This article examines the cultural ways in which traditional Judaism understands the relationship between an individual and Divinity. The article shows that this understanding has deep gendered dimensions. Grounded in feminist critiques of theology, as well as in Jewish studies and cultural studies, the article shows that the conceptualization of God-person relationship, in both Orthodox and Kaballic Jewish streams, is based on a hierarchical division to three different spaces. These spaces are: Mitzvah, Grace, and Desire or Will. The Mitzvah is (...) perceived to be the highest space and is represented as 'manly'. The intermediate space-Grace-is represented as a 'good woman' or as 'mother'. This space is characterized by a sacred yearning, as well as by lack of stability and continuity, paralysis, and even death. The lowest space is the space of Desire and personal will, which is culturally represented by a child or a whore-woman. This space is characterized by an attitude of disregard, resistance and fear. The article demonstrates how this cultural division of Divinity in to three, contradicts the declared Jewish position that God/divinity is 'One, Sole and Unique', and points at the inherent need of genderless conceptualization of Divinity in Judaism. (shrink)

After a short description of the nature of philosophical counselling, this paper suggests that what makes philosophical counselling philosophical is that it helps the counsellee in philosophical self‐investigations. These are critical non‐empirical investigations of the fundamental principles underlying the counsellee's ‘lived understanding’(i.e. conceptions which the counsellee lives by, though not necessarily articulates in words), aimed at the development of wisdom. In order to illustrate the nature of philosophical self‐investigation, two case studies are presented. The nature and measurability of success in (...) philosophical counselling is then discussed. A questionnaire filled out by a counsellee is quoted as an illustration of the possible effects and success of philosophical counselling. (shrink)

We live within political systems that increasingly seek to control movement, organized around both the desire and ability to determine who is permitted to enter what sorts of spaces, from gated communities to nation-states. In _Movement and the Ordering of Freedom_, Hagar Kotef examines the roles of mobility and immobility in the history of political thought and the structuring of political spaces. Ranging from the writings of Locke, Hobbes, and Mill to the sophisticated technologies of control that circumscribe the (...) lives of Palestinians in the Occupied West Bank, this book shows how concepts of freedom, security, and violence take form and find justification via “regimes of movement.” Kotef traces contemporary structures of global mobility and resistance to the schism in liberal political theory, which embodied the idea of “liberty” in movement while simultaneously regulating mobility according to a racial, classed, and gendered matrix of exclusions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the past decade, philosophers have started to use philosophical methods of counselling for everyday problems and predicaments, such as decision‐making, inter‐personal conflicts, occupational dissatisfaction, search for meaning, etc. This paper shows, on the basis of two case studies, how philosophical counselling can utilise analytic methods commonly used in academic philosophy, such as conceptual analysis. The paper also discusses the difference between philosophical counselling and psychological therapy.

Drawing on feminist and queer critiques that see violence as constitutive of identities, this essay points to subject-positions whose construction is necessarily conditioned by exercising violence. Focusing on settler colonialism, I reverse the optics of the first set of critiques: rather than seeing the self as taking form through the injuries she suffers, I try to understand selves that are structurally constituted by causing injury to others. This analysis refuses the assumption that violence is in conflict with identity, and that, (...) therefore, the endurance of violence of liberal states/societies is dependent upon mechanisms of active blindness. I argue that this assumption, which is shared by many critiques of violence, fails to perceive that people can desire the violent arrangements supporting their communities. They therefore fail to address political settings wherein violence is an affirmative element of political identities. (shrink)

In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon. Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect. There is an “explanatory gap” between our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects, referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and it (...) has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation. Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness. Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties. We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer. We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer. Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic. In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable and in other frame of reference it will not. These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct, just as in the case of an observer that claims to be at rest while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity. Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged, as they both describe the same underlying reality. Based on relativistic phenomena in physics we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness, we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to some critics, the notion of conscious experience is a good candidate for denoting a distinct and scientifically interesting phenomenon in the brain. I base this claim mainly on an analysis of neuropsychological data concerning deficits resulting from various types of brain damage as well as some additional supporting empirical evidence. These data strongly point to the hypothesis that conscious experience expresses information that is available for global, integrated, and flexible behavior.

One defining feature of the Hindu religious worldviews is a belief in the impermanence of the body and its perception as a source of suffering due to a misguided attachment of the self to its corporeal manifestation. This view is expressed in several important traditions, including classical yoga, which perceives the physical body as an impediment to attaining liberation and irrelevant in the state of liberation.However, the perception of the physical body in liberation is going through ontological changes in early (...) medieval Haṭhayoga texts. The dichotomy between embodied and disembodied states of the body when one is liberated is the focus of this article. In several medieval yoga texts dating between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries, the ontological immortal state of living liberation is more similar to physical death. Often the exact text holds both views of embodied and disembodied states simultaneously with no overt inconsistency. I argue that these tensions and contradictions can be explained in two ways: by looking at the assessed timeline of the texts and by reflecting on their sectarian and social origin. (shrink)

Looking at one site, the Israeli checkpoints in the occupied Palestinian territory, this article seeks to understand the mechanisms by which violence can present itself as justifiable, even when it materializes within frames presumably set to annul it. We look at the checkpoints as a condensed microcosmos operating within two such frames. One is the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian ‘peace process’, and the other is regulatory power, which in the Foucauldian framework presumably sidelines the violent form which sovereign power takes. We argue (...) that the checkpoints, which dissect the Palestinian occupied territories into dozens of enclaves and which are one of the most effective and destructive means of control within the current stage of occupation, can be seen as more than obstacles in the way of Palestinian movement; we suggest that they also function as corrective technologies that are meant to fail. It is with this failure that violence can appear as justified. In order to show the operation of this embedded failure, we examine one mechanism operating within the checkpoints: ‘the imaginary line’. The imaginary line is both a component within, and an emblem of a mode of control that constantly undoes itself in order to summon violence. Since it is never visibly marked in the physical space, the imaginary line is bound to be unintentionally crossed, thereby randomly rendering Palestinians as ‘transgressors’ of the rule and thus facilitating eruptions of violence by the soldiers stationed at the checkpoints. This article proposes an analysis of this hidden demarcation of space in order to question the different relations between subjects and power which it both assumes and constitutes. (shrink)

This essay traces the evocations of the Chinese practice of foot-binding in Western political thought. I examine the changing deployments of the image: as a contrast to European freedom or as a mirror reflecting its own limitations. The bound feet not merely illustrate a lack of freedom through an image of disabled mobility. They also situate freedom within global and gendered frameworks. Via a reading of the image and its contexts, we see that European freedom-as-movement emerged on the backdrop of (...) two imperial contrasts: images of nomadism, which are only marginally considered in this paper, and an assumed stagnation, that presumably prevailed in the East. Yet surprisingly, the image was often evoked to say something about Europe itself, rather than about its “others.” Therefore, it also reveals the corporeal dimensions of a concept of freedom that has underlaid a long liberal tradition. The crushed and squeezed feet of girls in China thus marked both a gendered and an imperial divide between those who can move freely, and therefore rule, and those who cannot rule because of their lack of mobility; yet at the same time, it undid this division by allowing the East and its stationariness to permeate Europe through a multiply foreign body: feminized, racially alien, and geographically distanced. (shrink)

A book on the notion of fundamental length, covering issues in the philosophy of math, metaphysics, and the history and the philosophy of modern physics, from classical electrodynamics to current theories of quantum gravity. Published (2014) in Cambridge University Press.

Loop quantum gravity predicts that spatial geometry is fundamentally discrete. Whether this discreteness entails a departure from exact Lorentz symmetry is a matter of dispute that has generated an interesting methodological dilemma. On one hand one would like the theory to agree with current experiments, but, so far, tests in the highest energies we can manage show no such sign of departure. On the other hand one would like the theory to yield testable predictions, and deformations of exact Lorentz symmetry (...) in certain yet– to–be–tested regimes may have phenomenological consequences. Exposing their shortcomings, here I discuss two arguments that exemplify this dilemma, and compare them to other cases from the history of physics that share their symptoms. (shrink)

Combining physics, mathematics and computer science, quantum computing and its sister discipline of quantum information have developed in the past few decades from visionary ideas to two of the most fascinating areas of quantum theory. General interest and excitement in quantum computing was initially triggered by Peter Shor (1994) who showed how a quantum algorithm could exponentially “speed-up” classical computation and factor large numbers into primes far more efficiently than any (known) classical algorithm. Shor’s algorithm was soon followed by several (...) other algorithms that aimed to solve combinatorial and algebraic problems, and in the years since theoretical study of quantum systems serving as computational devices has achieved tremendous progress. Common belief has it that the implementation of Shor’s algorithm on a large scale quantum computer would have devastating consequences for current cryptography protocols which rely on the premise that all known classical worst-case algorithms for factoring take time exponential in the length of their input (see, e.g., Preskill 2005). Consequently, experimentalists around the world are engaged in attempts to tackle the technological difficulties that prevent the realisation of a large scale quantum computer. But regardless whether these technological problems can be overcome (Unruh 1995; Ekert and Jozsa 1996; Haroche and Raimond 1996), it is noteworthy that no proof exists yet for the general superiority of quantum computers over their classical counterparts. -/- The philosophical interest in quantum computing is manifold. From a social-historical perspective, quantum computing is a domain where experimentalists find themselves ahead of their fellow theorists. Indeed, quantum mysteries such as entanglement and nonlocality were historically considered a philosophical quibble, until physicists discovered that these mysteries might be harnessed to devise new efficient algorithms. But while the technology for harnessing the power of 50–100 qubits (the basic unit of information in the quantum computer) is now within reach (Preskill 2018), only a handful of quantum algorithms exist, and the question of whether these can truly outperform any conceivable classical alternative is still open. From a more philosophical perspective, advances in quantum computing may yield foundational benefits. For example, it may turn out that the technological capabilities that allow us to isolate quantum systems by shielding them from the effects of decoherence for a period of time long enough to manipulate them will also allow us to make progress in some fundamental problems in the foundations of quantum theory itself. Indeed, the development and the implementation of efficient quantum algorithms may help us understand better the border between classical and quantum physics (Cuffaro 2017, 2018a; cf. Pitowsky 1994, 100), and perhaps even illuminate fundamental concepts such as measurement and causality. Finally, the idea that abstract mathematical concepts such as computability and complexity may not only be translated into physics, but also re-written by physics bears directly on the autonomous character of computer science and the status of its theoretical entities—the so-called “computational kinds”. As such it is also relevant to the long-standing philosophical debate on the relationship between mathematics and the physical world. (shrink)

Non-classical negations may fail to be contradictory-forming operators in more than one way, and they often fail also to respect fundamental meta-logical properties such as the replacement property. Such drawbacks are witnessed by intricate semantics and proof systems, whose philosophical interpretations and computational properties are found wanting. In this paper we investigate congruential non-classical negations that live inside very natural systems of normal modal logics over complete distributive lattices; these logics are further enriched by adjustment connectives that may be used (...) for handling reasoning under uncertainty caused by inconsistency or undeterminedness. Using such straightforward semantics, we study the classes of frames characterized by seriality, reflexivity, functionality, symmetry, transitivity, and some combinations thereof, and discuss what they reveal about sub-classical properties of negation. To the logics thereby characterized we apply a general mechanism that allows one to endow them with analytic ordinary sequent systems, most of which are even cut-free. We also investigate the exact circumstances that allow for classical negation to be explicitly defined inside our logics. (shrink)

Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.

The early history of the attempts to unify quantum theory with the general theory of relativity is depicted through the work of the under--appreciated Italo-Brazilian physicist Gleb Wataghin, who is responsible for many of the ideas that the quantum gravity community is entertaining today.

In the original publication, the corresponding author was indicated incorrectly. The correct corresponding author of the article should be Ori Lahav. The original article has been updated accordingly.

I discuss the philosophical implications that the rising new science of quantum computing may have on the philosophy of computer science. While quantum algorithms leave the notion of Turing-Computability intact, they may re-describe the abstract space of computational complexity theory hence militate against the autonomous character of some of the concepts and categories of computer science.

A remarkable theorem by Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (2003) (CBH) characterizes quantum theory in terms of information--theoretic principles. According to Bub (2004, 2005) the philosophical significance of the theorem is that quantum theory should be regarded as a ``principle'' theory about (quantum) information rather than a ``constructive'' theory about the dynamics of quantum systems. Here we criticize Bub's principle approach arguing that if the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics remains intact then there is no escape route from solving the measurement (...) problem by constructive theories. We further propose a (Wigner--type) thought experiment that we argue demonstrates that quantum mechanics on the information--theoretic approach is incomplete. (shrink)

We argue that the so-called "property-dualist" theory of consciousness is consistent both with current neurobiological data and with modern theories of physics. The hypothesis that phenomenal properties are global properties that are irreducible to microphysical properties, whose role is to integrate information across large portions of the brain, is consistent with current neurobiological knowledge. These properties can exercise their integration function through action on microscopic structures in the neuron without violating the laws of quantum mechanics. Although we offer no positive (...) argument for the existence of irreducibly global properties, the conclusion is that this view is a scientifically respectable hypothesis that deserves to be investigated. (shrink)

A recent attempt to compute a (recursion‐theoretic) noncomputable function using the quantum adiabatic algorithm is criticized and found wanting. Quantum algorithms may outperform classical algorithms in some cases, but so far they retain the classical (recursion‐theoretic) notion of computability. A speculation is then offered as to where the putative power of quantum computers may come from.

Within the controversy between the combinatorial and the connectionist approaches to cognition it has been argued that our semantic and syntactic capacities provide evidence for the combinatorial approach. In this paper I offer a counter-weight to this argument by pointing out that the same type of considerations, when applied to the pragmatics of adjectives, provide evidence for connectionism.

Spinoza’s Ethics has a robust and underappreciated theory of love. In this paper, I show that Spinoza’s discussion of love, which stands at a crossroads between his ethics and his epistemology, details the metamorphosis of love in the philosopher’s mind – from passionate love to intellectual love of God, and from imagination or opinion to scientia intuitiva. This metamorphosis is responsible for the closely interrelated philosopher’s morality and the perfection of their understanding, which are closely linked. Reading Spinoza’s guide to (...) ethical and philosophical progress through the prism of his theory of love holds the key to understanding some of the most perplexing issues presented in the second half of Part 5, namely, the nature of the intellectual love of God and the object of the third kind of knowledge. (shrink)

I discuss a rarely mentioned correspondence between Einstein and Swann on the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity, in which Einstein points out that the attempts to construct a dynamical explanation of relativistic kinematical effects require postulating a fundamental length scale in the level of the dynamics. I use this correspondence to shed light on several issues under dispute in current philosophy of spacetime that were highlighted recently in Harvey Brown’s monograph Physical Relativity, namely, Einstein’s view on the (...) distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the consequences of pursuing the constructive approach in the context of spacetime theories. r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

For many among the scientifically informed public, and even among physicists, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle epitomizes quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, more than 86 years after its inception, there is no consensus over the interpretation, scope, and validity of this principle. The aim of this chapter is to offer one such interpretation, the traces of which may be found already in Heisenberg's letters to Pauli from 1926, and in Dirac's anticipation of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations from 1927, that stems form the hypothesis of finite (...) nature. Instead of a mere mathematical theorem of quantum theory, or a manifestation of "wave-particle duality", the uncertainty relations turn out to be a result of a more fundamental premise, namely, the inherent limitation on spatial resolution that follows from the bound on physical resources. The implication of this view are far reaching: it depicts the Hilbert space formalism as a phenomenological, "effective", formalism that approximates an underlying discrete structure; it supports a novel interpretation of probability in statistical physics that sees probabilities as deterministic, dynamical transition probabilities which arise from objective and inherent measurement errors; and it helps to clarify several puzzles in the foundations of statistical physics, such as the status of the "disturbance" view of measurement in quantum theory, or the tension between ontology and epistemology in the attempts to describe nature with physical theories whose formalisms include subjective probabilities. Finally, this view also renders obsolete the entire class of interpretations of quantum theory that adhere to "the reality of the wave function". (shrink)

An analysis of the two routes through which one may disentangle a quantum system from a measuring apparatus, hence protect the state vector of a single quantum system from being disturbed by the measurement, reveals several loopholes in the argument from protective measurement to the reality of the state vector of a single quantum system.

One of the recurrent problems in the foundations of physics is to explain why we rarely observe certain phenomena that are allowed by our theories and laws. In thermodynamics, for example, the spontaneous approach towards equilibrium is ubiquitous yet the time-reversal-invariant laws that presumably govern thermal behaviour in the microscopic level equally allow spontaneous departure from equilibrium to occur. Why are the former processes frequently observed while the latter are almost never reported? Another example comes from quantum mechanics where the (...) formalism, if considered complete and universally applicable, predicts the existence of macroscopic superpositions—monstrous Schr¨odinger cats—and these are never observed: while electrons and atoms enjoy the cloudiness of waves, macroscopic objects are always localized to definite positions. (shrink)

Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.

A recent proposal to solve the halting problem with the quantum adiabatic algorithm is criticized and found wanting. Contrary to other physical hypercomputers, where one believes that a physical process “computes” a (recursive-theoretic) non-computable function simply because one believes the physical theory that presumably governs or describes such process, believing the theory (i.e., quantum mechanics) in the case of the quantum adiabatic “hypercomputer” is tantamount to acknowledging that the hypercomputer cannot perform its task.