En este artículo, en el marco del surgimiento de los nuevos realismos del siglo XXI y de su manifestación en el ámbito latinoamericano, se aborda en particular el Nuevo Realismo Analógico de Mauricio Beuchot. El filósofo mexicano entiende que gran parte de los desarrollos filosóficos del siglo XX han conducido al relativismo, y que, dadas las consecuencias socio-políticas producidas, es necesario resarcir el realismo. En este trabajo se problematiza la posibilidad de resarcir el realismo y evitar el relativismo partiendo de (...) las mismas bases que las de las filosofías cuestionadas. Nuestro objetivo es revisar uno de los supuestos ontológicos y epistemológicos subyacentes a dicho realismo y evaluar los alcances de este, cuestionando al mismo tiempo su declarada criticidad. Dicho análisis nos permitirá sostener, basado en los estudios antropológicos de Philippe Descola, que el realismo de Beuchot sucumbe al mismo relativismo que cuestiona y, en consecuencia, desde esta perspectiva, su propuesta es insuficiente para resarcir el realismo y evitar el relativismo. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es avizorar una posible articulación entre ethos trágico y ethos barroco. Para ello, se parte de la hipótesis de Echeverría sobre el barroquismo del Quijote unamuniano. Se sostiene que dicho ethos barroco, como actitud, como comportamiento, como estrategia vital, tal como lo define el filósofo ecuatoriano, se extiende más allá de dicha obra y se articula con el ethos trágico de la agonística unamuniana. Se toma la hipótesis de Sáez Rueda, quien entiende que la agonística (...) unamuniana está estrechamente vinculada a la actitud barroca y que, por otra parte, hay al menos dos lazos de unión entre lo barroco y lo trágico. A estos dos lazos, se sugiere, se pueden sumar dos más: uno de ellos parte de la concepción compartida por Echeverría y Unamuno respecto a la acción, la elección por el tercero que no puede ser; el otro parte de la hipótesis de que esa comunidad de actitud, de ethos, entre lo trágico y lo barroco, se puede establecer desde la función pedagógica moral de las obras trágicas y de las barrocas. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es dar cuenta de la fecundidad que el pensamiento de Unamuno (1864-1936) presenta en torno al problema hermenéutico. Para ello se tomará como eje la obra Cómo se hace una novela (1926-7), donde el pensador bilbaíno expone sus ideas en torno a la cuestión de la escritura y la recepción de la obra literaria. El estudio de la obra en cuestión y la referencia a muchas de sus otras obras estará atravesado por las nociones que (...) acuñara Ricoeur de “distanciamiento” y “apropiación” del mundo del texto . La importancia que cobra en Unamuno el receptor de la obra, anticipándose a las ulteriores teorías de la recepción, nos lleva a ver qué entiende éste por “comprensión”, y cuál es el papel que esa noción juega en sus concepciones filosófico-literarias. Finalmente, a partir de este “distanciamiento” y “apropiación” de la obra que propone Unamuno al lector, le será posible al receptor, la proyección de un mundo. (shrink)

En un artículo de 1975, titulado “Subjetividad e intersubjetividad, sujeto y persona”, artículo que da inicio a Hermeneutik im Rückblick (1995), Gadamer señala que a inicios del siglo XX se produce un nuevo giro crítico contra el concepto de “sistema de la filosofía”, el cual se constata atendiendo al problema de la intersubjetividad. Allí, en tan sólo algo más de una línea, Gadamer señala la magnitud e influencia de la obra de Unamuno en este giro de la filosofía: “el comienzo (...) parece que estuvo en España, donde Unamuno sirvió de inspiración a toda una nueva generación” (2007, 12).El objetivo de este trabajo es realizar una lectura sobre la recepción gadameriana de la obra de Unamuno tendiente a brindar una posible respuesta sobre los motivos que llevaron al filósofo alemán a realizar tal afirmación. Siguiendo esta línea pretendo indagar también qué había en la obra de Unamuno de interés para Gadamer, más allá de la lectura existencialista que se había desarrollado hasta entonces.Para ello, primero, y para contextualizar, reseñaré brevemente la recepción de la obra de Unamuno en Alemania, y pasaré revista sobre las investigaciones de los últimos 30 años que enmarcan los estudios de Unamuno bajo la koiné de la época: la hermenéutica; lo cual permite rever su obra fuera del marco existencialista. Luego, y como punto más importante, indicaré y argumentaré, a partir de los textos de Unamuno, sobre las razones que sustentan la afirmación gadameriana que ubica al filósofo vasco como iniciador del giro hermenéutico. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar la concepción ampliada de texto que desarrolla Unamuno en su epistemología de las ciencias humanas y sociales. Este sentido amplio del texto le permite ensanchar el horizonte de los medios expresivos para indagar en la historia y dar con el ser español. En primer lugar, señalo brevemente los antecedentes y estudios que permiten situar la epistemología unamuniana en el marco del paradigma hermenéutico. En segundo lugar, desarrollo las críticas de Unamuno a la primacía de (...) la reflexividad en torno al problema del conocimiento. Ello le permite a Unamuno indagar en otros modelos cognoscitivos que reconozcan la pertenecía eludida por la tesis cartesiana pero, al mismo tiempo, asuman el distanciamiento propio del conocimiento científico. En tercer lugar, desarrollo tres instancias del conocimiento por medio del lenguaje: la lengua hablada, la palabra escrita y el texto en un sentido ampliado como fundamento epistémico. Este último constituye para Unamuno el recurso idóneo para la indagación histórico-social. Finalmente, esta concepción de la textualidad le permite a Unamuno señalar que esta se constituye en la materia prima para las humanidades y ciencias sociales. (shrink)

This article deals with the theatrical work of Francisco García Escalante, known as Francis, from the point of view of Gender and Queer Theory. Since the theater work of Francis belongs to popular culture, this article analyzes elements of Mexican Review Theater (similar to Musical Theater) in reference to the dynamics she used to present diverse masculinities on stage. This essay also compares Francis’ symbolical construction of gender with that of popular singer Juan Gabriel.

1. ptie. L'inspiration sociale; les sources éternelles de l'art.--2. ptie. La technique personnelle: L'Allemagne du Clair de lune. Beethoven: la joie dans la douleur. Les sources de la sensibilité romantique chez Schumann et Gabriel Fauré. Les vraies sources du génie de Wagner. Émile Verhaeren. La poésie de mme. de Noailles. Balzac: La comédie humaine. Le théâtre de Théodore de Banville. L'œuvre d'Edmond Rostand.

This paper explores convergences and divergences in the thoughts of Gaston Bachelard and Paulin Hountondji and their notions of rational pluralism and true pluralism, respectively. There is a problematic in which for Bachelard rational pluralism can be comprehended as the various epistemological profiles to understand a scientific phenomenon, as well as the coherence that such theories have among themselves, while Huontondji is concerned with criticizing a collective ethnological view of philosophy and considers that the true pluralism is precisely the capacity (...) of philosophical singularities that appropriate the history of philosophy. Using Hountondji's criticism to exemplify the pluralism in African philosophy, his references to Bachelard in [African philosophy - Myth and reality], and other texts, we hope to get a better understanding of the rupture between ‘developments’ and ‘new involvements’ that reconstruct the old knowledge synthesized out of old philosophical perspectives. Here, I look for transversal dialogues among the few references to Bachelard in Hountondji's philosophy to find new possibilities for dialogue and engagement from an African phenomenology perspective. Thus, we study links between European and African thought, so presenting a new perspective on studies of Bachelardian philosophy itself. Keywords: systems, phenomenology, pluralism, discontinuities, African philosophy, Hountondji, Bachelard. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende esclarecer a problemática da epistemologia como fundamento para a compreensão filosófica das ciências. Para isso, contamos com a visão do filósofo francês Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), focando principalmente no seu texto O racionalismo aplicado (publicado em 1949) e a sua teoria que busca demonstrar a complexidade presente nas linhas de pensamento construídas na história da filosofia: o empirismo e o racionalismo.

A presente investigação pretende defender a ideia, como homenagem após os 60 anos da morte de Gaston Roupnel, de que há uma influência que vai além da noção de Instante como descontinuidade sobre Bachelard. Por essa via, a virada da filosofia bachelardiana para a crítica literária e poética perpassa uma cosmovisão influênciada por Roupnel em Siloë. Ao ter acesso direto a esse texto percebe-se que ali se dá um recomeço, uma nova ontogênese da vida para a ideia de devaneios espaciais (...) de uma perspectiva que une duração e instante, espaço e tempo. Nesse sentido, pretendemos desvelar a influência roupneliana sobre Bachelard por fora de A intuição do instante, no intuito de demonstrar a hipótese que foi a partir de Siloë que se abre o espaço para o devaneio bachelardiano. (shrink)

Los caminos espinosos en la construcción del conocimiento son un cometido al que solo el animal humano se ha enfrentado. El uso de un lenguaje proposicional le ha permitido iniciar construcciones racionales, que dan origen a las teorías más complejas en pos de comprender los enigmas del universo, y con ello iniciar la separación tajante entre episteme y doxa. Los discursos más enmarañados, rígidos y rigurosos convocan a científicos y epistemólogos. Enunciados con términos que, en ocasiones, se tornan oscuros y (...) poco comprensibles a quienes inician sus procesos formativos en el campo de la ciencia y la filosofía. Tal vez por ello se presenta un contraste actual en la enseñanza de las ciencias: por una parte, quienes apuestan por enseñar la rigidez de los enunciados científicos, y la conciben bajo un lenguaje unívoco, neutral y de carácter lógico-deductivo; y por otro lado, quienes la humanizan desde dinámicas móviles y cimentaciones semánticas artificiosas, las cuales, se alejan —como lo expone Héctor Palma en el prólogo del libro Bestiario epistemológico. Metáforas zoomórficas y de otras entidades en la enseñanza de las ciencias y la epistemología– de los enunciados depurados y se valen de nuevos discursos desde el ámbito literario, en los que abundan las metáforas. (shrink)

Si l'on veut bien définir le rationalisme comme une pensée d'organisation, on devra lui accorder une matière à organiser, des éléments à assembler, des expériences à ajuster. On devra le juger au terme même de cette organisation, après son effort synthétique, après son travail de mise en ordre. Il y a peu de justice à le taxer d'incapacité à propos d'une analyse de ce qu'il prend comme éléments de sa construction. Autant dire que le rationalisme est une philosophie fonctionnelle, une (...) philosophie d'opérations - ou plutôt, comme nous le montrerons plus explicitement dans notre livre sur la Mécanique ondulatoire, une philosophie d'opérateurs. Ce n'est pas une philosophie existentielle. Le rationalisme ne prétend pas pénétrer dans l'individualité d'une existence. Il ne commence à penser qu'en établissant des relations. (shrink)

En 32 romans, publiés entre 1934 et 1982, cet auteur d'origine australienne a élaboré autour de son protagoniste principal, l'inspecteur Roderick Allen de Scotland Yard, un ensemble de romans policiers d'enquête dans la meilleure tradition britannique.

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision-making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we (...) argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity. (shrink)

Some philosophers of religion have argued that moral anti-theodicy begs the question. This paper evaluates the arguments from two such philosophers, writing a decade apart—Robert Mark Simpson, and Lauri Snellman. Simpson argues that any global argument against theodicy must allow for the possibility of there existing a plausible theodicy, and that anti-theodical arguments (the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences) all implicitly discount this possibility, thus ending up begging the question. Snellman argues that (...) moral anti-theodicies presuppose that some evils cannot be justified, which would presuppose that theodicy is false from the start, which in turn would beg the question against theodicy. The author of the paper argues that Simpson’s arguments rest on an erroneous assumption regarding the nature of anti-theodicy, and that one of Simpson’s arguments sets a problematic standard for argumentation that the author argues we should not accept. It is also argued that Snellman’s argument relies on an unsupported claim from Toby Betenson. Therefore, the author concludes that Simpson and Snellman have not managed to show that moral anti-theodicies beg the question. (shrink)

While some countries are moving toward legalization, euthanasia is still criticized on various fronts. Most importantly, it is considered a violation of the medical ethics principle of non-maleficence, because it actively seeks a patient’s death. But, medical ethicists should consider an ethical alternative to euthanasia. In this article, we defend cryocide as one such alternative. Under this procedure, with the consent of terminally-ill patients, their clinical death is induced, in order to prevent the further advance of their brain’s deterioration. Their (...) body is then cryogenically preserved, in the hope that in the future, there will be a technology to reanimate it. This prospect is ethically distinct from euthanasia if a different criterion of death is assumed. In the information-theoretic criterion of death, a person is not considered dead when brain and cardiopulmonary functions cease, but rather, when information constituting psychology and memory is lost. (shrink)

Pour Gaston Bachelard, le « non » signifie dépasser et compléter le savoir antérieur, la philosophie de la connaissance scientifique doit englober les contradictions. Il établit le profil épistémologique de l’évolution, du réalisme naïf au surrationalisme en passant par le rationalisme classique et élargit le domaine de l’intuition à ce qu’il appelle une « intuition travaillée»s’exerçant dans un espace non analytique.

Dans ce premier ecrit qu'est sa these principale (1927), Bachelard etudie le processus d'affinement de la connaissance scientifique. Le role de la connaissance approchee est defini dans les sciences experimentales, ou le degre de precision, confronte au contingent et a l'indivisible, atteint necessairement une limite; ainsi que dans les sciences mathematiques qui, soumises a ce meme fractionnement epistemologique et ontologique, se pretent neanmoins a une approximation illimitee, puisque l'infini mathematique permet de creer toujours de nouveaux etres irrationnels assurant la continuite (...) de l'indefini des nombres rationnels. Par consequent, on atteint jamais qu'un fait rectifie et provisoire. La connaissance de la realite se verifie progressivement a chacune de ses acquisitions, et cette rectification constitue la veritable realite epistemologique, car elle exprime la pensee dans son dynamisme profond: l'approximation, c'est l'objectivation inachevee, mais c'est l'objectivation prudente, feconde, vraiment rationnelle puisqu'elle est a la fois consciente de son insuffisance et de son progres. En marge des debats du pragmatisme, les concepts de realite et de verite sont investis d'un sens nouveau par une philosophie de l'inexact. (shrink)

Utilisant les concepts psychanalytiques, l'auteur montre comment, dans la science, le language constitue le véhicule privilégié de l'anthropomorphisme et comment les projections affectives constituent autant d'obstacles épistémiologiques à son développement.

In recent years, many disciplines have become interested in the scientific study of morality. However, a conceptual framework for this work is still lacking. In The Moral Background, Gabriel Abend develops just such a framework and uses it to investigate the history of business ethics in the United States from the 1850s to the 1930s. According to Abend, morality consists of three levels: moral and immoral behavior, or the behavioral level; moral understandings and norms, or the normative level; and (...) the moral background, which includes what moral concepts exist in a society, what moral methods can be used, what reasons can be given, and what objects can be morally evaluated at all. This background underlies the behavioral and normative levels; it supports, facilitates, and enables them. Through this perspective, Abend historically examines the work of numerous business ethicists and organizations--such as Protestant ministers, business associations, and business schools--and identifies two types of moral background. "Standards of Practice" is characterized by its scientific worldview, moral relativism, and emphasis on individuals' actions and decisions. The "Christian Merchant" type is characterized by its Christian worldview, moral objectivism, and conception of a person's life as a unity. The Moral Background offers both an original account of the history of business ethics and a novel framework for understanding and investigating morality in general. (shrink)

Ni religion ni philosophie, l'animisme est une compréhension neuve de la nature et sans doute aussi un art de vivre qui, face à un monde agité, nous apprend à mieux habiter le monde. Et si l'animisme s'avérait la seule possibilité de sauver l'homme? Par une nouvelle façon d'être au monde, cette pensée, souvent méconnue, se donne à vivre comme une contre-philosophie. Cette initiation est un éveil de l'être tout entier, une nouvelle cosmogonie qui se donne à lire. Il s'agit de (...) réapprivoiser son corps en réapprenant, par exemple, à respirer, à contempler, à se dessaisir du sens des choses, à apprendre à oublier le temps. Face à un monde agité et au seuil du chaos, l'animisme invite à retrouver l'aspect essentiel des choses. Instaurant un dialogue entre la philosophie occidentale et cette philosophie africaine, Gaston-Paul Effa décentre la perspective, et change de focale : et si une nouvelle révolution était en marche? Et si, contrairement à l'idée reçue, c'était la Nature qui humanisait l'Homme? (shrink)

The metaphysics of dust -- Realist atomism -- Problems of the composition of phenomena -- Positivist atomism -- Critical atomism -- Axiomatic atomism.

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is justified, then (...) assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. (...) While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed. (shrink)

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

Examines the changes during the twentieth century in the views of mathematics, physics, and the scientific method and discusses the role of the mind in science.

Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that (...) Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...) are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn’t warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—that is, why we should care about it at all. In light of these arguments, I call for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment. (shrink)