Recently, philosophers have come forth with approaches to chemistry based on its actual practice, imparting to it a proper aim and character of its own. These approaches add to the currently growing movement of pluralist philosophies of science. We draw on recent pluralist accounts from chemistry and analyse three notions from modern chemical practice and theory in terms of these accounts, in order to complement the so far more general pluralist approaches with specific evidence. Our survey reveals that the concept (...) of element indicates conceptual pluralisms in chemistry. that electronegativity illustrates methodological pluralism in determining one and the same concept, and that acidity is an instance of plurality hidden behind ‘one notion’. (shrink)

Die Wissenschaft hat - von der Wissenschaftstheorie des 20. Jahrhunderts gründlich untersucht - bestimmte Strukturen ihres Wissens, ihrer Methodik der Wissensgewinnung und Wissensabsicherung entwickelt, die sie von anderen Arten des Umgangs mit Wissen - z.B. der Alltagserfahrung - signifikant unterscheidet. Für die Technikwissenschaften haben solche wissenschaftstheoretischen Untersuchungen jedoch bisher kaum stattgefunden. Was etwa die analytische Wissenschaftstheorie für die Naturwissenschaften geleistet hat, steht daher für die Technikwissenschaften noch aus. Denn das technische Wissen unterscheidet sich vom wissenschaftlichen Wissen in seiner inneren Struktur. (...) Diese Struktur aufzuklären ist eine lohnende Aufgabe, weil deren Kenntnis hilft, besser mit Technik umzugehen. Die in diesem Band vorgelegten analytischen Studien zur Wissenschaftstheorie der Technikwissenschaften behandeln - ausgehend vom Problem der Formalisierung und der Wahrheitsfrage in der Philosophie - die Grundeinheit des technischen Wissens, die technologische Regel, und den Aufbau und Zusammenhang technologischer Theorien. Daraus ergeben sich Hinweise auf die innere, d.h. auch logische Struktur des technischen Wissens. (shrink)

The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.

In the paper I voice my dissatisfaction with the author's essay because I think that the proposed “McClellean shift” from skeptical to trusting theism faces serious problems. The troubles are mainly caused by the way in which McClellan suggests to extend and “amend” the theist’s argument via the Moorean shift (which is intended to be a counter-argument to the atheist’s evidential argument from evil). But McClellan's proposal is no amendment at all, as it robs the theist's Moore-inspired argument its entire (...) logico-probabilistic force. (shrink)

In his essay Tracy Lupher (henceforth, TL) is concerned with Robert Kane's (1984) version of the modal ontological argument (MOA). As he correctly points out, Kane's argument is valid only if the accessibility relation between possible worlds is assumed to be symmetric. TL's remarks pave the way to thinking that the MOA is intended to establish the existence of a perfect being as a matter of logical necessity. Moreover, given TL's undisputed supposition (even shared by Kane) that S5 - in (...) which the accessibility relation is symmetric - captures the notion of logical necessity, the real issue becomes whether the premise of the MOA is true. Contrary to TL's main claim, the discussion thus shifts back from technical arguments for why the appropriate modal logic must have a symmetric accessibility relation to metaphysical, theological, or conceptual considerations about the notion of a perfect being itself. I argue that it is only due to such considerations that we even start to ponder the question of what modal logic is the appropriate one to choose. (shrink)

In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that the (...) presented examples of Liar-like paradox are supposed to be counterexamples to Tarski’s diagnosis of the classic Liar paradox. Third, that JN fail to notice Tarski’s postulate. And finally, that JN fail to recognize that the world they are pondering is not among the possible worlds. (shrink)

Band I. Optionen einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Bild-Hermeneutik -- Band II. Rekonstruktion und Narrativität.

Intentionality is a curious notion and so is partial identity; the latter is employed by Christopher Tomaszewski (henceforth, CT) in his paper to afford solutions to a wide array of different philosophical problems. The author’s central thesis is that intentionality is a kind of partial identity; i.e. when the mind is intentionally directed towards an external object, it "takes in" a part of the object – its form, but not its matter. In my essay I first expound Franz Brentano's views (...) on intentionality - inspired by Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism. Contrary to what CT suggests, I conclude (in light of Brentano's later work) that intentionality should not be characterized as a genuine relation since one can be intentionally directed towards existing as well as non-existing objects and since, in the case of the latter, it remains unclear what it is that the mind “takes in”. Second, I clarify the notion of partial identity. In this context it is not obvious to me what exactly CT's appeal to partial identity contributes to the solution of the problem of material constitution. Third, I explicate CT's thesis that intentionality is partial identity (based on previously given definitions) and conclude that his argument in support of mind/body-dualism fails. Overall, skepticism remains as to whether partial identity adequately captures the tricky terrain of intentionality. (shrink)

Societies change; and sociology has, since its inception, described and evaluated these changes. This article proposes a revised theory of collective learning processes, a conceptual framework which addresses ways in which people make sense of and cope with change. Drawing on Habermas’ classic proposal, but shifting the focus from argumentation towards storytelling, it explains how certain articulations allow for collective learning processes (imagining more inclusive orders), while others block learning processes (imagining more exclusive orders). More specifically, the article points to (...) narrative genres (romance, tragedy, comedy and irony) which organize feelings and shape the social bond, proposing that ironic and tragic stories have the potential to trigger collective learning processes, while romantic and comic stories tend to block them. (shrink)

The author introduces a normative conception of coherence, derived from a pragmatic interpretation of the application of norms to concrete cases. A distinction is made between the justification of a norm and its application. In the case of moral norms, justification and application can be analysed as two different discursive procedures which give rise to different aspects of the principle of impartiality. Impartial justification requires a procedure by which all interests concerned are taken into account whereas impartial application requires a (...) procedure where all features of a situation are considered. The complete description of a concrete case makes necessary a coherent interpretation of all the valid norms which are prima facie applicable. This requirement of an ideal coherent system of norms is restricted to interpretive “paradigms” in the case of legal norms, because it is necessary to produce singular judgments under the restrictive conditions of scarce time and incomplete knowledge. (shrink)

A cumulative emotion science requires sustained investments in theory development. To encourage such investments, a new section will be added to Cognition & Emotion that is specifically devoted to...

Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution (`change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued (...) that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. (shrink)

In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a “special case” of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is (...) a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**. (shrink)

This article argues for a robust notion of collective identity which is not reduced to a psychological conception of identity. In the first part, the debate on the concept of identity raised by several authors is taken up critically with the intention of defending a strong sociological conception of identity which by definition is a collective identity. The basic assumption is that collective identities are narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors. This theory (...) is then applied to the case of Europe, showing how identity markers are used to control the boundaries of a common space of communication. These markers are bound to stories which those within such a space of communication share. Stories that hold in their narrative structures social relations provide projects of control. National identities are based on strong and exclusive stories. Europeanization (among other parallel processes at the global level) opens this space of boundary constructions and offers opportunities for national as well as sub-national as well as transnational stories competing with each other to shape European identity projects. The EU — this is the hypothesis — provides a case in which different sites offer competing opportunities to continue old stories, to start new stories or to import old stories from other sites, thus creating a narrative network on top of the network of social relations that bind the people in Europe together. European identity is therefore to be conceived as a narrative network embedded in an emerging network of social relations among the people living in Europe. (shrink)

Now available in paperback for the first time since its original publication, the material in this book provides a broad, accessible guide to semantic typology, crosslinguistic semantics and diachronic semantics. Coming from a world-leading team of authors, the book also deals with the concept of meaning in psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics, and the understanding of semantics in computer science. It is packed with highly cited, expert guidance on the key topics in the field, making it a bookshelf essential for linguists, cognitive (...) scientists, philosophers, and computer scientists working on natural language. (shrink)

A pragmatic (communication-discursive) cognitive sociology beyond observationism (Luhmann, Turner, Conein) and individualistic reductionism (Esser, Boudon) as a way to do sociology as a critical theory and as a positive science is proposed, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action and its radical continuation in Luhmann's concept of the (cognitive) autopoiesis of social systems.

Methodological problems often arise when a special case is confused with the general principle. So you will find affordances only for ‚artifacts’ if you restrict the analysis to ‚artifacts’. The general principle, however, is an ‚invitation character’, which triggers an action. Consequently, an action-theoretical approach known as ‚pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science is recommended. According to this approach, the human being is not a passive-receptive being but actively produces those action effects that open up the world to us. This ‚ideomotor (...) approach’ focuses on the so-called ‚epistemic actions’, which guide our perception as conscious and unconscious cognitions. Due to ‚embodied cognition’ the own body is assigned an indispensable role. The action theoretical approach of ‚enactive cognition’ enables that every form can be consistently processualized. Thus, each ‚Gestalt’ is understood as the process result of interlocking cognitions of ‚forward modelling’ and ‚inverse modelling’. As can be shown, these cognitions are fed by previous experiences of real interaction, which later changes into a mental trial treatment, which is highly automated and can therefore take place unconsciously. It is now central that every object may have such affordances that call for instrumental or epistemic action. In the simplest case, it is the body and the facial expressions of our counterpart that can be understood as a question and provoke an answer/reaction. Thus, emotion is not only to be understood as expression/output according to the scheme ‚input-processing-output’, but acts itself as a provocative act/input. Consequently, artifacts are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for affordances. Rather, they exist in all areas of cognition—from Enactive Cognition to Social Cognition. (shrink)

Heideggers Frage nach dem Wesen der planetarischen Technik ist mehr und anderes als eine reine Technikkritik. Sie erfasst die Formationen der alles umfassenden Technik als Grundform der Seinsverlassenheit und eines veranderten Weltverhaltnisses nach dem Ende der Metaphysik. Der Band zeichnet Heideggers Technikphilosophie in ihren immanenten Verweisungszusammenhangen nach. Er befragt Heideggers Technikbegriff auch vor dem Horizont der ungeahnten Perspektiven, die Anthropotechniken und Digitalisierung seither eroffnen.

In a constitutional democracy, the imputation of a legal violation to an individual must be related to the fact that democratic approval of a norm - under limiting conditions - is coupled with the obligation to follow that norm. The neutrality of modern law toward the quality of motives for following a norm, however, challenges the assumption of such a connection. This challenge is overlooked by those who take the position that individual imputation should be based on the morally autonomous (...) individual's self-contradiction. In contrast, deterrence theories fail to see the other relevant aspect, namely that individual imputation cannot be completely divorced from the perspective of the individual as a citizen, who could indeed follow the norm because of his insight into the reasons for its validity. Individual imputation takes account of this double classification of a person subject to law as citizen and as private autonomous legal subject only if the actor is addressed as citizen in the reasoning given to support the determination of culpability without simultaneously requiring him to actually adopt the perspective of a citizen. Die individuelle Zurechnung einer Rechtsverletzung muß in einem demokratischen Verfassungsstaat etwas damit zu tun haben, daß mit der demokratischen Zustimmung zu einer Norm unter einschränkenden Bedingungen - auch die Verpflichtung zur Normbefolgung verbunden ist. Gegen die Vermutung eines solchen Zusammenhangs spricht jedoch die Neutralität des modernen Rechts gegenüber der Qualität der Motive seiner Befolgung. Dies wird von denjenigen Positionen übersehen, die eine individuelle Zurechnung auf den Selbstwiderspruch der sittlich autonomen Person gründen wollen. Dagegen übersehen präventive Schuldtheorien den anderen Aspekt, daß sich individuelle Zurechnung nicht gänzlich von der Perspektive des Staatsbürgers lösen darf, der eine legitime Norm aus Einsicht in die Gründe ihrer Geltung auch befolgen könnte. Der doppelten Codierung der Rechtsperson als Staatsbürger und als privatautonomes Rechtssubjekt entspricht die individuelle Zurechnung nur dann, wenn der Täter durch die Begründung des Schuldurteils als Staatsbürger angesprochen wird, ohne daß ihm ein Wechsel in die Perspektive eines Staatsbürgers auch zugemutet würde. (shrink)

The riddle of how to democratize the multi-level polity of the EU is answered by pointing to the empirical impact of an unfolding European public sphere. It is argued that there is a self-constituting dynamic of a European public sphere which abets the coupling of transnational spaces of communication with the institutional integration of the EU. From this perspective, democracy is not external to the EU, it is already part of the logic of European institution-building and governance and is fostered (...) by collective learning processes in which definitions of the collective good as well as conditions for appropriate forms of political participation are negotiated. In discussing the case of the EU’s constitutional reform, a theory of democratic functionalism is proposed which accounts for this specific form of democratization of the EU. (shrink)

Der Tierrechte-Ansatz stellt den Anspruch des Menschen auf Nutzung von Tieren prinzipiell in Frage. Der Grund besteht darin, dass durch den Gebrauch von Tieren zu menschlichen Zwecken typischerweise deren Rechte verletzt werden. Um welche Rechte es sich dabei handelt und welche Tiere sie allenfalls besitzen, ist Teil anhaltender Diskussionen sowohl in der Tierethik als auch innerhalb der Tierrechtsbewegung.

We start from the assumption that the real valued observables of a quantum system form a Jordan algebra which is equipped with a compatible Lie product characterizing infinitesimal symmetries, and ask whether two such systems can be considered as independent subsystems of a larger system. We show that this is possible if and only if the associator of the Jordan product is a fixed multiple of the associator of the Lie product. In this case it is known that the two (...) products can be combined to an associative product in the Jordan algebra or its complexification, depending on the sign of the multiple. (shrink)

Anthropologische Medizin (AM) i. S. Viktor von Weizsäckers sieht grundlegende Selbsterfahrungen des Menschen (Leiblichkeit, Zeitlichkeit u. a.) für den Umgang von Arzt und Krankem als zentral. Sie ist offen für die leiblich-seelische Betroffenheit, für die mögliche Stellvertretung des Physischen und Psychischen und sieht den Kranken als Subjekt und Objekt, das sich selbst zugleich Subjekt und Objekt ist. „Umgangslehre“ kennzeichnet AM als Handlungswissenschaft, die der „Doppelstruktur sachlicher und personaler Entsprechung von Mensch in Not und Mensch als Helfer bzw. Krankheit und Medizin“ (...) folgt. Sie unterscheidet Krankheit und Kranksein sowie klinische und (natur-)wissenschaftliche Objektivität. Lebensweltliche und psychosoziale Faktoren beeinflussen das Kranksein. Als Umgangslehre setzt anthropologisch-klinische Wissenschaft „an die Stelle der Objektivitätslehre der Erkenntnis eine personalistische […] Erkenntnislehre“, die auch ihre methodischen, handlungslogischen Sach- und Wertbegründungen reflektiert. Brücken zwischen AM und dem gegenwärtigen Ethikdiskurs werden skizziert. (shrink)

The topic may initially suggest that massive reductionism is pursued with it. Why this is not the case, can be explained as follows: 'Dictatorship of the proletariat', 'bureaucracy' and 'bureaucratization' are key terms through which new aspects, facts and connections of the questions about socialism can be opened again and again.

7 Klaus Hansen Feindberiihrungen mit versohnlichem Ausgang Carl Schmitt und der Liberalismus Das Ende des "Dritten Reiches" liegt iiber 40 Jahre zuruck. Noch immer hiilt sich eine ganze Gesellschaft, die es "nicht fertiggebracht hat, eine andere Geschichte hervorzubringen" (Jean Baudrillard), durch die nachgetragene Kritik und Schuldfeststellung ihrer Meisterdenker schadlos. Der "Nazi-Philosoph" Martin Heidegger beherrscht die feuilletonistische Hermeneutik der Jahreswende 1987 / 88; der "Nazi-Jurist" Carl Schmitt war von 1945 bis zu seinem Tode, 40 Jahre spiiter, immer wieder Gegenstand poli­ (...) tologischer und politi scher Verdammungsverdikte. Wer sich auf Carl Schmitt einliillt, begibt sich in einen Irrgarten, der emp­ fanglichen Gemiitern ein Faszinosum fUr sich ist. Die Beitriige von Sombart, Altmann und Thcker im vorliegenden Buch versuchen, dieser Schmitt'schen Attraktion auf die Spur zu kommen - und stellen dabei mehr Forschungsdesi­ derate als gesicherte Erkenntnisse fest. Vor allem aber geht es in dies em Buch darum, Carl Schmitt die Gerechtig­ keit einer angemessenen Auseinandersetzung widerfahren zu lassen. Freilich nicht dem "ganzen" Carl Schmitt, aber doch jenen Aspekten seines Werkes, die sich mit der Kritik des Liberalismus befassen. Carl Schmitt kritisiert den Liberalismus aus der Position eines Anti-Libera­ len, die sich in vierfacher Umschreibung skizzieren liillt. Der Anti-Liberalismus Schmitts ruhrt 1. von der anthropologischen Grundauffassung her. In der Tradition von Ma­ chiavelli und Hobbes stehend, sieht Schmitt den Menschen als "bose" und "gefahrlich" an. (shrink)