One of the most famous critiques of the Leibnitian calculus is contained in the essay “The Analyst” written by George Berkeley in 1734. His key argument is those on compensating errors. In this article, we reconstruct Berkeley's argument from a systematical point of view showing that the argument is neither circular nor trivial, as some modern historians think. In spite of this well-founded argument, the critique of Berkeley is with respect to the calculus not a fundamental one. Nevertheless, it highlights (...) central aspects of the calculus that are characteristic of modern scientific theories. (shrink)

A lay movement known as the Poor of Christ, incorrectly referred to as the Waldensians, started in the Roman Church in 1176 and rapidly spread through Europe despite severe persecution by the church. Through their values and methods, they impacted on the communities where they were present. This article aims to show their role and contributions indicating its impact on the 16th century Reformation and relevance for the church today. It does this by examining selected themes from the Poor of (...) Christ: their life-transforming faith, the strengthening of laity, the equal role of women in ministry, the importance of teaching and living the faith, a focused rather than fenced theology and loyalty to the one Church of Christ. The article also draws reference to the COVID-19 pandemic and explores what we can learn from the Poor of Christ in addressing this situation.Contribution: This article puts the spotlight on an overlooked lay movement that contributed significantly in preparing the climate for the 16th Century Reformation. Their example shows that the real strength of church is through members empowered to holistically live their faith. The article shows the current relevance of their values and methods. (shrink)

In a behavioral study we analyzed the influence of visual action primes on abstract action sentence processing. We thereby aimed at investigating mental motor involvement during processes of meaning constitution of action verbs in abstract contexts. In the first experiment, participants executed either congruous or incongruous movements parallel to a video prime. In the second experiment, we added a no-movement condition. After the execution of the movement, participants rendered a sensibility judgment on action sentence targets. It was expected that congruous (...) movements would facilitate both concrete and abstract action sentence comprehension in comparison to the incongruous and the no-movement condition. Results in Experiment 1 showed a concreteness effect but no effect of motor priming. Experiment 2 revealed a concreteness effect as well as an interaction effect of the sentence and the movement condition. The findings indicate an involvement of motor processes in abstract action language processing on a behavioral level. (shrink)

Der Band dokumentiert eine Tagung, die sich am 11. und 12.10.2011 in der Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung dem Umgang der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre mit Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) gewidmet hat. Funf diskursleitende Annaherungsweisen wurden fur ein Urteil uber Rezeption und Rejektion von Lehre und Person Kelsens in der und durch die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre gewahlt: Kelsen als Diskurspartner wahrend der Weimarer Zeit, Kelsen als Stein des Anstosses in den ersten Jahrzehnten der bundesrepublikanischen Staatsrechtslehre, Kelsen durch die autobiographische Brille herausragender Nachkriegsstaatsrechtslehrer, die Wiederentdeckung (...) Kelsens seit Mitte der Achtziger Jahre sowie der heutige Umgang der Staatsrechtslehre mit einem ihrer Klassiker. Mit Beitragen von: Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, Horst Dreier, Frieder Gunther, Stefan Korioth, Ulrike Lembke, Oliver Lepsius, Christoph Muller, Thomas Olechowski, Christoph Schonberger, Martin Schulte, Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Ewald Wiederin. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

Ist Geschichtsdarstellung ein transparentes Fenster zu einer faktischen Vergangenheit? Oder verlieren Fakten ihre Verbindlichkeit zugunsten der Repräsentation? Der vorliegende Band weist einen vermittelnden Weg zwischen diesen Extremen. Jenseits der positivistisch verstandenen historischen Fakten sowie der infolge des linguistic turn häufig behaupteten Unzugänglichkeit und Unentscheidbarkeit der faktischen Vergangenheit wird die Geschichtsdarstellung selbst als das eigentlich Greifbare zur Geltung gebracht. Geschichte ist demnach in ihrer Darstellung zu suchen – unabhängig davon, ob es sich um historiographische Quellen, literarische Texte, Gemälde oder um Museen (...) als mediale Darstellungsräume handelt. Die Beiträge gehen einem breiten Spektrum unterschiedlicher Dimensionen von Geschichtsdarstellung nach. Medien, Methoden und Strategien bilden dabei die zentralen Koordinaten, anhand derer Geschichtsdarstellung mit ihren narrativen und bildlichen Ausdrucksformen exemplarisch erörtert wird. Mit Beiträgen von Wolfgang Frühwald, Werner Goez, Thomas Kirchner, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Otto Gerhard Oexle, Antonios Rengakos, Hermann Schäfer, Jörg Schönert, Howard Weinbrot, Horst Wenzel und Gernot R. Wieland. (shrink)

We discuss the case against Factorism, which is the standard assumption in quantum mechanics that the labels of the $$\otimes$$ ⊗ -factor Hilbert-spaces in direct-product Hilbert-spaces of composite physical systems of similar particles refer to particles, either directly or descriptively. We distinguish different versions of Factorism and argue for their truth or falsehood. In particular, by introducing the concepts of snapshot Hilbert-space and Schrödinger-movie, we demonstrate that there are Hilbert-spaces and $$\otimes$$ ⊗ -factorisations where the labels do refer, even descriptively, (...) to similar particles, which renders them probabilistically absolutely discernible. (shrink)

The author endeavours to show two things: first, that Schrödingers (and Eckarts) demonstration in March (September) 1926 of the equivalence of matrix mechanics, as created by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan and Dirac in 1925, and wave mechanics, as created by Schrödinger in 1926, is not foolproof; and second, that it could not have been foolproof, because at the time matrix mechanics and wave mechanics were neither mathematically nor empirically equivalent. That they were is the Equivalence Myth. In order to make the (...) theories equivalent and to prove this, one has to leave the historical scene of 1926 and wait until 1932, when von Neumann finished his magisterial edifice. During the period 1926–1932 the original families of mathematical structures of matrix mechanics and of wave mechanics were stretched, parts were chopped off and novel structures were added. To Procrustean places we go, where we can demonstrate the mathematical, empirical and ontological equivalence of ‘the final versions of’ matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. -/- The present paper claims to be a comprehensive analysis of one of the pivotal papers in the history of quantum mechanics: Schrödingers equivalence paper. Since the analysis is performed from the perspective of Suppes structural view (‘semantic view’) of physical theories, the present paper can be regarded not only as a morsel of the internal history of quantum mechanics, but also as a morsel of applied philosophy of science. The paper is self-contained and presupposes only basic knowledge of quantum mechanics. For reasons of length, the paper is published in two parts; Part I appeared in the previous issue of this journal. Section 1 contains, besides an introduction, also the papers five claims and a preview of the arguments supporting these claims; so Part I, Section 1 may serve as a summary of the paper for those readers who are not interested in the detailed arguments. (shrink)

We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

The author endeavours to show two things: first, that Schrödingers (and Eckarts) demonstration in March (September) 1926 of the equivalence of matrix mechanics, as created by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan and Dirac in 1925, and wave mechanics, as created by Schrödinger in 1926, is not foolproof; and second, that it could not have been foolproof, because at the time matrix mechanics and wave mechanics were neither mathematically nor empirically equivalent. That they were is the Equivalence Myth. In order to make the (...) theories equivalent and to prove this, one has to leave the historical scene of 1926 and wait until 1932, when von Neumann finished his magisterial edifice. During the period 1926–1932 the original families of mathematical structures of matrix mechanics and of wave mechanics were stretched, parts were chopped off and novel structures were added. To Procrustean places we go, where we can demonstrate the mathematical, empirical and ontological equivalence of ‘the final versions of’ matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. -/- The present paper claims to be a comprehensive analysis of one of the pivotal papers in the history of quantum mechanics: Schrödingers equivalence paper. Since the analysis is performed from the perspective of Suppes structural view (‘semantic view’) of physical theories, the present paper can be regarded not only as a morsel of the internal history of quantum mechanics, but also as a morsel of applied philosophy of science. The paper is self-contained and presupposes only basic knowledge of quantum mechanics. For reasons of length, the paper is published in two parts; Part I appeared in the previous issue of this journal. Section 1 contains, besides an introduction, also the papers five claims and a preview of the arguments supporting these claims; so Part I, Section 1 may serve as a summary of the paper for those readers who are not interested in the detailed arguments. (shrink)

In the spirit of B. C. van Fraassen's view of science called Constructive Empiricism, we propose a scientific criterion to decide whether a concrete object is observable, as well as a coextensive scientific-philosophical definition of observability, and we sketch a rigorous account of modal language occurring in science. We claim that our account of observability solves three problems to which current accounts of observability, notably van Fraassen's own accounts, give rise. We further claim that our account of modal propositions (subjunctive (...) conditionals included), which proceeds wholly within the framework of the semantic view on scientific theories, grounds his claim that such an account is possible without relying on ‘inflationary metaphysics’, notably without postulating an infinitude of different universes besides the universe we inhabit. We thus claim to solve a fourth problem: how to give a precise nominalist account of modal language in science tailor-made for Constructive Empiricism. Introduction: Rough Guides The semantic view and the wave theory of light A scientific guide and a scientific criterion A New Rough Guide and a definition The Context Problem and Psillos' Problem Musgrave's Problem Modality without inflationary metaphysics Exitum. (shrink)

While the consequences of mathematically-based software, algorithms and strategies have become ever wider and better appreciated, ethical reflection on mathematics has remained primitive. We review the somewhat disconnected suggestions of commentators in recent decades with a view to piecing together a coherent approach to ethics in mathematics. Calls for a Hippocratic Oath for mathematicians are examined and it is concluded that while lessons can be learned from the medical profession, the relation of mathematicians to those affected by their work is (...) significantly different. There is something to be learned also from the codes of conduct of cognate but professionalised quantitative disciplines such as engineering and accountancy, as well as from legal principles bearing on professional work. We conclude with recommendations that professional societies in mathematics should sponsor an (international) code of ethics, institutional mission statements for mathematicians and syllabuses of ethics courses for incorporation into mathematics degrees. (shrink)

Objectives: The COVID-19 pandemic is having a major impact on the lives of everyone, but in particular on the health and well-being of older people. It has also disrupted the way that individuals access services and interact with one another, and physical distancing and “Stay at Home” orders have seen digital interaction become a necessity. While these restrictions have highlighted the importance of technology in everyday life, little is known about how older adults have responded to this change. Methods: Two (...) surveys, one in 2019 and another in 2020 collected data on a combined total of 1923 older adults aged 65 years and older in Canada. These looked at how older adults think about and use technology, with the 2020 survey additionally questioning how COVID-19 has impacted their use and attitudes towards technology. Results: While older adults feel more isolated in 2020, many feel positive about the benefits of technology and have increased technology use during the pandemic to support their health, wellness, and communication needs. Discussion: The results highlight the potential of technology for supporting older adults in various aspects of healthy aging. While these results point to the opportunities afforded by technology, challenges remain, such as how social and economic factors influence technology uptake. (shrink)

The trajectory of Merleau-Ponty’s career is often seen as a progressive development: he begins by analyzing scientific consciousness in The Structure of Behavior, complements that account with a phenomenological analysis of behavior as lived in Phenomenology of Perception, and then overcomes the “philosophy of consciousness” to which the earlier texts are committed in the turn toward an ontology of flesh in The Visible and the Invisible. Through close readings of Merleau-Ponty’s engagements with Gestalt psychology in The Structure of Behavior, I (...) argue that the immanent critique of Gestalt theory in that text already anticipates the chiasmic logic of flesh. This challenges the idea of a turn in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I begin by outlining the elemental, carnal, and reversible status of flesh. With careful attention to his source materials, I then distinguish Merleau-Ponty’s appropriations of Gestalt theoretical insights from his critical adaptations, defending three claims: (1) The Structure of Behavior borrows insights from Gestalt theorists that are undermined by their own, realistic ontology; (2) it modifies those insights to explicitly acknowledge the elemental status of nature; and (3) those modifications enable Merleau-Ponty to re-interpret Gestalt psychologists’ empirical findings, outlining how consciousness must emerge from nature as both carnal and reversible. (shrink)

Once Hilbert asserted that the axioms of a theory `define` theprimitive concepts of its language `implicitly''. Thus whensomeone inquires about the meaning of the set-concept, thestandard response reads that axiomatic set-theory defines itimplicitly and that is the end of it. But can we explainthis assertion in a manner that meets minimum standards ofphilosophical scrutiny? Is Jané (2001) wrong when hesays that implicit definability is ``an obscure notion''''? Doesan explanation of it presuppose any particular view on meaning?Is it not a scandal (...) of the philosophy of mathematics that no answersto these questions are around? We submit affirmative answers to allquestions. We argue that a Wittgensteinian conception of meaninglooms large beneath Hilbert''s conception of implicit definability.Within the specific framework of Horwich''s recent Wittgensteiniantheory of meaning called semantic deflationism, we explain anexplicit conception of implicit definability, and then go on toargue that, indeed, set-theory, defines the set-conceptimplicitly according to this conception. We also defend Horwich''sconception against a recent objection from the Neo-Fregeans Hale and Wright (2001). Further, we employ the philosophicalresources gathered to dissolve all traditional worries about thecoherence of the set-concept, raisedby Frege, Russell and Max Black, and whichrecently have been defended vigorously by Hallett (1984) in hismagisterial monograph Cantorian set-theory and limitationof size. Until this day, scandalously, these worries havebeen ignored too by philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

Ce numéro des Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg rassemble les contributions des intervenants qui ont participé à un colloque sur le thème Image, imaginaire et imagination chez Descartes et ses contemporains, qui s’est tenu les 29 et 30 mars 2017 à l’Université de Strasbourg. Ce colloque a été organisé par Frédéric de Buzon et Jil Muller dans le cadre du Centre de recherches en philosophie allemande et contemporaine. Nos remerciements les plus sincères vont à Emmanuel Salanskis pour son aid...

Herein is reproduced the text of the address of Jean-Marie Muller during the General Assembly of Iraqi groups dedicated to non-violence which took place in Erbil on 9 and 10 November 2009. Jean-Marie Muller defines six prospective forms of action for the non-violent movement in Iraq: training, information, sensitization, education, protest, and non-violent direct action.

Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. (...) Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation. (shrink)

We have developed a first generation tool for the unbiased identification and characterization of human pluripotent stem cells, termed PluriTest. This assay utilizes all the information contained on a microarray and abandons the conventional stem cell marker concept. Stem cells are defined by the ability to replenish themselves and to differentiate into more mature cell types. As differentiation potential is a property that cannot be directly proven in the stem cell state, biologists have to rely on correlative measurements in stem (...) cells associated with differentiation potential. Unfortunately, most, if not all, of those markers are only valid within narrow limits of specific experimental systems. Microarray technologies and recently next‐generation sequencing have revolutionized how cellular phenotypes can be characterized on a systems‐wide level. Here we discuss the challenges PluriTest and similar global assays need to address to fulfill their enormous potential for industrial, diagnostic and therapeutic applications. (shrink)

I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been (...) recognized. (shrink)

In this article I argue that one way of approaching Newman’s Idea of a University is to view it as a text about the formation of imagination. This is done in three parts. First, I identify the core features of imagination as Newman conceived it by drawing on various sources from his life and work. Second, I turn to Idea of a University in particular, primarily the “Lectures on University Teaching,” to demonstrate that the concept of imagination is a significant (...) underlying presence in Newman’s lectures. Finally, I conclude with a brief analysis of the relationship between reason and imagination within the university. (shrink)

Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...) ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. My reasoning against ideal utilitarianism will parallel Putnam's famous argument against the brains in a vat. Putnam argues that an envatted brain cannot describe its own situation because its words do not refer to brains and vats; I argue that an ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. (shrink)