The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants monitors the misconduct of its members using the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. To accomplish this task, the AICPA relies on various stakeholders to report known violations of its CPC. We examine the full population of sanctions imposed by the AICPA on its members under its CPC from 2008–2013 to identify recent trends in the misconduct of accounting professionals. While we find that multiple stakeholders identify and report violations, we also find that the (...) most common types of violations remain consistent with those reported in the 1990s. Further, we develop a taxonomy based on prior accounting literature to determine whether the AICPA CPC is being enforced to defend the public interest and/or the private interests of the accounting profession. In contrast to prior studies, our results suggest that as the accounting profession emerges from a recession and period of intense public scrutiny, the AICPA CPC is largely being enforced to defend the public interest. This public interest focus was most pronounced during the recessionary years of 2008–2010, as evident from misconduct reported by parties such as the Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and state boards of accountancy. Although key stakeholders have recently focused on reporting misconduct that threatens the public interest, we believe there are still areas in need of improvement, especially around the level of detail provided in the AICPA’s sanction records. We propose some possible solutions to improve public transparency. (shrink)

In the common law world, Albert Venn Dicey is known as the high priest of orthodox constitutional theory, as an ideological and nationalistic positivist. In his analytical coldness, his celebration of sovereign power, and his incessant drive to organize and codify legal rules separate from moral values or political realities, Dicey is an uncanny figure. This book challenges this received view of Dicey. Through a re-examination of his life and his 1885 book Law of the Constitution, the high priest Dicey (...) is defrocked and a more human Dicey steps forward to offer alternative ways of reading his canonical text, who struggled to appreciate law as a form of reasoned discourse that integrates values of legality and authority through methods of ordinary legal interpretation. The result is a unique common law constitutional discourse through which assertions of sovereign power are conditioned by moral aspirations associated with the rule of law. (shrink)

Causation is one of philosophy's most venerable and thoroughly-analyzed concepts. However, the study of how ordinary people make causal judgments is a much more recent addition to the philosophical arsenal. One of the most prominent views of causal explanation, especially in the realm of harmful or potentially harmful behavior, is that unusual or counternormative events are accorded privileged status in ordinary causal explanations. This is a fundamental assumption in psychological theories of counterfactual reasoning, and has been transported to philosophy by (...) Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). A different view--the basis of the culpable control model of blame (CCM)--is that primary causal status is accorded to behaviors that arouse negative evaluative reactions, including behaviors that stem from nefarious motives, negligence or recklessness, a faulty character, or behaviors that lead to harmful or potentially harmful consequences. This paper describes four empirical studies that show consistent support for the CCM. (shrink)

Measuring gene expression on a global scale has been one of the vexing problems of cell biology. Velculescu et al.(1) recently proposed a system for identifying gene expression levels based on very short sequence tags – about nine base pairs – located at a specific site within a gene transcript. By coupling the strategy to current automated sequencing machines and the large expressed sequence tag databases, it should be possible to follow changes in gene expression for large numbers of genes (...) economically and accurately. (shrink)

Clinical bioethics is big business. There are now hundreds of people who bioethics in community and university hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation and home care settings, and some who play the role of clinical ethics consultant to transplant teams, managed care companies, and genetic testing firms. Still, there is as much speculation about what clinically active bioethicists actually do as there was ten years ago. Various commentators have pondered the need for training standards, credentials, exams, and malpractice insurance for ethicists engaged (...) in clinical consultation. Much of the discussion seems to accept an implicit presumption that all clinical ethics consultation practices look pretty much alike. But is this accurate? What do clinical ethicists do, how and where do they do it, and what kind of clinical ethics is useful in the hospital and in other settings? (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as an effective way for firms to create favorable attitudes among consumers. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of proactive and reactive CSR on consumer responses, this research hypothesized that consumers’ perceived organizational motives (i.e., attributions) will mediate this relationship. It was also hypothesized that the source of information and location of CSR initiative will affect the motives consumers assign to a firms’ engagement in the initiative. Two experiments were conducted to test (...) these hypotheses. The results of Study 1 indicate that the nature of a CSR initiative influences consumer attribution effects and that these attributions act as mediators in helping to explain consumers’ responses to CSR. Study 2 suggests that the source of the CSR message moderates the effect of CSR on consumer attributions. The mediating influence of the attributions as well as the importance of information source suggests that proper communication of CSR can be a viable way to inculcate positive corporate associations and purchase intentions. (shrink)

We show that the fundamental legal structure of a well-written financial contract follows a state-transition logic that can be formalized mathematically as a finite-state machine (specifically, a deterministic finite automaton or DFA). The automaton defines the states that a financial relationship can be in, such as “default,” “delinquency,” “performing,” etc., and it defines an “alphabet” of events that can trigger state transitions, such as “payment arrives,” “due date passes,” etc. The core of a contract describes the rules by which different (...) sequences of events trigger particular sequences of state transitions in the relationship between the counterparties. By conceptualizing and representing the legal structure of a contract in this way, we expose it to a range of powerful tools and results from the theory of computation. These allow, for example, automated reasoning to determine whether a contract is internally coherent and whether it is complete relative to a particular event alphabet. We illustrate the process by representing a simple loan agreement as an automaton. (shrink)

An Argument From Evolutionary Naturalism An Argument from Personal Dignity References.

The rapid, recent emergence of new medical knowledge models has engendered a dizzying number of new medical initiatives, programs and approaches. Fields such as evidence-based medicine and translational medicine all promise a renewed relationship between knowledge and medicine. The question for philosophy and other fields has been whether these new models actually achieve their promises to bring about better kinds of medical knowledge—a question that compels scholars to analyze each model’s epistemic claims. Yet, these analyses may miss critical components that (...) explain how these models actually work and function. Using the case of translational medicine, this paper suggests that analyses which treat these models as a primarily epistemic interventions miss the way that new approaches are increasingly shaped by specific financial and commercial agendas. Ultimately, social epistemological analyses that are attentive to market forces are required to make sense of emerging bioscientific research models, which are increasingly tethered to or a manifestation of increasingly financialized models of science research and innovation. (shrink)

American orthodox medicine consolidated its professional authority in the early 20th Century on the basis of its unbiased scientific method. The centerpiece of such a method is a strategy for identifying truly effective new therapies, i.e., the randomized clinical trial (RCT). A crucial component of the RCT in illnesses without established treatment is the placebo control. Placebo effects must be identified and distinguished from pharmacological effects because placebos produce actual but unexplained therapeutic successes. The blinding necessary for a proper placebo-controlled (...) RCT therefore introduces an epistemic bias into orthodox medicine: therapeutic successes that rely upon a direct link between knowing and healing, such as placebo effects, are discarded in favor of therapeutic successes that rely upon an indirect link between knowing and healing, such as pharmacological interventions. Where the capacity to produce therapeutic results once validated the method of clinical medical science, now method validates results. The clinical consequences of this method of testing therapies include a diminished vision of the therapeutic potential of the doctor-patient relationship and of the potential human resources available for healing. Keywords: doctor-patient relationship, epistemology, placebo effect, professionalization, randomized clinical trials CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

If libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents have it within their power to bring it about that some world is actual. Against recent arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, I offer an account of power over the past which takes this implication of libertarianism into consideration. I argue that the resulting account is available to Ockhamists and that it is immune to recent criticisms of the notion of counterfactual power over the (...) past. But I contend that it is not an option for Molinists and that this fact leaves that position vulnerable to incompatibilist arguments. (shrink)

Lonergan is commonly read, sometimes favorably and sometimes unfavorably, through a Thomist lens. But the evidence suggests that Lonergan was interested in Hegel before he undertook his studies of Aquinas and that his interest in Hegel persisted throughout his intellectual career. Lonergan regarded Hegel’s absolute idealism as “the halfway house” on the way to his own critical realist position. His effort to establish his critical realism was informed and guided by a struggle with Hegel’s absolute idealist response to Kant’s Critical (...) Philosophy. Lonergan scholars who hope to understand adequately Lonergan’s critical realist position would do well to give more serious attention to his early and perduring relationship to Hegel. (shrink)

For more than 20 years, both here and abroad, significant efforts have been undertaken to provide equal access to nutritional food for all citizens. Yet, the numbers of under-nourished continue to rise, as do those afflicted with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease. Clearly, current efforts are not working. Relying on the psychological phenomena of learned helplessness and fundamental attribution error, it is argued that certain individuals may not be willing, or able, to take actions (...) that are currently prescribed regarding access to nutritious food. The water is muddied regarding potential solutions as the various actors involved (e.g., corporations, governments, individuals) cannot agree on a starting point and continue to point fingers regarding responsibility. It is posited that emphasis needs to shift from the current “one-size-fits-all” approach to one that is more tailored to the various actors, specifically the individuals. Within the group of individuals (consumers), based on Wenar’s Least Cost Theory, even further distinction must be made between those who see themselves as capable actors and those who do not. In this conceptual piece intended to refocus the discussion surrounding food access, we propose that future research should approach these issues from a unit of analysis perspective in an attempt to identify the solutions most likely to succeed at various participating levels. (shrink)

During periods of scarcity, or the fear of it, many health systems create or adopt triage protocols to determine how to best allocate limited resources. Interest in such protocols has become acute...

In "Behavioral Law and Economics: The Assault on Consent, Will, and Dignity," Mark D. White uses the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to examine the intersection of economics, psychology, and law known as "behavioral law and economics." Scholars in this relatively new field claim that, because of various cognitive biases and failures, people often make choices that are not in their own interests. The policy implications of this are that public and private organizations, such as the state and employers, (...) can and should design the presentation of options and default choices in order to "steer" people to the decision they would make, were they able to make choices in the absence of their cognitive biases and failures. Such policies are promoted under the name "libertarian paternalism," because choice is not blocked or co-opted, but simply "nudged." White argues that such manipulation of choice is impossible to conduct in people's true interests, and any other goal pursed by policymakers substitutes their own ends, however benevolent they may be, for people's true ends. Normatively, such manipulation should not be conducted because it fails to respect the dignity and autonomy of persons, what some hold to be the central idea in Kant's ethical system, and which serves to protect the individual from coercion, however subtle, from other persons or the state. (shrink)

Is it rational to strive for the unattainable? In this short and provocative study, Nicholas Rescher vigorously defends both the rationality and practicality of seriously pursuing impossible dreams.

I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold (...) onto the claim that understanding consists in the running of a program. (shrink)

Mandating psychiatric evaluation for patients who request physician‐assisted suicide may not offer the clearcut protection from possible coercion or other abuse that proponents assert. Competence itself is a complex concept and determinations of decisionmaking capacity are not straightforward, nor is the relationship between mental illness and decisionmaking capacity in dying patients clearly understood. And casting psychiatrists as gatekeepers in end‐of‐life decisions poses risks to the profession itself.

This book explores the complex issue of international ethics in the two dominant schools of thought in international relations; Liberalism and Realism. Both theories suffer from an inability to integrate the ethical and pragmatic dimensions of foreign policy. Liberal policy makers often suffer from moral blindness and a tendency toward coercion in the international arena, whilst realists tend to be epistemic sceptics, incorporating Nietzsche’s thought, directly or indirectly, into their theories. Mark Gismondi seeks to resolve the issues in these (...) two approaches by adopting a covenant based approach, as described by Daniel Elazar’s work on the covenant tradition in politics, to international relations theory. The covenant approach has three essential principles: policy makers must have a sense of realism about the existence of evil and its political consequences power must be shared and limited liberty requires a basis in shared values. _Ethics, Realism and Liberalism in International Relations_ will be of interest to students and researchers of politics, philosophy, ethics and international relations. (shrink)

Applied Natural Science: Environmental Issues and Global Perspectives will provide the reader with a complete insight into the natural-scientific pattern of the world, covering the most important historical stages of the development of various areas of science, methods of natural-scientific research, general scientific and philosophical concepts, and the fundamental laws of nature. The book analyzes the main scientific trends and developments of modern natural science and also discusses important aspects of environmental protection. Topics include: the problem of "the two cultures": (...) the mathematization of natural sciences and the informatization of society; the non-linear nature of the processes occurring in nature and society; application of the second law of thermodynamics to describe the development of biological systems; global problems of the biosphere; theory and practice of stable organic paramagnetic materials; polymers and the natural environment. Key features include: an interdisciplinary approach in considering scientific and technical problems; a discussion of general scientific trends in modern natural science, including globalization challenges in nature and society, the organic chemistry of stable paramagnetic materials, the fundamentals of the environmental chemistry of polymeric materials, etc.; a justification of applying classical (non-equilibrium) thermodynamics to studying the behavior of open (including biological) systems. (shrink)

About the extent of moral agency in the animal kingdom, one view is that only humans are moral agents. Holding a different view, I argue that moral agency depends on the capacity for other-regard and the capacity to be attuned to significance—such that things matter to one. I derive a criterion where a creature is a moral agent if she performs an action that promotes others’ significant interests and brings great costs to herself where she is aware of these significant (...) interests and imposed costs. Failure to confirm that she has this awareness is a weakness of examples of moral agency in animals that writers provide, since she may be unaware of the significance of what she is doing. Since species of non-ape Primates and aquatic mammals satisfy the evidential criterion, moral agency is likely prevalent throughout much of Mammalia. I consider possible objections from Kant, Singer, and Korsgaard. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Subjective Knowledge, Mental Disorders, and MedsHow to Parse the EquationMark D. Rego (bio)Keywordspsychopathology, antidepressants, suicidality, subjective experience, pre-reflectiveA few weeks, ago I was walking down the hall to my office when I spotted my brother-in-law coming the other way. This was odd on two accounts. First, he lives in Kentucky (I am in Connecticut) and second, he is at least a foot taller than the man in my hallway. (...) Nonetheless, I struggled to figure out why he was there. The resemblance was so striking it took me a minute or two to convince myself it was not him. Even after such convincing, the feeling that it was him remained.Later, I imagined that had I just returned from a crack cocaine den I would have been hypervigilant, if not paranoid, and consequently would be certain that my brother-in-law had arrived unannounced. Furthermore, I would probably assume that he was up to no good.How did I retain a strong feeling of recognition, the feeling that maybe it was really him, when I already concluded otherwise? And why, were I on crack cocaine, would the obvious facts be useless in rendering a decision about the identity of the man in the hall? Last, why would the post-cocaine man in the hall become a nefarious brother-in-law rather than a benign one?If I just computed some symbols to figure this out, wouldn't the feeling have gone away? If I activated a brother-in-law neural network, how did I come to acquire an evil brother-in-law neural network? And why wouldn't that go away either?In his article in this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Hadreas looks at questions like these through the prism of before and after effects of people treated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Hadreas investigates the implications of a straightforward recomputation of self-awareness when treated with these medicines and finds such approaches unsatisfying and incomplete in their explanatory power. (My example looks at a type of awareness, but not specifically self-awareness, as does Hadreas. Furthermore, my paradigm asks about computational conclusions using language more common in psychiatric literature, whereas Hadreas uses standard philosophical terms. Although not isomorphic, I believe the interchange of the two remains true to the issues Hadreas is addressing). [End Page 57]In my example, there is clearly something else going on than the incorrect arrangement of symbols or the misfiring of nodes in a network that influences how I feel and what I think. Neither reason nor empiricism seem to serve me well here. Hadreas utilizes Husserl to begin to unpeel the layers of self-awareness and self-states that intermix to form the shifts and contradictions which are so common in psychiatric treatment (and in common experience as I describe).This is a welcome reckoning; the psychiatric literature is overflowing with unquestioned premises about the neuropsychiatric correlates of reason and empirical approaches (described more as computation and neural networks in the literature—again, not strictly analogous, but the same criticisms apply) Hadreas is critical of. Unfortunately, Hadreas has navigated through a sea of highly questionable assumptions about the psychopharmacology of depression to illustrate his points. This is due in large part to the common practice of consulting literary narratives and critics rather than one of immersion in the literature as a whole and the daily life of patients and active clinicians. He arrived at his destination despite this, because many of these details did not affect his particular analysis. However, to look forward to a continuation of this work and clarify some important issues I devote most of my commentary to these issues. The points I raise are more extensively discussed in a previous edition of this journal (Rego 2005).Affect to Reason ShiftLet's begin with the idea that SSRIs work by dampening emotions. An extension of this idea is that they dampen negative emotions and strengthen positive ones like assertiveness, confidence, and optimism. An even further development in this direction is that, by dampening strong emotions, cognitive enhancement takes place with SSRI treatment. A summary observation then is that SSRIs facilitate... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Surrender Versus Control:How Best Not to DrinkMark D. Rego (bio)Keywordsaddiction, Alcoholics Anonymous, will, St. AugustineI recall as a teenager noticing that some people modified nouns in, what sounded to me, a peculiar way. A friend's mother who was taking an automotive repair course said, " We're going to learn to fix the brakes next week." The same folks would also use the possessive for common nouns in phrases like: (...) "I'll be ready after I take my shower." Although not incorrect, I believe this type of usage reflected a different attitude about brakes, showers, and other things. These tended to be more hands-on people and thus, in my understanding at least, had a more particular relationship with things in their world than others for whom objects were examples of types of things.This brief vignette serves as an introduction to my qualified enthusiasm for the project taken up by Allison Mitchell in her paper, "Taking Mentality Seriously: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Language of Addiction and Recovery" (Mitchell, 2006). Indeed, as a practicing psychiatrist I would be hard pressed not to endorse the use of language as a key to deeper aspects of experience.My following remarks are mostly contra Mitchell's hypothesis, but before beginning I name one more reason I think this project is worthwhile. In spite of much research and recitations of the motto "treatment works," we do not presently have a reliable treatment for addiction. The linguistic portrait painted by Mitchell allows us to view our treatments in vivo and reflect upon what we see. (For the purpose of this commentary, I consider alcoholism and Alcoholics Anonymous [AA] as a general example of addiction and treatment.)Medication treatment remains almost inconsequential except when applied for comorbid psychiatric disorders rather than the primary addiction. Even then it rarely serves to undo some form of self-medication, but instead only offers an important leg up in battling the addiction.Research and much experience has shown AA to be the single best treatment for alcoholism (Vaillant and Hiller-Sturmhofel 1996). Some investigators have proposed underlying mechanisms for its efficacy (some, like "creating dependency" run very counter to Mitchell) (Vaillant 2005). AA's success is highly dependent upon attendance (McCrady et al. 2004), which can of course be a marker for getting better in the first place and not solely a cause of improvement (i.e., people who are doing better attend more meetings not vice- versa). Even within AA, the dropout rate is quite high (Martin et al. 1996). Workers in this area [End Page 223] have raised questions about AA's approach and have proposed other avenues to sobriety, including interpersonal, cognitive–behavioral, and relapse prevention programs (Witkiewitz and Marlatt 2005, 2004; O'Dwyer 2006). Lamentably, some very large studies failed to show any effective ability to match up alcoholics with a particular treatment modality (Church 2004; Read 2004).Given the lack of clarity with which we still work, I think an approach like Mitchell's is a welcome call for serious reflection. The limitations of a linguistic analysis place an unfortunate constriction on implications to be drawn.Mitchell's chief concern is that the language of recovery, as reflected in twelve-step programs, betrays and even fosters a degree of passivity, which leaves the addict without an adequate sense of agency and autonomy with which to combat addiction. From a more philosophical perspective, Mitchell believes this is due to an incomplete philosophical materialism; one that lacks "mentality" (i.e., the sense that part of our physical being is made up of mental activities such as emotions, motivations, beliefs, etc.). This attitude is manifest in a "pretheoretic conception of the self" that leaves the addict with a dearth of self-awareness as a mental agent of action and change.In place of the standard recovery model in use today, Mitchell suggests cultivating a sense of self that values and fosters engaged agency that is both capable of self-control and responsive to external obligations.A Few ConcernsFirst, I will offer a few concerns about premises at work within the paper. Then, I outline an attempt to make sense of the... (shrink)