Results for 'Bare particulars'

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  1. No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If (...)
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  2. Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):149-159.
    My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to (...)
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  3. Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars).Daniel Giberman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):305-321.
    A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist’s Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject spatiotemporally located (...)
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  4.  81
    Are Bare Particulars Constituents?Richard Brian Davis - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410.
    In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. (...)
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  5. On Spacetime, Points, and Bare Particulars.Martin Schmidt - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (1):69-77.
    In his paper Bare Particulars, T. Sider claims that one of the most plausible candidates for bare particulars are spacetime points. The aim of this paper is to shed light on Sider’s reasoning and its consequences. There are three concepts of spacetime points that allow their identification with bare particulars. One of them, Moderate structural realism, is considered to be the most adequate due its appropriate approach to spacetime metric and moderate view of mereological (...)
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  6.  51
    Bare Particulars Laid Bare.Katarina Perović - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3):277-295.
    Bare particulars have received a fair amount of bad press. Many find such entities to be obviously incoherent and dismiss them without much consideration. Proponents of bare particulars, on their part, have not done enough to clearly motivate and characterize bare particulars, thus leaving them open to misinterpretations. With this paper, I try to remedy this situation. I put forward a much-needed positive case for bare particulars through the four problems that they (...)
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  7.  26
    Mere Individuators — Why the Theory of Bare Particulars Is Coherent but Implausible.Henrik Rydéhn - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--448.
    The claim that there are bare particulars — individuals possessing no properties — is a highly controversial thesis in metaphysics. It has been heavily criticized and is often thought to be subject to a number of decisive counterarguments, some of which aim to show that there is something incoherent about the very idea of a bare particular. I believe that the theory of bare particulars can, given certain modifications, be defended from such accusations. But the (...)
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  8. Yes: Bare Particulars!Niall Connolly - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1355-1370.
    What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism or the principles that distinguish (...)
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  9. Load Bare-Ing Particulars.Nathan Wildman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1419-1434.
    Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to (...)
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  10. "Bare Particulars".Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
    One often hears a complaint about “bare particulars”. This complaint has bugged me for years. I know it bugs others too, but no one seems to have vented in print, so that is what I propose to do. (I hope also to say a few constructive things along the way.) The complaint is aimed at the substratum theory, which says that particulars are, in a certain sense, separate from their universals. If universals and particulars are separate, (...)
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  11.  24
    The Aristotelian Alternative to Humean Bundles and Lockean Bare Particulars: Lowe and Loux on Material Substance .Robert Allen - manuscript
    Must we choose between reducing material substances to collections of properties, a’ la Berkeley and Hume or positing bare particulars, in the manner of Locke? Having repudiated the notion that a substance could simply be a collection of properties existing on their own, is there a viable alternative to the Lockean notion of a substratum, a being essentially devoid of character? E.J. Lowe and Michael Loux would answer here in the affirmative. Both recommend hylomorphism as an upgrade on (...)
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  12. Bare Particulars and Exemplifcation.Timothy Pickavance - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):95-108.
    Bare particulars tend to get a bad rap. But often, the arguments lodged against bare particulars seem to miss important aspects of the theoretical context of bare particulars. In particular, these arguments fail to situate bare particulars within a constituent ontology with substrates, and thus fail to appreciate an important consequence of that context: the need for two types of exemplification. In this paper, I do three things. First, I motivate and describe (...)
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  13. Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz.J. P. Moreland & Timothy Pickavance - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.
    Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the (...)
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  14. In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars.Timothy Pickavance - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
    In a recent article in this journal, Richard Brian Davis argues that 'bare particulars [as defended by J. P. Moreland] face several serious shortcomings'[2003: 547]. I argue that Davis's two principal criticisms fall flat.
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  15.  15
    Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz.J. P. T. MorelandPickavance - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1-13.
    Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the (...)
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  16.  88
    Against Bare Particulars A Response to Moreland and Pickavance.D. W. Mertz - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):14-20.
    In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; (...)
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  17.  81
    'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed.Richard Brian Davis - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
    In a recent series of articles, J. P. Moreland has attempted to revive the idea that bare particulars are indispensable for individuating concrete particulars. The success of the project turns on Moreland's proposal that while bare particulars are indeed 'partially clad'--that is, exemplify at least some properties--they are nevertheless 'bare' in that they lack internal constituents. I argue that 'partially clad' bare particulars (PCBPs) are impervious not only to traditional objections, but also (...)
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  18. Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195.
    An argument to the effect that, under a few reasonable assumptions, the bare particular ontology is best understood in terms of supersubstativalism: objects are identical to regions of space(-time) and properties directly inhere in space(-time) points or region as their bearers.
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  19.  92
    Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars.P. J. Moreland - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):251-263.
  20. Bare Particulars.Edwin B. Allaire - 1963 - Philosophical Studies 14 (1-2):1 - 8.
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  21. Another Look at Bare Particulars.Edwin B. Allaire - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):16 - 21.
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  22.  11
    Predicate Logic and Bare Particulars.David Oderberg - 2005 - In The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers. pp. 183-210.
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  23.  57
    Bare Particulars, Names, and Elementary Propositions.L. E. Palmieri - 1960 - Synthese 12 (1):71 - 78.
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  24.  60
    Meaning, Individuals, and the Problem of Bare Particulars: A Study in Husserl's Ideas. [REVIEW]Gary L. Cesarz - 1985 - Husserl Studies 2 (2):157-168.
  25.  48
    Bare Particulars and Acquaintance: A Reply to Mr. Trentman.Kenneth Barber - 1967 - Dialogue 5 (4):580-583.
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  26.  26
    Recognition, Naming and Bare Particulars.John Trentman - 1966 - Dialogue 5 (1):19-30.
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  27. Bare Particulars and Persistence in Bergmann.L. Angelone & G. Torrengo - 2009 - In Langlet B. Monnoyer J.-M. (ed.), Gustav Bergmann : Phenomenological Realism and Dialectical Ontology. Ontos Verlag. pp. 137--154.
     
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  28. Bare Particulars and Acquaintance.Kenneth Barber - 1967 - Dialogue 5 (4):580.
     
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  29. Bare Particulars, Form, and Content: A Structural Analysis of Gustav Bergmann's Ontology.Sandra S. Walther - 1966 - Dissertation, Yale University
     
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  30. A Puzzle for Particulars?David S. Brown & Richard Brian Davis - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65.
    In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this (...)
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  31.  48
    Loux on Particulars: Bare and Concrete.L. Nathan Oaklander & Alicia Rothstein - 2000 - Modern Schoolman 78 (102):97-102.
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  32. The Brave New Bare Particularism.Richard Davis - 2004 - Modern Schoolman 81 (4):267-273.
    Initially introduced to the philosophical world as elusive, we-know-notwhats—substrata underlying the properties had or exemplified by things, but themselves bereft of properties—bare particulars have been dismissed as undetectable, unnecessary, and even incoherent. Hardly a warm welcome. It appears, however, that times are changing. In a recent series of articles, for example, J. P. Moreland has argued that “bare particulars are crucial entities in any adequate overall theory of individuation”;’ that is, concrete particulars cannot be individuated (...)
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  33. Particulars: Bare, Naked, and Nude.Robert Baker - 1967 - Noûs 1 (2):211-212.
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  34.  45
    Particulars--Bare and Qualified.William P. Alston - 1954 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (2):253-258.
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  35.  11
    Wilfrid Sellars. On the Logic of Complex Particulars. Mind, N.S. Vol. 58 , Pp. 306–338. - Wilfrid Sellars. Particulars. English with Spanish Extracto. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 13 No. 2 , Pp. 184–199. - William P. Alston. ParticularsBare and Qualified. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 15 No. 2 , Pp. 253–258. [REVIEW]Carl G. Hempel - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (4):441-442.
  36.  9
    Sellars Wilfrid. On the Logic of Complex Particulars. Mind, N.S. Vol. 58 , Pp. 306–338.Sellars Wilfrid. Particulars. English with Spanish Extracto. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 13 No. 2 , Pp. 184–199.Alston William P.. ParticularsBare and Qualified. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 15 No. 2 , Pp. 253–258. [REVIEW]Carl G. Hempel - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (4):441-442.
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  37.  10
    Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1979 - In Michael Loux (ed.), Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. Doubleday. pp. 264-84.
    See Abstract under this title of the journal article below.
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  38. How the Dead Live.Niall Connolly - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):83-103.
    This paper maintains (following Yougrau 1987; 2000 and Hinchliff 1996) that the dead and other former existents count as examples of non-existent objects. If the dead number among the things there are, a further question arises: what is it to be dead—how should the state of being dead be characterised? It is argued that this state should be characterised negatively: the dead are not persons, philosophers etc. They lack any of the (intrinsic) qualities they had while they lived. The only (...)
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  39.  48
    Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley’s Regress.Bo R. Meinertsen - 2018 - Springer Singapore.
    This book addresses the metaphysics of Armstrongian states of affairs, i.e. instantiations of naturalist universals by particulars. The author argues that states of affairs are the best candidate for truthmakers and, in the spirit of logical atomism, that we need no molecular truthmakers for positive truths. In the book's context, this has the pleasing result that there are no molecular states of affairs. Following this account of truthmaking, the author first shows that the particulars in (first-order) states of (...)
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  40.  55
    Exemplification and Universal Realism.Erwin Tegtmeier - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):261-267.
    The relation between universal and particular is considered to be the Achilles’ heel of universal realism. However, modern universal realism with facts does not have the difficulties which traditional Platonic universal realism had. Its exemplification relation connecting particulars and universals in atomic facts is very different from Platonic participation. Bradley’s regress argument against the exemplification relation can be refuted in two different ways. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to avoid the assumption of an exemplification relation and thus to go (...)
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  41.  76
    How to Individuate Universals—Or Not.Richard Brian Davis - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (3):551-566.
    In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.
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  42.  96
    Particulars.Johanna Seibt - 2010 - In Roberto Poli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Theories and Applications of Ontology. Springer. pp. 23--55.
    According to the standard view of particularity, an entity is a particular just in case it necessarily has a unique spatial location at any time of its existence. That the basic entities of the world we speak about in common sense and science are particular entities in this sense is the thesis of “foundational particularism,” a theoretical intuition that has guided Western ontological research from its beginnings to the present day. The main aim of this paper is to review the (...)
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  43.  70
    Sortals for Dummies.John E. Sarnecki - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):145-164.
    Advocates of sortal essentialism have argued that concepts like “thing” or “object” lack the unambiguous individuative criteria necessary to play the role of genuine sortals in reference. Instead, they function as “dummy sortals” which are placeholders or incomplete designations. In disqualifying apparent placeholder sortals, however, these philosophers have posed insuperable problems for accounts of childhood conceptual development. I argue that recent evidence in psychology demonstrates that children do possess simple or basic sortals of physical objects or things. I contend that (...)
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  44. Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology.Michael J. Loux (ed.) - 1970 - University of Notre Dame Press.
    Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, (...)
     
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  45. Particulars and Persistence.Mark Johnston - 1984 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The thesis is concerned with the outline of an ontology which admits only particulars and with the persistence of particulars through time. In Chapter 1 it is argued that a neglected class of particulars--the cases--have to be employed in order to solve the problem of universals, i.e., to give a satisfactory account of properties and kinds. In Chapter 2, two ways in which particulars could persist though time are distinguished. Difficulties are raised for the view that (...)
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  46.  44
    Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (3):478-490.
    In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay--a bare particular--does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay--a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premise (...)
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  47. Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars.Noa Latham - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a classification of particulars in terms of their relations to spatiotemporal and spatial regions. It begins with an examination of spatiotemporal particulars, and then explores the extent to which a parallel account can be offered of continuants, or spatial particulars that can endure and change over time, assuming such particulars exist. For every spatial particular there are spatiotemporal particulars that can be described as its life and parts (...)
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  48.  68
    Particulars, Universals and Russell’s Late Ontology.Herbert Hochberg - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:129-137.
    Russell’s late ontology sought to avoid “wholly colourless particulars” (substrata, points of space, bare instants of time) by appealing to complexes of compresent qualities in place of particulars that exemplify qualitieso Yet he insisted on (i) calling qualities like redness “discontinuous,” “repeatable” particulars, and (ii) claiming that such qualities were not universals, since they were not exemplified but were ultimate subjects that exemplified universal relations and universal qualities. It is argued that his choice of terminology is (...)
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  49. Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72).
    The traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by a "substratum" was rejected by conscientious empiricists like Berkeley, Hume and Russell on the grounds that only qualities, not the substratum, could be experienced. To these philosophers the proper alternative seemed obvious. One simply eliminates the "unknowable" element in which qualities are alleged to inhere. In Russell's words, "What would commonly be called a 'thing' is nothing but a bundle of coexisting qualities such as redness, hardness, etc."' (...)
     
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  50.  32
    Plain Paritculars.Ernani Magalhaes - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92:87-108.
    Are concrete objects in some sense made up of the properties they exemplify? A distinguished tradition holds they are. I begin by defending the distinction: there is a real and not just semantic distinction between asserting and denying that concrete objects have their properties as parts. I then argue in favor of the view that concrete objects are not made up of their parts. First, this view has less ontological baggage than its opponent. Next, the supposed advantages of the alternative (...)
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