In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers. Specifically, I seek to show that Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers depends upon an implicit analysis of the function of excuses. I provide this analysis of excuses: a triadic relationship between moral norms, a background of normality and excuses. I then use this analysis to show that Jeff McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of soldiers rest upon (...) an implausible view of excuses, namely that the conditions of war merely constitute excuses for failing to comply with ordinary, or peacetime, morality. I argue that the conditions of war are best understood as providing a new background of normality rather than a set of excuses. To show this, I identify five conditions that separate the normality of war from the normality of peace. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan rejects the relevance of desert to the morality of self-defense. In Killing in War he restates his rejection and adds to his reasons. We argue that the reasons are not decisive and that the rejection calls for further attention, which we provide. Although we end up agreeing with McMahan that the limits of morally acceptable self-defense are not determined by anyone’s deserts, we try to show that deserts may have some subsidiary roles in the morality of self-defense. (...) We suggest that recognizing this might help McMahan to answer some unanswered questions to which his own position gives rise. (shrink)

This book reviews the facts and arguments surrounding Heidegger's politics, and situates them within critical political debates as we move into the 21st century.

This title is now available in a new format. Refer to Heidegger: A Graphic Guide 9781848311749.

The idea of place--topos--runs through Martin Heidegger's thinking almost from the very start. It can be seen not only in his attachment to the famous hut in Todtnauberg but in his constant deployment of topological terms and images and in the situated, "placed" character of his thought and of its major themes and motifs. Heidegger's work, argues Jeff Malpas, exemplifies the practice of "philosophical topology." In Heidegger and the Thinking of Place, Malpas examines the topological aspects of Heidegger's thought (...) and offers a broader elaboration of the philosophical significance of place. Doing so, he provides a distinct and productive approach to Heidegger as well as a new reading of other key figures--notably Kant, Aristotle, Gadamer, and Davidson, but also Benjamin, Arendt, and Camus. Malpas, expanding arguments he made in his earlier book _Heidegger's Topology_, discusses such topics as the role of place in philosophical thinking, the topological character of the transcendental, the convergence of Heideggerian topology with Davidsonian triangulation, the necessity of mortality in the possibility of human life, the role of materiality in the working of art, the significance of nostalgia, and the nature of philosophy as beginning in wonder. Philosophy, Malpas argues, begins in wonder and begins in place and the experience of place. The place of wonder, of philosophy, of questioning, he writes, is the very topos of thinking. (shrink)

This paper explores the tacit presumption that U.S. government disclosure of information regarding prior contact with extraterrestrials would precipitate a religious crisis (presuming that there is information to disclose). This issue has remained controversial since the earliest ufological writing, both government and academic, yet only minimal empirical evidence has been forthcoming. The present analysis is based on data collected as a part of the Alexander UFO Religious Crisis Survey (AUFORCS), a private study of Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish clergy (N (...) = 229) conducted in 1994 whose raw data only recently have been made public (to the author of this paper). The AUFORCS consisted of 11 statements about extraterrestrial contact, alien life, and a putative impact on religion, scaled on a five-point Likert metric requiring respondents to affirm their agreement or disagreement with each item. Findings from the AUFORCS data confirm that disclosure would not precipitate much of a religious crisis. Nor do there appear to be substantive differences in how leaders of respective religious traditions would react to such disclosure. The desirability of replicating this study through a large-scale national probability survey of the U.S. adult population is discussed. Keywords: ufology—extraterrestrials—religion—surveys. (shrink)

Aspects of the controversy concerning the theoretical status of some recent thinking on human cognition are discussed; in particular, the concept of ?unconscious knowledge?, the ?functionalist? analysis of the mental; the problem of the domains of explananda, given the recalcitrant difficulty in providing warrantable and generalizable criteria for individuating components of an organism's ?behavior'; the problem of the polymorphous character of various mental predicates and their misconceived treatment as ?state? or ?process? descriptors; the possible ?over?intellectualizing? of central?nervous?system processes, and the (...) availability of an alternative program for the ?middle?ground? between common?sense reasoning and neuroscientific research in the study of ?mind?. Throughout the discussion, a broadly neo?Wittgensteinian approach is advanced. (shrink)

The idea that our conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a report suggesting that the brain starts to prepare for a movement before the person concerned has consciously decided to move . Libet et al. claimed that their results show that our actions are not consciously initiated. The current article describes two experiments in which we attempted to replicate Libet et al.'s comparison of participants' movement-related brain activity with the reported times of their decisions to move and (...) also the reported times of their decisions of which hand to move. We also looked at the distribution of participants' reports over time to evaluate an alternative explanation of Libet et al.'s results. Although the Readiness Potential was usually present before all of the decisions to move, consistent with the findings of Keller and Heckhausen and Libet et al. , we found that many reported decision times were before the onset of the Lateralized Readiness Potential, which measures hand-specific movement preparation. The latter finding is consistent with the conclusion that the LRP always started after the conscious decision to move. We conclude that even though activity related to movement anticipation may be present before a conscious decision to move, the cortical preparation necessary for the movement to happen immediately may not start until after the conscious decision to move. (shrink)

The universal a priori of the correlation between transcendental being and its subjective modes of givenness constitutes the minimal framework for any phenomenological approach. The proper object of phenomenology is then to characterize both the exact nature of the correlation and the sense of being of the terms in relation, that is to say, of subject and world. It involves demonstrating that a rigorous analysis of the correlation unfolds necessarily on three levels and that phenomenology is thus destined to move (...) beyond itself towards a cosmology and metaphysics. The phenomenological correlation that we will establish is essentially a relation between a subject that is desire and a world that is pure transcendence and assumes their common belonging to a φύσίς whose description stems from a cosmology. But the difference of the subject, without which there is no correlation, refers itself to a more originary split that affects the very process of the manifestation and opens the space of metaphysics. (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Merleau-Ponty est tout entiere commandee par le souci de mettre rigoureusement en oeuvre le mot d'ordre husserlien de retour aux choses memes, ce qui exige, conformement au geste amorce par Husserl dans la Krisis, de reconnaitre l'oeuvre de l'idealisation -c'est-a-dire de l'objectivation- la meme ou elle se fait oublier, afin de la neutraliser. A l'instar de Bergson, pour qui la tache de la philosophie etait d'aller chercher l'experience au-dessus du tournant ou, s'inflechissant dans le sens de l'utilite, elle (...) devient proprement l'experience humaine, pour Merleau-Ponty, la tache de la pensee est de se situer a ce tournant ou l'experience s'accomplit et se voile a la fois dans des productions ou elle se fait proprement humaine, de definir un sens de l'Etre anterieur a la bifurcation du preobjectif et de l'oeuvre idealisante. Le but des recherches est de tenter de clarifier la nature exacte du tournant de l'experience ainsi que le projet phenomenologique merleau-pontien. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the phenomenology of life. The a priori of correlation characterises the being as what presents itself in its appearances only by being absent from them, as offering itself up to an exploration, in the face of which it continuously steps back or withdraws. Transcendental life must contain something living in order to be able to characterise itself as life. Desire never meets its object except in the mode of the object's own absence, and this is why nothing (...) stops it. The link between desire and the world is the truth of the relation between consciousness and object. The phenomenological dynamic that sees in desire the essence of the subject leads to a dynamic which has a truly ontological scope. In truth, ‘Life’ is the name given to the sense of Being: nothing that claims to be can stand outside life's embrace. (shrink)

O âmbito da fenomenologia pode ser circonscrito pelo que Husserl chamou de a priori universal da correlação entre o ente transcendente e seus modos subjetivos de doação. Este a priori significa ao mesmo tempo que a essência do ente envolve sua relação com uma consciência e que o sentido de ser do sujeito consiste em se relacionar com o ente transcendante, em fazê‑lo aparecer, o que equivale a dizer que uma consciência que não fosse cons-ciência de algo, ou seja, intencionalidade, (...) não seria. A dificuldade aqui é a de dar conta do sentido de ser dos pólos da correlação, a saber, do ente transcendente e do sujeito, à luz dessa correlação, que remete a uma forma de primado da relação sobre os termos. Trata‑se de se perguntar o que significa aparecer, qual é o estatuto daquilo que aparece e, enfim, qual é o modo de ser daquilo que chamamos de intencionalidade. Eu queria mostrar que a fenomenologia é fadada a se ultrapassar em proveito duma cosmologia e duma metafísica, que aparecem não como campos que lhe seriam estrangeiros mas, muito pelo contrário, como dimensões internas e constitutivas da própria fenomenologia. (shrink)

L’originalité de la métaphysique de Ruyer tient à ceci que le problème de l’incarnation de la conscience, décrite par la phénoménologie comme condition de possibilité de la perception, est résolu par le biais d’une identification de la conscience et du corps. Cette identification repose sur la découverte du concept fondamental de « surface absolue » ou « domaine de survol » : présence à soi sans distance d’une réalité étendue. Ce mode d’être convient également à la vie et à la (...) conscience vécue et il fonde par conséquent leur unité originaire. La conscience sensible, ou secondaire, doit alors être décrite comme l’autosurvol des aires cérébrales. Cependant, cette identification de la vie et de la conscience a pour contrepartie la perte de la dimension intentionnelle de la conscience et, par conséquent, l’impossibilité de rendre compte de la perception. La philosophie de Ruyer pose donc le problème suivant : cette conséquence est-elle nécessaire ou bien peut-on envisager au contraire une philosophie de la vie qui ne compromette pas mais fonde la conscience intentionnelle ?— The originality of Ruyer’s metaphysics is due to the fact that the problem of the incarnation of consciousness, described by phenomenology as a condition of possibility of perception, is solved by means of an identification between consciousness and body. This identification rests on the discovery of the basic concept of « absolute surface » or « flying-over domain » : self-presence without distance of a spatial reality. This mode of being is appropriate both to life and lived consciousness and, accordingly, grounds their originary unity. Then, sensible, or secondary consciousness is to be described as self flying-over of the cerebral areas. However, this identification between life and consciousness has as counterpart the lost of the intentional feature of consciousness and, consequently, the impossibility to account for perception. Thus, Ruyer’s philosophy poses the following problem : is that conclusion necessary or is it possible, on the contrary, to plan a philosophy of life that does not compromise but grounds intentional consciousness ? (shrink)

Je dois concéder, à la lecture de la conclusion du texte de Pierre Rodrigo, que le titre de mon dernier ouvrage, La vie lacunaire, est mal choisi car la vie comme telle ne peut en effet être lacunaire : elle est au contraire surpuissante et donc dépourvue de la moindre faiblesse ontologique. Seul le vivant est lacunaire mais, en revanche, il l'est de manière constitutive car c'est précisément ce qui le définit comme vivant. Afin de justifier cette conclusion, je renvoie (...) au début du chapitre I... (shrink)

We consider two formalizations of the notion of irrelevance as a rationality principle within the framework of (Carnapian) Inductive Logic: Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, JSP, which is classically important because it leads to Carnap's influential Continuum of Inductive Methods and the recently proposed Weak Irrelevance Principle, WIP. We give a complete characterization of the language invariant probability functions satisfying WIP which generalizes the Nix-Paris Continuum. We argue that the derivation of two very disparate families of inductive methods from alternative perceptions of (...) 'irrelevance' is an indication that this notion is imperfectly understood at present. (shrink)

The logical consequence relations η▹η provide a very attractive way of inferring new facts from inconsistent knowledge bases without compromising standards of credibility. In this short note we provide proof theories and completeness theorems for these consequence relations which may have some applicability in small examples.

This narrative ethics exploration stems from my happy prostate-specific antigen story, though it should not have been, as I annually refuse my family physician’s recommendation to purchase PSA screening. The reason for my refusal is I teach ethics to medical students and of course must walk the talk, and PSA screening is not publicly funded in the province of Ontario, Canada. In addition, I might have taken false comfort in ‘but all you need is a good index finger’ to detect (...) prostate cancer, expounded by a senior physician at a national medical conference in 2010, and applauded by the large audience of physicians. I was compelled to begin this exploration out of survivor guilt, although I will not be a survivor for long, and as a mea culpa to the men similarly situated to me in having late diagnosis of prostate cancer, aggressive tumours and multiple metastases, but who unlike me are dead because they did not experience the physician–educator-based exceptionisms and coincidences that permit me to still be alive. Although my PSA story will always be a happy story, even when my life ends in a few years, the initiation of public funding of PSA screening for all men over 50 would make my PSA story an even happier story. (shrink)

Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern views (...) that are seen as psychologistic because of one or another feature. Although these can avoid some of the classic objections to psychologism, some still hold. (shrink)

Bering's analysis is inadequate because it fails to consider past and present adult soul beliefs and the psychological functions they serve. We suggest that a valid folk psychology of souls must consider features of adult soul beliefs, the unique problem engendered by awareness of death, and terror management findings, in addition to cognitive inclinations toward dualistic and teleological thinking.

This research aims to understand how two basic schemas—vigilante and reparation—influence online public complaining. Drawing on two experiments, a longitudinal field study and content analysis of online complaints, the current research makes three core contributions. First, we show that for similar service failures, each schema is associated with different justice motivations, which have different moral implications for consumers. Second, vigilante and reparation complainers write complaints in a different manner and are drawn to different online platforms; this information is helpful to (...) identify complainers using each schema. Third, the schemas moderate the process leading to different post-complaint benefits. Specifically, perseverance has a greater effect on obtaining a resolution for reparation complainers compared to vigilantes. Additionally, whereas a recovery leads to an increase in positive affect for reparation complainers, vigilantes experience a high level of positive affect simply by posting their complaint. The theoretical, ethical, and managerial implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 10, Page 24-26, October 2011.

Embodied approaches to cognition see abstract thought and language as grounded in interactions between mind, body, and world. A particularly important challenge for embodied approaches to cognition is mathematics, perhaps the most abstract domain of human knowledge. Conceptual metaphor theory, a branch of cognitive linguistics, describes how abstract mathematical concepts are grounded in concrete physical representations. In this paper, we consider the implications of this research for the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematics. In the case of metaphysics, we argue that (...) embodied mathematics is neutral in the sense of being compatible with all existing accounts of what mathematical entities really are. However, embodied mathematics may be able to revive an older position known as psychologism and overcome the difficulties it faces. In the case of epistemology, we argue that the evidence collected in the embodied mathematics literature is inconclusive: It does not show that abstract mathematical thinking is constituted by metaphor; it may simply show that abstract thinking is facilitated by metaphor. Our arguments suggest that closer interaction between the philosophy and cognitive science of mathematics could yield a more precise, empirically informed account of what mathematics is and how we come to have knowledge of it. (shrink)