Resumen: En la antigua filosofía confuciana, el pensamiento de la “Armonía entre el Hombre y la Naturaleza” ocupa un lugar primordial. La noción confuciana tiene una arraigada y extensa historia, evolucionando y profundizándose a lo largo de sucesivas generaciones. Su contenido es profundo e intrincado, y abarca una perspectiva armoniosa e integrada de la naturaleza, una priorización de la rectitud sobre el interés personal y una perspectiva de desarrollo sostenible. Estas ideas tienen un valor significativo como punto de referencia para (...) el establecimiento y avance de los sistemas sociales contemporáneos. Este artículo pretende explorar los orígenes y el desarrollo del concepto de “Armonía entre el Hombre y la Naturaleza”, al tiempo que analiza y reflexiona sobre cómo influye esta ideología en la construcción de la sociedad actual. (shrink)

There are three conventionally held views about the relationship between mankind and nature in the Roman villa: man is master over the natural landscape; villas were positioned at vantage points so that the downward gaze of a dominus reinforced his domination; gardens offered opportunities to bring order upon nature. This article argues to the contrary that Manilius Vopiscus’ villa in Statius’ Siluae 1.3 presents a harmonious relationship between key natural features, the villa architecture and the villa (...) proprietor himself. Nature sometimes takes precedence, while the villa complements and integrates with the environment. This allows us to appreciate the nuances in Statius’ overall presentation of the relationship between mankind and nature in Book 1 and in other poems in the Siluae. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Harmony Between Rousseau’s Musical Theory and his PhilosophyJohn T. ScottRousseau is best known as the author of philosophic works, but he was a musician and musical theorist before he burst onto the European literary scene with his First Discourse. While he earned celebrity as an anti-philosophical philosopher, he continued to consider music as his primary vocation and avocation throughout his life. Rousseau testifies to the (...) class='Hi'>harmony between his musical work and his philosophy in his Dialogues, where he explains that his musical writings and compositions are animated by the same feelings and ideas as all of his works—that they too are based on the principle of his “system” that “man is good although men are wicked.” 1 His mature musical theory not only incorporates his philosophy of human nature and development but also extends it through an examination of the role of the passions in human communication. Rousseau’s musical theory is an important, yet often overlooked, facet of his philosophy.The relationship between Rousseau’s musical theory and his philosophy as a whole has seldom been extensively analyzed. 2 His only widely known writing relating to music is the Essay on the Origin of Languages, but even that work has in general not received a full accounting because it has rarely been interpreted in light of his other musical writings. The Essay emerged out of both the Second Discourse and the contemporaneous musical polemics of the mid-1750s. The simultaneous elaboration of his “system” and his continued work on music was the context in which Rousseau’s mature musical theory developed. After an account of Rousseau’s pre-systematic musical writings and [End Page 287] a discussion of the development of his musical theory, I will turn to an examination of the Essay. Finally, I will conclude by discussing Rousseau’s novel aesthetic theory and its impact.Rousseau’s Presystematic Musical Writings“Jean-Jacques was born for music.” 3 Rousseau’s musical writings might be characterized as his attempt to account for his native love for music. In his Confessions he speaks of “the taste or rather passion for music” that he had almost from birth and says that it was while in Italy, after running away from Geneva at age sixteen, that his passion began to declare itself. 4 Rousseau increasingly indulged his love for music over the next several years, although six months in a choir school at about the age of seventeen was almost the only formal musical instruction he received. He acquired and painstakingly mastered Rameau’s Treatise on Harmony, and studied informally with a young organist with Italian training, recalling how he compared his friend’s “principles” to those of “my Rameau.” 5 At least in retrospect, then, Rousseau noted the contrast between French and Italian music that would later bring him into conflict with his youthful hero.Rousseau soon took up the profession of a music teacher and copyist, a trade to which he would return after abandoning philosophy. Copying music acquainted him with the difficulty of the ordinary visual system of notating music, and he therefore devised a numerical system. It was with his system of notation and a play, Narcisse, that Rousseau set out for Paris in 1741. He gained an audience for his “Plan Regarding New Signs for Music” (1742) at the Academy of Sciences, and while it was favorably received, the report of a select committee concluded that his system was not entirely new and was less practical in most respects than the ordinary system. 6 Rousseau was nonetheless convinced of his system’s utility and published it as the Dissertation on Modern Music (1743). This work contains a digression on musical expression where he explains that we are not “touched” by sounds themselves but by the harmonic relationships they have among them. He sends his reader to Rameau’s writings, where the source of musical expression is “sufficiently explained.” 7 In his mature musical writings Rousseau expounds a theory explicitly opposed to Rameau’s theory of musical expression.Several incidents in the next decade before the discovery of his “system” seem to have contributed to Rousseau’s subsequent break with Rameau. [End... (shrink)

The central role played by Darwin's analogy between selection under domestication and that under nature has been adequately appreciated, but I have indicated how important the domesticated organisms also were to other elements of Darwin's theory of evolution-his recognition of “the constant principle of change,” for instance, of the imperfection of adaptation, and of the extent of variation in nature. The further development of his theory and its presentation to the public likewise hinged on frequent reference to (...) domesticates.We have seen that Darwin's reliance on the analogy between domesticated varieties and wild species was a bold and original step, in light of contemporary views on the nature of domesticates. However, as Darwin undoubtedly foresaw, his reliance on the analogy created difficulties as well as solving problems, and these began with his Malthusian codiscoverer of the principle of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace. Wallace's paper “On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type,” presented to the Linnean Scoiety along with the first public unveiling of Darwin's theory, states: We see, then, that no inferences as to varieties in a state of nature can be deduced from the observation of those occurring among domestic animals. The two are so much opposed to each other in every circumstance of their existence, that what applies to the one is almost sure not to apply to the other. Domestic animals are abnormal, irregular, artificial; they are subject to varieties which never occur and never can occur in a state of nature.62Much has been made of the similarity of views of Darwin and Wallace, but this quotation surely reveals how utterly different their views were on what to Darwin was an important matter. Several critics of the Origin saw Darwin's reliance on the domesticates as his Achilles heel. As Young has pointed out, Samuel Wilberforce included the following passage in his attack on the Origin: Nor must we pass over unnoticed the transference of the argument from the domesticated to the untamed animals. Assuming that man as the selector can do much in a limited time, Mr. Darwin argues that Nature, a more powerful, a more continuous power, working over vastly extended ranges of time, can do more. But why should Nature, so uniform and persistent in all her operations, tend in this instance to change? Why should she become a selector of varieties?63Another critic, Fleeming Jenkin, found the analogy a weakness in Darwin's theory because of the limited extent of variation in any one direction in domestic animals and plants.64 We have already seen that Darwin had confided a similar view to his notebook thirty years earlier, but changed his mind as a result of his profound study of domesticates. De Beer's reference to “an English country gentleman's knowledge of domestic plants and animals and their breeding”65 fails totally to recognize the originality and depth of Darwin's knowledge of domesticates.Why did Darwin, against the currents of his time, rely so heavily on mankind's experience with domesticated organisms to shape his theory about species in nature? On reason is that only with domesticates was an approach that came close to experimental verification possible. Darwin fully realized the inadequacies of the experiment, as is emphasized by his repeated contrasting of selection under nature and selection by man. Yet the extensive experience and data of plant and animal breeders offered the only reliable base against which Darwin could continually challenge his views. As he wrote in the introduction to Variation, with domestication, “man ... may be said to have been trying an experiment on a gigantic scale.”66 Given Darwin's high opinion of the quantitative work of Malthus and Quetelet (as emphasized by Schweber),67 and his unremitting efforts to secure data by which to test his theories, it was inevitable that he should attach high significance to domesticated varieties. John Tyndall, in his Belfast address of 1874, said: “The strength of the doctrine of Evolution consists, not in experimental demonstration (for the subject is hardly accessible to this mode of proof), but in its general harmony with scientific thought.”68 Darwin would have agreed with the latter thought, but I think he would have challenged the preceding one on the grounds that long experience with domesticated varieties did provide an element of experimental demonstration. It gave him confidence in his theory, and he used his vast knowledge of artificial selection boldly and creatively. (shrink)

This article aims to show how the changes to NEPA by the Trump Administration are an act of environmental racism, defined as “[i]ntentional or unintentional racial discrimination in environmental policy‐making, enforcement of regulations and laws, and targeting of communities for the disposal of toxic waste and siting of polluting industries.”.

: Youzi, Confucius’ disciple, proposed the thought of “Harmony is Valued”, which was also the value pursuit of Confucius. They interpreted the implication of “Harmony” from practicing the rules of propriety. “He” means “harmony”. Mencius called the harmony between people “Support of the People”, and he discussed the harmonious coexistence between the revolutionaries and the public from the perspective of “Benevolent Policy” and “Good Nature”. Xunzi explained the institution, normalization and impartiality necessary for (...) society from the aspect of “Harmony”, which expanded the theoretical implication of “Harmony”. Confucian thought of “Harmony is Valued” is also the embodiment of the ideology of “Advocating Fairness” and “Harmony Between Man and Nature”, which contained the thought of the harmonious relationship between people and nature. Confucian thought of “Harmony is Valued” has achieved an innovative development in modern society, which complies with the idea of sustainable development. It is of great referential significance for rethinking the relation between people, the relation between human and nature, and the relation between economic development and natural environment etc. Resumo: Youzi, discípulo de Confúcio, propôs o pensamento de “harmonia tem preço”, que também era a busca de valor de Confúcio. Eles interpretaram a implicação de “Harmonia” de praticar as regras de propriedade. “Ele” significa “harmonia”. Mencius chamou a harmonia entre as pessoas de “Apoio do Povo” e discutiu a convivência harmoniosa entre os revolucionários e o público na perspectiva da “Política Benevolente” e da “Boa Natureza”. Xunzi explicou a instituição, normalização e imparcialidade necessária para a sociedade, sob o aspecto da “Harmonia”, que ampliou a implicação teórica da “Harmonia”. O pensamento confucionista de “harmonia tem preço” é também a personificação da ideologia de “Defender o Justo” e “Unidade do Céu e do Homem”, que continha o pensamento da relação harmoniosa entre as pessoas e o universo. O pensamento confucionista de “A harmonia tem um preço” alcançou um desenvolvimento inovador, na sociedade moderna, que está de acordo com a ideia de desenvolvimento sustentável. É de grande significado referencial para repensar a relação interpessoal, a relação entre o homem e a natureza, a relação entre o desenvolvimento econômico e o ambiente natural etc. (shrink)

The author seeks, through an examination of the characters of Dostoevsky, to interpret the nature of man and his fate. A "Christian existentialist," he sees man's life as essentially tragic, torn between the "dialectical opposites," God and nature. Man's only hope for harmony and synthesis lies in the total "surrender of his autonomy to the demands of God." Sometimes obscure in meaning, the book contains nevertheless a number of interesting suggestions.--V. C. C.

The statement “Building the socialist harmonious society” contains the recognition and understanding of the conflicts of values in the contemporary society. The connotation of socialist harmonious society contains its own dominant values: In the relations of person-to-person, it requires democracy to guarantee the achievement of freedom and rule of law to ensure social fairness and justice. In the relationship of human and nature, it demands harmony between man and nature and the coordinated and sustainable development of (...) economy, society and ecology. Putting-people-first is the essential principle. The construction of contemporary values is a basic approach of building the socialist harmonious society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:God, the Absolute Wise Man, and the Study of ReligionClemens CavallinThe Absolute Wise ManIn the beginning of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG], Thomas Aquinas remarks that, according to the Philosopher (that is, Aristotle), the wise man orders "things rightly and governs them well."1 To do this, the wise man needs to pay attention to the proper goal of his activity, that is, the good toward which he is to (...) order things. This means that there can be wise politicians, carpenters, and philologists; but Aquinas has primarily in mind "the absolute wise man" (simpliciter sapiens), who queries both the origin of the universe and its end: God.Moreover, not only does the absolute wise man contemplate the nature of God, the ultimate source and truth of the universe, but as even the highest theoretical wisdom (in the Aristotelean sense of sophia) has a practical, ordering dimension, it is also proper for such a person to teach truth and oppose falsehood—in other words, to be a teacher.2Toward the end of the first chapter of SCG, "The Office of the Wise [End Page 1207] Man," Aquinas returns to his introductory quote from Proverbs 8:7: "My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate impiety." Aquinas interprets impiety (impietas) as "falsehood against the divine truth," and its opposite, piety (pietas), he writes, is another word for religion.3 The absolute wise person is, therefore, in the business of ordering religion toward its proper goal, God as the origin and end of the universe. As a result, besides the mistaken views of heretics, the Christian wise man, according to Aquinas, has to oppose the errors of Jews, gentiles, and Muslims, that is, all non-Christian religions. In refuting the latter two, he has to use natural reason, as they accept neither the Old nor the New Testament.4 And this philosophical task is the fundamental errand of SCG.Moreover, the quest for and ordering of knowledge in relation to ultimate wisdom brings with it a joyous union of "man to God in friendship," as God, the creator, made everything in wisdom, as ordered to himself, the Supreme Being and Truth.5 To pursue wisdom thus divinizes man.However, my goal in this article is not primarily to deepen our understanding of the Thomist spirituality of higher wisdom, but to probe the possibility of a Catholic "religious studies" endeavor inspired by Aquinas's approach in SCG I. My main question is, therefore, whether the office of the wise man is compatible with (or at least complementary to) the idea and practice of religious studies. Or if a Catholic approach to religious studies must do without absolute wisdom and settle for a lower-level goal such as ordering the relations between the diverse religious traditions of global society with the goal of harmonious coexistence? In that case, the spirituality of the scholar turns from divinization to humanization, but in what way would such studies be Catholic?A Catholic "religious studies" is here understood as different from theology of religions, and more generally from dogmatic theology.6 Theology of religions is concerned with questions such as the possible salvific role of non-Christian religions, with how to understand the principle of extra ecclesiam nulla salus ("no salvation outside the Church") and [End Page 1208] the trichotomy of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.7 The main concern of religious studies is not such evaluations, but rather the details of the history of religions and the contemporary diversity and changes of religion and spirituality. The theoretical thrust of religious studies aims at understanding the natural inclination for religion and its manifold manifestations (beliefs, rituals, and myths). It is also distinct from natural theology (for example as found in SCG), as the latter deals with the possibility and scope of rational knowledge of the divine.Moreover, religious studies as a field differs from that of Catholic studies, which has Catholicism itself as the object of study and which combines perspectives from religious studies and theology, often with the aim of cultivating the Catholic identity of a college or university.8Moreover, the interreligious-dialogue active component of interre-ligious studies is more limited... (shrink)

The author seeks, through an examination of the characters of Dostoevsky, to interpret the nature of man and his fate. A "Christian existentialist," he sees man's life as essentially tragic, torn between the "dialectical opposites," God and nature. Man's only hope for harmony and synthesis lies in the total "surrender of his autonomy to the demands of God." Sometimes obscure in meaning, the book contains nevertheless a number of interesting suggestions.--V. C. C.

Although the history of adopting the Western Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) concept in China spans less than 20 years, the core principles of CSR are not new and can be legitimately interpreted within traditional Chinese culture. We find that the Western CSR concepts do not adapt well to the Chinese market, because they have rarely defined the primary reason for CSR well, and the etic approach to CSR concepts does not take the Chinese reality and culture into consideration. This article (...) resolves these problems and contributes a new definition of CSR, called here – the Harmony Approach to CSR. Simply, the Chinese harmony approach to CSR means 'respecting nature and loving people'. It is the first time CSR has been defined in relation to Confucian interpersonal harmony and Taoist harmony between man and nature. Conceptually, this definition will broaden our understanding and will fit the characteristics of the Chinese market better. The idea of incorporating cultural contexts into CSR concepts could also contribute to future CSR studies. In business practice, it will help corporations to adopt CSR on their own initiative. The proposed virtues of traditional Chinese wisdom, in particular, will guide corporations to a new way of improving their CSR performance. (shrink)

If we arrange in chronological order the various statements Darwin made about God, creation, design, plan, law, and so forth, that I have discussed, there emerges a picture of a consistent development in Darwin's religious views from the orthodoxy of his youth to the agnosticism of his later years. Numerous sources attest that at the beginning of the Beagle voyage Darwin was more or less orthodox in religion and science alike.78 After he became a transmutationist early in 1837, he concluded (...) that the doctrine of secondary causes must be extented even to the history of life and that after the first forms of life were created, there was no further need for divine intervention, except where man was concerned. Man's body, he thought, was produced by the process of transmutation, but he believed for a time that man's soul was “superadded.” By mid-1838 he had become convinced that nothing, after the creation of life, was due to miracles. God works only through laws, which are capable of producing “every effect of evey kind which surrounds us.” The existence of man, the idea of God in man's mind, and the harmony of the whole system were in his eyes prearranged goals of deterministic laws imposed by God. Such a conception excludes the miracles on which Christianity depends; but it is not possible to say whether Darwin's loss of Christian faith, which occurred at about this same time, preceded and made possible his “materialism” or was rather caused or hastened by it.79 In the weeks after his reading of Malthus, Darwin's belief in a plan of creation gave way to the belief that God created matter and life and designed their laws, leaving the details, however, to the workings of chance. This remained his view until the 1860s.There is no exact parallel between this development of Darwin's religious views and the development of his ideas on evolution, but there is a general correspondence. When he believed in a plan of creation, Darwin's theory of transmutation did not depend on struggle or the selection of chance variations. Adaptation was, for him, an automatic response to environmental chance. From late 1838 to 1859 he believed in designed laws and chance, and this belief, too, has its parallel in his theory. The element of chance in natural selection meant that there could be no detailed plan,in which even man's idea of God would be a necessary outcome of nature's laws (man himself is not a necessary outcome of the working of natural selection).80 But Darwin still believed nature was programmed to achieve certain general ends. We might say that he believed in a general, though not a special, teleology. Natural selection was for him a law to maximize utility, creating useful organs, retaining vestiges for future use. For many years it was a law designed to produce organisms perfectly adapted to their environments. Only later did Darwin come to doubt even this sort of design in nature.81 One way of describing the development of Darwin's evolutionary thought is to say that it shows a gradual abandoning of his “theistic” assumptions, so that by the late 1860s his theory was informed to a slighter extent by notions of purpose and design than it was in 1838 or 1844 or 1859. (shrink)

The latter half of the eighteenth century saw radical changes in the way nature - both external and human nature - was perceived. It is these new perceptions, these new images of the 'the natural' that this book examines: new appreciations of the 'sublime' wildness of landscape; new revelations by the life sciences of natural creative fecundity; new assertions of the innocence of 'natural man', as illustrated by the noble savage, the contented peasant, the happy family; a new (...) sense of harmony between man and nature, reflected in changing moral, psychological, economic, and religious attitudes. Professor Charlton concentrates on French examples, for in France the contrast between old and new views was particularly vivid; but there are also numerous comparisons with England and other European countries, making this a major study in the cultural history of Europe at an especially crucial time for the formation of many of our modem assumptions about man and nature. (shrink)

Marx holds that mankind has developed from nature and in mutual interaction with nature: nature is not an “other” but is man’s body. Capitalism is a necessary stage in mankind’s historical development of the mastery of nature, but it regards nature as an “other” to be exploited. Thus, a further historical development is necessary: the overcoming of the dichotomy between man as subject and nature as object.Capitalism bases its concept of wealth on unnecessary (...) production rather than on socially useful production and on the maximization of true leisure and free and creative activity for all. It creates excess pollution and depletes nonrenewable resources as a result of this wasteful, exploitative, unnecessary production. A Marxian solution to environmental problems involves the replacement of capitalism with a rational humane, environmentally unalienated social order. Unfortunately, the actual practice of Marxism has not generally been in accord with its own theory. Such rational, humane social orders have not yet been instituted, but they must be soon. We must take one aspect of Marx’s ideas to its logical conclusion: Marxist practice has been, at best, homocentric, but now it must overcome that limitation and truly see nature as our “body.” Marxism must become ecologically aware; mankind must become the steward of its “body”: the ecosystem upon which it depends and which now depends upon it for its health (homeostasis). (shrink)

Marx holds that mankind has developed from nature and in mutual interaction with nature: nature is not an “other” but is man’s body. Capitalism is a necessary stage in mankind’s historical development of the mastery of nature, but it regards nature as an “other” to be exploited. Thus, a further historical development is necessary: the overcoming of the dichotomy between man as subject and nature as object. Capitalism bases its concept of wealth on (...) unnecessary production rather than on socially useful production and on the maximization of true leisure and free and creative activity for all. It creates excess pollution and depletes nonrenewable resources as a result of this wasteful, exploitative, unnecessary production. A Marxian solution to environmental problems involves the replacement of capitalism with a rational humane, environmentally unalienated social order. Unfortunately, the actual practice of Marxism has not generally been in accord with its own theory. Such rational, humane social orders have not yet been instituted, but they must be soon. We must take one aspect of Marx’s ideas to its logical conclusion: Marxist practice has been, at best, homocentric, but now it must overcome that limitation and truly see nature as our “body.” Marxism must become ecologically aware; mankind must become the steward of its “body”: the ecosystem upon which it depends and which now depends upon it for its health (homeostasis). (shrink)

Violence in the world, explosive population growth, uneven and unfair distribution of wealth, destruction of the environment and/or the ineffectiveness of supranational political and economic tools and institutions and other problems are more and more achieving global character. The growth of number, frequency and intensity of global problems and threats is a reality. In the same time it represents a big challenge: How to find a generally acceptable, adequate global solution? The majority of political and intellectual leaders around the world (...) acknowledge concept of sustainable development/sustainable living as the most important tool for protecting the biosphere and for securing reasonable development for the future. The development and implementation of the sustainable living concept is driven by the effort to reach – as much as possible – the ideals of humanism and the harmony between man and nature, based on the respect of life. Values compatible with a sustainable way of living are a set of values, the implementation of which promote the shift towards sustainable future. These values are not completely new. Just the opposite. They create the core of the common heritage of humankind, since the oldest religious cultures. The submitted study tries to map the recent developments of values compatible with the sustainable way of living problematic from both Czech, Slovak and thinkers from abroad perspectives in the wider framework of relevant international activities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Michelet and Social Romanticism: Religion, Revolution, NatureArthur MitzmanIn 1851, shortly before his second and definitive suspension from his teaching at the Collège de France, Jules Michelet told a young friend of his dissatisfaction with the meager political impact of the Republican professors of the time: “Our present propaganda... has resembled strongly that which might be made by a man enclosed in a crystal glass. He finds his voice to (...) be resounding and very strong: that’s because it breaks against the inner surface. But those who are outside, the men of the people, hear nothing.” 1Michelet had become painfully aware of how little his voice had been heard outside the crystal in June 1848, when barricade-builders outside his house on the Rue des Postes responded to his son-in-law’s appeal not to expose the dwelling of the great historian to artillery fire by asking, “Who is Michelet?” 2 This occurred two years after the publication of Le Peuple and only months after the appearance of his celebration of the commoners’ festivals of federation in 1790, both texts being landmarks in the social romantic anticipation of 1848. In fact it was the 1848 Revolution itself that had diminished the resonance of Michelet’s ideas, by polarizing the country in a way that made it impervious to his message of social harmony.Before 1848, Michelet was a central figure in the intellectual disaffection that delegitimized the July Monarchy. His work in the 1840s had shifted from the historical erudition of his many-volumed Histoire de France to contemporary polemics against the clergy and the government: attacks on the Jesuits and the Church 3 swiftly broadened to a conflict with the intellectual and political establishment of the period. In Le Peuple (1846), Michelet combined an analysis of the profound social divisions within the French nation with a remarkable sketch of the relation between civilization and nature, a Rousseauian appeal to the natural qualities of the common people and an [End Page 659] invocation of the genius of the future, who would be gifted with “the two sexes of the spirit.”Le Peuple was the first of a series of works on nature, women, and the common people, those three “others” of nineteenth-century high culture, that have throughout this century fascinated cultural historians. In the historiographical tradition, its author has been celebrated by those who viewed him as their predecessor in the broadening of history-writing to include culture and mentalities, such as Lucien Febvre and Jacques Le Goff, and denigrated by those, like Pieter Geyl, who have been outraged by his nationalistic pathos and his blatant subjectivity. 4 I shall suggest in this essay that all of these aspects of Michelet’s work are rooted in his significance in the 1840s as a social romantic, the contemporary and friend of George Sand, Lamennais, Pierre Leroux, and others.For apart from what Michelet has come to mean, as totem or as scarecrow, to the scholarship of the twentieth century, he was enmeshed in the ideological conflicts of his own time. Without an understanding of those conflicts, an important perspective on his place in the history of ideas will be missing, a perspective which, moreover, may shed some light on the broader historical significance of the social romanticism he represented. For example, the “ideological” Michelet was best known in his own time as an anti-clerical. 5 Indeed, his version of the Romantic évangile éternel, which he developed in the 1840s, takes a privileged place among the efforts of intellectuals in the first half of the nineteenth century to work out new religious conceptions to replace a moribund Catholicism. 6 Yet the principal framework of his polemical activity was not the Church but the liberal academic establishment, with which he was at war from his 1843 lectures on the Jesuits to his dismissal from his official functions at the beginning of the Second Empire.Michelet and the July Monarchy: From Liberalism to Social RomanticismSeen from the standpoint of the early years of his career, roughly 1825 to 1835, Michelet would seem an improbable candidate for any kind of romanticism. Given his impoverished, artisan background as well... (shrink)

The recent controversy over whether Marxism is an ecologically viable theory or can justify astate of harmony between man and nature has a serious flaw because none of the participants in the discussion seems to think that technology is intrinsic to the reconciliation of man with nature. While it is correct that the writings of the early Marx offer some basis for the reconciliation, the later Marx was preoccupiedwith the question of nature’s instrumentality or the (...) human significance of nature, and he saw technology as the human mode of dealing with nature. Marx and Marxists have contributed to making us aware of man’s exploitation of and alienation from other men, but not man’s exploitation of and alienation from nature. To eradicate the second requires a radical deconstruction of modern technomorphic culture and its metaphysical foundations. (shrink)

The recent controversy over whether Marxism is an ecologically viable theory or can justify astate of harmony between man and nature has a serious flaw because none of the participants in the discussion seems to think that technology is intrinsic to the reconciliation of man with nature. While it is correct that the writings of the early Marx offer some basis for the reconciliation, the later Marx was preoccupiedwith the question of nature’s instrumentality or the (...) human significance of nature, and he saw technology as the human mode of dealing with nature. Marx and Marxists have contributed to making us aware of man’s exploitation of and alienation from other men, but not man’s exploitation of and alienation from nature. To eradicate the second requires a radical deconstruction of modern technomorphic culture and its metaphysical foundations. (shrink)

Modern social and scientific-technological progress have resulted in an unprecedented acceleration of rates of change in all the principal elements of the system comprising the material life of society: production, social relationships, the geographic environment, population, and others. This made more obvious the complex interrelationship among these elements and the need to coordinate them rationally within the framework of the single system of mutual determination of various natural and social factors, any disruption of the stability and integrity of which is (...) pregnant with exceedingly serious consequences to human existence. (shrink)

It behooves us to examine , first, in the work of Rousseau the overlapping of their conception of nature and the foundations of social and political life : it is possible to mention the harmony between man and nature without considerations of politics? Then we examine some aspects of modern subjectivity – feeling of existence , moral conscience , the idea of ​​ happiness, pursuit of the indoor unit.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 23-48 Fantastick Associations and Addictive General Rules: A Fundamental Difference between Hutcheson and Hume MICHAEL B. GILL The belief that God created human beings for some moral purpose underlies nearly all the moral philosophy written in Great Britain in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. David Hume attacks this theological conception of human nature on all fronts. It (...) is out of these attacks that Hume develops his own "science of man" based solely on "experience and observation."1 Francis Hutcheson is often taken to be the most important positive influence on Hume. And there can be no doubt that Hume does take on board several crucial Hutchesonian elements. But Hutcheson's moral theory, like that of most of his contemporaries, is grounded in a theological conception of human nature to which Hume is adamantly opposed.2 In this paper I will examine how Hume's disagreements with Hutcheson embody the anti-theological purpose that defines Hume's work as a whole. I will look, in particular, at Hume's and Hutcheson's different positions on the principles of association. I hope to show how Hume's use of these principles in the Treatise advances his larger goal of placing "the science of man" on "a foundation almost entirely new" (T xvi). I will proceed, first, by explaining Hutcheson's conception of human nature and his use of the principles of association; second, by sketching in broad outline how Hume's accounts of the origins of justice and natural virtue undermine crucial components of Hutcheson's conception of human nature; and third, by elucidating in more detail an aspect of Hume's associationism that is particularly revealing of his distance from Hutcheson. Michael B. Gill is at the Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, 1360 Liberal Arts and Education Building, West Lafayette IN 47907 USA. email: [email protected]. 24 Michael B. Gill I. Hutcheson and Association Hutcheson discusses the mind's tendency to associate in all of his writings, but his most extensive treatment of the matter comes in his Essay on the Passions.3 Hutcheson begins the Essay by telling us that something is good if and only if the perception of it "Causes, or Occasions" a pleasurable feeling, and that something is evil if and only if the perception of it causes or occasions a painful feeling (EP 2). Crucially, Hutcheson denies that all of our pleasures and pains are of the same type (EP 1-8).4 He holds, rather, that there are at least five distinct types of pleasures and pains and that each of them grounds a different irreducible type of good and evil. There are, first, the pleasures and pains caused by things we perceive through the external senses of taste, touch, smell, etc.; things that cause such pleasures are called naturally good, while things that cause such pains are called naturally evil. Second, there are the "Pleasant Perceptions, arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects" (EP 5); the things that cause these pleasures are called beautiful.5 Third, there are the pleasures and pains we feel upon perceiving the happiness or misery of other human beings; the things that cause these pleasures are called public goods while those that cause the corresponding pains are called public evils. Fourth, there are pleasures and pains, usually called approval and disapproval, that we feel upon perceiving the actions of others; the actions that cause approval are called virtuous or morally good, while those that cause disapproval are called vicious or morally evil. Finally, there are the pleasures and pains we feel upon perceiving others' moral perceptions of our own actions; the pleasure of perceiving others' approval of one's actions is called the feeling of honor, while the pain of perceiving others' disapproval is called the feeling of shame. For Hutcheson, then, natural goodness, beauty, the public good, virtue and honor are all defined by our pleasures and pains. He does not think, however, that these are defined by just any of our actual or occurrent pleasures and pains. He holds, rather, that they are defined by the pleasures and pains we feel under certain privileged... (shrink)

The Law has always been an instrument to exorcise different kinds of fear, primarily the fear of differences, through the distribution of shares of power. Perhaps, this system, inherently conflictual, is behind the failure of the multicultural policies of many countries, that have divided the society in as many separate communities as are the elements that differentiate each human being. The Law has also recognized to men a total power over Nature, feeding its illusion of control, that in recent (...) decades has shattered in front of several natural disasters. Ecuador, Buthan and South Africa have introduced in their Constitutions ideas belonging to the indigenous cultural tradition (buen vivir, buddhism and ubuntu), which express harmony between men and Nature. The paper analyzes these experiences in order to propose a new model of eco-friendly constitutionalism. (shrink)

A survey of the history of the ideal of a balance between man and nature in America, this book outlines the development of the conservation movement and summarizes the thinking of such men as Thoreau. One misses a critical discussion of the men and ideas opposed by the conservationists, e.g., Carnegie. The discussion of contemporary problems, the population-explosion and the arms race, is provocative but less careful and well-documented than the rest of the book.—R. J. W.

Problems of the relationship between man and nature are becoming a steadily increasing portion of the questions facing modern civilization. Moreover, their character is changing significantly. Only two or three decades ago, the most acute problems were an unending list of "shortages" of one type or another, while the environment in which men lived was regarded primarily as a set of resources without which things could not be produced. Today it is the threat of excessive human influences on (...) nature that has taken center stage. The biosphere is beginning to be perceived on the level of its capacity to assimilate what has been produced, and the growing question is how best to combine the scientific-technological creations of man with the objective processes occurring in nature. (shrink)

One of the more exotic and mysterious features of Leibniz’s later philosophical writings is the harmony between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace. In this paper I show that this harmony is not a single doctrine, but rather a compilation of two doctrines, namely (1) that the order of nature makes possible the rewards and punishments of rational souls, and (2) that the rewards and punishments of rational souls are administered naturally. I (...) argue that the harmony is best considered as Leibniz’s distinctive collation, development, and rebranding of these doctrines, which were not themselves unique to Leibniz, nor uncommon in the seventeenth century. There follows a detailed examination of various concrete examples of the harmony in operation, from which I show that it is essentially the culmination of Leibniz’s lifelong thinking about divine justice. (shrink)

This paper briefly summarizes Durkheim’s theory of the dual nature of man suggested earlier in his Elementary Forms of Religious Life. It is characteristic of human beings that two opposite principles confront each other within them: soul and body, concept and sensation, moral activity and sensory appetites. Although this inherent inconsistency of man has been long recognized by philosophical thought, no doctrine explanation to it has been provided to date. While empiricist monism has proved to be unable to explain (...) how concepts emerge from sensations and disinterestedness develops from self-interest, absolute idealism, on the contrary, cannot deduce sensations from concepts. Although theories suggested by Plato and Kant do not bypass the problem of dualism, they only rephrase it and make no progress in solving it. According to Durkheim, dualism of human nature stems from the fact that all religions are founded on dividing all things into the sacred and the profane. This division, in turn, is explained by coexistence of collective and individual origins in the human being. Sacred things arise out of the collective origin that enables individual consciousnesses to fuse into communion. Collective origin does not act with constant strength, but intensifies during the periods of effervescence, when it subdues the individual origin. Since the importance of the social aspect of man increases over time, there is no reason to believe that complete consent between individual and society is possible that would endow man with internal harmony. (shrink)

For Kant, any authentic moral demands are wholly distinct from the demands of prudence. This has led critics to complain that Kantian moral demands are incompatible with our human nature as happiness-seekers. Kant’s defenders have pointed out, correctly, that Kant can and does assert that it is permissible, at least in principle, to pursue our own happiness. But this response does not eliminate the worry that a life organized around the pursuit of virtue might turn out to be one (...) from which we cannot expect any of this (permissible) happiness. To address this worry, Kant would need to establish that there is a kind of harmony between virtue and our own happiness that can give us confidence that aiming at morality does not require us to abandon our hope for happiness in this life. This paper aims to show that Kant—building on insights from Rousseau that Kant identifies with Cynicism—does offer an account of such a harmony between virtue and worldly happiness. (shrink)

Power, informational equipment of industrial potential of human civilization, of course, thanks to the growing scientific and technical progress. At the same time its effects often cause the technological, ecological, anthropological disasters. All this actualize the role of ethics in its practical dimensions. It is very important to use the philosophical and heuristic potential of ethics, its sensitivity to humanistic sense of contemporary environmental and biomedical problems. Their solution depends largely the future of human life and fate of the planet. (...) According to this factors the aim of this article is to reflect the strategy of interpretation of the relationships between man and nature in a number of world religions. Also the aim of article is to model the parameters of interfaith dialogue for the invention of effective forms of religious communities' participation in the environmental initiatives intended to the optimizing of the balance between society and the natural environment. The novelty element of our study is that it not only covers the basic tenets of religious traditions on environmental issues, but also outlines the opportunities and heuristic potential of synergy between productive humanistic and socially relevant ideas of different faiths and philosophically-religious discourses for the invention of instruments for interdenominational cooperation in the practical environmental projects and initiatives. Only the declarations of concern about environmental problems, of course, are not enough. Value consciousness of religious communities and individuals must be transformed into the practical sphere. It means that religious organizations should be actively involved, including their financial, intellectual and organizational forces to the real environmental projects and initiatives that have applied out and can lead to tangible results. Many religions have the conceptual resources of a certain attitude to environmental issues. And the vector of this attitude can be returned ambivalently: either toward passivity and paralyzing the creative will of man, or in the direction of real activity-promoting. Under these conditions, the educational activities within religious communities is of paramount importance. Its key value postulate is the social and communicative harmony, health of human society and the preservation of human culture in its humane forms. Under another conditions the environmental initiatives of religions are only declaratory and little effective. The study is implemented on the disciplinary boundaries of ethics, social philosophy and religious studies. The author uses the methodological possibilities of synergy of humanistic ideas of religious ethics concept. (shrink)

Dujiangyan irrigation system of more than 2000 years history is a symbol of originality of Chinese ancestors both in its conception and project mode. It is still working well and benefit Chengdu Plain nowadays while other comparable water conservancy projects of the same or later age have vanished and been forgotten. More than just a world-famous cultural heritage, it shows the harmonious relationship between man and nature. And it also reveals us how to solve problems in the era (...) of economic globalization, such as the constantly silt up of the dams, the exhaustion of the energy and the crisis of the deterioration of ecosystem. The inspirations it gives us range from technology to humanities, from economy to various aspects in social life. In a word, Dujiangyan irrigation system demonstrates the wisdom and creativity of Chinese people and has a universal significance despite the change of time and space. (shrink)

The formation and development of any architectural form and system has its own historical and cultural background. The ancient Chinese architectural system has a long history and characteristics inseparable from the historical development of Chinese traditional philosophy. Chinese philosophy, as a theory of human self-consciousness, does not give knowledge, but mainly gives ideas and ways of thinking for the needs of human self-development; At the same time, ancient Chinese architecture became a physical object reflecting the idea of traditional Chinese philosophy. (...) Therefore, in order to explore ancient Chinese architecture, it is necessary to analyze and study it from the point of view of traditional Chinese philosophy. Like Confucius' thoughts on etiquette, the idea of the "doctrine of the middle" and the concept of hierarchical division; These ideas had a profound influence on ancient Chinese architecture, including urban planning, traditional dwellings, the environment, Lao Tzu's desire for harmony and unity between man and nature, worship of the gods, etc., as well as the theory that emerged later "Feng Shui", etc. temple space and garden architecture in the south of the Yangtze River. This article is devoted to the analysis of the influence of Confucianism and Taoism on the general principle of designing spaces of ancient Chinese architecture. The article selects some typical examples of ancient Chinese architecture for analysis. The following principles are manifested in the design of spaces of Chinese architecture under the influence of Confucianism and Taoism: moderation of living space; the principle of symmetry, balance and coordination; architectural hierarchy formed on the basis of the needs of "rituals"; integration of architecture and the environment; design of spaces according to "Feng Shui". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 139 twenty years ago has slowly given way to an awareness that cross-cultural differences are real enough to call for different rules of behavior and different sets of values. Several possibilities are still open to the ethicist concerned with the problem of relativism. We may want to reconsider more carefully than ever before the connotations of "relative," of "action" and of "culture" in the context of those (...) anthropologists whose claims are said to be detrimental to ethics. Of these terms so crucial for what Moser calls relativism of right, only the first has been analyzed from opposite perspectives by Stevenson and Berlin. So far as I know, no one has treated "relative" as a relational term in the fruitful way suggested by Berlin.19 We may also come to realize that the issue of relativism is too much imbedded in historical and metaphysical tenets and thus is not amenable to the ahistorical treatment of the logical status of moral judgment. Thus we may want to rewrite its whole history by exploiting one of the best facets of Moser's essay. That is, a comparative study of the sociology of knowledge with the organic model of cultural anthropology. Lastly we may agree with A. Edel and consider the whole issue a closed chapter in the history of philosophy, and move on to the philosophically more fruitful investigation of the why and wherefore of moral change between generations and between historical periods. L. M. PALMER University of Delaware Ernst Cassirer: Scientific Knowledge and the Concept of Man. By Seymour W. Itzkoff. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. xi +286. $9.95) There is a sense in which the title of this book is misleading. To be sure, Dr. Itzkoff does deal with Cassirer and with Cassirer's neo-Kantian conception of scientific knowledge and of man. But there is more to the book than this. The first seven chapters are, in effect, a demonstration that "Cassirer left us with a difficult theoretical dilemma: the existence of two contrasting and opposed views of human nature" (p. 172). The last two chapters (pp. 172-252) are the author's attempt to bring those two views into harmony within the framework of contemporary science and philosophical analysis. The first two chapters (pp. 1-37) trace briefly the development of philosophical thought from the time of "the intellectual revolution set in motion by Galileo" to Kant's "Copernican revolution"--to the Kantian thesis, that is, that "the fundamental act of perception and the structuring of experience itseLf depend upon... 'transcendental apperception' as a 'condition of the possibility of perception itself'" (p. 27). It is the concern with "form and function" rather than with "substance and reality," which the Marburg neo-Kantians, and with them Cassirer, accepted as the lasting achievement of Kant's "critical philosophy." But Cassirer found in Kant also a "parallel concern... for humanistic disciplines" (p. 33) and, as "a central theme," the assertion of the "autonomy of human nature" (p. 35). The survey is suggestive but, in some respects, it is also inaccurate. For example, Kant's presumed "lapse into a radical subjectivism" cannot be justified by the reference, in passing, as it were, to the Opus postumum (p. 29)--although the fault is here perhaps that of Norman Kemp Smith rather than that of the author. A more ~o I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), pp. 96-106. 140 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY serious misrepresentation of Kant may be found in the author's acceptance of T. D. Weldon's statement that "the categories... supply principles which are... essential to the existing of a unitary self-consciousness" (p. 32), for this is precisely the reverse of the Kantian position. Also, it is hardly accurate to speak of "Kant's postulation of laws of ethical behavior" (p. 36), for, surely, the various formulations of the categorical imperative are not "laws of ethical behavior" but criteria of such laws. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 38-98) are devoted to discussions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Kant's initial commitment to Newtonian mechanics is, of course, a wellknown fact; but Professor Itzkoff quite correctly points out... (shrink)

This paper aims to show that to think of the artificial means to think at the same time of man, nature, culture and society not as separate entities but as elements of one and the same system; since, in its field of action, the artificial articulates its component dimensions, which altogether are natural, human, cultural and social. Usually we call artificial both the procedure through which we project the realisation of something and the product of our project: the realisation (...) of the artefact. The artefact incorporates, in the physical and inanimate dimensions of nature, those dimensions which are proper to the producer. When the artificial imitates and reproduces certain aspects of nature, its action is directed towards achieving an improvement in man's life. In this perspective, we think that the artificial cannot be viewed as a factor external to man and man's social life. (shrink)