Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity (the difference principle), social democracy includes four possible principles in an eligible set that could be chosen as a principle of (...) reciprocity. However, I argue that von Platz’s conception of reciprocity still fails to justify welfare-state capitalism. Of the four principles of reciprocity in social democracy’s eligible set, one of them, the principle of utility, does not express a notion of reciprocity and thus does not belong. The other three – the principle of equality, the difference principle, and the principle of equity – are not compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Thus, since capitalism cannot satisfy a principle of reciprocity in the (revised) eligible set, it is incompatible with the social democratic interpretation of democratic equality. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit möchte eine entscheidende Phase im Denken des Deutschen Idealismus beleuchten. Gemäß dem Diktum der Neuzeit, nach dem Wahrheit mit Gewißheit gleichzusetzen ist, kann allein das Ich als das allem Zugrundeliegende in Anspruch genommen werden. Es ist die Transzendentalphilosophie Kants, die zuerst dieser Einsicht rückhaltlos folgt und ein philosophisches System auf dem Boden des Ich zu errichten sucht. Aber Kant hat das volle Wesen des Ich nicht durchklären können. Deshalb erweist sich auch das Herzstück seiner theoretischen Philosophie, die (...) Deduktion der Kategorien, als nicht genugtuend durchgeführt. Erst Fichte gelingt es, das Ich als ursprüngliche, alles umfassende Einheit zu entfalten. Das ermöglicht in eins die Deduktion universaler Kategorien mit systematischer Strenge. Unwiderruflich ist damit die Vollendungsgestalt eines Denkens erreicht, dessen Prinzip das Wesen des Ich ist. (shrink)

Wann immer wir etwas sehen, horen, fuhlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustande des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschliesslich die Gegenstande dieser Zustande prasent, (...) niemals aber das Subjekt oder der Zustand selbst (zumindest nicht als solche). Diese Antwort widerspricht einigen in der Philosophie des Geistes tief verwurzelten Auffassungen. Eine davon ist die Auffassung, das phanomenale Bewusstsein von Zustanden des Erscheinens bestunde in irgendeiner unmittelbaren Bekanntschaft mit eben diesen Zustanden. In Wahrheit, so wird argumentiert, hat das fragliche Bewusstsein eine auf die Welt gerichtete Struktur. Es ist nichts anderes als das Prasent-Sein von Gegenstanden in Zustanden des Erscheinens. Dieses Ergebnis hat bedeutende Konsequenzen. Es stellt insbesondere die klassische Taxonomie mentaler Zustande in Frage. Einerseits lasst sich die Unterscheidung von intentionalen und phanomenalen Eigenschaften nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn das phanomenale Bewusstsein von Zustanden des Erscheinens ist eine Art der Intentionalitat. Andererseits lasst sich die Einheit des Merkmals der Intentionalitat nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn die Intentionalitat von Zustanden des Erscheinens ist von grundsatzlich anderer Art als die Intentionalitat propositionaler Einstellungen. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, nicht weiter zwischen intentionalen und phanomenalen Zustanden zu unterscheiden, sondern zwischen verschiedenen Arten intentionaler Zustande. (shrink)

Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduced through a puzzle, and readers are invited to (...) work their own ways toward a solution. Hetherington’s light and undogmatic style encourages class discussion and independent thought rather than the memorization of “book” answers.Covering all of the most important epistemological issues, informed by classical and contemporary literature, and rich in probing questions and suggestions for further readings, Knowledge Puzzles is a pedagogical breakthrough. Whether it is used as a main text or supplement, this lucid and engaging text will be welcomed by both teachers and students. (shrink)

Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In the present paper, I argue that modal dualism is false. I do so via an argument that differs from most previous arguments against modal dualism in that it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism or modal rationalism. The point of my argument is, instead, that modal dualism is internally inconsistent because it (...) is the result of the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the abandonment of these semantic and epistemological assumptions. The relevant inconsistency manifests itself in the modal dualist notion of epistemic modality. For this notion to play the explanatory roles assigned to it by modal dualists, it has to be a notion of a genuinely epistemic kind of modality. But the only way to make sense of such a notion is via just those semantic or epistemological assumptions that the modal dualist is keen to avoid. Anyone willing to abandon these assumptions has to go further and detach the epistemic from the modal altogether. (shrink)

Emotional stimuli (e.g. words, images) are often remembered better than neutral stimuli. However, little is known about how memory is affected by an environmentally induced emotional state (without any overtly emotional occurrences) – the focus of this study. Participants were randomly assigned to discovery (n = 305) and replication (n = 306) subsamples and viewed a desktop virtual environment before rating their emotions and completing objective (i.e. item, temporal-order, duration) and subjective (e.g. vividness, sensory detail, coherence) memory measures. In both (...) samples, a Partial Least Squares Correlation analysis showed that an emotional state characterised by high negative emotion (i.e. threat, fear, anxiety) and arousal was reliably associated with better memory in both objective (i.e. item) and subjective (i.e. vividness and sensory detail) domains. No reliable associations were observed for any temporal memory measures (objective or subjective). Thus, an environmentally induced state of negative emotion corresponds with enhanced memory for indices of episodic memory pertaining to “what” happened, but not necessarily “when” it happened. (shrink)

In athletics, coaches and athletes share a unique and important relationship. Recently Jowett and her colleagues (Jowett & Cockerill, 2003; Jowett & Meek, 2000; Jowett & Ntoumanis, 2003, 2004; Jowett & Timson-Katchis, 2005) utilized relationship research (focusing on, for example, marital, familial and workplace relationships) from conjoining fields, and in particular social and cognitive psychology, to develop and test a four-component model (4 C’s) that depicts the most influential relational and emotional components (closeness, commitment, complementarity and co-orientation) of coach-athlete relationships. (...) Proceeding from a review of the literature on human touch communication to examine research on the power of touch to exchange relational and emotional messages (Hertenstein et al., 2006), the present study explores coaches’ and athletes’ collective experiences of communicating via touch, utilizing in-depth interviews with eight college coaches and athletes. A phenomenological approach was used to gather, analyze and interpret the data, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) philosophical exploration of perception and human experience, which emphasizes the body as a means of communicating with the world. The findings indicate that touch between coaches and athletes increased at major events when emotions and tensions ran high. In addition, touch involved showing appreciation, instructing, comforting and giving attention, and affected perceptions of relationships. The findings also show that touch communication is influenced by societal factors, such as gender, relational stage, and what spectators, parents and other athletes may think. By illustrating how touch is enacted and experienced by a group of college coaches and athletes, the study represents an initial step toward understanding touch communication in the coach-athlete dyad. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007. (shrink)

Logical Holism and Wittgenstein’s ‘Practical Turn’. – Logical holism is the idea that each elementary proposition belongs to a system and is logically connected to other propositions of that system. In this paper I explore this idea and draw its connections to the nature of negative propositions and the ‘problem of recognition’ on the basis of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. In the first section I argue that in January 1930 the idea leads Wittgenstein to a better understanding of how the negative feature (...) is expressed in propositions, thereby raising the problem of recognition to which he is not yet able to find a proper solution. In the second section I explore how the problem still persists during Wittgenstein’s ‘practical turn’. What he now calls the ‘problem of representation’ forces him to change again his conception of propositions. In the final section I argue that this change is mainly due to the modification of his conception of hypotheses which urges a solution to the problem of representation, though the problem remains unsolved in January 1930. (shrink)

A communities of practice framework views learning in terms of identity (trans)formation within and through participation, utilizing a set of shared resources, in a community organized around a joint endeavor, or practice. From an ethnomethodological perspective, however, the theoretical notions of community, shared resources, and identity constitute not explanatory resources, but rather topics requiring data-grounded exploration. In other words, the following empirical questions arise: If and how the participants (a) organize their group as community, (b) co-constitute a shared repertoire of (...) participatory resources, and (c) work up and manage identities as practitioners within that community. In the present study, I examine interactions at conversation analytic data sessions in Japan. The analyses focus on how the participants use terminology during their participation in doing data analysis, and how such terminology use is implicated in constituting their group as a community, and in working up and managing identities within that community. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis as articulated in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’. First, I argue that in Chapter XII, Wittgenstein draws on his account of infinity to begin to challenge the view that all hypotheses can be proven by empirical evidence. I then argue that in Chapter XXII that Wittgenstein sharpens this conception of hypotheses claiming that no hypotheses can be verified. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis relates to (...) his practical view of how language functions. (shrink)

Models for clinical ethics case consultation often make reference to ‘balancing’ or ‘weighing’ moral considerations, without further detail. In this paper, we investigate balancing in clinical ethics case consultation. We suggest that, while clinical ethics services cannot resolve ongoing deep philosophical debates about the nature of ethical reasoning, clinical ethicists can and should be more systematic and transparent when balancing considerations in case consultations. We conceptualise balancing on a spectrum from intuitive to deliberative, and argue that good balancing in case (...) consultation involves articulating reasons for giving something more or less weight. We develop a framework of four practical strategies for better balancing in clinical ethics case consultation: intuitions as a launchpad, drilling down, pairwise comparison and group deliberation. (shrink)

The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are (...) pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss whether the view that understanding is the ability to relate the use of an expression to a certain purpose leads to a theory of meaning as use. In particular, I investigate the view that a theory of meaning relies on the assumption that use is related to immanent purposes of language. I inquire whether it is possible to identify those purposes that seem essential for the use of language. Interpreting Wittgenstein, I argue that this idea (...) relies on a misunderstanding between purposes and effects. Single purposes are not to be conceived of as essential for the use of language. However, if we want to speak of an essential purpose of language, I argue, this purpose is to be conceived of as an end in itself. I draw the conclusion that the use of language is an end in itself rather than a means that fulfils essential purposes. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a (...) more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 In this article, we will look at the political philosophical theories of Brian Barry ( Culture and Equality , 2001) and Chandran Kukathas ( The Liberal Archipelago , 2003) and see which consequences both theories have for the Belgian model of church and state. For both authors, the liberal state should be neutral toward religion but they interpret this neutrality in a different way. According to Kukathas, neutrality implies a hands-off policy and therefore, recognizing (...) and financing religions is out of the question. For Barry on the other hand, the state is neutral if equal people have equal opportunities. Consequently, state support for religions and even the recognition of religions is possible, if religions are treated in the same way. However, a hands-off policy is also in line with Barry’s theory. Both from a pragmatic and from a normative point of view, Barry’s egalitarian liberalism seems the most interesting theory as an inspiring source for the evolvement and modification of the Belgian system, towards more fairness and equality. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks that discusses the meaning of being in practical agreement with a rule, arguing that Brandom misconstrues the idea undergirding Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of the relation between the pragmatic and normative aspects of language. First, I discuss Brandom's idea of normative pragmatism and Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Brandom enforces the picture of implicit rules as a salient solution for the problem of infinite regress regarding explicit (...) rules. Second, I compare both views and show that although Brandom takes his solution for a Wittgensteinian answer to the regress problem it is very likely that Wittgenstein's understanding of rule-following rather suggests a different view. Moreover, I explain why Brandom thinks that he cannot accept this view and why he offers an interpretation-based account instead which he thinks is underlying the agreement between rule and practice. Third, I criticize Brandom's account from a Wittgensteinian point of view arguing that what is underlying the agreement are so-called 'bedrock-practices' rather than mutual interpretations. (shrink)

Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschließlich die Gegenstände dieser Zustände präsent, (...) niemals aber das Subjekt oder der Zustand selbst (zumindest nicht als solche). Diese Antwort widerspricht einigen in der Philosophie des Geistes tief verwurzelten Auffassungen. Eine davon ist die Auffassung, das phänomenale Bewusstsein von Zuständen des Erscheinens bestünde in irgendeiner unmittelbaren Bekanntschaft mit eben diesen Zuständen. In Wahrheit, so wird argumentiert, hat das fragliche Bewusstsein eine auf die Welt gerichtete Struktur. Es ist nichts anderes als das Präsent-Sein von Gegenständen in Zuständen des Erscheinens. Dieses Ergebnis hat bedeutende Konsequenzen. Es stellt insbesondere die klassische Taxonomie mentaler Zustände in Frage. Einerseits lässt sich die Unterscheidung von intentionalen und phänomenalen Eigenschaften nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn das phänomenale Bewusstsein von Zuständen des Erscheinens ist eine Art der Intentionalität. Andererseits lässt sich die Einheit des Merkmals der Intentionalität nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn die Intentionalität von Zuständen des Erscheinens ist von grundsätzlich anderer Art als die Intentionalität propositionaler Einstellungen. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, nicht weiter zwischen intentionalen und phänomenalen Zuständen zu unterscheiden, sondern zwischen verschiedenen Arten intentionaler Zustände. (shrink)

Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: that the expressions we know as different proper names are the bearers of different meanings and that the descriptions corresponding to these meanings contain quotations of the expressions whose meanings they are taken to be. While is the source of a number of intractable problems, descriptivists feel committed to it because it is the only available option to adhere to, which they use to take as a matter of course. In the (...) present paper I will bring up for discussion a, to my knowledge, new descriptivist account, inter-nominal descriptivism, which avoids the commitment to by rejecting. According to this account, all tokens of the expressions known as different proper names express the same descriptive mode of presentation and this descriptive mode of presentation is akin to the character of an indexical. I will try to show that, contrary to first appearance, this idea can be developed in a consistent and plausible manner. (shrink)

This book focuses on the financing of religions, examining some European church-state models, using a philosophical methodology. The work defends autonomy-based liberalism and elaborates how this liberalism can meet the requirements of liberal neutrality. The chapters also explore religious education and the financing of institutionalized religion. This volume collates the work of top scholars in the field. Starting from the idea that autonomy-based liberalism is an adequate framework for the requirement of liberal neutrality, the author elaborates why a liberal state (...) can support religions and how she should do this, without violating the principle of neutrality. Taking into account the principle of religious freedom and the separation of church and state, this work explores which criteria the state should take into account when she actively supports religions, faith-based schools and religious education. A number of concrete church-state models, including hands-off, religious accommodation and the state church are evaluated, and the book gives some recommendations in order to optimize those church-state models, where needed. Practitioners and scholars of politics, law, philosophy and education, especially religious education, will find this work of particular interest as it has useful guidelines on policies and practices, as well as studies of church-state models. (shrink)

In this chapter I discuss Roger Trigg’s contribution to this volume on Wittgenstein, concepts, and human nature. Trigg shares many of the basic assumptions that form the methodological framework of cognitive science of religion (CSR) arguing that Wittgenstein’s later work shares common ground with presumptions, commitments, and accounts in cultural studies that are usually rejected by proponents of CSR. In particular, he challenges Wittgenstein’s notion of truth, that he sees under the threat of radical relativism. Against his view I argue (...) that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy never comes at the cost of losing the notion of objective truth. It rather demands a change in the conceptual framework that underlies the use of this notion of truth. In the first section I argue for the claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s development. In the second section I explore the social nature of meaning in the Later Wittgenstein, arguing, in the third section, that it does not commit us to radical relativism. Finally, I draw some conclusions from my argument for the studies of CSR. (shrink)

What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, offering a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way.

In the sparse literature that is concerned with Wittgenstein’s views regarding children and childhood, in his later work, it is often suggested that Wittgenstein presents, or at least is committed to, a romantic notion of the child according to which children should be conceived of as innocent beings who are ontologically different from adults. In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks do not support such an interpretation. First, I investigate the arguments for this view presented by Stanley Cavell, Yasushi (...) Maruyama, and Philip Shields. Second, I consider an anti-essentialist understanding of Wittgenstein’s concept of childhood that has been suggested in opposition to the treatment of the child as the ‘ontological other’ and argue that Wittgenstein refers to the child as intermediate link with which to state grammatical facts. In contrast to these various views, I hold, third, that the PI is committed to a strong and substantial concept of childhood. I argue for this claim on the basis of the ‘Motto’ of the PI; Wittgenstein’s reference to the philosopher Augustine; and the use of ‘primitive’. I conclude that Wittgenstein’s concept of childhood in his later works neither romanticises nor dispraises the child as the ‘ontological other’. (shrink)

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. -/- Wittgenstein’s writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein’s return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these (...) works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein’s few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. -/- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein's thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein's return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works (...) indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein's few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Munster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle s philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by (...) John R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality." "I think Munster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R. Searle". (shrink)

Praktische Gründe dienen uns Menschen dazu, unser Handeln verständlich zu machen. Philosophen sind fasziniert vom Wesen praktischer Gründe. Auf was für einen Gegenstand beziehen wir uns, wenn wir unser Handeln erklären? Sind praktische Gründe als psychologische Zustände der handelnden Person aufzufassen, etwa als deren Wünsche oder Überzeugungen? Oder sind sie identisch mit den sich in der Welt befindenden Tatsachen, also unabhängig vom Geist der Akteure? Verursachen Gründe unser Handeln? Diese und andere Fragen sind aktueller Gegenstand einer vielschichtigen Diskussion in der (...) analytisch geprägten Handlungstheorie. Dieses Buch bietet eine einschneidende Veränderung in der Sicht auf diese Fragen an. Überlegungen Wittgensteins folgend, werden praktische Gründe nicht als ontologischer Gegenstand, sondern als sprachliche Instrumente aufgefasst, die mit Funktionen und Zwecken verbunden sind. Auf diese Weise gelingt es, einen frischen Blick auf die normativen Bedingungen des Gebrauchs von Gründen, ihre Rolle in praktischen Überlegungsprozessen und ihre Bedeutung für die Motivation und Moral menschlichen Handelns in einer gemeinsam geteilten Praxis zu gewinnen. (shrink)

Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations, while indistinguishable via introspection, are states of fundamentally different kinds. This fundamental difference can be spelled out in various ways. According to the view I will be concerned with, it is a fundamental difference in the personal-level structure of both states. Against this version of disjunctivism, I will raise a new challenge. It is a variant of what can be seen as the standard (...) challenge against disjunctivism: how to do justice to the indistinguishability of veridical perceptions and hallucinations. It differs, however, from common versions of this challenge in where it locates the potential incompatibility of disjunctivism with the relevant fact of indistinguishability. Commonly, it is the disjunctivist assumption of a fundamental difference between both kinds of states which is regarded as incompatible with the indistinguishability of these states. In contrast, I will suggest that if hallucinations and veridical perceptions differed in the way proposed by structural disjunctivism, this difference would induce a corresponding difference in the psychological processes of their introspection and that the assumption of such a difference in the manner of introspection is most likely incompatible with a properly formulated indistinguishability claim. (shrink)

Resumen: Luego de entregar algunos breves antecedentes biobibliográficos del autor francés Alain Robbe-Grillet, se analiza con profundidad los principios esenciales de la poética de la “Nueva Novela” francesa, ante todo las rupturas del tiempo y espacio convencional, para estudiar su presencia en sus primeras dos novelas, Las gomas y El mirón, que llevan aún ciertos rasgos policiales. Este análisis literario revela su carácter híbrido y posmoderno y una creciente parodización del género policial.: The paper provides a brief bio-bibliographical background of (...) the French author Alain Robbe-Grillet and analyses in depth the basic principles of the ‘New French Novel’. It accounts for its conventional time and space breach and looks into its presence in his first two novels; The erasers and Jealousy, which still bear some traces of the detective fiction. This literary analysis exposes their hybrid and postmodern character and the growing parody being made of the police genre. (shrink)

Developmental psychologists have argued for the view that understanding one’s own intentions and the intentions of others consists in the performance of a psychological mechanism and moreover that the ability to understand intentions depends on the ontogenetic development of this mechanism. In this paper, I refer to Michael Tomasello as the most notable proponent of this view and present arguments against it. I argue that understanding intentions results from social agreement in practice rather than from psychological processes transpiring in the (...) minds of intentional agents. In my defence, I will appeal to the later Wittgenstein, who expounds the view I proffer here. First, I shall expose the key differences in each of their views, particularly in terms of how the ability to understand intentions is related to language acquisition. In the second section, I employ an argument from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations to reject the claim that children in their first year of life develop an understanding of intentions ontogenetically. Finally, in the third section I argue that the understanding of an intention requires the ability to form an intention autonomously. In the process of forming an intention, the child creates its own understanding, namely one that is socially accepted if it is in agreement with established usage, customs, and institutions as part of everyday practice. On the basis of this view, I suggest that understanding intentions depends on the agreement of behaviour in certain practical contexts rather than as the accordance of mental states with a psychological mechanism. (shrink)