We may succeed in the fulfillment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallelism between practical and epistemic rationality, building (...) on Williamson’s (2002) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa (2007, 2011, 2015, 2021), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman (2000, 2009). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose une réinterprétation originale du rôle cognitif du Je pense kantien qui se veut pertinente pour la phénoménologie et pour la philosophie actuelle de l’esprit. L’étude du rapport entre temporalité phénoménale et cognition catégoriale constitue le fil conducteur de cette recherche. Elle mène à la question capitale du statut ultime du Moi, du sens du Je du Je pense. Que désigne-t-il : un épiphénomène contingent, une représentation sui generis, une métareprésentation, un acte indéconstructible, un événement fonctionnel, une forme (...) logique ? Recèle-t-il une véritable unité ou plutôt une multiplicité productrice d’unité ? Représente-t-il une identité réelle ou un changement identifiable, un référent vide ou ‘saturé’ ? La réponse à toutes ces questions dépend notamment de la façon de concevoir l’efficacité du Je, c’est-à-dire de l’articulation entre inconscient cognitif, conscience de soi et conscience de quelque chose en général. En pensant Kant avec la philosophie moderne et contemporaine, l’auteur tente d’élucider l’instabilité inévitable du passage critique à un Cogito postmétaphysique. (shrink)

In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism. These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not (...) only appear to warrant H&M’s initial claims but also seem to point to further uneasy tensions within the AE framework. The paper goes beyond H&M by tracing the roots of these criticisms and apparent tensions to phenomenology and the role it plays in AE’s distinctive conception of strong life-mind continuity. It is highlighted that this phenomenological dimension of AE contains certain unexamined anthropomorphic and anthropogenic leanings which do not sit comfortably within its wider commitment to life-mind continuity. In light of this analysis it is suggested that AE will do well to rethink this role or ultimately run the risk of remaining theoretically unstable. The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical development of AE by highlighting potential internal tensions within its framework which need to be addressed in order for it to continue to evolve as a coherent paradigm. (shrink)

Grit, which is originally conceptualized as passion and perseverance for long-term goals, has been associated with optimal performance. Although previous meta-analytic and systematic reviews summarized how grit relates to performance outcomes, they possess considerable shortcomings, such as (a) absence of summary on the association of grit with well-being outcomes; (b) absence of discussion on social, psychological, and emotional mechanisms linking grit to well-being; and (c) lack of elaboration on how alternative models can resolve fundamental problems in the grit construct. This (...) integrative review provides a comprehensive summary on the link of grit to performance and well-being outcomes. Importantly, it elaborates how alternative models can potentially address flaws in the existing grit theory. Future research directions are discussed on how to move forward the science of grit. (shrink)

In this paper, an attempt is made to solve various problems posed to current theories of verisimilitude: the problem of linguistic variance; the problem of which are the best scientific methods for getting the most verisimilar theories; and the question of the ontological commitment in scientific theories. As a result of my solution to these problems, and with the help of other considerations of epistemological character, I conclude that the notion of 'Tarskian truth' is dispensable in a rational interpretation of (...) the scientific enterprise. As a logical result, however, falsificationism will be vindicated. (shrink)

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here (...) highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)

An epistemic notion of verisimilitude (as the 'degree in which a theory seems closer to the full truth to a scientific community') is defined in several ways. Application to the structuralist description of theories is carried out by introducing a notion of 'empirical regularity' in structuralist terms. It is argued that these definitions of verisimilitude can be used to give formal reconstructions of scientific methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism and normal science.

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists' interests. A rational choice, game-theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that `social' interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with `cognitive' ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors (...) of scientific papers, as in an `ideal free speech situation'. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process. (shrink)

A critical interpretation on Zubiri is put forward as an essential element for grasping the current importance of his thought, since this puts his potential contributions to the test and proposes corrections and creative extensions within the contemporary horizon of philosophy, with regard to phenomenology, hermeneutics, neurosciences and emergentism. The book focusses mainly on the evolution of Zubiri’s philosophy, his metaphysics, noology, anthropo- logy and the relationship between science and philosophy, but also on his serious crises. It should be placed (...) in context by associating this with today’s proposals for a new realism, linked to new forms of both ontology and hermeneutics. (shrink)

Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes and of the assessing of rival SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to this kind of studies.

Scientific research is reconstructed as a language game along the lines of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Researchers are assumed to aim at persuading their colleagues of the validity of some claims. The assertions each scientist is allowed or committed to make depend on her previous claims and on the inferential norms of her research community. A classification of the most relevant types of inferential rules governing such a game is offered, and some ways in which this inferentialist approach can be used (...) for assessing scientific knowledge and practices are explored. Some similarities and differences with a game-theoretic analysis are discussed. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...) while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

The problem of the reduction of chemistry to physics has been traditionally addressed in terms of classical structural chemistry and standard quantum mechanics. In this work, we will study the problem from the perspective of the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules, proposed by Richard Bader in the nineties. The purpose of this article is to unveil the role of QTAIM in the inter-theoretical relations between chemistry and physics. We argue that, although the QTAIM solves two relevant obstacles to reduction (...) by providing a rigorous definition of chemical bond and of atoms in a molecule, it appeals to concepts that are unacceptable in the quantum–mechanical context. Therefore, the QTAIM fails to provide the desired reduction. On the other hand, we will show that the QTAIM is more similar to Bohmian mechanics and that the basic elements of both theories are closely related. (shrink)

The connection between scientific knowledge and our empirical access to realityis not well explained within the structuralist approach to scientific theories. I arguethat this is due to the use of a semantics not rich enough from the philosophical pointof view. My proposal is to employ Sellars–Brandom's inferential semantics to understand how can scientific terms have empirical content, and Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics to analyse how can theories be empirically tested. The main conclusions are that scientific concepts gain their meaning through `basic (...) theories' grounded on `common sense, and that scientific method usually allows the pragmatic verification and falsification of scientific theories. (shrink)

The syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot account for an ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth Meditation and related texts. Descartes' notion of god relies on the analytic-synthetic distinction, which Descartes had identified before Leibniz and Kant did. I describe how the syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot explain Descartes' ontological argument; then I apply the analytic-synthetic distinction to Descartes’ idea of god.

The scientist's decision of accepting a given proposition is assumed to be dependent on two factors: the scientist's 'private' information about the value of that statement and the proportion of colleagues who also accept it. This interdependence is modelled in an economic fashion, and it is shown that it may lead to multiple equilibria. The main conclusions are that the evolution of scientific knowledge can be path, dependent, that scientific revolutions can be due to very small changes in the empirical (...) evidence, and that not all possible equilibria are necessarily efficient, neither in the economic nor in the epistemic sense. These inefficiencies, however, can be eliminated if scientists can form coalitions. (shrink)

Este artículo revisa críticamente los modelos de gestión de la diferencia ala luz de algunas novedades que afectan a los conceptos de cultura, identidady diversidad cultural. De un lado, se sugieren razones para dejar de identificardiversidad étnica con diversidad cultural o cultura con tradiciones, lengua yreligión; de otro, la ambigua categoría de cultura sigue presentando una dualidadantagónica de sentidos (como tradición y como valor formativo) queredunda en su falta de operatividad. Se propone una reflexión sobre el sentidode los términos acorde (...) con un pluralismo y un cosmopolitismo crítico donde lacomprensión de algunas instituciones jurídicas y políticas forma parte de unmarco universalizable de racionalidad en un sentido cultural. (shrink)

This article explores the importance of mental expression in understanding the phenomenon of inner speech. Most accounts of inner speech assume from the outset the common idea that the expressions of a subject (e.g., a smile) and their mental states (e.g., joy) are two different types of items somehow related to each other. This relational view of expression is challenged in this article. Firstly, it is argued that relational views of expression cannot explain some features of inner speech. Secondly, a (...) non-relational view of expression is developed, according to which mental states are patterns of expressive behavior. Thirdly, it is argued that only from the framework of non-relational expressivism is it possible to explain the main features of inner speech. Finally, it is concluded that non-relational expressivism emerges as a prominent contender among contemporary views of the mind, as it provides the only account of inner speech that can fully explain the phenomenon. (shrink)

The decision whether to have a realist or an anti-realist attitude towards scientific hypotheses is interpreted in this paper as a choice that scientists themselves have to face in their work as scientists, rather than as a ‘philosophical’ problem. Scientists’ choices between realism and instrumentalism are interpreted in this paper with the help of two different conceptual tools: a deflationary semantics grounded in the inferentialist approach to linguistic practices developed by some authors, and an epistemic utility function that tries to (...) represent the cognitive preferences of scientists. The first tool is applied to two different questions traditionally related to the problem of scientific realism: the non-miracle argument, and the continuity of reference. The second one is applied to the problem of unconceived alternatives, and to the distinction between realist and instrumentalist attitudes towards scientific hypotheses. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

Byung-Chul Han es uno de los intelectuales más populares del momento, habiendo basado su éxito, sobre todo, en una especie de crítica filosófica de la civilización de consumo capitalista e hipertecnificada. En este artículo se repasan algunos de los clichés habituales en su obra, para mostrar que en la mayor parte de los casos no suele haber razones para estar de acuerdo con tales críticas, sino que estas responde principalmente a un afán de esnobismo.

Es proverbial el orgullo que sentía el cardenal Marcelo Spínola por Don Bosco y su obra, la primera obra (1884) escrita en español sobre el santo sacerdote y educador de Turín. El inesperado hallazgo de cuarenta cartas dirigidas a los salesianos es una buena excusa para darlas a conocer, pues Spínola -como obispo de Coria y luego como arzobispo de Sevilla- las escribió para exponer con detalle los motivos de su profundo afecto a la Congregación Salesiana. La edición crítica de (...) las cartas va precedida de una breve, pero necesaria introducción. (shrink)

Los científicos tratan de persuadir a sus colegas y, en última instancia, al conjunto de la sociedad, para que acepten sus tesis, descubrimientos y propuestas. Desarrollan para ello una serie de estrategias que pueden ser estudiadas como un “juego de persuasión” en el que intervienen, además de los procesos de argumentación formal e informal típicamente estudiados por la lógica y metodología de la ciencia, aspectos tradicionalmente considerados “sociológicos”. En este artículo se analiza el debate sobre la ciencia del cambio climático (...) como un juego de este tipo, desde un enfoque inferencialista, sobre la base del esquema presentado en Zamora Bonilla (2006a). (shrink)

The connection between scientific knowledge and our empirical access to realityis not well explained within the structuralist approach to scientific theories. I arguethat this is due to the use of a semantics not rich enough from the philosophical pointof view. My proposal is to employ Sellars–Brandom's inferential semantics to understand how can scientific terms have empirical content, and Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics to analyse how can theories be empirically tested. The main conclusions are that scientific concepts gain their meaning through `basic (...) theories' grounded on `common sense’, and that scientific method usually allows the pragmatic verification and falsification of scientific theories. (shrink)

Two aspects of Miranda Fricker’s book are criticised: the implicit assumption that ethical theory can solve fundamental problems in epistemology, and the excessive reliance on testimony as a fundamental source of knowledge. Against the former, it is argued that ethical theories are based on cultural prejudices to a higher extent than epistemological theories. Against the latter, argumentation is proposed as a more important epistemic practice than testimony.

ArgumentThis paper addresses the complex process of inscribing the names of the American natural world – both the natural species and the territories – in the records of the Spanish Empire as undertaken by its official chronicler Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (1478–1557). Fernandez de Oviedo's ambitious attempt to identify all natural phenomena in the Historia general y natural de las Indias provides a very clear instance of the parallel developments of science and imperial discourse in the Early Modern period. As (...) we shall see, however, Fernández de Oviedo's point of view in this regard was by no means the same as the point of view developed in Spain by the imperial administration; on the contrary, Fernandez de Oviedo's criteria for identifying and naming reveal an effort to displace any external assumption and prejudice and call for a distinctly local view of American reality. In Fernández de Oviedo's text, the traditional notions of identity and difference as well as the relative positions of center and periphery were put into question in order to propose new ways to frame and control reality in an expanding world. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo las tres etapas del pensamiento de Vicent Martínez Guzmán: 1) la fenomenología lingüística, primero en estrecha conexión con Fernando Montero y John L. Austin, y luego transformada por la pragmática trascendental y la teoría de la acción comunicativa ; 2) la teoría filosófica de Europa, basada en Kant, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset y la Ética comunicativa o discursiva; y 3) la filosofía de la paz, que se convierte en una filosofía para hacer las paces, superando la (...) violencia, la guerra y las injusticia: una investigación interdisciplinar basada en la intersubjetividad con sentido ético y político.In this paper I set forth the three stages of Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s thought: 1) the Linguistic Phenomenology, first closely connected with Fernando Montero and John L. Austin, but later transformed by the Transcendental Pragmatics and the Theory of Communicative Action ; 2) the philosophical theory of Europe, based on Kant, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset and the communicative or discursive ethics; and 3) Philosophy of Peace that becomes in philosophy for making peace, overcoming violence, war and injustice: an interdisciplinary research based on intersubjectivity with ethical and political sense. (shrink)

El artículo expone la innovadora visión de la rebeldía que aporta Camus inspirándose en Nietzsche y en algunos mitos de la cultura griega. Se centra especialmente en El hombre rebelde y El mito de Sísifo, que constituye su punto de partida, en la medida en que la rebeldía es el camino para salir del mundo cerrado que genera el «sentimiento de lo absurdo». En el peculiar pensamiento de Camus se entremezclan literatura y filosofía, conformando una filosofía poética como la de (...) Nietzsche. Y la interpretación más adecuada de sus figuras literarias de la rebeldía es la que conecta con el sentido nietzscheano de lo trágico. La rebeldía en la obra de Camus ofrece un orden de sentido favorable a la vida en medio del caos, lo cual la vincula a la posición de Nietzsche, al situarse «más allá del nihilismo» pasivo, que es el que produce la vivencia del absurdo y la tendencia destructiva de la vida. El «renacimiento» que supone el sentido moral de la rebeldía en Camus le separa de la filosofía existencialista. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza la tensión entre libertad y seguridad a partir de la crítica del uso del imaginario colectivo como forma de legitimar socialmente recortes de garantías y de libertades. Se clarifica qué noción de imaginario resulta pertinente para este uso, y se muestra cómo en lugar de un imaginario social, estamos ante un conjunto de imágenes funcionales al propio discurso del orden. La fuerza de las imágenes (“tolerancia cero”, fronteras, derecho penal del enemigo, visión cinematográfica del delincuente) permite la (...) aceptación colectiva de medidas restrictivas de derechos y de garantías en ámbitos como la política de inmigración o la reforma del código penal. Estas imágenes son analizadas a partir del paralelismo que mantienen con las metáforas del discurso económico (“mano invisible”, self made man). Frente a ese imaginario, alentado por intereses económicos y políticos basado en razones pragmáticas y difundido por los medios de comunicación de masas, se propone el uso de la imaginación política así como la construcción jurídica de binomios de valores más imaginativos. (shrink)

The aim is to examine the multiple meanings of creativity in creative economy. The meanings which reinforce the individual aspect stress that personal characteristics may unlock the wealth that lies within people. The definitions that reinforce the organizational and social aspects understand creativity as a process, which requires knowledge, networks, and technologies that interconnect novel ideas and contexts. The perspectives which reinforce the political aspect see that creativity took the status of a doctrine to secure collaboration between government and industry. (...) However, these notions of creativity stress its instrumental utility and undermine fantasy, play, or uselessness. (shrink)