This article posits that Andy Clark’s model of distributed cognition manifests socially through the agonism of human activity, and that rhetorical theory offers an understanding of human conflicts as productive and necessary elements of collective response to situation rather than as problems to be solved or noise to be eliminated. To support this assertion, the paper aligns Clark’s argument that cognition responds to situated environmental conditions with the classical concept of kairos, it associates Clark’s assertion that language structures behavior with (...) the long-held rhetorical stance that language is constitutive, and it examines the online encyclopedia Wikipedia as an enactment of what Clark and rhetorical theorists claim about productive agonism and the litigious nature of identity and cognition. (shrink)

We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a (...) principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver. (shrink)

Bioethicists invoke a duty to rescue in a wide range of cases. Indeed, arguably, there exists an entire medical paradigm whereby vast numbers of medical encounters are treated as rescue cases. The intuitive power of the rescue paradigm is considerable, but much of this power stems from the problematic way that rescue cases are conceptualized—namely, as random, unanticipated, unavoidable, interpersonal events for which context is irrelevant and beneficence is the paramount value. In this article, I critique the basic assumptions of (...) the rescue paradigm, reframe the ethical landscape in which rescue obligations are understood, and defend the necessity and value of a wider social and institutional view. Along the way, I move back and forth between ethical theory and a concrete case where the duty to rescue has been problematically applied: the purported duty to regularly return incidental findings and individual research results in genomic and genetic research. (shrink)

The long-standing overarching policy governing research with human subjects conducted and supported by most federal agencies and departments in the United States, known as the Common Rule, has recently been revised, with most requirements slated to become effective in 2018. Although there are multiple alterations to the current regulations, some of the most significant changes aim to enhance consent for research. While some of the particular provisions in this regard will be easy to apply and promise to help meet this (...) goal, others may be more challenging to implement despite their intuitive appeal. In this article, I examine some of the provisions in the revised Common Rule that relate to consent: new required consent elements; the goal of comprehension in the consent process; consent forms; and broad consent. By raising issues about these provisions now and suggesting possible ways to overcome their potential shortfalls, the hope is that future efforts can be taken to help clarify and appropriately implement them. (shrink)

Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on (...) an account of faultless disagreement that improves upon a recent proposal due to Karl Schafer. In amending Schafer’s proposal, I put forward an empirically informed view of our beliefs regarding matters of personal taste, as well as an account of our assertions concerning such matters. I also argue that absolutists should take disagreement about these matters to be conative, rather than doxastic, in nature. The anticipated result is an independently compelling account of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste that fits naturally with absolutism. (shrink)

The Panopticon project for a model prison obsessed the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham for almost 20 years. In the end, the project came to nothing; the Panopticon was never built. But it is precisely this that makes the Panopticon project the best exemplification of Bentham’s own theory of fictions, according to which non-existent fictitious entities can have all too real effects. There is probably no building that has stirred more philosophical controversy than Bentham’s Panopticon. The Panopticon is not merely, (...) as Foucault thought, “a cruel, ingenious cage”, in which subjects collaborate in their own subjection, but much more—constructing the Panopticon produces not only a prison, but also a god within it. The Panopticon is a machine which on assembly is already inhabited by a ghost. It is through the Panopticon and the closely related theory of fictions that Bentham has made his greatest impact on modern thought; above all, on the theory of power. The Panopticon writings are frequently cited, rarely read. This edition contains the complete “Panopticon Letters”, together with selections from “Panopticon Postscript I” and “Fragment on Ontology”, Bentham’s fullest account of fictions. A comprehensive introduction by Miran Bozovic explores the place of Panopticon in contemporary theoretical debate. (shrink)

Foucault and Religion seeks to unearth a new dimension of Foucault scholarship. Renowned Foucault scholar Jeremy Carrette reveals not simply how Foucault's work can be applied to religion but how a religious question at the heart of Foucault's own work offers a radical challenge to religious ideas. Carrette argues that Foucault offers a twofold critique of Christianity by bringing the body and sexuality into religious practice and exploring a political spirituality of the self. This first major commentary on Foucault (...) and religion opens up the diverse religious questions the philosopher raises in his work, and sheds new light on how Foucault challenges religious thinking and transforms religious understanding. (shrink)

Functionalism about truth, or alethic functionalism, is one of our most promising approaches to the study of truth. In this chapter, I chart a course for functionalist inquiry that centrally involves the empirical study of ordinary thought about truth. In doing so, I review some existing empirical data on the ways in which we think about truth and offer suggestions for future work on this issue. I also argue that some of our data lend support to two kinds of pluralism (...) regarding ordinary thought about truth. These pluralist views, as I show, can be straightforwardly integrated into the broader functionalist framework. The main result of this integration is that some unexplored metaphysical views about truth become visible. To close the chapter, I briefly respond to one of the most serious objections to functionalism, due to Cory Wright. (shrink)

This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and (...) philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity. (shrink)

We report a series of experiments carried out with Palestinian and Israeli participants showing that violent opposition to compromise over issues considered sacred is increased by offering material incentives to compromise but decreased when the adversary makes symbolic compromises over their own sacred values. These results demonstrate some of the unique properties of reasoning and decision-making over sacred values. We show that the use of material incentives to promote the peaceful resolution of political and cultural conflicts may backfire when adversaries (...) treat contested issues as sacred values. (shrink)

Since its introduction just over two decades ago, evidence-based medicine (EBM) has come to dominate medical practice, teaching, and policy. There are a growing number of textbooks, journals, and websites dedicated to EBM research, teaching, and evidence dissemination. EBM was most recently defined as a method that integrates best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values and circumstances in the treatment of patients. There have been debates throughout the early 21st century about what counts as good research evidence between (...) EBM proponents and philosophical critics and even within the EBM community itself. Similar controversy arises about the relative worth of patient values and clinical expertise (and how these can be integrated). EBM has also evolved in ways that have come under scrutiny. Specifically, policymakers have used EBM research methodology to increase the relative importance of clinical guidelines that some clinicians have argued are tyrannical. Philosophers have addressed all of these controversies, and with very few exceptions have been critical of EBM. In addition most philosophical attention has been on the epistemic role of Randomization and evidence hierarchies, with relatively little attention being paid to the role of Diagnosis, expertise, patient values, and Systematic Reviews within EBM. (shrink)

Acentral promise of human embryonic stem cell research is the potential to develop viable therapeutic approaches to a range of devastating diseases and conditions. Despite excitement over such advances, there are scientific and medical reasons to be cautious as stem cells and their products are introduced into patients. In response to such concerns, the International Society for Stem Cell Research as well as ad hoc groups and individuals have offered approaches to governance of this research. While there are similarities among (...) these governance models and they are in principle easily endorsable, in this paper I raise a set of concerns related to their implementation, suggesting areas where gathering data may facilitate more appropriate oversight. Next, I suggest areas that seem to have been neglected as these governance models have been developed so that they may be on the agendas of those seeking to revise these models in the future. Finally, I describe how some of the concerns that have arisen in considering the appropriate governance of stem cell research may be useful in science and translational research more broadly. (shrink)

Koonin, in an article in this issue, claims that CRISPR–Cas systems are mechanisms for the inheritance of acquired adaptive characteristics, and that the operation of such systems comprises a “Lamarckian mode of evolution.” We argue that viewing the CRISPR–Cas mechanism as facilitating a form of “directed mutation” more accurately represents how the system behaves and the history of neoDarwinian thinking, and is to be preferred.

This is a three-part study and defense of the idea of basic human equality. (This is the idea that humans are basically one another's equals, as opposed to more derivative theories of the dimensions in which we ought to be equal or the particular implications that equality might have for public policy.) Part (1) of the paper examines the very idea of basic equality and it tries to elucidate it by considering what an opponent of basic human equality (e.g. a (...) philosophical racist) might hold. It explores the idea of there being no morally significant fundamental divisions among humans (of the kind that some people insist on as between humans and others animals). Part (2) considers whether basic human equality must be based on some descriptive similarity among us (naturalistic or metaphysical); it considers the positions of a number of thinkers who have denied this. Part (3) considers John Rawls's conception of basic equality in terms of range properties. (Being in Ohio is a range property; Columbus and Cincinnati are both equally in Ohio even though even though Columbus is in the center of the state, while Cincinnati is just over the river from Kentucky.) It explores the application of this Rawlsian idea to the descriptive properties that might be thought relevant to human equality. This three part paper is a rather technical philosophical exploration. And it is just a beginning; we need much more work on the idea of basic equality. Some of the energy that has gone into discussions of equality as a policy aim (e.g. in the Dworkin/Sen literature or in the literature surrounding Rawls's Difference Principle) needs to be devoted to this more fundamental conception. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of political participation in a theory of rights. If political participation is a right, how does it stand in relation to other rights about which the participants may be making political decisions? Suppose a majority of citizens vote in favour of some limit on (say) the free exercise of religion. If their decision is allowed to stand, does that mean that we are giving more weight to the right to participate than to the right to (...) religious freedom? In this paper, I argue that talk of conflict (and relative weightings) of rights is inappropriate in a case like this. I argue that the special role of participation in a theory of rights is not a matter of its being given moral priority over other rights. Instead it's a matter of this being a right whose exercise seems peculiarly appropriate, from a rights-based point of view, in situations where reasonable right-bearers disagree about what (other) rights they have. (shrink)

Despite concern that patients in the intensive care unit (ICU) may not be treated with respect and dignity, there is not conceptual clarity regarding what constitutes such treatment. In addition, measures specific to treatment with respect and dignity in the ICU are unavailable. Accordingly, a multidisciplinary group developed a conceptual model for treatment with respect and dignity in the ICU and used mixed methods to gather data on this issue. This effort included interviews with patients and families, focus groups with (...) health care professionals, and direct observations. These data were then compared and contrasted to synthesize what was learned. Finally, pilot quantitative patient and family survey data were collected and analyzed. Each of these approaches, which comprise the papers in this supplement to Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics, is briefly described in this article. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper examines the field network – linking together lay observers in geographically distributed locations with a central figure who aggregated their locally produced observations into more general, regional knowledge – as a historically emergent mode of knowledge production. After discussing the significance of weather knowledge as a vital domain in which field networks have operated, it describes and analyzes how a more robust and systematized weather observing field network became established and maintained on the ground in the early twentieth (...) century. This case study, which examines two Kansas City-based local observer networks supervised by the same U.S. Weather Bureau office, demonstrates some of the key issues involved in maintaining field networks, such as the role of communications infrastructure, especially the telegraph, the procedures designed to make local observation more systematic and uniform, and the centralized, hierarchical power relations that underpinned even a low-status example of knowledge production on the periphery. (shrink)

There are all sorts of ways in which one can dirty one’s hands in politics. The classic problem is that of the political leader who finds he has to act immorally for the sake of the greater good. But some dirty-hands problems are more mundane. They arise out of the fact that one acts in politics alongside others, particularly in a democracy, and so one is not always in control of the values and principles that are being put into play. (...) This happens sometimes because of the need for compromise; or through procedures like majority decision. Some of these cases have an interesting historical dimension. They reflect the fact that politicians have to act against the background of decisions made by their predecessors. Laws routinely remain in force, for example, despite the demise of the political factions that enacted them: so a politician may have to keep faith with and faithfully administer a legal decision he condemns. I argue that this is best understood not as the balancing of disparate personal convictions, but of his having to act in the name of the whole society. The sense of “dirty hands” arises from the juxtaposition of the politician’s own convictions with the requirements of his particular role as speaking for an entity larger than himself. (shrink)

By what right do sovereign states prohibit migrants from entering their territories? It cannot be assumed that they do, certainly not as a matter of the way we define “sovereignty.” Can the sovereign right to exclude immigrants be derived from the sovereign’s status as owner of the territory it controls? This Article shows that the idea of the sovereign as owner is too problematic to be the basis of any argument for the right to exclude. It also argues against the (...) proposition that communities, considered as informal sovereigns, have a right to exclude based on their communal property in the land they inhabit. In both cases, an “ownership conception” is distinguished from a more attractive “responsibility conception” of sovereignty. The former remains unclear, while the latter leaves open the question of who the sovereign is responsible for. (shrink)

In earlier articles, the author developed what is known as the "Supersession Thesis," asserting that historic injustice may be overtaken by changes in circumstances so that a situation that was unjust when it was brought about may coincide with what justice requires at a later time. The Supersession Thesis was developed initially as a tool for considering historic injustice suffered by indigenous peoples in the European settlement of countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. In this paper, (...) the author explores the application of the Supersession Thesis to issues about the Palestinian right of return and also to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. The paper argues that, while it is not unthinkable that the Supersession Thesis might eventually legitimize the settlements and undermine the Palestinian right of return, there is no guarantee that this will happen. The application of the Supersession Thesis does not depend on the passage of time, but on changes in circumstances that a theory of justice makes relevant. Many of the circumstances that make the Supersession Thesis relevant to the post-colonial situations described do not apply in the Israeli situation. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the possibility of applying the Supersession Thesis in this case, because it enables us to assess the merits of the Thesis more sharply in relation to injustice that is taking place now, as opposed to injustice that took place in the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Complementary and alternative medicine is used by many in hopes of achieving important health-related goals. Survey data indicate that 42 percent of the U.S. population uses CAM, accounting for 629 million “office” visits a year and expenditures of 27 billion dollars. This high prevalence of use calls for a careful evaluation of CAM so as to ensure the well-being of those using its modalities. Such an evaluation would obviously include assessments of the safety and efficacy of particular approaches, the training (...) and integrity of practitioners, and the appropriateness of modalities for different conditions or uses. Given the lack of published data concerning many of these aspects of CAM, the likely unfamiliarity of its practitioners to the approaches available to clinicians practicing modern scientific medcine, and the need to respect the unique preferences of persons seeking assistance with achieving health-related goals, it is also important to assess the potential roles of informed consent for the use of CAM. Examining such roles is the central task of this paper. (shrink)

My aim in this article is programmatic. I argue that understanding perceptual experience on the model of perceptual affordances allows us to acknowledge the centrality of embodiment to moral phenomenology, on the one hand, and to see more transparently the place of the emotions in the moral life, on the other. I suggest some means by which moral perception, construed as the perception of moral affordances, might be cultivated.

Differential privacy (DP) aims to confer data processing systems with inherent privacy guarantees, offering strong protections for personal data. But DP’s approach to privacy carries with it certain assumptions about how mathematical abstractions will be translated into real-world systems, which—if left unexamined and unrealized in practice—could function to shield data collectors from liability and criticism, rather than substantively protect data subjects from privacy harms. This article investigates these assumptions and discusses their implications for using DP to govern data-driven systems. In (...) Parts 1 and 2, we introduce DP as, on one hand, a mathematical framework and, on the other hand, a kind of real-world sociotechnical system, using a hypothetical case study to illustrate how the two can diverge. In Parts 3 and 4, we discuss the way DP frames privacy loss, data processing interventions, and data subject participation, arguing it could exacerbate existing problems in privacy regulation. In part 5, we conclude with a discussion of DP’s potential interactions with the endogeneity of privacy law, and we propose principles for best governing DP systems. In making such assumptions and their consequences explicit, we hope to help DP succeed at realizing its promise for better substantive privacy protections. (shrink)

Les juges créent-ils du droit ? Eros Roberto Grau, avocat, ancien professeur à la prestigieuse Faculté de droit de l’Université de São Paulo et ancien membre de la Cour suprême brésilienne de 2004 à 2010, aurait sans aucun doute pu faire un livre inaccessible sur cette question, tant son parcours, ses forts engagements et ses réflexions prolifiques l’y autorisent.Sa biographie est en particulier disponible en brésilien sur le site de la Cour suprême brésilienne et sur son site personnel . Mais (...) le présent ouvrage édité par Carlos Miguel Herrera, « texte de combat » selon son préfacier Antoine Jeammaud, est une invitation à mieux découvrir l’approche critique du droit défendue par l’auteur sous l’angle d’une théorie réaliste de l’interprétation aussi habile qu’originale. Classiquement, selon cette dernière, on ne le sait que trop bien, le droit n’est pas à considérer c .. (shrink)

Equality is the central value for egalitarians. It is the value that distinguishes egalitarianism from other political theories. However, if equality is the central value for egalitarians, then why it is of value should be an obvious starting point for any discussion of egalitarianism. This article seeks to clarify the ways in which equality has been valued in philosophical discussion. I discuss the standard ways of valuing equality and argue that an understanding of equality as valuable because it is part (...) of other values offers an important new insight into how we value equality especially in relation to the traditional understanding of equality as either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. (shrink)

First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper is about Poincaré’s view of the foundations of geometry. According to the established view, which has been inherited from the logical positivists, Poincaré, like Hilbert, held that axioms in geometry are schemata that provide implicit definitions of geometric terms, a view he expresses by stating that the axioms of geometry are “definitions in disguise.” I argue that this view does not accord well with Poincaré’s core commitment in the philosophy of geometry: the view that geometry is the study (...) of groups of operations. In place of the established view I offer a revised view, according to which Poincaré held that axioms in geometry are in fact assertions about invariants of groups. Groups, as forms of the understanding, are prior in conception to the objects of geometry and afford the proper definition of those objects, according to Poincaré. Poincaré’s view therefore contrasts sharply with Kant’s foundation of geometry in a unique form of sensibility. According to my interpretation, axioms are not definitions in disguise because they themselves implicitly define their terms, but rather because they disguise the definitions which imply them. (shrink)

Critical notice of Paul Faulkner, "Knowledge on Trust" (OUP 2011) and Benjamin McMyler, "Testimony, Trust, and Authority" (OUP 2011).

Pragmatic factors encroach on epistemic predicates not solely because the threshold for actionable belief may shift with an epistemic agent’s context, as an evidential Bayesian might insist, but also because what our inductive policy should be may shift with that context. I argue for this thesis in the context of imprecise probabilities, maintaining that the choice of the defining hyperparameter for an Imprecise Dirichlet Model for nonparametric predictive inference may correspond to the choice of an eager versus reticent inductive policy (...) in a way that can be sensitive to stakes and other practical circumstances. (shrink)

What is the scope of morality? To whom are we obligated? Whom are we morally required to help? Whom may we not harm? Whom commands our respect and from whom are we forbidden to withhold our assistance? Do moral concerns and requirements diminish over distance, so that our duties are stronger to those who are near to us, and weaken to vanishing point as possible beneficiaries of our actions and inactions are found further and further away? And what does “distance” (...) mean in these circumstances? When is a person near to me? When is a person far away? Is it a matter of who they are, and of their relation to me? Or is it sheer geography? If it is geography, does a person count as near or far in virtue of where they live or in virtue of where they happen to be? (shrink)

The latest important addition to The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, these essays lend credence to Bentham's claim that his ideas were `for the use of all nations and all governments professing liberal opinions'.