The paper presents and discusses the Hubble tension with respect to recent results in cosmology. I shall argue that the measurements from the James Webb Space Telescope and TRGB stars calibrations allow us to infer that the estimates of H0 with late universe methods are robust. Building on from robustness analysis, I conclude that the resolution of the tension cannot be expected to come from new systematics, but rather from new physics.

AI-based technologies are increasingly pervasive in a number of contexts. Our affective and emotional life makes no exception. In this article, we analyze one way in which AI-based technologies can affect them. In particular, our investigation will focus on affective artificial agents, namely AI-powered software or robotic agents designed to interact with us in affectively salient ways. We build upon the existing literature on affective artifacts with the aim of providing an original analysis of affective artificial agents and their distinctive (...) features. We argue that, unlike comparatively low-tech affective artifacts, affective artificial agents display a specific form of agency, which prevents them from being perceived by their users as extensions of their selves. In addition to this, we claim that their functioning crucially depends on the simulation of human-like emotion-driven behavior and requires a distinctive form of transparency—we call it emotional transparency—that might give rise to ethical and normative tensions. (shrink)

Many approaches to quantum gravity -the theory that should account for quantum and gravitational phenomena under the same theoretical umbrella- seem to point at some form of spacetime emergence, i.e., the fact that spacetime is not a fundamental entity of our physical world. This tenet has sparked many philosophical discussions: from the so-called empirical incoherence problem to different accounts of emergence and mechanisms thereof. In this contribution, I focus on the partial order relation of causal set theory and argue that (...) causation can be characterized as an a-temporal constraint over the kinematic space defined by the theory. The relation constrains the growth of a new element/event with respect to the other elements/events of a given set. Therefrom, the flow of time emerges from the collection of the possible growths of the given set, where each possibility is characterized by a classical probability assigned by the dynamics of the theory. (shrink)

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed (...) to satisfy (§2.1). I then (§2.2) highlight a number of tensions in the literature on the mark of the cognitive, suggesting they’re best resolved by distinguishing two distinct programs. The first program (§3) is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive capturing our everyday notion of cognition. I argue that such a program is bound to fail for a number of reasons: it is not clear whether such an everyday notion exists; and even if it existed, it would not be able to spell out individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for cognition; and even if it were able to spell them out, these conditions won’t satisfy the desiderata a mark of the cognitive should satisfy. The second program is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive spelling out a genuine scientific kind. But the current state of fragmentation of cognitive science, and the fact that it is splintered in a myriad of different research traditions, prevent us from identifying such a kind. And we have no reason to think that these various research traditions will converge, allowing us to identify a single mark. Or so, at least, I will argue in (§4). I then conclude the paper (§5) deflecting an intuitive objection, and exploring some of the consequences of the thesis I have defended. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is mistaken, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the extended mind thesis is true. To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the free energy principle (...) in Section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In Section 3, I argue that using Markov Blankets to determine whether the mind extends will provide us with an answer based on circular reasoning. In Section 4, I consider whether Markov Blankets help us track the boundaries of the mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to Markov Blankets to track the boundaries of the mind yields extensionally inadequate conclusions which violate the parity principle. In Section 5, I further argue that Markov Blankets led us to sidestep the debate over the extended mind, as they make internalism about the mind vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph follows. (shrink)

Hempel’s account of thought experiments has been discussed only by a very few authors and, for the most part, with rather cursory remarks. Its importance, however, is not only historical, but also systematic theoretical, because it involves the distinction between discovery and justification, a main pillar of neopositivistic philosophy of science. Hempel raised the question whether thought experiments constitute a methodological component of scientific research or, on the contrary, are merely a heuristic-psychological device for obtaining and/or transmitting new ideas. While (...) conceding a few exceptions in the natural sciences, he argued that thought experiments always have a heuristic character in the social sciences. There is however a fundamental tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments, between the thesis of methodological monism and the neopositivistic dichotomy discovery/justification. On the one hand, on the basis of the unity of scientific method, Hempel admits a difference only in degree between the natural and the human sciences, but on the other hand, he draws a principled distinction between thought experiments of the human sciences (which have only a greater or lesser heuristic value) and those of the natural sciences (which may have also a cognitive-justificatory value). If one assumes the unity of method in the minimal sense in which no scientific knowledge can renounce intersubjective controllability, this tension can be removed either by rejecting the discovery/justification dichotomy or by interpreting it differently. Here, following the second path, two senses of the dichotomy are distinguished, one of which must be accepted, while the other rejected. This removes the internal tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments and suggests the thesis that any plausible thought experiment, both in the natural and the human sciences, must already contain some justification, implicit or explicit, of the theoretical hypotheses that they formulate. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I examine the authors’ concept of relational cognition, showing that it has two possible readings, both more “cartesian” than the authors suppose. Whence the authors’ “anti-cartesianism,” then? I suggest it is due to an understanding of cognition that allows cognition to operate at very long timescales, and provide an argument to resist such an understanding.

In considering what it means to lead organizations effectively and ethically, the literature comprising spirituality at work and spiritual leadership theory has become highly influential, especially in the USA. It has also attracted significant criticism. While in this paper, we endorse this critique, we argue that the strand of literature which purportedly takes a Christian standpoint within the wider SAW school of thought, largely misconstrues and misapplies the teaching of its founder, Jesus. As a result, in dismissing the claims and (...) application of SAW and SLT, there is a real risk that we lose the vital contribution of Christian thought, not least some of the timeless counter-cultural wisdom of Jesus which, we contend, offers a vital foundation to the practice of ethical leadership and business ethics in organizations. In proposing a way forward, two thorny issues which face all leaders are addressed: dealing with ego and closing the gap between what we say and what we do. The more we understand about the dynamics of human nature, the more we learn about the profundity of Jesus’ teachings. We then propose a number of ways in which Jesus-centred ethical leadership can be practised. Each is radical and each implies risk: both the personal risk of inner renewal arising from repentance as a doorway to personal integrity, as well as the risk of opposing unethical practices and promoting the excellence of core practices in the workplace. (shrink)

This essay focuses on an unknown Latin translation of Georg Ernst Stahl's treatise on the nature of sulfur (Zufällige Gedancken und Nützliche Bedencken über den Streit von dem so genannten Sulfure). The original edition, published in 1718, laid the foundation for the phlogiston theory, which dominated European chemistry until the early 1770s. However, the dissemination of the treatise on sulfur outside the German states remained limited. Its Latin translation proposes a different scenario as it was owned by three prominent French (...) chemists: Étienne-François Geoffroy, Jean Hellot and Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier. Geoffroy's early interest in Stahl's chemistry has been evidenced and it is suggested that the acquisition of the manuscript might be linked to his connection with Stahl through Caspar Neumann, a chemist from Berlin. When he entered in the possession of the manuscript Jean Hellot wrote a long excerpt of Stahl’s work. Lavoisier acquired the manuscript in 1766, and his critical reading of Stahl's work significantly influenced his own effort to outline a new theory of combustion. This manuscript represents a significant historical connection between Stahl’s phlogiston theory and Lavoisier's revolutionary ideas. (shrink)

Der Neue Experimentalismus musste sich angesichts seines Gegensatzes zwischen experimentellen Praktiken und grundlegenden Theorien mit dem Problem der Beziehung zwischen der Einmaligkeit der ersteren und der Allgemeinheit der letzteren auseinandersetzen. Andere Autoren (von Charles A. Baylis und Nelson Goodman bis Catherine Elgin) haben das Konzept der Exemplifikation verwendet, um die Beziehung zwischen partikulären und universellen/allgemeinen Begriffen oder Gesetzen zu klären. Es stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob sie zwar einen Gesichtspunkt andeuten, der neue Aspekte des Problems beleuchten kann, das Problem (...) selbst aber nicht lösen. In diesem Artikel wird auf der Grundlage von Überlegungen, die an anderer Stelle entwickelt wurden, sowie in Anlehnung an eine Anregung von Aristoteles vorgeschlagen, den Begriff der Exemplifikation mit dem Problem der Induktion und der Abduktion zu verknüpfen, die hier als Bezeichnung für eine Vielzahl methodischer Verfahren verstanden werden, die darauf abzielen, eine kognitive Beziehung zwischen der Reproduzierbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Begriffe oder Gesetze und der Konkretheit, der Lokalität und dem situierten Charakter experimenteller Praktiken herzustellen. Eine notwendige Voraussetzung für die Lösung des durch diese Beziehung aufgeworfenen Problems ist die Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Bedeutungen − einer reflexiv-transzendentalen und einer genetisch-methodologischen − des Begriffspaares Entdeckung/Rechtfertigung. Dies wirft gleichzeitig Licht auf das Problem der Induktion sowie auf das Problem des Verhältnisses zwischen der Universalität wissenschaftlicher Gesetze und dem stets lokalen und situierten Charakter experimenteller Praktiken. Der letzte Teil des Artikels zeigt, wie diese Schlussfolgerungen auch für Gedankenexperimente gelten, indem auf John Nortons Auffassung eingegangen wird. (shrink)

Vice epistemology studies the qualities of individuals and collectives that undermine the creation, sharing, and storing of knowledge. There is no settled understanding of which epistemic vices exist at the collective level. Yet understanding which collective epistemic vices exist is important, both to facilitate research on the antecedents and effects of collective epistemic vice, and to advance philosophical discussions such as whether some collective epistemic vices are genuinely collective. I propose an empirical approach to identifying epistemic vices in corporations, analyzing (...) a large dataset of online employee reviews. The approach has parallels to the methodology for identifying the big-five personality traits. It surfaces epistemic vices that are attributed to corporations by its own members and reduces the number of vices to the minimum required to describe differences between corporations. This approach yields a new taxonomy of epistemic vices for corporations. While two vices identified have close correlates in the existing literature, four others have not been identified at all or only in aspects. Two of these vices are ‘genuinely’ collective in the sense that they can only be attributed to collectives. (shrink)

Experimental balance is usually understood as the control for the value of the conditions, other than the one under study, which are liable to affect the result of a test. We discuss three different approaches to balance. ‘Millean balance’ requires identifying and equalizing ex ante the value of these conditions in order to conduct solid causal inferences. ‘Fisherian balance’ measures ex post the influence of uncontrolled conditions through the analysis of variance. In ‘efficiency balance’ the value of the antecedent conditions (...) is decided ex ante according to the efficiency they yield in the estimation of the treatment outcome. Against some old arguments by Worrall, we show that in both Fisherian and efficiency balance there are good reasons to randomize the allocation of treatments, in particular when there is no agreement among experimenters as to the antecedent conditions to be controlled for. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is mistaken, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the extended mind thesis is true. To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the free energy principle (...) in Section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In Section 3, I argue that using Markov Blankets to determine whether the mind extends will provide us with an answer based on circular reasoning. In Section 4, I consider whether Markov Blankets help us track the boundaries of the mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to Markov Blankets to track the boundaries of the mind yields extensionally inadequate conclusions which violate the parity principle. In Section 5, I further argue that Markov Blankets led us to sidestep the debate over the extended mind, as they make internalism about the mind vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph follows. (shrink)

This paper argues that the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics suggests a form of holism for which the whole (total ensemble of paths) has properties that are not strongly reducible to the properties of the parts (the single trajectories). Feynman’s sum over histories calculates the probability amplitude of a particle moving within a boundary by summing over all the possible trajectories that the particle can undertake. These trajectories and their individual probability amplitudes are thus necessary in calculating the total (...) amplitude. However, not all possible trajectories are differentiable, thus suggesting that they are not physical possibilities, but only mathematical entities. It follows that if the possible differentiable trajectories are taken to be part of the physical system, they are not sufficient to calculate the total probability amplitude. The conclusion is that the total ensemble is weakly non-supervenient upon the physically possible trajectories. (shrink)

The COVID-19 outbreak has seen people in many countries asked to radically modify their way of life in compliance with sweeping safety measures. During the current crisis, technology is turning out to be key, in that it allows practitioners to deliver psychological services to people who would otherwise be unreachable. However, professionals cannot solely rely on their traditional modes of practice, in that different methods are required to bring to light the needs of those affected by the emergency. People are (...) being overwhelmed by a cascade of unusual and unexpected events that are putting a strain on their everyday routines and usual meaning-making systems; ongoing challenges to their employment and financial status will likely divert personal resources away from psychological well-being. We therefore argue that psychologists should also consider the needs of the general population. Among those who may require help – aside from the main targets of psychological intervention, such as healthcare personnel and COVID-19 patients and their relatives – specific attention should be paid to those who are not at the center of the crisis. We suggest that this large segment of potential users may benefit from a non-medical approach focused on the promotion of meaning-making processes. Indeed, the disruptive nature of the current situation hinders sense-making and threatens to undermine psychological balance and well-being, at an individual as well as at a societal level. The present article proposes a methodological perspective based on the reconstruction of meaning-making processes (sense of coherence, predictability, metaphors, narratives). Specifically, psychological interventions should promote personal and collective resources with a view to: “normalizing” current distressful experiences (i.e., acknowledging that such reactions are normal in light of the present situation); widening the observational field, taking relational contexts into account, and promoting an understanding of distressful experiences as coping strategies; fostering meaning-making/reconstruction processes through the use of appropriate metaphors and narratives; promoting a sense of coherence. We present two clinical vignettes to illustrate how these principles might be applied in practice. In conclusion, the exceptional psychological challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic require practitioners to adopt a broad and flexible perspective on clinical intervention. (shrink)

Neural structural representations are cerebral map- or model-like structures that structurally resemble what they represent. These representations are absolutely central to the “cognitive neuroscience revolution”, as they are the only type of representation compatible with the revolutionaries’ mechanistic commitments. Crucially, however, these very same commitments entail that structural representations can be observed in the swirl of neuronal activity. Here, I argue that no structural representations have been observed being present in our neuronal activity, no matter the spatiotemporal scale of observation. (...) My argument begins by introducing the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” (Sect. 1 ) and sketching a prominent, widely adopted account of structural representations (Sect. 2 ). Then, I will consult various reports that describe our neuronal activity at various spatiotemporal scales, arguing that none of them reports the presence of structural representations (Sect. 3 ). After having deflected certain intuitive objections to my analysis (Sect. 4 ), I will conclude that, in the absence of neural structural representations, representationalism and mechanism can’t go together, and so the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” is forced to abandon one of its commitments (Sect. 5 ). (shrink)

Enactive approaches to cognition argue that cognition, including pretense, comes about through the dynamical interaction of agent and environment. Applied to cognition, these approaches cast cognition as an activity an agent _performs_ interacting in specific ways with her environment. This view is now under significant pressure: in a series of recent publications, Peter Langland-Hassan has proposed a number of arguments which purportedly should lead us to conclude that enactive approaches are unable to account for pretense without paying a way too (...) severe theoretical price. In this paper, we will defend enactive approaches to pretense, arguing that they can in fact explain pretense without incurring in the negative theoretical consequences Peter Langland-Hassan fears. To this effect, we start by exposing Langland-Hassan’s challenge (§2), to then highlight its core assumptions and demonstrate their falsity (§3). Having done so, we argue that none of the theoretical consequences Langland-Hassan fears follow (§4), and in fact enactive approaches to cognition may be explanatorily superior to the one Langland-Hassan favors (§5). A brief conclusion will then follow (§6). (shrink)

: According to a traditional view, inferences are personal-level entities pertaining to the domain of reasons, and therefore they cannot be accounted for in causal terms – specifically, as mere associations. I intend to argue that this is at the very least a drastic simplification, for two reasons. First, the word “association” is polysemous, so we should specify in which of its possible senses an inference is not a mere association. Second, personal-level inferences based on formal rules are only the (...) extreme end of a complex developmental trajectory. As the last decades of research in the field have shown, we should refrain from identifying the entire domain of reasoning with that final stage, which is in fact mostly contingent upon extensive logical training. In this paper, I try to disentangle some major stages in the development of full-fledged inferences, and then to show that all of them – till the final one – can be considered associative in appropriate senses of the word. Keywords: Reasoning; Association; Consciousness; Inference; Development Un approccio associativo alle inferenze: l’evoluzione verso il prototipo Riassunto: Secondo una concezione tradizionale, le inferenze sono entità collocate al livello della persona e appartenenti al dominio delle ragioni, e pertanto non è possibile ridurle a un resoconto causale – più specificamente, a mere associazioni. Intendo sostenere che questa è quanto meno una drastica semplificazione, per due ragioni. Primo, la parola “associazione” è polisemica, quindi dovremmo precisare in quale senso un’inferenza non è una mera associazione. Secondo, inferenze al livello della persona e basate su regole formali sono solo il punto estremo di una complessa traiettoria di sviluppo. Come gli ultimi decenni di ricerca in questo campo hanno mostrato, dovremmo evitare di identificare l’intero dominio del ragionamento con questo stadio finale, che di fatto dipende da un esteso addestramento logico. In questo articolo, provo a discriminare alcuni stadi essenziali nello sviluppo delle inferenze in senso pieno, e quindi a mostrare che ciascuno di essi – incluso quello finale – possono essere considerati associativi in qualche opportuno senso della parola. Parole chiave: Ragionamento; Associazione; Coscienza; Inferenza; Sviluppo. (shrink)

In this article, Charlotte Blease argues that patient access to online shared clinical notes (also called ‘open notes’) may cause or exacerbate nocebo effects in two ways. 1 First, open notes may enhance patient understanding about the adverse effects of medications and treatments. However, reading information about adverse effects may lead patients to form negative expectations that, in turn, may cause or worsen symptoms via nocebo mechanisms. Second, open notes may paradoxically lower the quality of the therapeutic relationship by allowing (...) patients to detect signs of discrimination and stigma in clinical notes. By accessing their shared notes, patients may identify (or think that they are identifying) signs of stigmatisation and discrimination in clinicians’ words. This may diminish their trust while increasing their anxieties and fears, all factors that have been associated with enhanced nocebo effects. The article then suggests different strategies to mitigate nocebo effects while using open... (shrink)

Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon’s argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond (...) to a weaker version of the argument for the claim that we should revise our notion of determinism. (shrink)

With reference to an already existing and relatively widespread use of the expression in question, mathematical “thought experiments” (“TEs”) involve mathematical reasoning in which visualisation plays a relatively more important role. But to ensure an unambiguous and consistent use of the term, certain conditions have to be met: (1) Contrary to what has happened so far in the literature, the distinction between logical-formal thinking and experimental-operational thinking must not be ignored; (2) The separation between the context of discovery and the (...) context of justification is to be rejected, at least in one of the main senses in which it was defended by the logical empiricists and Popper (this excludes any position which, ascribing to mathematical TEs only a heuristic role, regards them an intermediate step to attain more traditional forms of rigour); (3) The distinction between mathematical TEs and formal proofs must be regarded as one of degree, and not as a qualitative one, although this distinction may be used in a de facto way for particular or local purposes. (shrink)

Elsewhere I have tried to provide the justification of both the irreducible distinction of science and philosophy and their inevitable complementarity. Unlike empirical science, philosophy has no limit whatever as far as its possible objects are concerned. To say that there is no limit whatever to the possible objects of philosophy is to say that, strictly speaking, it has no object at all and must find its object outside itself, that is, in common sense knowledge and the natural and human (...) sciences. Against the background of this conception, the paper argues that philosophy of science, as a critical reflection on common sense knowledge and the natural or human sciences, inherits from philosophy in general this two-faced Janus nature, which in the philosophy of science shapes the epistemological status of the discipline in an even more prominent way. To show this in detail, the paper enunciates eleven theses that derive from the intimate connection of unity and distinction that exists between philosophy of science on the one hand and the particular and specialized scientific knowledge on the other. (shrink)

Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: (1) the standard evolutionary psychology model (Carruthers), (2) the individualist empiricist (...) model (Wellman, Gopnik), (3) the cultural empiricist model (Heyes), and (4) the radical socio-cultural constructivist model, which we favor. We motivate model (4) by arguing that many forms of mental state ascription do not serve the function of simply describing inner states causally responsible for the behavior of a cognitive agent; rather, they relate the agent to her environment by characterizing her practical commitments. Making these practical commitments explicit has an important regulatory function in that it supports action coordination and alignment on joint goals. We propose a model of how the ascription of mental states may have evolved as a linguistic device to perform exactly this function of making agents’ practical commitments explicit. (shrink)

Debates on situated affectivity have mainly focused on tools that exert some positive influence on affective experience. Far less attention has been paid to artifacts that interact with the expression of affect, or to those that exert some negative influence. To shed light on that shadowy corner of our affective social lives, I describe the workings of an atypical socio-affective artifact, namely, sunglasses. Drawing on insights from psychology and other social sciences, I construe sunglasses as a social shield that helps (...) us block spontaneous emotional expressions, as well as affecting other social processes that heavily depend on the eye region: gaze direction detection, identity recognition, and the sense of intimacy afforded by eye contact. (shrink)

The movement has great significance for all philosophical problems, both metaphysical and epistemological. In the first part of this article I would like to show how Patočka takes up some theoretical knots of this problem in four essays on Aristotle. These texts explain movement as a fundamental ontological factor. They therefore link it to ontology. In the second part, however, I will use a contribution by Chiurazzi to show that the same theme was in fact also present in the ancient (...) thought of Plato, who was criticised by Aristotle. In the conclusion, I will try to summarise some common ideas about movement, all of which confirm the centrality of a dynamic ontology, and show the richness of the consequences of this approach. One of the most important results is that the basis of movement coincides with what makes life itself possible. In this way, dynamis becomes the very basis of reality itself. (shrink)

With the present paper I maintain that the group field theory (GFT) approach to quantum gravity can help us clarify and distinguish the problems of spacetime emergence from the questions about the nature of the quanta of space. I will show that the mechanism of phase transition suggests a form of indifference between scales (or phases) and that such an indifference allows us to black-box questions about the nature of the ontology of the fundamental levels of the theory. I consider (...) the GFT approach to quantum gravity which derives spacetime as an emergent property from abstract non-geometrical tetrahedra through a processes of phase transition. Because the physical interpretation of the tetrahedra is problematic in view of their (non)-spatiotemporal nature, I will apply the considerations about phase transitions to GFT and conclude that the fundamental ontology of the theory and the mechanism of spacetime emergence can and should be treated separately. (shrink)

Maximus the Confessor's belief that the Incarnation would have happened without a Fall is a key facet of his thought, yet contradicts portions of his corpus which state that God became human due to sin. I assert that Maximus affirms a prelapsarian motive of the Incarnation for two reasons: his conception of deification as participation and understanding of humanity's original vocation. Deification and vocation are presented by Maximus in such a way that they could have only been fulfilled through Christ's (...) Incarnation; the joining of human and divine natures is not a soteriological necessity. Analysing accounts of the Fall of Adam in both the Questiones ad Thalassium and the Ambiguum demonstrate that the Confessor reconciles the historic need for salvation with the will of God from all eternity. I argue that a reading of Ambigua 41 in the context of the Maximian corpus reveals an all-encompassing reason for the Incarnation. Philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία), God's love for humanity, is the motive (σκοπός) for the Incarnation that embraces the divine preexistent intention without contradicting soteriology. (shrink)

"Gregorio Piaia si è formato presso l'Università di Padova, dove si laureò il 17 febbraio 1968 con una tesi coordinata da Carlo Giacon sul tema dell'averroismo politico nel pensiero di Marsilio da Padova. Tra i suoi maestri è da ricordare ancora Giovanni Santinello, del quale fu il principale collaboratore nel guidare il gruppo di lavoro formato da giovani studiosi impegnati nel progetto di una grande Storia delle storie generali della filosofia, uscita in prima edizione in lingua italiana tra il 1979 (...) e il 2004 ed ora in corso di traduzione e aggiornamento in lingua inglese. La vita "pubblica" di Piaia si è svolta essenzialmente nella sua funzione di professore universitario, all'inizio come docente in formazione presso l'Università di Padova, poi quale professore associato presso l'Università di Verona, infine dal 1987 di nuovo a Padova, dove in qualità di professore ordinario tenne per quasi trent'anni la cattedra di storia della filosofia. Padova, Verona, il Veneto: certamente questi sono stati i riferimenti territoriali entro i quali si è compiuta la carriera accademica del bellunese Piaia. Ma egli estese ben presto l'ambito della sua attività di docente oltre questi limiti geografici, in Europa e nelle Americhe. Lo stesso spirito di apertura ha animato l'attività scientifica di Gregorio Piaia, che non si è svolta in limiti territoriali o di scuola precisi ma all'interno di una vasta "repubblica delle lettere" dai contorni più internazionali che nazionali: ne è testimonianza il suo ruolo di direttore o redattore di importanti riviste e la sua presenza nelle più rilevanti società di promozione degli studi filosofici e storico-filosofici. Non meno degna di nota, infine, è la sua costante attenzione e disponibilità nei confronti dei giovani studiosi. Il presente volume intende essere modesto segno della stima di cui gode e dell'ampiezza dei suoi interessi di ricerca." --Contratapa. (shrink)

One of the critical challenges of our contemporary world is rethinking temporality to face the global catastrophe of the Anthropocene. Recent theories in social sciences and philosophy envision a new conceptualization of our biosphere in which human and non-human life forms, inert objects, and technological devices are entangled. However, these approaches present two major problems: a) they affirm that organic and inorganic processes are ontologically symmetrical and have the same type of agency; and b) they consider that technicity on planet (...) Earth emerges in the hominization process. In this work, we will develop a genealogy of our biosphere that proposes an ecological and untimely alternative: life, from its earliest beginning, is a technical phenomenon that changes the face of the universe. (shrink)

Meditation comprises a series of practices mainly developed in eastern cultures aiming at controlling emotions and enhancing attentional processes. Several authors proposed to divide meditation techniques in focused attention and open monitoring techniques. Previous studies have reported differences in brain networks underlying FA and OM. On the other hand common activations across different meditative practices have been reported. Despite differences between forms of meditation and their underlying cognitive processes, we propose that all meditative techniques could share a central process that (...) would be supported by a core network for meditation since their general common goal is to induce relaxation, regulating attention and developing an attitude of detachment from one’s own thoughts. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis based on activation likelihood estimation of 10 neuroimaging studies on different meditative techniques to evidence the core cortical network subserving meditation. We showed activation of basal ganglia , limbic system and medial prefrontal cortex . We discuss the functional role of these structures in meditation and we tentatively propose a neurocognitive model of meditation that could guide future research. (shrink)

Recently, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have argued that the extended consciousness thesis, namely the claim that the material vehicles of consciousness extend beyond our heads, is entirely compatible with, and actually mandated by, a correct interpretation of the predictive processing framework. To do so, they rely on a potent argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis, namely the Dynamical Entanglement and Unique Temporal Signature (DEUTS) argument. Here, we will critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor, arguing for the following three claims. (...) First, we will claim that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on culture and cultural practices does not help them substantiate the extended consciousness thesis. Secondly, we will argue that the way in which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein formalize the boundaries of a subject’s conscious mind is inadequate, as it yields conclusions running counter some of their assumptions. Lastly, we will argue that the DEUTS argument does not establish the extended consciousness thesis, as it licenses a phenomenal bloat objection which is exactly analogous to the “cognitive bloat” objection to the extended mind thesis. We will thus conclude that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s proposed marriage between the extended consciousness thesis and predictive processing fails, and that, contrary to a popular opinion, DEUTS is not a strong argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis. (shrink)