsibility. Towards this end, I shall consider Meursault, the protagonist in Camus’s The Stranger, whom I take to be one of the most irresponsible characters in literature. The depths of Meursault’s irresponsibility can best be appreciated, fittingly enough, within Sartre’s psychoanalytic framework. [End Page 60]IIn Being and Nothingness, Sartre offers up the ontologically rooted phenomenon of bad faith, which, for present purposes, can be explicated as follows: consciousness, which is intentional (nothing more than that which it is conscious of), reflectively reconstitutes the Self, which does not exist in consciousness but as an object in the external world. There is no intrinsic Self, and the Self that does exist is perpetually being transcended. Despite this state of unremitting transcendence, however, at any point in time there are the undeniable facts of our particular existences, which (however we choose to interpret them) define the range of our possible projects. These brute facts, which are inexorable, constitute our facticity. Thus, Sartre tells us, there is a “double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence” (B&N, p. 98). 2 It is in a person’s approach to the relationship between these two properties, which is marked by an irresolvable tension, that bad faith arises: “Bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them or to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other” (B&N, p. 98).Sartre provides numerous illustrations of individuals who flee from either their facticity or transcendence. For example, there is the homosexual and his interlocutor, the “champion of sincerity.” The former, despite repeated homosexual encounters, refuses to draw the conclusion that he is a homosexual; instead, he sees both his past behavior and his present inclinations as part of a “restless search.” Conversely, the latter demands that the homosexual sincerely avow what he is, “a homosexual.” Both are in bad faith. The homosexual denies responsibility for all that he has done by perpetually pushing his conception of Self into the future, and thus perpetually beyond the reach of his ability to make judgments about himself—he makes a mockery of his past and present choices. The champion of sincerity, on the other hand, pushes the homosexual’s conception of Self into the past in order to make it a thing—he denies the homosexual’s (and perhaps his own) freedom to make future choices, which is what enables us to transcend what we presently are. The former flees facticity; the latter, transcendence.All persons in bad faith fall... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Health Care Ethics: A Comprehensive Christian Resource by James R. ThobabenPaul D. SimmonsHealth Care Ethics: A Comprehensive Christian Resource by James R. Thobaben Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2009. 429pp. $28.00In recent years, a stir has been created by the vocal and aggressive involvement of evangelicals in such issues as abortion, homosexuality, and end-of-life decisions. James Thobaben, the dean of Asbury Seminary, provides what he calls a [End (...) Page 203] “comprehensive resource” for evangelicals, and promises better understandings of their perspectives and commitments for those who are baffled or frustrated by the actions and claims of those on the religious right.Thobaben casts a wide net when defining those he includes as “evangelicals”—Southern Baptists, members of Campus Crusade, Pentecostals, the Holiness movement, neoevangelicals, charismatics, and Anabaptists. These diverse groups are evangelicals because of their “consistency on moral choices,” doctrinal orientation, and styles of social advocacy (24). Although they differ in a number of ways, they all share having been influenced in some way by John and Charles Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, and the Reformation. All stress conversion in that “one must say yes to the divine Jesus Christ” and become identified with the community of faithful believers (57). And in recent decades, they have become a potent political force with regard to the issues of abortion and homosexuality.Thobaben covers a wide range of topics in this book: from a general discussion of theodicy and healing to bioethics, disability, sickness, family and congregational care, professional truthfulness, managing care, end-of-life decisions, assisted reproduction, organ donation, and death. Yet, although he claims to provide a “comprehensive resource” on evangelical Christian health care ethics, he fails to provide a thorough examination of his subject matter. For example, Thobaben pays little attention to the historic beginnings of the religious right. One misses any mention of political action groups or the coalitions formed with or by conservative Christian groups to pursue social reforms, or of why such disparate groups have cooperated for political or social goals under the same umbrella. He focuses solely on identifying and articulating the consensus among those who embrace certain moral values on the current scene. Thobaben’s uncritical approach to his subject matter leaves the impression that this book is essentially an apology for evangelical, right-wing Christian social thought. One searches in vain for any critical discussion of the beliefs and values he presents or any thoughtful engagement with those who might view the stances he presents as an assault against women’s rights or an attack on the rights of gays, lesbians, and transsexuals.Moreover, in a book like this, one would have expected a more careful assessment of biblical passages and historical precedents. Thobaben does not provide much rationale for his method for moving from the Bible to current social issues. For example, no prohibition against abortion is found in the Bible and the few passages about homosexual practices hardly add up to the fierce opposition to gays found among strident evangelicals. Moreover, Thobaben does not mention that in 1965 laws against contraceptives were declared unconstitutional by the Griswold vs. Connecticut decision, the Supreme Court’s rejection of a ban supported by an evangelical crusade led by Anthony Comstock. [End Page 204]It is interesting to note that Thobaben holds a strongly qualified commitment to religious liberty and only a “thin” version of the social contract basic to the Bill of Rights (37). He argues that in at least some situations “intolerance is not only morally understandable but strongly preferable,” as in the examples of the “abolition of slavery and prolife/antiabortion advocacy” (29) or, in another context—where he distinguishes between tolerance toward those outside the church and intolerance toward those within it—with regard to homosexuality and alcohol intoxication (30).The task of Christian ethics is to enlighten believers and the general citizenry by a careful exposition of the sources of wisdom available to those who want to think and think morally about issues of importance to human flourishing. That task is especially important in an age of demagogic hostility toward unpopular groups. Sadly, this book does not engage such critical questions. It may prove... (shrink)

Restless Ideas is a lively new textbook of contemporary social theory that speaks directly to the anxious age in which we live today. In addition to providing a highly readable guided tour of major social theories from the mid-20th to the early 21st century, this book is full of dynamic examples that show how these theories may be used to deepen our understanding of current events and of our own life experiences. The emergence of demagogic political leaders like Donald Trump (...) in the USA, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey; the rise of religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and political populism; the digital echo-chamber of social media; and the underlying causes of Brexit are only some of the many current social issues that can be framed through contemporary social theories. Similarly, the politics of sexual, racial and ethnic minorities can be analyzed through the prism of theoretical perspectives such as queer theory, standpoint and intersectional theory, postcolonial theory and critical race theory, while the ongoing struggles for gender equality and gender justice can usefully be examined through the generational perspectives of feminist theories. This book sets the stage with a critical discussion of the loaded history of the social theory canon and makes the argument that there has never been a better time than the present to broaden our understanding of our shared global heritage of social theory, to include some of the formerly excluded classics of past social thinkers, and to open the doors to current social thinkers theorizing from the margins. The book traces the modern roots of contemporary social theory back to the works of the early structural functionalists, systems theorists, conflict theorists, symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists and sociobiologists, building on and at times inverting the canon with the critical advancements to social theory. Later chapters focus on the current influence of structuration theory, third wave critical theory, postmodernism and poststructuralism, critical race theory, postcolonialism, liquid and late modernity theories, and globalization theories. These perspectives include the works of contemporary social theorists such as Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu, Juliet Mitchell, Dorothy Smith, Judith Butler, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Gayatri Spivak, Homi K. Bhabha, Zygmunt Bauman, Slavoj Zizek, Alain Badiou, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, Manuel Castells and Ulrich Beck. The underlying premise - and the promise - of this book is that social theory has the power to provide us with the skills for more informed observation, analysis, and empathic understanding of social behavior and social interaction. In a word: the value of social theory may be seen in how it can enhance social literacy - by deepening our understanding of the world around us, and by empowering us to become practical theorists in our own lives. (shrink)

La democracia vista desde premisas filosóficas críticas es la forma de poder que incentiva una estrategia vigorosa que sostiene el régimen económico globalizado y enajena los derechos fundamentales. Se explica su inicio en la antigüedad griega y su resurgimiento en el siglo de las luces en Francia con Rousseau hasta anclarse en la política contemporánea como el régimen “de las mayorías” y “de la equidad socio política”. La democracia desde la modernidad se desarrolla en América Latina como régimen de una (...) ideología que incentiva la retórica demagógica, siendo capaz de encubrir los totalitarismos y las dictaduras. La democracia, régimen político, ideología de instrumento constitucional de la economía globalizada somete hoy por hoy las consciencias y acapara con fuerza las estrategias de los dispositivos de dominación y de control. Nuestro propósito es tomar partido por una posición Latinoamericana, desde un cambio de valoración subjetiva que contrarreste los mecanismos que la promueven y respaldan. Palabras clave: democracia; democracia en América Latina; desarrollo histórico; subjetivación; autonomía social. Which Democracy for Latin America?Democracy, viewed from critical philosophical premises, is the form of power that incentives a vigorous strategy supporting the globalized economical regime and alienates fundamental rights. Its beginning can be tracked to Ancient Greece, and its resurgence in France’s Century of Lights with Rousseau, ultimately settling down in contemporary politics as the regime “of majorities” and of “socio-political equity”. From Modern Times democracy unfolds in Latin America as a regime linked with an ideology which encourages demagogical rhetoric and is capable of covering up totalitarianisms and dictatorships. Democracy, as a political regime and the ideology of globalized economy, subjugates consciences and fiercely monopolizes the devices of domination and control. Our aim is to argue for a Latin American stand, stemming from a change of subjective valuation which counteracts the mechanisms that promote and support the former. Keywords: Democracy; Democracy in Latin America; Human Development; Subjectivation; Social Autonomy. (shrink)

Depuis la disparition du bloc soviétique émergent, dans les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, des partis aux programmes attrape-tout et à la rhétorique démagogique. Même s'ils sont loin d'avoir raflé la mise lors des élections européennes de juin 2004, leurs leaders charismatiques pourraient bien à terme faire école, à la faveur du désarroi de populations précarisées par une libéralisation tous azimuts. Raison de plus pour être attentif au phénomène populiste que ces formations politiques et hommes incarnent, d'autant qu'il est présent (...) dans la plupart des vingt-cinq États de l'Union.Since the disappearance of the Soviet block political parties with simplifying programmes and demagogical rhetoric have been emerging in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Even if these were far from getting the upper hand at the last European elections in June 2004, their charismatic leaders might eventually set a model thanks to an outrageously liberal policy that has left the population helpless and confused and has jeopardized their situation. This one more reason to beware of the populist phenomenon embodied in those political groups and men, especially as this phenomenon is to be seen in most of the twenty-five states of the Union. (shrink)

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.2 (2002) 91-95 [Access article in PDF] From: A Symposium on Rhetoric, Writing, and Culture Jeffrey Walker For who does not know, except them, that the art of using letters is fixed and unchanging, so that we always use the same letters for the same purposes, but in the art of discourse the case is entirely the reverse? —Isocrates, Against the SophistsThe essays composing this issue (...) of Philosophy and Rhetoric are based on papers that originally were presented at a symposium on "Rhetoric, Writing, and Culture," sponsored by the Emory University Center for Teaching and Curriculum, Department of English, and Hightower Fund, in March 2001. The ostensible purpose of the symposium was to consider the double nature and status of rhetoric: on one hand, a hermeneutic/theoretical discipline with applications across the humanities (in the analysis of texts, events, culture, argumentative practices, ideologies, and so forth); and, on the other hand, a practical "art of discourse," a techne, whose central or distinctive application is the training of skilled writers and speakers. The former tends to be emphasized in contemporary rhetorical studies, while the latter is the most familiar (though not necessarily essential) characteristic of "classical" or ancient rhetoric. Likewise, we can connect these two orientations, respectively, with rhetorical cultural studies and with the teaching of writing, speaking, and communication in general. While the natural assumption is that these two orientations are mutually supporting, that is not always or necessarily the case. One can argue that the first pulls in the direction of "philosophy" (however that may be defined), while the second pulls in the direction of sheer technique—and at one time or another, each has been [End Page 91] open to criticism for its lack of attention to the other: philosophers are ineffective rhetoricians, and cannot intervene in the public sphere; orators are superficial thinkers, and practice an irresponsible, demagogic art of manipulation and domination. This tension goes all the way back to the first critiques of the sophists, and plays out through the entire history of rhetoric. The symposium's speakers, then, were asked to reflect, in any way that seemed suitable to them, on either or both aspects of rhetoric's double nature, and/or the relationships between them.A symposium, inevitably, as a rhetorical event, always takes its own somewhat unpredictable trajectory, as papers are produced and presented, and as the ensuing discussion unfolds. And the four essays presented here—Steven Mailloux on Frederick Douglass and the nineteenth-century American debate over slavery; Susan Wells on "double consciousness" in S. Weir Mitchell's account of the case of Mary Reynolds and W. E. B. Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk; James L. Kastely on the discontinuity between the "philosophical" and "technical" halves of Plato's Phaedrus;and Richard Doyle on the strange intersection between the emergence of LSD and the evolution of biotechnological understandings of DNA—are all revisions and expansions of the original presentations, reflecting the contingencies of their invention and reinvention. Nevertheless, the original motives of the symposium are still in evidence.As different as these essays are, it can be said that one or two underlying themes run through them, and provide a reply to the original topic proposed for the symposium. Perhaps the keynote is what Mailloux describes as "rhetorical paths of thought": that is, the "migration" and "evolution" of topoi, figures, lines of arguments, bits of narratives, and rhetorical traditions themselves (or fragments of them?) "from one community to another... [and] from one cultural moment to the next," as Frederick Douglass takes in the rhetorical traditions, practices, tropes and arguments exemplified in the Columbian Orator, as well as Aristotle's arguments on slavery, and as they become enabling parts of his own rhetorical repertoire in the debate on abolition. In Wells's essay, this appears as the "refunctioning" or reworking of topoi, as the notion of "double consciousness" is adapted as part of a "new logic of scientific authority" in Mitchell's account of "split personality," and also as a way of understanding and performing public discourse and identity in... (shrink)

Implement the concept of political discussions in the context of Hispanic American philosophy will lead to the analysis of the concept of stupidity. What is meant by political idiocy? How is it consolidated? If philosophy pretends to display the different ways in which politics is involved in the definition of human beings and its culture, must begin by exploring the mechanisms that serves the dominant political discourse in America to guarantee the total absence of critical thinking.

This paper explores the issue of knowledge management in modern Democracies, along with the demands posed by the truth problem. While a singular concept of truth can neither be epistemically safe, thus becoming flexible for partial or subjective demonstrations of its authentic or ideal value, nor applicable for every society, it can still take the form of a critical consensus, based on two new principles that are introduced here. The continuity of such a consensus that lies beyond the manipulation of (...) an un-ethical rhetoric or demagogy can safeguard the existence of the Polis, without having to cease espousing typical logic syllogisms as well as the moral qualities that are essential for a meaningful way of social and political life. If not conducive to the collective good, the search for truth remains futile in the practical level of making people’s lives better and of enhancing their common bonds. (shrink)