As regards the emergence of a European private law in our time, this article shows that lessons can be learnt from the history of unification of regionally defined private law in the German Confederation (1815–1866). An important lesson is that the Europeanization of private law will be anything but a spontaneous process. Moreover, like the members of the German Confederation almost 200 years ago, the members of the current European Union will not have an equal say in the debate about (...) unification of private law. Now, as then, economic interdependencies between the respective members will come into play. That is to say, the members the economies of which are relatively less dependent upon the economies of other members than vice versa are poised to have a larger say in the debate. (shrink)

In distributive bargaining, bargainers may have an impulse to bluff and thereby risk an impasse. The current paper does not explain bargaining impasses. For our purposes, it suffices to recognize that bargaining impasses may occur without assuming irrationality. The design problem is to ensure that impasses are avoided as often as possible. One possible solution is to allow for the formation of an agreement by “conduct”. The ‘agreement by conduct’ outcome as a commercial norm may coordinate bargainers’ expectations so as (...) to enable them to perform the same contract, even if they made written demands above ½ (as a bluff). The idea that the “deal-is-on” philosophy as expressed in the “agreement-by-conduct” rule affects and promotes economic exchange is probed in the context of a modified Divide-the-Dollar game. (shrink)

Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) describes a recursive, unproductive pattern of thought that is commonly observed in individuals who experience anxiety and depression. Past research on RNT has primarily relied on self-report, which fails to capture the potential mechanisms that underlie the persistence of maladaptive thought. We investigated whether RNT may be maintained by a negatively biased semantic network. The present study used a modified free association task to assess state RNT. Following the presentation of a valenced (positive, neutral, negative) cue (...) word, participants generated a series of free associates, which allowed for the dynamic progression of responses. State RNT was conceptualised as the length of consecutive, negatively valenced free associates (i.e. chains). Participants also completed two self-report measures that assessed trait RNT and trait negative affect. Within a structural equation model, negative (but not positive or neutral) response chain length positively predicted trait RNT and negative affect, and this was only the case for positive (but not negative or neutral) cue words. These results suggest that RNT tendencies may be reflected in semantic retrieval and can be assessed without self-report. (shrink)

Corporate Social Responsibility amongst Small and Medium Enterprises is often characterised in the literature as unstructured, informal and ad hoc discretionary philanthropic activities. Drawing insights from recent theoretical/analytical frameworks :52–78, 2010), and on empirical data collected from both Nigeria and Tanzania, we found that CSR practices in SMEs are much more nuanced than previously presented. In addition, SMEs undertake their CSR practices to varying degrees in multiple spaces—i.e. the workplace, marketplace, community and the ecological environment. These CSR practices go beyond (...) philanthropy and in some instances involve institutional works aimed at addressing some of the institutional gaps in the environments where these SMEs operate. The paper makes a contribution by drawing attention to the multiple spaces of CSR practices amongst SMEs, and the institutional works they do, which are often taken for granted in the extant literature. We provide a unique perspective—by arguing that what is frequently conceptualised as philanthropic CSR in Africa is ‘institutional works’. (shrink)

Speeches delivered in Tamil at various schools in Tamil Nadu, during 2010-2015, by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, 1931-2015, former President of India.

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. -/- Fællesskabet er (...) ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse. (shrink)

Is het nog de moeite waard om het op te nemen voor de transcendentale kritiek van Dooyeweerd? Deze vraag suggereert dat de transcendentale kritiek wanneer zij aan zichzelf overgelaten zou worden, niet meer te redden is. Dat is misschien wat overdreven, maar één ding is duidelijk: de transcendentale kritiek is niet onomstreden, zelfs niet onder de meest trouwe volgelingen van Dooyeweerd. En daarin zit iets paradoxaals: het was hem er immers om te doen met zijn transcendentale kritiek ‘de denkgemeenschap in (...) het avondland’ te herstellen, maar het lukt hem niet eens om de denkgemeenschap onder gelijkgezinden op dit punt te bewaren. Intentie en werkelijkheid lopen hier dus ver uiteen. Daar zijn verschillende redenen voor. In de eerste plaats lijkt de transcendentale kritiek geplaagd te worden door een tweetal tegenstrijdige uitgangspunten. Kort gezegd komen deze uitgangspunten hierop neer: 1) de transcendentale kritiek poogt aan te tonen dat ieder theoretisch denken uitgaat van religieuze uitgangspunten; het theoretische denken is dus niet neutraal, zelfgenoegzaam of autonoom; 2) het onder punt 1 genoemde kan worden aangetoond door een stringente analyse van de aard van het theoretische denken zelf, zoals het door ieder die zich bezighoudt met wetenschap en wijsbegeerte beoefend wordt. De vraag is nu of het eerste punt niet impliceert, dat het tweede onmogelijk is. (shrink)

The focus of this article is on representations of irregular migration in a Scandinavian context and how irregular migrants are constructed as a target group. A common feature in many European states is the difficult attempt to navigate between an urge for control and respecting, upholding and promoting humanitarian aspects of migration management. Legitimizing policies therefore become extremely important as governments have to appease national voters to remain in power and have to respect European regulations and international conventions. Doing so (...) raises questions of social, political and economic rights, of moral obligations, of sovereignty, and of equity, as well as of how to define target groups and legal and categorical statuses into the debates. Having a backdrop in the theoretical framework of Carol Bacchi, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram and Giorgio Agamben, this article looks at how policy problematizations and constructions of target populations guide and legitimize particular policy approaches and may end up marginalizing and excluding groups in society and ultimately become a challenge for democracy.Dansk abstract: Legitimering af politik: Hvordan politiske tilgange til irregulære indvandrere formuleres og legitimeres i SkandinavienFokus i denne artikel er på repræsentationer af irregulær migration i en skandinavisk kontekst og hvordan illegale indvandrere er konstrueret som målgruppe. Et fælles træk i mange vesteuropæiske nationalstater er det svære forsøg på at navigere mellem kontrol og samtidig respektere, forsvare og fremme humanitære aspekter af migrationsstyringen. At legitimere den givne politik er derfor blevet særdeles vigtigt fordi regeringerne er nødt til at formilde de nationale indvandringsskeptiske vælgere for at forblive ved magten og er nødsaget til at respektere europæiske regler og internationale konventioner. Dette italesætter en diskussion om sociale, politiske og økonomiske rettigheder, af moralske forpligtelser, af suverænitet, af at definere målgrupper og juridiske statuskategorier i debatterne. Artiklen har baggrund i en teoretisk ramme som er udstukket af Carol Bacchi, Anne Schneider, Helen Ingram og Giorgio Agamben. Artiklen ser på, hvordan politiske problematiseringer og konstruktioner af målgrupper vejleder og legitimerer bestemte politiske strategier og kan ende med at marginalisere og udelukke grupper i samfundet og i sidste ende blive en udfordring for demokratiske principper som sådan. (shrink)

Als er iéts duurzaam kan worden genoemd, zijn het wel levensbeschouwingen. Vermoedelijk is bij de mens de reflectie op het eigen leven begonnen toen het cognitieve vermogen om te reflecteren ontstond. Rotstekeningen van tienduizenden jaren oud zijn de eerste tastbare aanwijzingen in die richting. En sindsdien is de mensheid blijven reflecteren op zijn eigen bestaan, op de wereld om hem heen, op het firmament erboven en op de samenhang tussen dat alles. Op welk moment daarbij het bovennatuurlijke, spirituele of goddelijke (...) in de reflecties werd betrokken is onbekend, maar zeker ook al duizenden jaren geleden. Wereldbeschouwingen hebben in de regel implicaties voor het menselijk handelen, ze zijn zelden uitsluitend beschouwend van karakter. Ze bevatten bijvoorbeeld impliciete of expliciete opvattingen over de ontologie, de ‘aard der dingen’, ons vermogen om de werkelijkheid te kennen en ze hebben meestal implicaties voor de ethiek. (shrink)

Buku ini berawal dari sebuah disertasi yang ditulis Sr. Gerardette Philips, RSCJ, pengarangnya, untuk meraih gelar doktor di bidang Ilmu Filsafat di Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta. Penerbitannya menjadi sebuah buku oleh Interfidei—sebuah Penerbit di Indonesia yang menaruh perhatian khusus pada persoalan dialog antaragama— sungguh layak disambut baik. Penerbitan buku ini dalam bahasa Inggris memiliki segi negatif maupun positifnya tersendiri. Segi negatifnya, hal itu membuat jumlah publik pembacanya di Indonesia lebih terbatas pada mereka yang dapat memahami bahasa Inggris. Jumlahnya jelas (...) jauh lebih sedikit dibandingkan dengan jumlah pembaca buku ini kalau ditulis dalam bahasa Indonesia. Walaupun demikian, segi positifnya, dengan diterbitkannya dalam bahasa Inggris, publik pembaca yang dapat mengaksesnya secara internasional menjadi lebih banyak. Apalagi buku ini juga memuat Kata Pengantar dalam bahasa Inggris dari Prof. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, seorang tokoh Muslim yang hendak ditampilkan pengarang buku ini sebagai pemikir sekaligus pelaku dialog Muslim-Kristen yang melampaui pendekatan pluralisme. Tokoh dari pihak agama Kristen yang ditampilkan oleh pengarang adalah Hans Küng. Selama ini banyak orang beranggapan bahwa pluralisme merupakan paham hubungan antaragama, yang memiliki bentuk pendekatan yang paling tepat dalam melakukan dialog antaragama, termasuk di dalamnya dialog antara umat Muslim dan Kristen. Memang, dibandingkan dengan pendekatan eksklusivisme maupun inklusivisme, seperti ditegaskan oleh pengarang buku ini (hlm. 1; 60–63; 67), pluralisme memiliki kelebihan tersendiri. Namun, pluralisme mengandung beberapa kelemahan yang layak dikritik. Paling tidak ada tiga kelemahan pokok dari pendekatan pluralisme yang dicoba ditunjukkan dalam buku ini. Pertama, pluralisme mengandung bahaya tidak mengambil serius identitas keagamaan yang khas dan berbeda untuk setiap agama karena ingin menekankan keselarasan antara semua agama, agar tidak terjadi konflik antara pemeluk agama yang berbeda. Guna menguatkan pendapatnya, pengarang mengutip pernyataan Paul Knitter (hlm. 64) yang berbunyi: “Karena begitu terpesona oleh keindahan sebuah simfoni, kaum pluralis melupakan perbedaan dan kekhasan dari masing-masing alat musik yang dipakai.” Pendekatan pluralisme juga mengandung bahaya jatuh ke dalam relativisme, karena— terdorong oleh kehendak untuk mau bersikap terbuka terhadap penganut agama yang lain dan mau menghormati perbedaan keyakinan mereka— para pluralis lalu cenderung merelatifkan klaim kebenaran agamanya sendiri. Tanpa harus menjadi seorang eksklusivis—yang memutlakkan klaim kebenaran keyakinan agamanya sendiri seraya menganggap sesat keyakinan agama yang lain—keseriusan untuk sungguh meyakini kebenaran iman agama yang dipeluknya, sangat diperlukan dalam berdialog agar tidak menjadi kompromistis dan jatuh ke dalam relativisme. Sikap terbuka terhadap para pemeluk agama yang lain—yang berbeda dengan agamanya sendiri—memang diperlukan dalam sebuah dialog antaragama yang sejati. Namun, hal itu perlu dilakukan tanpa kehilangan jatidirinya sendiri sebagai pemeluk agama tertentu yang diyakini kebenarannya. Kelemahan ketiga dari pluralisme adalah bahaya menjadi imperialis tanpa disengaja. Kembali mengutip pernyataan Knitter (hlm.68), pengarang menyebut adanya dua kemungkinan seorang pluralis yang berniat baik tanpa disengaja menjadi seorang imperialis. Pertama, dengan terlalu cepat seorang pluralis menarik kesimpulan tentang adanya suatu dasar pijak atau platform yang sama dari macam-macam agama yang ada yang dapat mempersatukan semuanya. Kedua, ia dengan terlalu mudah merumuskan panduan umum bersama untuk melakukan dialog antaragama-agama yang berbeda................ Salah satu kelemahan buku ini—sebagai sebuah buku yang dimaksud- kan untuk dibaca oleh publik pembaca umum—adalah bahwa formatnya masih mempertahankan format aslinya sebagai sebuah disertasi dan belum cukup diolah untuk dijadikan buku yang lebih dapat diakses dan lebih enak dibaca oleh publik pembaca umum. Bahkan di dalamnya masih dapat ditemukan kata “disertasi” dan belum diganti dengan kata “buku” (lihat hlm. 11). Semboyan dalam bahasa Latin “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus,” artinya “Di luar Gereja tidak ada keselamatan,” yang dalam teks asli disertasi salah ditulis “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Sales!” masih terulang kesalahannya dalam buku ini (lihat hlm. 90). Lepas dari kelemahan kecil di atas, penerbitan buku ini sekali lagi sungguh layak dihargai dan jelas menambah khasanah intelektual yang dapat memperkaya wawasan maupun memberi inspirasi yang berguna bagi siapa saja yang bermaksud mengembangkan dialog antaragama pada umumnya dan khususnya dialog Muslim-Kristen yang menjadi fokus perhatian dalam buku ini. Sr. Gerardette Philips, RSCJ, Ph.D., penulis buku ini, bukan hanya menjadi seorang akademikus yang telah meneliti pemikiran Hans Küng dan Seyyed Hosein Nasr, tetapi ia sendiri sudah cukup lama terlibat dalam upaya mengembangkan dialog Muslim- Kristen. Beliau bahkan sempat menjadi anggota tim penasihat Paus Benedictus XVI dalam Komisi Kepausan dalam Bidang Hubungan dengan Islam. Pengalamannya yang cukup banyak dalam mewujudkan dialog hidup antara umat Islam dan umat Katolik jelas ikut memperkaya wawasan dalam buku ini. (J. Sudarminta, Program Pascasarjana, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

Het Leids-Haags Allegorieënlexicon toont nieuwe perspectieven op de maatschappelijke werkelijkheid met een actuele duiding van vijftig kernthema’s uit de wetenschap. De auteurs zijn de duale promovendi en hun promotores van Leiden University Dual PhD Centre The Hague. Ze worden daarbij geïnspireerd door de metafoor van de grot van Plato: Waar ben ik? Waar sta ik? Welk beeld zie ik? Hoe kan ik dat begrijpen? Er ontstaan beeldende voorstellingen van begrippen waarin op zoek wordt gegaan naar de centrale gedachten die ten (...) grondslag liggen aan die begrippen. Zo wordt de veranderende wereld waargenomen met het besef dat we nooit kunnen weten of we de gehele werkelijkheid kunnen zien of begrijpen. De waarneming is afhankelijk van de zichtpositie die de waarnemer inneemt. Zo ontstaan verbeeldingen van waarnemingen van ons menselijk bestaan. Zoals: assimilatie, creativiteit, gender, kunstenaarschap, magistraat, participatie, regels, tragedie en verzorgingsstaat. Eerst wordt actuele literatuur besproken. Daarna volgt discussie. Tenslotte neemt de auteur positie in. Met bijdragen van promotores Wilfried Admiraal, Ingrid van Biezen, Hans Borgman, Paul Cliteur, Jaap van den Herik, Rikki Holtmaat, Willem Otterspeer, Jos Raadschelders, Robert Tijssen, Wim Willems en promovendi. (shrink)

One takes advantage of some basic properties of every homotopic \(\lambda\)-model (e.g. extensional Kan complex) to explore the higher \(\beta\eta\)-conversions, which would correspond to proofs of equality between terms of a theory of equality of any extensional Kan complex. Besides, Identity types based on computational paths are adapted to a type-free theory with higher \(\lambda\)-terms, whose equality rules would be contained in the theory of any \(\lambda\)-homotopic model.

Dit artikel is, samen met een nog volgend tweede, bedoeld als aanzet tot een bredere studie. Die studie zal, naar ik hoop, binnen twee jaar voltooid zijn. Ze maakt in zekere mate deel uit van een onderzoeksprogramma dat in uitvoering is aan de Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte van de Vrije Universiteit. Het is nu niet van belang de eigen plaats ervan binnen dat programma nauwkeuriger te omschrijven. Wel kan worden gezegd dat de studie een sterk historische inslag heeft, maar uitmondt in (...) een meer persoonlijke, systematische beschouwing. Dat artikelen met dit thema een plaats krijgen in Philosophia Reformata, behoeft waarschijnlijk weinig betoog. Een tijdschrift dat ontstaan is uit een herbezinning op reikwijdte en functie van “rede”, een herbezinning die ertoe leidde “liefde” als dieptemotief in de werkelijkheid te honoreren, —zo’n tijdschrift lijkt geen ongeschikte plek. (shrink)

Die voortgesette proses van implementering van nuwe materiaal wat gebruik word vir katkisasie in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika vertoon 'n besondere trajek. Die proses het, in terme van geloof, begin met die formalisering van sowel die geloofsbegrip as die beskrywing van die inhoud van geloof. Dit is voortgesit deur 'n proses van die objektivering van die inhoud van geloof tot feite wat geleer kan word en is uiteindelik voltrek deur die implementering van 'n pragmatiese opvoedkundige doelwit waarin geloof (...) bloot 'n middel tot 'n doel geword het. Die trajek kan kortliks soos volg beskryf word: • Die Heidelbergse Kategismus Geloof is die aanneming van die beloftes van God wat vertroue in die lewende God skep. • 'Kortbegrip': Geloof is sekere kennis van God en sy beloftes en 'n hartlike vertroue dat al my sondes om Christus ontwil vergewe is. • Die belydenis van die Hervormers: Ek glo in God beteken dat ek al my vertroue op God stel en Hom op sy woord neem. • Geloofsleer: Geloof is kennis van die Woord van God en vertroue in die God van die Woord. • Geloof en Lewe 11: Geloof is die toe-eiening van kenbare geloofoorleweringe wat in die Bybel opgeneem is. Die kerk kan daarom kinders deur 'n proses van kategese begelei tot geloofsvolwassenheid. Vandag is die uitgangspunt van katkisasie en die motivering daarvoor in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika die oortuiging dat die kerk kinders deur 'n proses van kategese tot godsdienstige volwassenheid kan lei. Van Selms se kategismus pas nie in die trajek wat hier beskryf word nie. Die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika sou vandag heeltemal anders gelyk het as meer as een generasie van die lidmate van die Kerk aan hierdie kategeseboek blootgestel was. (shrink)

Supercommentary, with commentaries on Praśastapādabhāṣya, a work on Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣikasūtra, treatise on the Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy.

Acknowledgments 1. Culture Is Essential 2. Culture Exists 3. Culture Evolves 4. Culture Is an Adaptation 5. Culture Is Maladaptive 6. Culture and Genes Coevolve 7. Nothing about Culture Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution.

Philosophers often consider problems of free will and moral luck in isolation from one another, but both are about control and moral responsibility. One problem of free will concerns the difficult task of specifying the kind of control over our actions that is necessary and sufficient to act freely. One problem of moral luck refers to the puzzling task of explaining whether and how people can be morally responsible for actions permeated by factors beyond their control. This chapter explicates and (...) assesses skeptical, compatibilist, and libertarian approaches to moral luck. First, I argue that what makes the above problems of free will and moral luck distinct is largely their emphasis on different kinds of luck. Second, I describe and evaluate skeptical arguments from constitutive and circumstantial luck that it is impossible to act freely. Third, I explicate and assess various support and implication relationships between various kinds of compatibilism and libertarianism, on the one hand, and causal, constitutive, circumstantial, and resultant moral luck, on the other. (shrink)

Background:Moral distress occurs when constraints prevent healthcare providers from acting in accordance with their core moral values to provide good patient care. The experience of moral distress in nurses might be magnified during the current Covid-19 pandemic.Objective:To explore causes of moral distress in nurses caring for Covid-19 patients and identify strategies to enhance their moral resiliency.Research design:A qualitative study using a qualitative content analysis of focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. We purposively sampled 31 nurses caring for Covid-19 patients in (...) the acute care units within large academic medical systems in Maryland and New York City during April to June 2020.Ethical considerations:We obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland, Baltimore.Results:We identified themes and sub-themes representative of major causes of moral distress in nurses caring Covid-19 patients. These included (a) lack of knowledge and uncertainty regarding how to treat a new illness; (b) being overwhelmed by the depth and breadth of the Covid-19 illness; (c) fear of exposure to the virus leading to suboptimal care; (d) adopting a team model of nursing care that caused intra-professional tensions and miscommunications; (e) policies to reduce viral transmission (visitation policy and PPE policy) that prevented nurses to assume their caring role; (f) practicing within crisis standards of care; and (g) dealing with medical resource scarcity. Participants discussed their coping mechanisms and suggested future strategies.Discussion/Conclusion:Our study affirms new causes of moral distress related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Institutions need to develop a supportive ethical climate that can restore nurses’ moral resiliency. Such a climate should include non-hierarchical interdisciplinary spaces where all providers can meet together as moral peers to discuss their experiences. (shrink)

As there is currently a neo-Aristotelian revival currently taking place within contemporary metaphysics and dispositions, or causal powers are now being routinely utilised in theories of causality and modality, more attention is beginning to be paid to a central Aristotelian concern: the metaphysics of substantial unity, and the doctrine of hylomorphism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of hylomorphism present in the contemporary literature and argue that not only does each engender unique conceptual difficulties, but neither adequately captures the (...) metaphysics of Aristotelian hylomorphism. Thus both strands of contemporary hylomorphism, I argue, fundamentally misunderstand what substantial unity amounts to in the hylomorphic framework – namely, the metaphysical inseparability of matter and form. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of moral uncertainty in explaining the morally disruptive character of new technologies. We argue that existing accounts of technomoral change do not fully explain its disruptiveness. This explanatory gap can be bridged by examining the epistemic dimensions of technomoral change, focusing on moral uncertainty and inquiry. To develop this account, we examine three historical cases: the introduction of the early pregnancy test, the contraception pill, and brain death. The resulting account highlights what we call “differential (...) disruption” and provides a resource for fields such as technology assessment, ethics of technology, and responsible innovation. (shrink)

In this paper I will introduce a new compatibilist account of free action: indirect conscious control compatibilism, or just indirect compatibilism for short. On this account, actions are free either when they are caused by compatibilist‐friendly conscious psychological processes, or else by sub‐personal level processes influenced in particular ways by compatibilist‐friendly conscious psychological processes. This view is motivated by a problem faced by a certain family of compatibilist views, which I call conscious control views. These views hold that we act (...) freely when we act in a way that is caused by certain conscious psychological processes. One problem for such views is that current neuroscience suggests that most of our actions are not caused by such processes. Instead, many of the actions we typically suppose are free are caused by sub‐personal level processes and hence would count as not free according to contemporary conscious control views. I argue, contra these views, that many actions caused by these sub‐personal level processes are indirectly free. Further, most of the actions we ordinarily judge to be free are free in this indirect manner. (shrink)

What is property, and why does our species happen to have it? In The Property Species, the economist Bart Wilson explores how we acquire, perceive, and know the custom of property, and why this might be relevant to social scientists, philosophers, and legal scholars for understanding how property works in the twenty-first century.

The article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer’s claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as well as the (...) changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian ‘imperialism’ toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer’s arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events. (shrink)

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU confirms the protection of personal data as a fundamental human right and affords data subjects more control over the way their personal information is processed, shared, and analyzed. However, where data are processed by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, asserting control and providing adequate explanations is a challenge. Due to massive increases in computing power and big data processing, modern AI algorithms are too complex and opaque to be understood by most data (...) subjects. Articles 15 and 22 of the GDPR provide a modest regulatory framework for automated data processing by, among other things, mandating that data controllers inform data subjects about when it is being used, and its logic and ramifications. Nevertheless, due to the phrasing of the articles and the numerous exceptions they allow, doubts have arisen about their effectiveness. In this paper, we empirically evaluate the quality and effectiveness of AI disclosures as mandated by the GDPR. By means of an online survey (N = 835), we investigated how data subjects expect to be informed about the automated processing of their data. We then conducted a content analysis of the AI disclosures of N = 100 companies and organizations. The combined findings reveal that current GDPR-mandated disclosures do not meet the expectations and needs of data subjects. Explanations drawn up following the guidelines of the generic formulations of the GDPR differ widely and are often vague, incomplete and lack transparency. In our conclusions we identify a path towards standardizing and optimizing AI information notices. (shrink)

This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking that digitally-based artificial intelligence may be incapable of having coherent macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between (...) the three. Section 2 then argues that if this is true and micropsychism—the panpsychist view that phenomenal consciousness or its precursors exist at a microphysical level of reality—is also true, then human brains must somehow manipulate fundamental microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes in an analog manner that renders them phenomenally coherent at a macro level. However, Sect. 3 argues that because digital computation abstracts away from microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes—representing cognitive functions non-monotonically in terms of digits—digital computation may be inherently incapable of realizing coherent macroconscious experience. Thus, if panpsychism is true, digital AI may be incapable of achieving phenomenal coherence. Finally, Sect. 4 briefly examines our argument’s implications for Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory theory of consciousness, which we contend may need to be supplanted by a theory of macroconsciousness as analog microphysical-phenomenal information integration. (shrink)

We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems (...) to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to increase the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to decrease the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports. (shrink)

I am aware of the tree and its leaves, but am I aware of my awareness of these things? When I try to introspect my awareness, I just find myself attending to objects and their properties. This observation is known as the ‘transparency of experience’. On the other hand, I seem to directly know that I am aware. Given the first observation, it is not clear how I know that I am aware. Fred Dretske thought that the problem was so (...) acute that he issued the challenge of answering ‘How do you know that you are not a zombie?’ I propose that a view found in the Advaita Vedanta, that awareness is self luminous, reconciles these two observations. I understand self-luminosity as the thesis that: (1) I am implicitly aware of my awareness and (2) I am phenomenally aware of a distinct phenomenal character of my awareness. In support of the first claim, that I apparently only attend to objects in the world when introspecting perceptual experience, suggests that I do not know my awareness explicitly, but rather that I must know it implicitly. In support of the second claim, I argue that the mere fact that I am perceptually conscious is not sufficient to allow me to know that I am perceptually conscious. In particular, the qualities I am perceptually aware of do not tell me that I aware of them, rather they just seem to be properties of objects. I also assess whether strategies for responding to Cartesian sceptical scenarios can be employed against Dretske’s consciousness scepticism. I argue that these strategies either fail to distinguish me from a zombie or they do not adequately describe my epistemic situation. By contrast to other accounts, if awareness has its own distinct phenomenal character, then it cannot be considered to be a prima facie property of the world, hence the self-luminosity of awareness provides a plausible account of how I know that I’m not a zombie. (shrink)