Popper’s original definition of verisimilitude in terms of comparisons of truth content and falsity content has known counter-examples. More complicated approaches have met with mixed success. This paper uses a new account of logical content to develop a definition of verisimilitude that is close to Popper’s original account. It is claimed that Popper’s mistake was to couch his account of truth and falsity content in terms of true and false consequences. Comparison to (...) a similar approach by Schurz and Wiengartner show certain advantages of this new approach. (shrink)

Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of (...) verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but in agreement . We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which does not lie in the difference between syntactic (object-language) versus semantic (meta-language) formulations, but in the difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence (Sect. 6). (shrink)

2 Popper's Logical Definition of Verisimilitude. 3 Popper's Probabilistic Definition of Verisimilitude. 4 Conclusion.

Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts, content-aspects and likeness-aspects of (...) class='Hi'>verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but in agreement. We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which does not lie in the difference between syntactic versus semantic formulations, but in the difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence. (shrink)

Popper's definition of verisimilitude was criticized for its paradoxical consequences in the case of false theories. The aim of this paper is to show that paradoxes disappear if the falsity content of a theory is defined with help of dCn or Cn –1.

The question of truth is a broadly broached subject in Philosophy as it features along the entire historical and polemical growth of the discipline right from the time of the Ancients down to our Post-Modern era. Yet, the delimiting realization of being unable to register general success in our dogged attempts at truth and knowledge, mostly stares us blankly in the face, for matters on which philosophy endeavours to speculate on, are beyond the reach of definite knowledge.1 Our theories of (...) the universe open up to modifications, refutations, and further propositions, evidencing a historical development in philosophical inquiry. This generally is the growth of our science, of our knowledge. This paper critically seeks to examine Popper’s notion of verisimilitude. It takes us through the scientist’s journey from ignorance to truth, and the difference between probability and verisimilitude. It addresses the relevance of the theory of content in understanding verisimilitude, under its distinctions as quantitative and qualitative. Finally, it discusses corroboration and the criteria for theory-choice. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that Arrow’s well-known impossibility theorem is instrumental in bringing the ongoing discussion about verisimilitude to a more general level of abstraction. After some preparatory technical steps, we show that Arrow’s requirements for voting procedures in social choice are also natural desiderata for a general verisimilitude definition that places content and likeness considerations on the same footing. Our main result states that no qualitative unifying procedure of a functional form can simultaneously satisfy (...) the requirements of Unanimity, Independence of irrelevant alternatives and Non-dictatorship at the level of sentence variables. By giving a formal account of the incompatibility of the considerations of content and likeness, our impossibility result makes it possible to systematize the discussion about verisimilitude, and to understand it in more general terms. (shrink)

Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

The concept of verisimilitude is an indispensable tool for the fallibilist and realist epistemology. Part of the argument for this thesis consists in the important applications of this notion within the history and philosophy of science. But perhaps the harder part is to convince a sceptical reader of the existence of this concept. A general programme for defining and estimating degrees of truthlikeness for various kinds of scientific statements is outlined in some detail. Ten years after Miller's and Tichy's (...) refutation of Popper's attempted definition, this paper reviews recent developments and debates, and concludes that the treatment the Popperian problem with Carnapian logical tools leads to a new synthesis which turns out to formally contain Levi's theory of epistemic utilities as a special case. (shrink)

The paper identifies in the literature two categories of codes of ethics, inspirational and prescriptive, and introduces new classification categories of allodial and decretal. The first classification is based on the identity of the ethics decision‐maker – the authors or the addressees of codes. The second classification is based on whether operational definitions are applied by the codes. Such concrete definitions may be in the rules themselves, in related documents or be known from shared knowledge. The second classification has importance (...) if national associations of accountants use codes as a means for assurance of specific outcomes of defined ethical behaviours. For the study, a survey of 57 codes of ethics issued by national associations of professional accountants was undertaken to determine the basic features of codes and to analyse their content. The areas of ethical concern in national associations were identified and compared to the IFAC model code for professional accountants. The paper reports that national organisations of accountants have promulgated decretal codes in 96% of cases examined. As these codes contain operational definitions, their outcomes can be scientifically measured and sanctions for breaches fairly and reasonably imposed. (shrink)

The paper identifies in the literature two categories of codes of ethics, inspirational and prescriptive, and introduces new classification categories of allodial and decretal. The first classification is based on the identity of the ethics decision‐maker – the authors or the addressees of codes. The second classification is based on whether operational definitions are applied by the codes. Such concrete definitions may be in the rules themselves, in related documents or be known from shared knowledge. The second classification has importance (...) if national associations of accountants use codes as a means for assurance of specific outcomes of defined ethical behaviours. For the study, a survey of 57 codes of ethics issued by national associations of professional accountants was undertaken to determine the basic features of codes and to analyse their content. The areas of ethical concern in national associations were identified and compared to the IFAC model code for professional accountants. The paper reports that national organisations of accountants have promulgated decretal codes in 96% of cases examined. As these codes contain operational definitions, their outcomes can be scientifically measured and sanctions for breaches fairly and reasonably imposed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it is the explicativecharacter of Tarski's semantic definition of truth given in his study of 1933 that allows forconsideration of a philosophical background of this definition in the proper sense. Given the explicativecharacter of this definition it is argued that the philosophical tradition that should be taken intoaccount with regard to this philosophical background is the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw Schoolin its connections with the School of Brentano. As (...) an example of the explanatory power ofconsidering this tradition as far as Tarski's philosophical choices are concerned I use here thenotion of sentence-inscription, i.e., the notion of that entity of which truth is predicated inthe definition in question. One of the consequences of these statements is that philosophicaldiscussions concerning the semantic definition of truth can be regarded from two points ofview. On the one hand, they may take the perspective of its explicational function, i.e., theperspective of its philosophical background. On the other hand, they might consider the philosophicalconsequences of the definition with respect to the goal of the explication, i.e., they may considerits philosophical content independently of its historical background. (shrink)

Work purpose: to present and analyze pedagogical strategies and the communicational approach to definitions of bioethics, a mutual part of the bioethics contents being realized on the university studies of Dentistry, Organization, Planning and Management in Healthcare, and professional studies of Medical Radiology at the Medical School in Rijeka. Methods: the method of content analysis was used to research and present encyclopaedic and some authorial definitions of bioethics, with special emphasis on definitions of bioethics by authors – bioethicists from (...) Croatia; the method of pattern 1: included the curriculum of Medical Ethics and Bioethics and the Ethics of Healthcare, and researched standpoints of forty-five students educated in studies where bioethics courses are being realized. The pattern is specifically stratified because it: a) included students whose curriculum is being realized in shifts – intensive lectures in a duration of two weeks, and those whose lectures are being realized each week during one semester; b) different year of education . 2. The scale of assessment was used to research and obtain standpoints of students on the contents of the curriculum, methods of its performance, and the achieved level of communication among students and communication with the professor. Expected results: the presented method of work and results obtained by the scale of assessment should display the acceptability and successfulness of the presented pedagogicalmethodological means of work and point out to weaknesses and deficiencies, and finally conclude the extent to which the presented concept, and approaches to the actualization of the definitions of bioethics contribute to the realization of dialogue and communication in which students simultaneously experience the curriculum as necessary, useful, interesting, and one that may motivate them to think, exchange ideas and offer possible solutions. The scale of assessment should point out to different standpoints of students depending on the length of their study and commitment to a method of class realization. (shrink)

Theories of verisimilitude have routinely been classified into two rival camps—the content approach and the likeness approach—and these appear to be motivated by very different sets of data and principles. The question thus naturally arises as to whether these approaches can be fruitfully combined. Recently Zwart and Franssen (Synthese 158(1):75–92, 2007) have offered precise analyses of the content and likeness approaches, and shown that given these analyses any attempt to meld content and likeness orderings violates some (...) basic desiderata. Unfortunately their characterizations of the approaches do not embrace the paradigm examples of those approaches. I offer somewhat different characterizations of these two approaches, as well as of the consequence approach (Schurz and Weingartner (Synthese 172(3):415–436, 2010) which happily embrace their respective paradigms. Finally I prove that the three approaches are indeed compatible, but only just, and that the cost of combining them is too high. Any account which combines the strictures of what I call the strong likeness approach with the demands of either the content or the consequence approach suffers from precisely the same defect as Popper’s—namely, it entails the trivialization of truthlikeness. The downside of eschewing the strong likeness constraints and embracing the content constraints alone is the underdetermination of the concept of truthlikeness. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely (...) that Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

A part of chapter 1, Book II of the Physics of the Šif¯ ' is dedicated to the aristotelian definition of motion . The developments to which the treatment of this question gives rise are distinctive of the Avicennian style in his Physics . By assuming the notion of double entelechy, Avicenna is following the most classical exegetical tradition. However, by setting a correspondence between the double entelechy and the double notion of motion: 1) motion as an intermediary state, (...) which can be ascribed to a moving object at any instant of its trajectory, and 2) motion as a traversal of a given distance, which cannot be ascribed to the moving object, but at the end-point of its trajectory, Avicenna gives a new content to a lieu commun of the exegetical tradition. (shrink)

The mutakallimūn, who began to take care of nature as a result of their metaphysical concerns from the early period and with the influence of the dualist and materialist groups, suggested various theories that attempt to explain the structure and functioning of the universe. Over time, many subjects of physics became an indispensable part of Kalām and were used in the proof of the fundamental principles. Thus, in addition to the definition of body (jism), Kalām books began to contain (...) detailed topics such as time, space, movement and distance. After summarizing the definitions of body, which were made by the mutakallimūn, this article will examine the contents of Ibn Kamāl's epistle on ṭafra (leaping), which has many copies with various titles in the Turkish Libraries. In the beginning of the epistle, Ibn Kamāl mentions the descriptions of body suggested by the prominent mutakallimūn, and then, he compares the views of al-Naẓẓām, who believes in the finite division, with atomist mutakallimūn who accept the infinite division. He criticizes the idea of ṭafra with regard to the notion of body in Kalām. After explaining the arguments of both groups with their justifications, he points out the weaknesses of the arguments of each group, as well. In this connection, he revisits the theory of ṭafra, which is, he argues, a mandatory consequence of al-Naẓẓām’s definition of object, as he also reviews the opinions of Quṭb al-Din al-Rāzī in this direction. (shrink)

In de Ronde and Massri it was argued against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement in terms of pure and separable states. In this paper we attempt to discuss how the logos categorical approach to quantum mechanics is able to provide an objective formal account of the notion of entanglement—completely independent of both purity and separability—in terms of the potential coding of intensive relations and effective relations. We will show how our novel redefinition allows us to provide an anschaulich (...) content to the notion of entanglement, erasing in this way the “spookiness” still present within its orthodox understanding in terms of space-time separated collapse particles. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 167-181, July 2022. A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching definition is deeply problematic because it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the (...) functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude. (shrink)

Although information content is invariant up to an additive constant, the range of possible additive constants applicable to programming languages is so large that in practice it plays a major role in the actual evaluation of K(s), the Kolmogorov complexity of a string s. We present a summary of the approach we've developed to overcome the problem by calculating its algorithmic probability and evaluating the algorithmic complexity via the coding theorem, thereby providing a stable framework for Kolmogorov complexity even (...) for short strings. We also show that reasonable formalisms produce reasonable complexity classifications. (shrink)

According to some commentators of the Iranian Civil Code, the definition of sale stated in Article 183 is influenced by Article 1101 of French Civil Code. They have concluded that the essence of sale is confined to mutual consent, i.e. the sale would not be valid without the consent of either party. They have taken even a step further and considered the contents of Article 338 of the civil code, which describes contract of sale, contradictory to Article 183 and (...) argued that the sale of a specified concrete object is not contained in Article 183 while the sale of unascertained goods is obliged to that article. They believe that the definition of Article 183 of civil code excludes not only all commitments, but also swap contracts because there are two mutual commitments and two agreeing legal contracts in a swap contract while there is no mentioning of them in Article 183. However, the objections are not rightfully lodged because first, the contracts and obligations are not incompatible with the definition of Article 338 as the seller and the buyer within a contract of sale are obliged to give authority to the other party over the object of sale or the price. It means that there are two commitments and the obligation of the seller to give authority over the object of sale appears in two ways: dominion over concrete object while making a transaction and dominion over non-specified object with the obligation that it does not attend to fulfil possession by the time of the sale. Secondly, Article 183 contains the phrase “their acceptance” which includes swap contract too because this phrase indicates that the acceptance is mutual. (shrink)

"Spiritual well-being" was coined in 1971 and has since become a popular concept in modern psychology studies. Multidimensional investigations covering the concept's structure, theoretical foundations, interaction areas, and development, on the other hand, have been limited. In response to this scarcity, the research aims to examine the concept of "spiritual well-being" from all of these perspectives. It also seeks to provide a new definition of "spiritual well-being." Another contribution of the study to the "spiritual well-being" literature is that it (...) attempts to explain the framework and theoretical basis of the term. This study was mostly based on an analysis of relevant literature. Literature data on how the thought began and developed were gathered for this purpose. The semantical relationship between "well-being" and "spirituality" is investigated. Following that, the concept's content, areas of interaction, approaches, and theoretical foundations with which it is closely associated were defined as well as the concept's relationship with spirituality was stressed. Some works in the subject's literature have also been analytically evaluated, with a particular emphasis on their contributions to the enhanced relationship of "spiritual well-being" with other domains, as well as the conceptualization process of it. The research findings characterize spiritual well-being as the acquisition of well-being from spiritual areas to which individuals related. The contributions of spirituality to "well-being" underline the significance of "spiritual well-being" in the Psychology of Religion. "Spiritual well-being" is a concept used to determine the original reflections and good effects of these contributions on individuals, as well as to measure various types of "well-being.". (shrink)

The paper identifies in the literature two categories of codes of ethics, inspirational and prescriptive, and introduces new classification categories of allodial and decretal. The first classification is based on the identity of the ethics decision‐maker – the authors or the addressees of codes. The second classification is based on whether operational definitions are applied by the codes. Such concrete definitions may be in the rules themselves, in related documents or be known from shared knowledge. The second classification has importance (...) if national associations of accountants use codes as a means for assurance of specific outcomes of defined ethical behaviours. For the study, a survey of 57 codes of ethics issued by national associations of professional accountants was undertaken to determine the basic features of codes and to analyse their content. The areas of ethical concern in national associations were identified and compared to the IFAC model code for professional accountants. The paper reports that national organisations of accountants have promulgated decretal codes in 96% of cases examined. As these codes contain operational definitions, their outcomes can be scientifically measured and sanctions for breaches fairly and reasonably imposed. (shrink)

Joan Weiner has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers constitute linguistic stipulations that carry no ontological commitment: they don’t present numbers as pre-existing objects. This paper offers a critical discussion of this view, showing that it is vitiated by serious exegetical errors and that it saddles Frege’s project with insuperable substantive difficulties. It is first demonstrated that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of so-called Foundations-content, and of sense, reference, and truth. The discussion then focuses on the role of definitions (...) in Frege’s work, demonstrating that they cannot be understood as mere linguistic stipulations, since they have an ontological aim. The paper concludes with stressing both the epistemological and the ontological aspects of Frege’s project, and their crucial interdependence. (shrink)

Frege believes (1) that his definition of number is (partly) arbitrary; (2) that it "makes" numbers of certain extensions; (3) that without such a definition we cannot even think or understand arithmetical propositions. this position is part of a view according to which mathematics in general involves the free construction of objects, their properties, and the very contents of mathematical propositions. frege tries to avoid excess subjectivism by the kantian device of treating alternative systems of arithmetic (e.g.) as (...) different appearances of a single realm of unstructured truths. (shrink)

Despite the undeniable epistemic progress of developmental biology from the second half of the twentieth century to the present day, there still is widespread disagreement on defining the biological term of ‘development’. This scientific field epistemologically is neither unsuccessful nor immature, thus the persistent lack of agreement on its most central concept raises some important questions: is there any need for an explicit definition of biological development, and if so, what content should the definition have? My central (...) thesis is twofold. First, that current definitions of biological development are conceptually or empirically inadequate. Second, that an explicit definition of biological development is very much needed (a) for the practical purposes of science textbooks, but more importantly is needed (b) epistemically for exposing or overcoming problematic assumptions and for partially guiding scientific research by coding the appropriate assumptions. To support this thesis, initially I will show the deficiencies of the dominant definitions of biological development; and subsequently I will provide two arguments: an Argument from Practical Purposes and an Argument from Epistemic Purposes. Finally, for accommodating practical and epistemic purposes and as a response to the inadequacy of the available definitions of development, I will propose and defend an operational definition of biological development which is aimed to be broader than the received ones, while being more precise and fruitful to conduct empirical research. (shrink)

This small anthology contains thirteen essays by eleven authors on the question: What are the defining characteristics of morality? What makes a judgment, an attitude, or an argument a moral one? The selection of articles is excellent. Ethicians included are: C. H. Whitely, A. MacIntyre, W. K. Frankena, C. C. W. Taylor, Neil Cooper, P. F. Strawson, T. L. S. Sprigge, P. Foot, K. Baier, G. E. M. Anscombe, D. F. Gauthier. An obvious objection to the pursuit of a (...) class='Hi'>definition would be to suggest, as Whitely does, that there are no defining traits for all uses of "moral" or "morality": one can hope only to find family resemblances in the uses of the words. Others insist that there is a more precise and consistent use of these notions in ordinary language, though there may be different senses of the word moral, each with sufficiently clear defining traits. In a useful introduction that provides a unifying background for the essays, the editors suggest that six chief candidates appear for the role of the leading characteristic of morality: moral rules and principles can be defined by reference to their capacity for universality, their prescriptivity, their overriding force, the importance they have, the forms of sanctions appealed to, or by reference to their content. The authors in their essays do not, of course, define morality simply in terms of any one of these features; but they do stress or deny the importance of each of these features. Students will find this a helpful work, and there is a good bibliography.--R. D. L. (shrink)

In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss (...) the content of the traditional comprehension of delusionality. It is suggested that the ambiguities in defining delusions has to do with the question whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of incorrectness or of incomprehensibility. (shrink)

The current work builds a definition of irritability from both academic definitions and lay perspectives. In Study 1, a quantitative content analysis of academic definitions resulted in eight main content categories. In Study 2, a community sample of 39 adults participated in qualitative interviews. A deductive thematic analysis resulted in two main themes. The first main theme dealt with how participants positioned irritability in relation to other negative states. The second dealt with how participants constructed irritability as (...) both a loss of control and as an experience that should be controlled. The discussion integrates the findings of both studies and provides a concise, but comprehensive definition. (shrink)

A common criticism of Locke’s ideational definition of knowledge is that it contradicts his accounts of knowledge’s reality and sensitive knowledge. Here it is argued that the ideational definiton of knowledge is compatible with knowledge of idea-independent reality. The key is Locke’s notion of the signification. Nominal agreements obtain if and only if the ideas’ descriptive contents are the ground for truth; real agreements obtain only if their total denotation are the grounds for truth. The signification of the ideas (...) determine whether they denote real or fantastical objects. Three types of ideas, simple quality-ideas, modal ideas, and relational ideas, necessarily signify real objects. The fourth type, the ideas of substances, are real only if those particular combinations of qualitites have been perceived to co-exist. Locke’s ideas are intrinsically either real or fantastical and thus, it is argued, his models of truth and knowledge’s reality are far from typical correspondence theories. (shrink)

This book proposes guidelines for constructing and evaluating definitions of terms, i.e. words or phrases of general application. The guidelines extend to adoption of nomenclature. The book is meant to be a practical guide for people who find themselves in their daily lives or their employment producing or evaluating definitions of terms. It can be consulted rather than being read through. The book’s theoretical framework is a distinction, due to Robert H. Ennis, of three dimensions of definitions: the act of (...) the definer, the content of the definition, and its form. The act of a definer is what the definer does in defining a term; the book distinguishes, following Ennis, three basic acts of defining: reporting, stipulating, and advocating. The content of a definition is in one sense the information that the definition conveys and in another sense the words in its defining part. The form of a definition is the way it is expressed, for example as a definition by genus and differentia. (shrink)

Spinoza’s definition of ‘attribute’ has been described as ‘one of the most puzzling passages in the Ethics’ and ‘a longstanding worry’ for Spinoza interpreters. Its puzzling status stems from its apparent ‘subjectivist’ character and the dominant understanding of Spinoza’s notion of attribute as an ‘objectivist’ notion. The paper aspires to remove this puzzlement by proposing and defending a reading of E1d4 in which it is understood to have two senses. First, I defend the objectivist character of Spinoza’s notion of (...) attribute, and explain why E1d4 is problematic within the framework of an objectivist interpretation of the Spinozistic attribute. Second, I propose a reading of E1d4 as having two senses and explain the cause of an apparent contradiction in E1d4. Finally, I devote the largest part of the paper to a defence of the Two-Sense Reading of E1d4. More specifically, I draw on four sources for this defence: the structure of E1d1 and E1d3, the content and form of E1p4 and its demonstration, Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism and Descartes’ treatment of attribute and its influence on Spinoza. (shrink)

In this short monograph, John Horty explores the difficulties presented for Gottlob Frege's semantic theory, as well as its modern descendents, by the treatment of defined expressions. The book begins by focusing on the psychological constraints governing Frege's notion of sense, or meaning, and argues that, given these constraints, even the treatment of simple stipulative definitions led Frege to important difficulties. Horty is able to suggest ways out of these difficulties that are both philosophically and logically plausible and Fregean in (...) spirit. This discussion is then connected to a number of more familiar topics, such as indexicality and the discussion of concepts in recent theories of mind and language. In the latter part of the book, after introducing a simple semantic model of senses as procedures, Horty considers the problems that definitions present for Frege's idea that the sense of an expression should mirror its grammatical structure. The requirement can be satisfied, he argues, only if defined expressions--and incomplete expressions as well--are assigned senses of their own, rather than treated contextually. He then explores one way in which these senses might be reified within the procedural model, drawing on ideas from work in the semantics of computer programming languages. With its combination of technical semantics and history of philosophy, Horty's book tackles some of the hardest questions in the philosophy of language. It should interest philosophers, logicians, and linguists. (shrink)

The modern history of verisimilitude can be divided into three periods. The first began in 1960, when Karl Popper proposed his qualitative definition of what it is for one theory to be more truthlike than another theory, and lasted until 1974, when David Miller and Pavel Trich published their refutation of Popper's definition. The second period started immediately with the attempt to explicate truthlikeness by means of relations of similarity or resemblance between states of affairs (or their (...) linguistic representations); the work within this similarity approach was summarized in the books of Graham Oddie [1986] and Ilkka Niiniluoto [1987]. During the subsequent third period, studies in verisimilitude have been actively continued, and interesting results and applications have been achieved, but not many dramatic novelties. While it is now obsolete to claim that truthlikeness with reasonable properties cannot be defined at all, there is still a lot of controversy about the best and least arbitrary approach to doing this. (shrink)

In this work, author evaluated past theories and perspectives behind the definitions of science and/or branches of science. Also some of the philosophers of science and their specific philosophical interests were expressed. Author considered some type of interactions between some disciplines to determine, to solve the philosophical/scientific problems and to define the possible solutions. The purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define new perspective for the philosophy of science, (iii) to define relation between (...) new philosophy perspective and philosophy of science, (iv) to define and organize name, number, relations, and correct structure between special science branches and philosophy of science, (v) to define necessary and sufficient number of branches for philosophy of science, (vi) to define and express the importance and place of new philosophy of science perspective in the new system, (vii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of science, (viii) to re-define meanings of some philosophical/scientific theories, (ix) to define systematic solution for the conflicts, problems, confusions about philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science, (x) to define new branches of science, (xi) to re-construct branches and hierarchy of science, (xii) to define new theories about science and branches of science. Author considered R-Synthesis as a method for the evaluation of the philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science. This R-Synthesis includes evaluation of eight categories of general/specific perspective, 21-dimensions, and 12 general subjects (with related scope and contents) for the past 12,000 years. It is a kind of synthesis of science and non-science, physical science and non-physical science, religious science and non-religious science, and others. In this article, author defined 27 possible definitive/certain result cases for this new synthesis. Author defined the possible formation stages shortly to express new disciplines, new constructional and/or complementary theories. These theories are considered to define 21 major effective disciplines. New philosophy perspective is defined (R-Philosophy) shortly. New perspective and sub branches are defined for the philosophy of science. Major sciences are defined due to new basic philosophies. 42-basic components are defined for each science branch. New and/or re-constructed sciences, branches of science, basic sciences, and new hierarchy of science are defined with figure. Electromagnetic sciences, information sciences, and system sciences are defined specifically. Hybrid Sciences, New Era Science, and Ideal Scientific System are defined with general/specific figure. Relation between the some old branches and new branches of science was expressed generally due to new perspective of philosophy of science. (shrink)

One of the recent trends in dealing with the concept of lying has been to argue that the idea that one needs to deceive someone in order to lie has been accepted too hastily. In Lying and Insincerity Stokke shares this opinion and proposes a definition of lying based on the notion of common ground that includes bald-faced lies. Additionally, he rejects the idea that lying can be accomplished with pragmatic means such as conversational implicatures and proposes a formal (...) distinction between lying and misleading. In this review, I present the content of Stokke’s book and critically discuss the two points mentioned above. (shrink)

The practice of assigning authorship for a scientific publication tends to raise two normative questions: 1) ‘who should be credited as an author?’; 2) ‘who should not be credited as an author but should still be acknowledged?’. With the publication of the revised version of The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (ECCRI), standard answers to these questions have been called into question. This article examines the ways in which the ECCRI approaches these two questions and compares these approaches (...) to standard definitions of ‘authorship’ and ‘acknowledgment’ in guidelines issued by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) and the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME). In light of two scenarios and the problems posed by these kinds of ‘real-world’ examples, we recommend specific revisions to the content of the ECCRI in order not only to provide a more detailed account of the tasks deserving of acknowledgment, but to improve the Code’s current definition of authorship. (shrink)

I present a new definition of verisimilitude, framed in terms of causes. Roughly speaking, according to it a scientific model is approximately true if it captures accurately the strengths of the causes present in any given situation. Against much of the literature, I argue that any satisfactory account of verisimilitude must inevitably restrict its judgments to context-specific models rather than general theories. We may still endorse—and only need—a relativized notion of scientific progress, understood now not as global (...) advance but rather as the mastering of particular problems. This also sheds new light on longstanding difficulties surrounding language-dependence and models committed to false ontologies. (shrink)

A metric approach to Popper's verisimilitude question is proposed which is related to point-free geometry. Indeed, we define the theory of approximate metric spaces whose primitive notions are regions, inclusion relation, minimum distance, and maximum distance between regions. Then, we show that the class of possible scientific theories has the structure of an approximate metric space. So, we can define the verisimilitude of a theory as a function of its (approximate) distance from the truth. This avoids some of (...) the difficulties arising from the known definitions of verisimilitude. (shrink)

Today, there are different understandings of the first article on the content of the Christian faith, for which an analysis from a theological perspective is necessary. This research sought to reveal the meaning of the first article on the content of the Christian faith in recent theological works that have been produced, through the use of a hermeneutic exercise, conducting a bibliometric and categorical analysis and using NVivo software to analyse the qualitative data. We concluded that the recent (...) theological literature addresses the meaning of the first article of the Christian faith based on the existence, concept and definition of God and his attributes, as well as his power, behaviour, creation, revelation and reign. Although there is little extant material compared to other topics or areas of knowledge that can be explored using these tools, this fact is explained because, normally, theologians are not interested in publishing in high-impact journals. The way of approaching God in contemporary literature can be enriched by taking into account specific contexts, such as poverty, discrimination, suffering, violence, human trafficking, immigration and political realities, in such a way that it is not only a metaphysical reflection of God but also a historical and immanent and even an interreligious research that broadens the concept of the Christian God and answers questions that contemporary society asks in daily life. (shrink)

The book begins by focusing on the psychological constraints governing Frege's notion of sense, or meaning, and argues that, given these constraints, even the ...

The Netherlands is one of the few countries where euthanasia is legal under strict conditions. This study investigates whether Dutch newspaper articles use the term ‘euthanasia’ according to the legal definition and determines what arguments for and against euthanasia they contain. We did an electronic search of seven Dutch national newspapers between January 2009 and May 2010 and conducted a content analysis. Of the 284 articles containing the term ‘euthanasia’, 24% referred to practices outside the scope of the (...) law, mostly relating to the forgoing of life-prolonging treatments and assistance in suicide by others than physicians. Of the articles with euthanasia as the main topic, 36% described euthanasia in the context of a terminally ill patient, 24% for older persons, 16% for persons with dementia, and 9% for persons with a psychiatric disorder. The most frequent arguments for euthanasia included the importance of self-determination and the fact that euthanasia contributes to a good death. The most frequent arguments opposing euthanasia were that suffering should instead be alleviated by better care, that providing euthanasia can be disturbing, and that society should protect the vulnerable. Of the newspaper articles, 24% uses the term ‘euthanasia’ for practices that are outside the scope of the euthanasia law. Typically, the more unusual cases are discussed. This might lead to misunderstandings between citizens and physicians. Despite the Dutch legalisation of euthanasia, the debate about its acceptability and boundaries is ongoing and both sides of the debate are clearly represented. (shrink)

Hempel’s Dilemma remains at the center of the problem of defining physicalism. In brief, the dilemma asks whether physicalism should be defined by appeal to current or future physics. If defined by current physics, physicalism is almost certainly false. If defined by an ideal future physics, then physicalism has little determinable content. Montero and Papineau have innovatively suggested that the dilemma may be avoided by defining physicalism structurally. While their definition is one among many definitions, it is significant (...) in that—if successful—it would break the impasse for defining physicalism. I argue, however, that the structural definition fails because it counts metaphysical frameworks (crucially, versions of divine idealism) as “physicalist”—an unwelcome result for physicalists. This paper thus furthers the debate on the definition of physicalism and sheds light on the relationship between physicalism and idealism. (shrink)