Section 75 of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003 overturned the principle in English law that a person cannot be retried for an offense of which he has been acquitted, recognizing advances in forensic science that uses modern analysis of DNA in adducing in evidence. The special plea of autrefois acquit can be overturned based on finding of compelling evidence after a previous acquittal of a suspect who can now be tried again for the same offense. The (...) double jeopardy arises only after a lawful acquittal or autrefois convict of the accused for the first offense and these principles have allowed exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy developed by the courts. There is an analogous rule in common law courts based on the unreasonable splitting of the case when there is a severing of indictments which overrides the bar on the accused being retried for the same offense. This paper examines the difficulty of trying a defendant fairly in the English courts when the defense has pleaded an abuse of process and there is no clear overall argument for trial. This question needs an appraisal of legal ethics in criminal courts because a retrial of the accused on the same charge breaches the autrefois acquit doctrine, and severing of an indictment can cause the fair trial process to be undermined. (shrink)

Serpa, Leal, and Muñoz’s article proposes that learning through narrative is fundamental in the field of mental health, including clinical practice, caregiving, and research. The reason is that mental health patients’ experiences are marked by pain, suffering, and stigma, and are of themselves a call for stories, a call to be heard and socially legitimized. The narratives, whose relevance should be situated in the broader movement of the narrative turn, therefore have a key role in overcoming epistemic injustice—a concept put (...) forward by the feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker—by offering a place for the speech and legitimacy for the accounts of mental health sufferers. The authors’ thesis is presented as an... (shrink)

Des œuvres littéraires et philosophiques majeures des xix e et xx e siècles sont mises en correspondance, jusque dans les années 1960, où sont abandonnées les anciennes références au moi exalté des romans introspectifs, au sens du monde historique des grandes épopées idéologiques, et à l’idéal absolu de l’art, de la religion, de la métaphysique. Cet abandon conduisit à des cas extrêmes d’indifférenciation entre littérature et sciences humaines. Toutefois, l’engouement parallèle pour une autobiographie existentielle non réductionniste ou pour l’enquête policière (...) allégorisant en première personne la réflexion métaphysique, de même que le déferlement des romans de science-fiction cosmiques et théologiques, semblent témoigner du déplacement déguisé d’un désir refoulé, celui de trois absolus, le moi, le monde, Dieu, plutôt que de son irréversible disparition. (shrink)

Persons who are dangerous and legally responsible, but who have not yet committed any currently recognised criminal offence, fall within the gap left between the domains of criminal justice and civil commitment. Many jurisdictions operate legal regimes that permit the detention of such persons in order to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms. These regimes often either fail to respect the principle of proportionality or contradictorily treat a dangerous offender as both legally responsible and not responsible at the same (...) time. In response to these problems, a number of preventive detention models have been proposed. Retributivist models seek to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms by requiring blame on the dangerous person’s part in order to warrant detention. However, these models are ill-equipped to deal with the problem of coextensiveness; i.e., they struggle to comprehensively reconcile proportionality in punitive sentencing with the period over which dangerous persons remain dangerous and during which one might therefore want them to be incapacitated. In order to achieve comprehensive incapacitation of dangerous persons for the duration of their dangerousness, retributivist models are forced to abandon their fidelity to proportionality in punitive sentencing, thereby losing themselves in the process. Accordingly, if the practice of preventive detention can be justified at all, such justification will not be of a retributivist character. (shrink)

Autrefois déconsidéré, le chat a aujourd’hui le statut privilégié d’animal de compagnie, au terme d’un long processus de valorisation amorcé au xviiie siècle. Cet article montre comment le premier livre consacré à cette espèce, Les Chats (1727) de François-Auguste de Paradis de Moncrif, contribua à ce changement. Là où le chat passait pour un sujet féminin et frivole, « l’historiogriffe » en fit un objet d’histoire, combinant deux modèles de masculinité, érudite et galante, dissociés par la Querelle des Anciens (...) et des Modernes. L’érudition lui permit de critiquer la phobie des chats en renvoyant aux mœurs des Orientaux, mais aussi de citer maints amateurs et amatrices de la haute société française. Moncrif réunit ainsi une communauté émotionnelle livresque constituée de félinophiles estimables, hommes et femmes, pour démontrer qu’il est parfaitement juste et raisonnable de chérir un chat. (shrink)

Autrefois thème privilégié de débats doctrinaux byzantins autant que prétexte à des manipulations stratégiques consommées – c’est elle, après tout, qui permet de justifier la dictature du prolétariat –, la distinction marxienne entre socialisme et communisme semble depuis longtemps remisée au magasin des accessoires idéologiques d’une époque heureusement révolue, quand bien..

Autrefois on avait l'heure locale, qui était l'heure solaire. L'instrument en était essentiellement la lunette méridienne. Il était midi lorsque le soleil passait au méridien du lieu. Il arrivait que cette lunette fût montée sur un canon. À travers une loupe, le soleil enflammait l'étoupe et le canon tirait un coup, qui avertissait ainsi le voisinage. Comme on divisait le temps entre le lever du soleil et celui du coucher par douze et qu'on faisait de même pour la nuit, (...) il fallait, suivant les (...) - Histoire – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Skeptical theism is a family of responses to arguments from evil. One important member of that family is Stephen Wykstra’s CORNEA-based criticism of William Rowe’s arguments from evil. A cornerstone of Wykstra’s approach is his CORNEA principle. However, a number of authors have criticized CORNEA on various grounds, including that it has odd results, it cannot do the work it was meant to, and it problematically conflicts with the so-called common sense epistemology. In this paper, I explicate and defend a (...) CORNEA principle. After sketching a brief argument for it, I show how it can be acquitted of these recent charges. (shrink)

Certain scholars wish to acquit St. Thomas Aquinas of the “illicit inference from facts to norms” commonly referred to as the naturalistic fallacy. Seeing in certain passages his awareness of illegitimate ways to derive morality from natural ends, many have come to read Aquinas as agreeing with the view that knowledge of the moral order does not derive from knowledge of human nature and of the natural ends of its parts and powers. This paper aims to expose the deficiencies (...) of this reading as a way of bringing more fully into view the whole thought of Aquinas on the question. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.4 : 637–661. (shrink)

In this Article, I will argue that a person may be deserving of criminal punishment even in certain situations where she is not necessarily morally responsible for her criminal act. What these situations share in common are two things: the psychological factors that motivate the individual’s behavior are environmentally determined and her crime is serious, making her less eligible for sympathy and therefore less likely to be acquitted. -/- To get to this conclusion, I will proceed in four steps. In (...) Part II, I will offer the first two of these steps. First, I will argue that our foundational assumption that moral responsibility is necessary for just blame and punishment is not self-evident and is actually rather difficult to explain and justify. Second, I will offer an explanation and justification that appeals to our moral psychology. Specifically, I will argue that we subscribe to this assumption ultimately because we sympathize with agents who lack responsibility for their actions. -/- Third, in Part IV, I aim to show that even if moral responsibility is not conceptually — only “emotionally” — necessary for just blame and punishment, the traditionally recognized criminal excuses are not at risk because, contrary to popular wisdom, they do not really rely on this assumption to begin with. Instead, they stand less for the metaphysical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing the non-responsible and more for the normative/ethical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing those whom we cannot reasonably expect to have acted better. I will further argue that the latter proposition does not necessarily reduce to the former. -/- Fourth, once I have defended my account of the excuses, I will question in Parts V and VI the increasingly popular notion that we should add certain conditions or circumstances to the list of recognized excuses. I will focus on one in particular — the psychological theory of “situationism” — and will argue that, despite its initial plausibility, it should be kept off the list. While situationism arguably does negate moral responsibility, it does not negate criminal responsibility. -/- Of course, this is a controversial point. Criminal responsibility is almost universally thought to require moral responsibility. But in a previous article, "Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention," 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1299, I used personality psychology to drive a wedge between the two. In this article, I will use the opposite end of the psychological spectrum — social psychology — to drive the same important wedge. (shrink)

If the bindingness of morality was to rest on something as ‘subjective’ as the non-cognitivist says it does, the grouse goes, and morality itself would come down crashing. Nothing less than an ‘objective’ source of normativity, it is supposed, could hold morality in orbit. Some of these worries automatically morph into worries about the projectivist model of normativity of law as well: one which understands the authority or normativity of law in terms of subjective attitudes taken towards the law. As (...) well as the stock worries about non-cognitivism, there are some additional ones that the projectivist model brings in its wake that it cannot account for the ‘uniform’ bindingness of law and that a subjective source of normativity of law based on mental states is unintelligible. This essay makes the case for acquitting the projectivist model of normativity of law from the above charges. But the route to that necessarily leads through first acquitt... (shrink)

« La déconstruction, c’est la pulvérisation d’un socle spéculatif où la vie trouverait son assise, sa légitimation, sa paix. » Autrefois son élève, Reiner Schürmann identifie dans l’oeuvre de Heidegger un impensé, le principe d’anarchie. Contre cette métaphysique occidentale qu'il s'applique à déconstruire, le penseur de la présence aurait fait de l'être et de l'agir une seule et même question. Et sapé ainsi toute possibilité de définir un fondement rationnel sur lequel construire une philosophie pratique. Que l'agir humain, à (...) l'époque technologique, se trouve privé d'arché : voilà ce que cette étude majeure, lisant Heidegger à rebours, a permis de dévoiler. (shrink)

The Model Penal Code’s ‘De Minimis’ provisions (§ 2.12) cover different kinds of case in which, for reasons of equity, a prosecution should be dismissed. An exploration of these different cases illuminates some general issues about the structure of the criminal process, and about the processes of criminalization. These include the significance of the difference between dismissing a case and acquitting the defendant, and of the distinction between offences and defences; whether criminal offences should always be so defined that they (...) specify at least a pro tanto wrong, or may sometimes legitimately specify only a prima facie wrong – and whether this is consistent with the presumption of innocence; what kinds of conduct we can properly be expected to answer for in a criminal court; and the proper division of responsibilities between legislatures, prosecutors and courts in determining what kinds of conduct are to be defined and treated as criminal wrongs. (shrink)

The nature and consistency of John Locke's views about liberty and suspension, as well as their bearing on what is now called determinism, remain matters of controversy and sometimes, despair. This chapter explains what it is that "determines the will" according to John Locke. It begins by explaining the central terms Locke employs and the meanings he assigns them. Next, the chapter cites and discusses some of the main doctrines that he formulates using that terminology. In light of these explanations, (...) the chapter analyzes two recent interpretations of Locke's doctrines about liberty, suspension, and the will. The first of these, offered by Vere Chappell, convicts Locke of inconsistency; the second, offered by Gideon Yaffe, proposes away to acquit him. Finally, drawing on the lessons of those examinations, the chapter presents and develops a consistent and more satisfying interpretation of Locke's treatments of liberty and suspension in relation to the will. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss rape myths and mythologies, their negative effects on rape and sexual assault complainants, and how they prejudicially construct women qua women. The backdrop for the analysis is the Belfast Rugby Rape Trial, which took place in 2018. Four men, two of whom were well-known rugby players, were acquitted of rape and sexual assault in a nine-week criminal trial that dominated local, national and international attention. The acquittal resulted in ‘I Believe Her’ rallies and protests across (...) Northern Ireland. Of concern were the deeply sexist and misogynistic text exchanges among the acquitted about the complainant and women more generally. One month after the trial, the Criminal Justice Board of Northern Ireland commissioned an independent review of the arrangements to deliver justice in cases of serious sexual offences. The Gillen Review proposed 16 key recommendations, among them measures to dispel rape myths and the role that Relationship and Sex Education in schools could play in combatting these myths. I will explore these issues using Miranda Fricker's construction of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is little appreciation of the profound impact that routine testimonial injustice—where the credibility of a speaker is deflated or undermined on account of her social identity—can have on the wellbeing of speakers and how it ramifies with other forms of injustice. To illustrate, I draw on neurological explanations to show why attributions of sexual consent are unjustly sustained in cases of rape and sexual assault. (shrink)

On 11 September 2019, the verdict was read in the first prosecution of a doctor for euthanasia since the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act of 2002 was installed in the Netherlands. The case concerned euthanasia on the basis of an advance euthanasia directive for a patient with severe dementia. In this paper we describe the review process for euthanasia cases in the Netherlands. Then we describe the case in detail, the judgement of the Regional Review Committees (...) for Termination of Life on Request and Euthanasia and the judgement of the medical disciplinary court. Both the review committees and the disciplinary court came to the conclusion there were concerns with this case, which mainly hinged on the wording of the AED. They also addressed the lack of communication with the patient, the absence of oral confirmation of the wish to die and the fact that the euthanasia was performed without the patient being aware of this. However, the doctor was acquitted by the criminal court as the court found she had in fact met all due care criteria laid down in the act. We then describe what this judgement means for euthanasia in the Netherlands. It clarifies the power and reach of AEDs, it allows taking conversations with physicians and the testimony of the family into account when interpreting the AED. However, as a practical consequence the prosecution of this physician has led to fear among doctors about prosecution after euthanasia. (shrink)

It has been argued that Pyrrhonists will have trouble acquiescing in the religious practices of their compatriots, since those practices depend on beliefs that are supposedly eliminated by suspension of judgement. According to this objection ..., the Sceptic’s religious behaviour will be inescapably disingenuous. As a way out of this predicament, some interpreters have suggested that the sort of religion that Sextus was familiar with did not require the kind of belief that is subjected to Sceptical examination. This, however, acquits (...) Sextus of the charge of insincerity at the price of taking religious behaviour to be a culturally contingent exception to, rather than a standard case of, Pyrrhonian conduct. Another worry concerns the fixity of Sextus’ philosophical agenda. The argument in PH 3 concludes that, if one goes by what dogmatic philosophers have to say, one will be forced to think that god is inconceivable. By contrast, the first part of the M 9 section on theology argues not for suspension of judgement across the board, but only for the more modest claim that several noteworthy explanations of the emergence of religious belief are unsatisfactory. Insofar as this is the case, M 9 fails to live up to the standard set by PH 3, a failure due either to authorial incompetence or to a difference in philosophical objective. If that is the case, then the two discussions cannot be read as successful examples of the same philosophical outlook. In this paper, I argue for a comprehensive reading of Sextus’ take on religious matters that responds to these worries. In the first half of the paper, I present the two caveats as formulating a uniform agenda concerning theology (Section 1) which is further consistent with the Pyrrhonian stance as presented in PH 1 (Section 2). I show not only that Sextan Sceptics are able to engage in ordinary religious practices, but also that they can do so whether or not their cultural environment takes these practices to depend on holding dogmatic beliefs. In the second half of the paper, I argue by way of a detailed analysis that both PH 3 and M 9 are intended to motivate suspension of judgement about highly specific dogmatic tenets, and while their sources and targets might change, their intended outcome remains the same. The argument in PH 3, often understood as a sort of ‘master argument’ aimed at disarming a broad theistic consensus, depends in fact on peculiar commitments concerning the nature of inquiry (Section 3). The conceptual section of M 9 incorporates explicitly dogmatic—and quite plausibly Epicurean—material in order to argue for suspension of judgement about yet another issue, namely, the question of the natural or conventional origin of the concept of god (Section 4). (shrink)

Résumé éditeur : "Nous avons perdu les deux repères qui permettaient autrefois de nous définir entre les dieux et les bêtes. Nous ne savons plus qui nous sommes, nous autres humains. De nouvelles utopies en naissent. D'un côté, le post-humanisme prétend nier notre animalité et faire de nous des dieux promis à l'immortalité par les vertus de la technique. D'un autre côté, l'animalisme veut faire de nous des animaux comme les autres et inviter les autres animaux à faire partie (...) de notre communauté morale. Alors forgeons une nouvelle utopie à notre mesure. Ne cherchons plus à nier les frontières naturelles - celles qui nous séparent des dieux ou des animaux - et défendons un humanisme conséquent, c'est-à-dire un cosmopolitisme sans frontières.". (shrink)

A UK doctor was recently acquitted of charges of reinstating a variety of female genital mutilation after delivering a child. In this paper, I contend that this incident reflects a broader confusion concerning the ethico-legal status of non-therapeutic genital surgeries for children and adults, which are not derivable from tenets of medical ethics, but rather violate them. I argue that medical professionals have an obligation to announce and address this confusion in order to motivate legislative reform, since the inconsistency of (...) the current law entrenches the underlying sexism and ethnocentrism upon which its sense depends. Without convincing arguments for condoning male circumcision and female cosmetic genital surgery and for treating adult women of colour as lacking the capacity to consent, the current legislation stands in need of urgent revision. (shrink)

This paper explores the role that difference plays in collective decision-making using the Condorcet jury theorem. Agents facing a dichotomous decision might prove biased toward one of the options facing them. That is, they may be more likely to decide correctly when one of the options is correct than when the other option is. A juror might be more likely to convict a guilty defendant than to acquit an innocent one. Agents may display opposing biases. This paper identifies the (...) optimal committee composition in the presence of such bias. This composition depends upon both the prior probability that each option is correct and the relative costs of the two types of possible error. Optimal committee composition will be expressed in terms of the absolute margin that a group with one form of bias should enjoy over the other. (shrink)

Given that an analysis of disposition ascription cannot be made in terms of a simple subjunctive conditional, we present a multiply qualified conditional analysis that places disposition ascription within an implicit fundamental causal conceptual typography within which a disposition ascription is embedded, framed, and understood. By placing the multiply qualified analysis within an implicit causal matrix involving a focal cause, pathway of influence, mechanism of action, contributing/partial cause, mediator, extrinsic moderator,, intrinsic moderator, and manifestation, we show how this analysis evades (...) counterexamples and arguments raised against the simple conditional analysis. We then indicate how the causal conceptual landscape provides a roadmap for unpacking and explicating parameters of the ceteris paribus qualifier to acquit the analysis of charges of being vacuous or irredeemably vague. (shrink)

In conversation analysis, through Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, and others, the conceptual architecture is joined at the hip to a technical architecture of transcripts, sequence, and turn productions. That the conceptual was to be found and demonstrated in the material detail of temporal productions was central to CA’s extraordinary innovations. As with CA, an Epistemic CA has the task of giving evidence of its conceptual order in actual materials, and thus animating the materials to show them. The task and relationship are (...) emblematically reflexive: we shall find the expression ‘Oh’ indexing ‘changes of state’ or ‘inapposite inquiries’, for example, as of the account-able animations of turns and sequences of turns. Our shared attachments to sequential analysis deliver the expectation that we shall see how Epistemic order is achieved on actual occasions, through actual materials, rendered as transcript. The discussion turns to how the Epistemic Program engages and acquits this analytic expectation. (shrink)

Assume that a person who is suspected of either murdering X or raping Y credibly and voluntarily confesses to have committed ‘a terrible crime’ but immediately after this utterance decides to remain silent. The remaining available evidence cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the exact offence which he committed. Should such an accused be acquitted of both offences and evade the law or should a way be found to allow a conviction, although no specific offence can be proven beyond reasonable doubt? (...) Harel and Porat suggest that such an accused should be convicted of an unspecific offence. This paper reaches entirely different conclusions, according to which the prevailing insistence of most Criminal justice systems on offence specificity is justified. It is argued that offence specificity stems from the cognitive psychological difficulties associated with simulating the event in question if the accused is convicted of an unspecific offence. The reason is that fact-finders are unable to simulate the details of an unspecific offence while retaining a confidence level sufficiently high to satisfy the standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. The fact-finder faces a choice between a proven offence which is difficult to simulate and a group of unproven offences which are easy to simulate. These difficulties also give rise to a more solid expressivist justification for offence specificity than that conceded by Harel and Porat. Unspecific offences undermine the efficacy of condemnation because the message that corresponding convictions would broadcast to members of the public would be either blurred and ineffective or based on scenarios none of which was proven beyond reasonable doubt. This paper therefore offers two independent justifications for the prevailing insistence on offence specificity, both of which are based on the cognitive psychological difficulties of simulation, as found by the fact-finder and the public respectively. (shrink)

Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith offer a comprehensive historical and philosophical interpretation of, and commentary on, one of Plato's most widely read works, the Apology of Socrates. Virtually every modern interpretation characterizes some part of what Socrates says in the Apology as purposefully irrelevant or even antithetical to convincing the jury to acquit him at his trial. This book, by contrast, argues persuasively that Socrates offers a sincere and well-reasoned defense against the charges he faces. First, the authors establish (...) a consensus of ancient reports about Socrates ' moral and religious principles and show that these prohibit him from needlessly risking the condemnation of the jury. Second, they consider each specific claim made by Socrates in the Apology and show how each can be construed as an honest effort to inform the jurors of the truth and to convince them of his blamelessness. The arguments of this book are informed by a critical review of the scholarly literature and careful attention to the philosophy expressed in Plato's other early dialogues. (shrink)

We study the strategic interactions within testing in a model of political agency. A principal decides between convicting and acquitting an agent of unknown innocence based on a noisy signal that is manipulable by the agent’s unobserved actions. We identify conditions under which the principal sets a threshold conviction strategy in the form of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” We show that, in spite of strategic concerns, the amount of information that a principal can glean from the test is entirely determined (...) by the threshold; in equilibrium, the threshold is set where the signal realization conveys just enough information to validate a conviction. As such, the game of testing is analytically equivalent to the principal’s statistical inference problem. We next examine how exogenous shocks on preference parameters affect the principal’s equilibrium threshold and welfare. In general, the principal benefits from being better at distinguishing types; whether she should increase or decrease the threshold depends crucially on whether the agent’s distribution of signals varies with types in the absence of manipulation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Socrates' Trial and Conviction of the Jurors in Plato's ApologyDougal BlythI am going to argue in this paper that, in the three speeches constituting his Apology of Socrates, Plato presents the judicial proceedings that led to Socrates' execution as having precisely the opposite significance to their superficial legal meaning. This re-evaluation will lead to some reflections on the politics of Socrates' defence, and, similarly, on Plato's own aims in (...) writing the Apology. I want to show not only that the trial as portrayed demonstrates an inevitable dereliction of duty by the democratic jury, but also, more interestingly, that throughout the proceedings Socrates understands the meaning of the trial precisely in terms of his anticipation of the jurors' judicial incapacity.In the prooimion to his defence speech, Socrates requests that the jurors ignore his manner of speaking and concentrate on whether his case is just, "since this is a judge's virtue (), while that of a rhêtôr is to speak the truth" (18a5-6, cf. 35c2-5). We can gloss the expression "a judge's aretê" in this context as his function, or responsibility.1 Socrates claims that he, himself, fulfills his own responsibility as a defendant to tell the truth (17b4-c4, 33c1-2, cf. 34b5, 35b9-c2) in a speech that asserts his exemplary piety in Apollo's service and his beneficial influence on the Athenian youth. But if, in claiming that he is innocent of the charge, Socrates does tell the truth, then those jurors who thereupon convict him of impiety and corruption, and subsequently sentence him to death, have failed in their duty to judge rightly.My claim is that Socrates sees the trial as a test of the jurors' abilities. It is characteristic of Socrates to test people regarding their concern for virtue and justice, a habit to which he devotes extended discussion during his defence, even dramatising it provocatively in a central passage (29d7-e5) that I aim shortly to analyse in detail. Moreover, Socrates specifically withholds from the jury the title of dikastai or judges; he does finally award the title in his address following the sentence, but only to those who have voted [End Page 1] to acquit him (40a2-3).2 The possibility thus emerges that Socrates has treated the legal proceedings all along as a moral (and intellectual) test, or trial, of the empanelled jurors themselves, to see whether they are capable of the legal function to which they have been allotted. In that case, Socrates is putting on trial, not just those individual citizens, but the very legal system of democratic Athens.Socratic irony and truthfulnessBefore considering Socrates' own explicit judgement during those final remarks on the jurors' moral offence and punishment, I should first address briefly the issue of Socrates' irony. In the past, some writers have asserted that this irony involves him in not telling the truth about himself during his defence, in which case the jury might well have been justified in convicting him. Actually, there does seem to be a consensus among the more extended treatments of the Apology that have emerged during the last decade, at least on the point that Plato presents Socrates as committed to making as sincere an attempt at a defence of his case as is consistent with his philosophical commitment to virtue, and so to telling the truth.3I shall not re-argue this point in detail, but shall take it to be secured by two basic considerations: consistency with the Crito would require Socrates to recognise a legal obligation to make a sincere attempt at defence while his obligation to Apollo to continue his mission in Athens if possible would motivate that attempt with the goal of acquittal.4 Instead, I want to show what role irony does have in Socrates' defence, given that his principled law-abidingness requires him to attempt to persuade the jury, in accordance with truth and justice, that he is innocent (cf. 19a6-7, 18a7-b1, 18e5).Where Socrates acknowledges the obligation to defend himself, he remarks on the difficulty he faces, a difficulty that has resulted from the slander to which he has long... (shrink)

L’idée d’articuler la phénoménologie et le marxisme peut sembler aujourd’hui quelque peu dépassée, comme elle a pu autrefois apparaître contingente et artificielle. Pourtant, la récurrence et l’insistance avec laquelle, depuis près d’un siècle, ce projet a été réactivé sont peut-être le signe d’une affinité insoupçonnée entre ces deux courants de pensée. Si Husserl n’a pas accordé d’intérêt particulier au marxisme et si Heidegger ne l’a fait qu’assez tardivement, certains de leurs élèves et m...

Ce texte est la suite d'une réflexion présentée ici. À première vue, les Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature (1753) radicalisent encore un peu plus cet héraclitéisme. Diderot semble y mettre l'accent principalement sur le caractère fluent de la nature, dans laquelle tout se trouve dans un état de perpétuelle métamorphose. Linné, avec son esprit classificateur et fixiste, se trompe. Rien – ni les plantes, ni les animaux, ni même les minéraux – n'y est aujourd'hui tel qu'il a été (...) class='Hi'>autrefois, ni ne (...) - Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Are Scientists responsible for the usage of the results of their research? Scientists belong to the most favourite group of people who are declared to be responsible for many various things. On the other hand, there is severe disagreement with regard to the question what it is that scientists are responsible for. According to some people, scientific responsibility essentially covers the correct acquisition, processing and publication of information, whereas others make scientists responsible for almost all consequences of their research, even (...) if they cannot influence them. This disagreement is exemplified by the attitudes towards Otto Hahn’s research on nuclear fission which range from blaming him for the development of the nuclear bomb to acquitting him from any responsibility because of the (alleged) lack of knowledge on the possible consequences of his research. In order to (dis-) solve this problem it is necessary to formulate clearly the conditions for ascribing responsibility to someone. By doing so, it is shown in the present paper, (i) that it is indeed possible to ascribe to scientists responsibility for certain consequences of their research (including the usage of its results), and (ii) that, as a matter of fact, it is implausible to make Hahn responsible for the nuclear bomb, but that it isn’t justified either to regard him as a kind of “naive country scientist”, because there is a lot of information he could and should have had as a (responsible) scientist. (shrink)

En Afrique subsaharienne, les naissances gémellaires sont entourées de nombreuses perceptions et de diverses pratiques culturelles. La présente étude qui fait suite à des travaux (quantitatifs) en lien avec le taux d’accouchement gémellaire ainsi que la surmortalité des enfants jumeaux s’intéresse aux perceptions, connaissances et attitudes des Subsahariens concernant les naissances gémellaires. Elle analyse des entretiens qualitatifs recueillis au Burkina Faso et au Sénégal auprès de jumeaux, de parents de jumeaux et d’acteurs associatifs, médicaux et religieux (94 entretiens). Les principaux (...) résultats indiquent que le jumeau subsaharien demeure un être « extraordinaire », au carrefour de plusieurs mondes culturels ; ils indiquent aussi qu’il est moins craint et moins menacé de nos jours, mais peut-être plus exposé qu’autrefois par une mendicité chronique des mères. (shrink)

Siglinde Clementi propose un volume au titre polysémique. Die Marketenderin signifiait autrefois la cantinière qui accompagnait le régiment, à l’image de la Mère Courage de Bertolt Brecht, mais dans l’espace sud-germanique, le terme caractérise aussi, surtout depuis le lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les femmes actives dans les sociétés de tir (Schützenverein), une institution du monde germanique remontant aux guerres napoléoniennes. Cinq textes sont ici réunis ; le plus long, presqu...

" Que reste-t-il de l'Etat? ". " Pas grand-chose " serait-on tenté de dire, tant on ne cesse de répéter que l'Etat est " en crise " et qu'il est entré dans un " processus de désintégration ". Certes, il existe d'évidents mouvements d'émiettement des compétences autrefois concentrées au niveau de l'Etat central. Elles sont redistribuées au profit, d'un côté, d'organisations mondiales ou européennes, supra- et inter-étatiques, de l'autre, d'entités publiques subétatiques comme, en Belgique, les Communautés et Les Régions. (...) Certes, on assiste aussi à des mouvements tangibles de retrait de l'Etat dans la gestion collective de pans importants d'activités sociales, que ce soit au profit du " marché ", de la " science " ou de la " société civile ". Mais mesure-t-on bien l'ampleur et la nature de ces processus et est-on sûr qu'ils ne sont pas compensés par d'autres qui iraient dans le sens d'un redéploiement de l'Etat? C'est à l'analyse de ces différents mouvements de repli, de redéploiement et de continuation de l'action de l'Etat dans la société actuelle qu'est consacré le présent ouvrage. Au départ de la question : " Où en est l'Etat aujourd'hui? ", cet ouvrage collectif, issu d'un congrès de politologues qui s'est tenu à l'Université Libre de Bruxelles en 2002, traite de l'avenir du mode institutionnel par lequel les êtres humains ont entendu assurer, pendant des siècles en Occident, la production de cadres communs à leur existence individuelle et collective. (shrink)

La Jaiminiyasamhita, en partie inédite, est une œuvre puranique de nature "encyclopédique". Dans une section de six chapitres intitulée "La question de Janaka" ('Janakaprasna'), le roi Kartaviryarjuna rend visite à Dattatreya, afin de recevoir un enseignement sur l''advaita', la "non-dualité". Ce dernier lui rapporte l'enseignement que le sage Asita transmit autrefois au roi mythique Janaka. Cette "question de Janaka", à l'instar des Upanisad, se présente sous la forme d'un dialogue entre un maître et un disciple. La thématique au cœur (...) de ce dialogue concerne la nature du 'brahman' et son rapport au corps. Elle permet à l'auteur de faire montre de l'étendue de son savoir dans des domaines aussi riches que variés: le développement embryonnaire et les théories physiologiques, les conceptions cosmogoniques, les paradoxes de la non-dualité et les disciplines de salut, en particulier le yoga, influencé par des conceptions tantriques. (shrink)

À l’instar de Diderot qui, après sa Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient, a écrit ses Additions à la Lettre sur les aveugles, nous proposons une suite à nos « Nouveaux dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous » (publiés dans L’Enseignement philosophique, 65 e année, n° 2, décembre 2014- février 2015, p. 3-22). Reprenant l’examen du sujet principal (la perception) qu’ils avaient naguère abordé dans ces dialogues (qui étaient au nombre de trois, comme les tout premiers conçus (...) autrefois par Berkeley et dont les nôtres étaient le contre-pied), puis le prolongeant (cet examen) dans d’autres directions, Hylas, interprète de nos pensées, et Philonous, interprète des objections que nous ne cessons de formuler contre elles, réfléchissent, dans le quatrième dialogue, sur la prétendue capacité que nous aurions de penser nos sensations ; dans le cinquième dialogue, sur l’opposition entre être et être un être ; enfin, dans le sixième dialogue, sur les raisons que l’on a de se réjouir non seulement de voir que tout est éphémère, mais également de vieillir et de mourir. (shrink)

Colleen McCluskey begins Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing with an overview of Aquinas’s account of human nature and his theory of human action. She discusses the powers of the soul, including the sensory appetite and its passions, the intellect, and the will. Crucially, she devotes considerable attention to the ways in which the passions can affect the intellect’s judgment and, thereby, the will. She then explores Aquinas’s account of the ontological status of evil as a privation, arguing that criticisms of (...) the privation theory can be met, though the theory is not enough by itself to acquit God of responsibility for the existence of evil. The centerpiece of Thomas Aquinas on Wrongdoing is a careful exploration of Aquinas’s understanding of the three sources of moral wrongdoing: defects in the intellect, defects in the sensory appetite, and defects in the will. Finally, McCluskey examines vices, which are firmly rooted dispositions, acquired by repeated action, that prompt particular acts of wrongdoing. She provides a helpful overview of Aquinas’s treatment of the vices both in ST II-II, where the vices are discussed in relation to the virtues to which they are opposed, and in the contemporaneous De malo, questions 9–15, in which Gregory the Great’s list of seven capital vices provides the structuring principle. (shrink)

Jan Łukasiewicz a élaboré un programme de recherche portant sur l’histoire de la logique. À son avis, la logique mathématique contemporaine (modern) est en continuité directe avec la logique formelle du passé. En conséquence, une interprétation correcte et fidèle des idées anciennes exige une application des outils logiques contemporains. Autrement dit, de bonnes études historiques sur la logique doivent consister à examiner la logique d’autrefois à travers les lunettes logiques contemporaine...

In the practice of “jury nullification,” a jury votes to acquit a defendant despite sufficient evidence of lawbreaking, on the grounds that a conviction would be unjust, usually because the law itself is unjust or because the expected punishment would be unduly harsh. This practice is widely condemned by judges. Nevertheless, in the case of an unjust law or unduly harsh punishment, there are no good arguments against jury nullification, and there is one powerful argument in its favor: it (...) is prima facie wrong to knowingly cause unjust harm to others. Thus, jurors are often morally obligated to disregard the law. (shrink)

This article examines the distinction between judicial reasoning flawed by errors on questions of law, properly addressed on appeal, and errors that constitute judicial misconduct and are grounds for removal from the bench. Examples analysed are from the transcripts and reasons for decision in R v George SKQB (2015), appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (2016) and the Supreme Court of Canada (2017), and from the sentencing decision rendered by the same judge more than a decade earlier in R (...) v Edmondson SKQB (2003). Both were sexual assault cases. In George a thirty-five year old woman with five children was tried and ultimately acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference after she was assaulted in her home by a fourteen year old male. Striking similarities between the reasoning and language in the trial decision in George and the sentencing decision in Edmondson demonstrate entrenched antipathy for sexual assault law and the fundamental principles of justice, equality, and impartiality. This is arguably judicial misconduct, persisting despite access in the interim to many years of judicial education programming, not merely legal error. The problem does not lie with the judge alone, however. A toxic mix of misogyny and blindly zealous enforcement of the law appears to have undermined the administration of justice in George from the outset at all levels. The problems are systemic. Were this not the case, it is likely that Barbara George would not have been charged. (shrink)

Bacon's scientific method is commonly thought to proceed mechanically to its infallible end. In this book however, Urbach presents Bacon's philosophy in an alternative light which acquits him of several errors. Urbach describes Bacon as an experimental scientist and examines the criticisms made against him, one of which was that he did not understand the roles of mathematics and science. Bacon was not a traditional metaphysician and was alarmed at the lack of progress in science since ancient times, especially the (...) lack of practical results. He attempted to open up a middle path between practical experience and unsupported theorizing. The author intends to clarify rather than defend Bacon's work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Self of Book 1 and the Selves of Book 2 Terence Penelhum One ofthe more familiar problems ofinterpretationin Hume's Treatise is that of reducing the sense of shock that arises from the apparent differences between what he says about the selfin book 1 and what he says about it in book 2. One way in which scholars have attempted to reduce it is to take him very seriously (...) when he distinguishes, in the book 1 discussion, "betwixt personal identity, as itregards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves."1 If one does this, it becomes possible to see that what might seem to be inconsistent positions are compatible, and merely represent complementary aspects of an extended account of how human beings represent their natures and identities to themselves in thought and feeling and choice. This, at least, is now widely believed. The belief has led to very illuminating accounts of Hume's analysis of the emotional life and ita relationship to his more famous theories in epistemology.2 In spite of these, I think there is an egregious gap in Hume's psychology which we should not be tempted to suppose he has filled. Unless I have misread them, two recent authors have yielded to this very temptation. Since I have said Hume's psychology has an important gap in it, I should begin by making clear what the gap is, and emphasize that I do not think I have uncovered an inconsistency in Hume's theories of the self. He has, of course, been accused of such inconsistencies.3 His account in book 1 has itself been said to be inconsistent because he ascribes to the self there a tendency to confuse invariance and succession in telling us how we come to generate the fiction of continuing identity; such a story seems to ascribe a continuing reality to the mind in the very process ofshowing how the beliefin it can come toexistwhen there are onlysuccessive perceptions toconstitute it. This is a special application of a wider charge sometimes levelled against him, thatalthoughhisassociationism appearstoreduce allexplanation to relationships between perceptions, he is bound to depart from this restriction in ascribing tendencies and mistakes to the mind. Given the nature ofthe beliefhe is explainingwhen he discusses self-identity, the special application is troubling.4 He has also been accused of Volume XVIII Number 2 281 TERENCE PENELHUM inconsistencyin assumingat the outset ofhis discussion oftheindirect passions in book 2 that we have an idea, or even an impression, ofthe self, when in book 1 he has appeared to deny this. Many have argued (and I have been among them) that Hume can be acquitted of these charges. Mercer, for example, has made short workofthe last one.5 When Hume introduces the selfin book 2, he says clearly that he is referring to "self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T 277), not to the idea of the pure ego constructed by rationalist philosophers. The charge of confusion in the argument of Treatise 1.4.6 has been rebutted by several writers, beginning with Nelson Pike.6 In the briefest summary: since the mind is nothing but a series of perceptions, Hume's question in book 1 is not a question about how it is that a mind he tacitly assumes to be more than this comes to think it is more than this, but a question about how the series that the mind actually is, comes to include within it from time to time perceptions ofthe series that represent it as having an identity that it (strictly) lacks. The actual relationship of the mind to its perceptions is one ofinclusion, and Hume's puzzle is how certain perceptionsofthe mind come to be in the mind. This reading ofHume may well leave him with some unattractive problems, but it does not convict him of contradicting himself. If something like this is accepted, we can see Hume in book 1 as combining scepticism about philosophical defences of a natural belief with the assumption of an obUgation to give an account of how... (shrink)

The open practice of euthanasia in The Netherlands stood alone in the world until the government of the Northern Territories in Australia accepted the possibility of physician-assisted suicide. Even though the active ending of lives in The Netherlands is still a crime by law, the current practice allows it and acquits physicians if certain conditions have been met. Of the many facets of euthanasia, the teaching of this practice represents a further logical step. In this contribution, we intend to describe (...) the comprehensive teaching program of euthanasia of the Free University of Amsterdam's Postgraduate Family Medicine Program. Here students receive university-based training for 1 day a week in a cohort of 12 and on the job training for 4 days with individual family physicians for 2 consecutive years. We especially intend to portray the integration of euthanasia into the wider teaching of the process of counseling and aid of the dying. (shrink)

In Aristophanes’ Wasps, Philocleon says that he and his fellow jurors do not acquit Oeagrus until he has recited a speech from the Niobe. Scholars have almost universally assumed that this was the name of a contemporary tragic actor, despite its extreme rarity. This article argues that the reference is rather to the father of Orpheus. As a figure from the generation before the archetypal bard, ‘an Oeagrus’ represents the old-fashioned poetry to which Philocleon and his fellow jurors are (...) devoted. (shrink)