La fundamentación de la física clásica llevó a Descartes a encontrar en el "ego cogito" la condición necesaria de todas las representaciones posibles: los conceptos de materia y de movimiento, tal como los exigía la nueva ciencia fueron concebidos por él inicialmente en una forma extremadamente racionalista, lo cual convirtió al "yo pienso" en el sujeto, en el fundamento de todo lo que puede ser real. Algunos científicos han sostenido que el "yo" según Descartes supone una tal preeminencia de la (...) epistemología, que impide pensar la moral y la situación del hombre frente a la incertidumbre de la vida. Se verá en el artículo que el sujeto hace de la naturaleza un mero objeto, pero mantiene su propia esfera, la de la libertad, hacia la cual estará dirigida toda la admiración después de que Descartes lograra resolver el enigma del universo. (shrink)

¿Cuántas imágenes hacen un poema? ¿Cuántas palabras se necesitan para construir un pensamiento? Vemos palabras de la misma manera que vemos árboles y casas, pero no vemos el bosque ni la ciudad como no vemos el poema y el pensamiento; lo verdaderamente esencial de ambos permanece oculto a nuestra simple y cotidiana mirada. El ojo y el oído se han acostumbrado a ver y a oír, es natural, es lo que se espera de dos órganos que están hechos para cumplir (...) esta misión. Pero ni vemos ni oímos más allá de los límites creados por la rutina de nuestra cotidianidad, hemos fijado a la superficie el paisaje y todo cuanto lo contiene: colores, olores, sonidos y texturas; vemos sin ver, oímos sin oír, olemos sin oler, tocamos sin sentir; esto es, sin diferenciar. Sin duda, establecer la diferencia, en cada acontecimiento particular, nos permitiría ir más allá de lo que simplemente se pone frente a nosotros; estamos tentados a nombrar esta diferencia como profundidad, pero mucho me temo que la profundidad también es una trampa, se trataría más bien de saber moverse entre ambas; sería algo así como dejarse sorprender por lo nuevo que hay en lo mismo, por lo imperceptible e invisible que existe en lo real y visible de la cotidianidad. (shrink)

Es paradójico cómo la vida suele entenderse de manera menos equivocada desde la ficción, la realidad en sí y por sí se convierte en una trampa donde la razón que la justifica termina por dibujarle sus propios barrotes. Tal vez lo que sucede es que la razón no tiene tan completamente asegurada una razón, de la misma manera que la locura no está ausente de razón y de sentido; es evidente que siempre hallaremos una razón en la locura y una (...) locura en cada razón. Exacerbar la razón o la locura nos pondrá siempre en el ojo del huracán, nos hará visibles ante los demás, nos personalizará, es decir, descubrirá en cada uno de nosotros a un personaje. (shrink)

¿Estamos los seres humanos predeterminado o somos creadores de nuestro propio destino? La respuesta puede ser inmediata, algo parecido al texto de Erich Fromm que nos sirvió de epigrafe, o demorarse un poco en algunas consideraciones históricas que nos permitan hacer el recorrido de aquello que hemos pensado a lo largo de una historia en la cual no nos conformamos con simplemente ser o existir, sino que buscamos razones que expliquen esos modos de ser y de existir, intentando claridad sobre (...) nuestro ethos. (shrink)

El presente número de la Revista Escritos recoge algunos artículos cuyos resultados fueron presentados en el II Congreso Iberoamericano de Bioética e Investigación, llevado a cabo por la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana en convenio con la Corporación Universitaria Lasallista, entre el 17 y 19 de agosto de 2016. Así mismo, se incluyen algunas de las ponencias leídas por los invitados centrales del evento.

El objeto de este artículo consiste en señalar las relaciones entre el método, la física y la metafísica cartesianas. Puede afirmarse que a partir de la idea básica de como debe ser la ciencia, Descartes concibe su física y fija el mecanicismo como la condición de toda explicación y de toda inteligibilidad; de estos se siguen las consecuencias metafísicas concernientes a la distinción del cuerpo y del alma y los temas finales de su unión que tanta claridad aportan sobre los (...) sentimientos y la moral. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza las “palabras sobre Dios” de cinco comunidades eclesiales periféricas de Medellín, a través de un método hermenéutico y etnográfico. Lo anterior se desarrolla en dos momentos; el primero, caracteriza la población sujeto y objeto de estudio; y el segundo, identifica la visiones y atributos de Dios que estas personas poseen desde la experiencia de lo religioso. Se concluye que la mayoría de las personas que participaron del estudio suponen la existencia de Dios, lo conciben como un ser (...) personal, eterno, espiritual y supremo. En sus afirmaciones se evidencia la influencia de una visión trinitaria de la divinidad que implica un acto de confianza. Dios, en ese contexto, es sobre todo poderoso, actúa y crea. En la manifestación de la experiencia de las personas no se percibe una diferencia conceptual en relación con la visión de Dios que profesa el cristianismo; y aunque hay un uso del lenguaje tradicional para referirse a los contenidos de la fe, no es sencilla la manera en que comprenden y explican cada uno de ellos. Lo anterior tiene una incidencia en las prácticas eclesiales. (shrink)

This paper proposes freedom as the condition of possibility for the construction of trust in human relationships. The methodology used is a review of the scientific literature of the most recent moral and political philosophy. As a result of the dialogue between different positions, it is discovered that freedom, despite being present in the act of trust, is forgotten in the discussion around trust, a forgetfulness that has as its main causes the assumption that trust is natural and the confusion (...) between the propensity to trust and the act of trusting. All this leads to proposing an approach of the act of trusting that starts from the freedom of the trustee and the trustor. (shrink)

Esta investigación pone en diálogo las posiciones de Hobbes y de Spaemann respecto a la naturaleza de la confianza, para lo cual se asume una postura hermenéutica. Los principales resultados de esta arrojan que para Hobbes la confianza ha de ser aprendida, pues la desconfianza es lo primero con lo que se encuentra el ser humano; mientras que, para Spaemann, el hombre es un ser confiado y aprende a desconfiar. Como efecto de este diálogo se descubre que ambos autores tienen (...) como base para la confianza la sociabilidad humana, por lo cual se concluye que la disposición de la confianza se da en la naturaleza humana como condición de posibilidad para el acto de confiar. (shrink)

Ficción y mito son algo más que lenguajes o formas narrativas, son estructuras arquitectónicas a través de las que se fija el pensamiento y su forma manifiesta de aparecer en la cotidianidad; este texto pretende rastrear la fundación de América Latina a través de la literatura en su forma de ficción y mito.

There is an evident lack of studies examining the pursuit of excellence in futsal. The aims of this study were to evaluate anthropometric and physiological variables that may contribute to distinguishing among performance levels in professional futsal players and to evaluate correlates of those variables. The participants were 75 male professionals (age = 25.1 ± 5.1 years, body height = 182.3 ± 6.2 cm, body mass = 80.8 ± 10.4 kg), who were divided into performance levels using two criteria: (i) (...) starters (first teams) vs. non-starters (substitutes) and (ii) top-level players (members of the national team and players who participated in top-level team competition in Europe) vs. high-level players (team players competing at the highest national competitive rank). Variables included anthropometrics (body height and mass, BMI, body fat percentage), generic tests of physiological capacities [5- and 10-m sprints, countermovement jump, broad jump, 20-yard test, reactive strength index (RSI)], and futsal-specific fitness tests [kicking speed by dominant and non-dominant leg, futsal-specific tests of change of direction speed, and reactive agility (FSRAG) involving/not involving dribbling the ball]. Top-level players outperformed high-level players in RSI, broad jump, kicking speed, and FSRAG involving dribbling. Starters achieved better results than non-starters in fewer variables, including kicking speed and RSI. Body fat percentage negatively influenced FSRAG involving dribbling, and RSI. FSRAG, RSI, and kicking speed were significantly correlated, indicating the similar physiological background of these capacities. The findings suggest that enhanced reactive strength and the ability to rapidly change direction speed in response to external stimulus while executing futsal-specific motor tasks (e.g., dribbling), along with players’ ability to kick the ball speedily, can be considered essential qualities required for advanced performance in futsal. Consequently, futsal strength and conditioning training should be targeted toward lowering relative body fat, maximizing lower-body reactive strength and including futsal-specific skills (e.g., dribbling, shooting) in reactive agility drills. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...) reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. (shrink)

Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...) it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

This paper offers several new insights into the epistemology of immunity to error through misidentification, by refining James Pryor’s distinction between de re misidentification and wh-misidentification. This is crucial for identifying exactly what is at issue in debates over the Immunity thesis that, roughly, all introspection-based beliefs about one’s own occurrent psychological states are immune to error through misidentification. I contend that the debate between John Campbell and Annalisa Coliva over whether the phenomenon of thought insertion provides empirical evidence against (...) claims like Immunity has wrongly focused on de re misidentification and largely overlooked the role of wh-misidentification. I argue that, once we properly distinguish the two notions, subjects of thought insertion can be seen to make an error of wh-misidentification in their judgments. I argue that this disproves the Immunity thesis, properly understood, and show what broader implications this has for our understanding of IEM and the first person. (shrink)

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Schopenhauer on the Inevitability of Suffering Criticisms of Schopenhauer's Thesis that to Desire Is to Suffer The Unattainability of True Satisfaction The Inevitability of Boredom The Negative Nature of Pleasure and Satisfaction Happiness and Well‐Being Degrees of Unhappiness: The Possibility of Amelioration The Paradox of the Suspension or Negation of the Will The Inevitability of Unhappiness References Further Reading.

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)

Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.

Epistemicists claim that if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Some contest this on epistemic grounds: vague intuitions about vague matters need not fully preclude knowledge, if those intuitions are response-dependent in some special sense of enabling vague knowledge. This paper defends the epistemicist principle that vagueness entails ignorance against such objections. I argue that not only is response-dependence an implausible characterization of actual vague matters, its mere possibility poses no threat to epistemicism and is properly (...) accounted for by the epistemicist’s own principles. (shrink)

Sorensen has argued that one can exploit the vagueness of an ordinary predicate like ‘small’ to induce a sort of vagueness in ‘vague’, by constructing a series of predicates of the form ‘n-small’, where x is n- small if and only if x is small or x n. The resulting ‘Sorensen’ed’ predicates present a Sorites case for ‘vague’ ; hence the vagueness of ‘vague’. Hyde argues that this demonstrates that all vague predicates are higher-order vague. Others doubt whether Sorensen’s series (...) really delivers such a result, claiming Hyde’s argument to be either: unsound, because it misidentifies the true source of vagueness in Sorensen’s Sorites ; invalid, because it fails to generalize to all vague predicates ; or circular, because it presupposes the very thing it tries to prove, namely, higher-order vagueness. This paper contributes to the Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi debate by clarifying the relations between vague vagueness and higher-order vagueness. I show how claims of higher-order vagueness are derivable from claims of vague vagueness. This is the missing piece needed to complete Hyde’s argument and overcome the objections presented by Deas, Hull, Tye, and Varzi. I then show how Sorensen’s considerations, once properly generalized, pose more far-reaching consequences about the vagueness of ‘vague’ than either defenders or critics of Hyde’s argument have appreciated. (shrink)

This article has four main objectives. First, it introduces the ideal types of domination of Weber. Contrary to the received wisdom, which knows only “three ideal types” (traditional, charismatic and legal rational) I present the “fourth” type of domination, Weber called “Wille der Beherrschten” as an important correction of his ideal type of legal-rational authority. Next I make a novel, critical distinction between patrimonial and prebendal types of traditional authority. Third, I discuss various ways that communist regimes tried to legitimate (...) themselves and how they entered eventually a legitimation crisis, leading to the collapse of communism. In the next section, I explore the different ways post-communist capitalisms seek legitimacy (with various combinations of legal rational authority and patrimonialism), and finally I conclude with a trend of re-convergence of some post-communist systems (especially Russia and Hungary, but with signs for similar trends elsewhere) into an illiberal, prebendal quasi-democratic system. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...) it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

BackgroundDrug user networks and community-based organizations advocate for greater, meaningful involvement of people with lived experience of drug use in research, programs and services, and policy initiatives. Community-based approaches to research provide an opportunity to engage people who use drugs in all stages of the research process. Conducting community-based participatory research with people who use drugs has its own ethical challenges that are not necessarily acknowledged or supported by institutional ethics review boards. We conducted a scoping review to identify ethical (...) issues in CBPR with people who use drugs that were documented in peer-reviewed and grey literature.MethodsThe search strategy focused on three areas; community-based research, ethical issues, and drug use. Searches of five academic databases were conducted in addition to a grey literature search, hand-searching, and consultation with organizational partners and key stakeholders. Peer reviewed literature and community reports published in English between 1985 and 2013 were included, with initial screening conducted by two reviewers.ResultsThe search strategy produced a total of 874 references. Twenty-five references met the inclusion criteria and were included in our thematic analysis. Five areas were identified as important to the ethics of CBPR with people who use drugs: 1) participant compensation, 2) drug user perspectives on CBPR, 3) peer recruitment and representation in CBPR, 4) capacity building, and 5) participation and inclusion in CBPR.ConclusionsWe critically discuss implications of the emerging research in this field and provide suggestions for future research and practice. (shrink)

Karl Polanyi’s scholarship is interpreted in radically different ways. The “hard” reading of Polanyi sees him as a radical socialist; the “soft” reading presents him as a theorist of mixed economy. This article sides with the soft interpretation. It uses Polanyi’s biography to explain his theoretical “elusiveness,” presents a novel interpretation of his three types of economic integration, claiming all economies are “mixed.” While it acknowledges Polanyi as one of the major sources of world system theory, it claims that Polanyi (...) saw not only the dangers, but also the necessity and positive consequences of globalization. Finally, it shows that, in spite of Polanyi’s life-long commitment to the political left, his scholarly work did not offer an apology of socialism. Instead this article uses Polanyi’s theory of economic integration to build a critical political economy of state socialism. (shrink)

In this work, we propose a meaningful extension of description logics for non-monotonic reasoning. We introduce \, a logic allowing for the representation of and reasoning about both typical class-membership and typical instances of a relation. We propose a preferential semantics for \ in terms of partially-ordered DL interpretations which intuitively captures the notions of typicality we are interested in. We define a tableau-based algorithm for checking \ knowledge-base consistency that always terminates and we show that it is sound and (...) complete w.r.t. our preferential semantics. The general framework we here propose can serve as the foundation for further exploration of non-monotonic reasoning in description logics and similarly structured logics. (shrink)

What is a philosophy class like? What roles do teachers and students play? Questions like these have been answered time and again by philosophers using images and metaphors. As philosophers continue to develop pedagogical approaches in a more conscious way, it is worth evaluating traditional metaphors used to understand and structure philosophy classes. In this article, we examine two common metaphors—the sage on the stage, and philosophy as combat—and show why they fail pedagogically. Then we propose five metaphors—teaching philosophy as (...) world-traveling, wondering, conducting an orchestra, storytelling, and coaching—that can better respond to the needs of increasingly diverse student bodies. Further, these metaphors find their ground in long-standing beliefs about what philosophy is, how it is done, and what it can do for those willing to engage in it. While no single one of them is comprehensive, we think that these models can help us enliven our own thinking about our teaching and the roles we and our students play in our classrooms. (shrink)

This anthology offers the first serious, broad-ranging collection of English translations of significant Latin American contributions to social and political thought spanning the last forty years. Iván Márquez has judiciously selected narratives of resistance and liberation; ground-breaking texts in Latin American fields of inquiry such as liberation theology, philosophy, pedagogy, and dependency theory; and important readings in guerrilla revolution, socialist utopia, and post–Cold War thought, especially in the realms of democracy and civil society, alternatives to neoliberalism, and nationalism in the (...) context of globalization. Highlighting the vitality, diversity, and originality of Latin American thought, this anthology will be invaluable for students and scholars across the social sciences and humanities. (shrink)

I propose a novel solution to the Sorites Paradox. The account vindicates the tolerance of vague predicates in a way that properly addresses the normativity of vagueness while avoiding sorites contradiction, by treating sorites reasoning as a type of defeasible reasoning. I show how this can be done within the setting of a nonmonotonic deontic logic. Central to the proposal is its deontic interpretation of tolerance. I draw a key distinction between two types of tolerance, based on different deontic notions, (...) and show how the account captures key differences between these types of sorites reasoning. I compare the resulting theory to various existing contextualist proposals and argue that it better accounts for the normative aspects of sorites reasoning. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play (...) its part. Touch enables us to navigate the everyday world of coffee pots and staircases; our moral sensibility comes into play when we act or when we judge our actions and those of others, and plays a directive role in what we feel, how we feel it, and how we react to it. Taking the analogy further, I will suggest that inconsistency causes, in both cases, a certain clumsiness, and that clumsiness is linked to arbitrariness – like the person that helps others in dire need, but only does so on some rainy days. (shrink)

Perú es indiscutiblemente un país multilingüe, con 48 lenguas habladas en diferentes grados de uso y dominio. En Ayacucho, uno de los departamentos de Perú, se hablan tanto el quechua como el español, lo que resulta en un alto grado de bilingüismo en la población. El objetivo de este estudio fue analizar la estrategia de la gramática contrastiva quechua-castellano en los niveles fonológicos, morfológicos, sintácticos y semánticos en la población de Ayacucho. Para ello, se adoptó un enfoque cualitativo y se (...) utilizaron técnicas de entrevista y revisión documental. Los resultados indican que la gramática contrastiva entre el quechua y el castellano a nivel fonológico, morfológico, sintáctico y semántico es altamente efectiva para el aprendizaje tanto de la primera como de la segunda lengua. (shrink)