Effective altruists call us to apply evidence-based reasoning to maximize the effectiveness of charitable giving. In particular, effective altruists assess causes in terms of their scope, neglectedness, and tractability, and then recommend devoting resources to the cause that scores best on these criteria. So far, effective altruists concerned with animal suffering have seen these criteria as supporting interventions that improve the lives of layer hens, and they now seem to think that these criteria support directing efforts toward broilers. In this (...) paper, however, we argue that the effective altruist framework commits animal advocates to focus at least much attention--if not more--on fish. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

This translation makes available to the Anglophone world, for the first time, what is possibly Max Stirner’s final reply to his critics, entitled ‘Die Philosophischen Reactionäre’ (1847). The article was signed ‘G. Edward’, and its authorship has been disputed ever since John Henry Mackay ‘cautiously’ attributed it to Stirner and included it in his collection of Stirner’s lesser writings. If it is indeed Stirner’s final reply, then some of the main traits of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum are restated and (...) posited against those whom Stirner scornfully refers to as ‘the philosophers’. Since it was written almost three years after his magnum opus, it would offer a unique insight into Stirner’s own appraisal of the book in the wake of the ultimate demise of Young Hegelianism. Other than its obvious historical-philosophical significance, the text bears witness to Stirner’s own ‘spectrality’. The controversy over Stirner’s authorship is related to the inherently idiosyncratic nature of his thought. Stirner defies – and indeed mocks – all philosophical and theoretical conventions or categorizations. Yet, perhaps the controversy over Stirner’s authorship of ‘Die Philosophischen Reactionäre’ need not be settled after all: the mystery surrounding it only affirms the spectrality of the thinker who, in the words of ‘Edward’, one can ‘go crackers’ on. (shrink)

“Philosophical Anthropology,” which is reconstructed here, does not deal with anthropology as a philosophical subdiscipline but rather as a particular philosophical approach within twentieth-century German philosophy, connected with thinkers such as Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. This paper attempts a more precise description of the core identity of Philosophical Anthropology as a paradigm, observes the differences between the authors within the paradigm, and differentiates the paradigm as a whole from other twentieth-century philosophical approaches, such as transcendental philosophy, evolutionary (...) theory or naturalism, existentialism, and hermeneutic philosophy. In determining the human being as “excentric positionality,” Philosophical Anthropology arrives at unique categorical intertwinings between the biological, social and cultural sciences. (shrink)

Der gute Mensch von Kopenhagen - Niels Bohr und die Entfesselung des Atoms Der Physiker und Nobelpreisträger Niels Bohr (1885?1962) veränderte durch seine Forschung unseren Blick auf die Welt. Mit seinem Atommodell konnte erstmals die Stabilität von Materie erklärt werden, doch zugleich machten die darauf aufbauende Atomphysik und Nukleartechnik unsere Welt so unsicher wie nie zuvor. Ernst Peter Fischer beleuchtet Leben und Werk dieses faszinierenden Mannes, dessen Erkenntnisse uns bis heute beschäftigen. Ernst Peter Fischer, geboren 1947 in Wuppertal, (...) studierte Mathematik, Physik und Biologie und promovierte 1977 am California Institute of Technology. 1987 habilitierte er sich im Fach Wissenschaftsgeschichte und lehrt seither an der Universität Konstanz. Als Wissenschaftspublizist schreibt er für GEO, Bild der Wissenschaft, Die Weltwoche und die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Fischer ist Autor zahlreicher Bücher, darunter der Bestseller?Die andere Bildung?(2001) und die Max-Planck-Biographie?Der Physiker?(2007). Für seine Arbeit erhielt er mehre Preise, u. a. den Sartorius-Preis der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 281 g. The Problematics of History. Two types are distinguished: the more general neoidealism, especially the Italian, which will be treated in subsequent volumes; and the more technical examination of historical knowledge by Dilthey, Simmel, Spengler, Windelband, Rickert, M/insterberg, Weber, Troeltsch, Meinecke, and Huizinga. Without exaggerating it, Lamanna points to the strain of "inquietude" and restlessness which shows itself in much of the early twentieth-century philosophizing, especially (...) in its attacks on rationalism, and which serves to foreshadow the greater anxieties that will be portrayed in the second volume of the trilogy. I add only two small observations, not by way of criticism, but merely to supplement the expositions (which seem to me to be excellent) of two men whom I happen to know well. Giuseppe Prezzolini appears with Papini (as he should) as a founder and leader o[ the pragmatist periodical Leonardo. Whereas Papini's adventures in philosophical romance were quite extravagant, Prezzolini's contributions were satirically ironical His L'Arte di persuadere, which to a hasty reader might well appear as a "manuale per i bugiardi" (p. 308), really appears, in view of his subsequent career in La Voce and in his Vita di Macehiavelli as a brilliant Macchiavellian satire. Similarly there is an undercurrent of genial satire in the pragmatisms of James and Schiller. The criticism in Dewey's social philosophy of what he refers to as the bourgeois Utilitarian liberalism and individualism of early nineteenth-century Britain appears in Lamanna 's pages (as in other scholarly European works) as a criticism of "Americanism." Dewey called his political philosophy a "new individualism" which was about the same as the doctrines of European social democrats. It was very democratic in contrast to the liberalism of the early utilitarians. But this early individualistic liberalism is no more American than it is European. Certainly Dewey's democracy is at least as American as the "Americanism" which he criticized. If we must use these terms, we could say that the socalled "Americanization of Europe" coincided with the Europeanization of America. James was politically an individualist and Dewey was a socialist; both were equally American and equally concerned to be cosmopolitan. These terminological problematics are not intended as a criticism of Lamanna's exposition of Dewey's philosophy, which seems to me one of the very best of the many I have read. On p. 245 "Cominger" should be Commager. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Aus den A nfiingen der Psychoanalyse. Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess. A bhandlungen und Notizen aus den Jahren 1887-1902. By Sigmund Freud. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1962. Copyright, Imago Publishing Co., London, 1950.) This selection of the letters, notes and treatises sent to the Berlin physician and biologist Wilhelm Fliess makes fascinating reading today, twenty-five years after Freud's death. Most of this material originates in the years 1893-1901 and therefore covers not only the period of Freud's shift from neurology to psychology but also the period of his most vigorous creativity in psychoanalysis itself, namely the publication together with his predecessor, Josef Breuer, of Studien iiber Hysterie. It is the period of his self-analysis which laid the groundwork for psychoanalytic therapy, the years during which he conceived and published his basic work Interpretation of Dreams. It is also the time when he wrote Sexuality in the Etiology of Neuroses, Ueber den Traum, and Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens. 282 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Included in this volume of papers sent to Fliess is The Draft of a Psychology written in a burst of enthusiasm during three weeks in the autumn of 1895 (pp. 305-384 of the text). This important paper deals not only with emotive life but with the origin of cognitive thought, a topic which went in part into Chapter 7 of the Interpretation of Dreams. In this paper Freud still tries to combine his ideas of the physiology of the brain with his psychological and psychopathological findings. It is therefore a watershed of his intellectual endeavors, although Freud abandoned on the whole the effort to incorporate a theory of cognitive thought into his writings. Some rudiments of the Draft reappeared, however, in Das Ich und das... (shrink)

Stereotypes shape inferences in philosophical thought, political discourse, and everyday life. These inferences are routinely made when thinkers engage in language comprehension or production: We make them whenever we hear, read, or formulate stories, reports, philosophical case-descriptions, or premises of arguments – on virtually any topic. These inferences are largely automatic: largely unconscious, non-intentional, and effortless. Accordingly, they shape our thought in ways we can properly understand only by complementing traditional forms of philosophical analysis with experimental methods from psycholinguistics. This (...) paper seeks, first, to bring out the wider philosophical relevance of stereotypical inference, well beyond familiar topics like gender and race. Second, we wish to provide philosophers with a toolkit to experimentally study these ubiquitous inferences and what intuitions they may generate. This paper explains what stereotypes are, and why they matter to current and traditional concerns in philosophy – experimental, analytic, and applied. It then assembles a psycholinguistic toolkit and demonstrates through two studies how potentially questionnaire-based measures can be combined with process measures to garner evidence for specific stereotypical inferences and study when they ‘go through’ and influence our thinking. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Dialectic of Enlightenment is undoubtedly the most influential publication of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Written during the Second World War and circulated privately, it appeared in a printed edition in Amsterdam in 1947. "What we had set out to do," the authors write in the Preface, "was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism." Yet the work goes far beyond a mere critique of (...) contemporary events. Historically remote developments, indeed, the birth of Western history and of subjectivity itself out of the struggle against natural forces, as represented in myths, are connected in a wide arch to the most threatening experiences of the present. The book consists in five chapters, at first glance unconnected, together with a number of shorter notes. The various analyses concern such phenomena as the detachment of science from practical life, formalized morality, the manipulative nature of entertainment culture, and a paranoid behavioral structure, expressed in aggressive anti-Semitism, that marks the limits of enlightenment. The authors perceive a common element in these phenomena, the tendency toward self-destruction of the guiding criteria inherent in enlightenment thought from the beginning. Using historical analyses to elucidate the present, they show, against the background of a prehistory of subjectivity, why the National Socialist terror was not an aberration of modern history but was rooted deeply in the fundamental characteristics of Western civilization. Adorno and Horkheimer see the self-destruction of Western reason as grounded in a historical and fateful dialectic between the domination of external nature and society. They trace enlightenment, which split these spheres apart, back to its mythical roots. Enlightenment and myth, therefore, are not irreconcilable opposites, but dialectically mediated qualities of both real and intellectual life. "Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology." This paradox is the fundamental thesis of the book. This new translation, based on the text in the complete edition of the works of Max Horkheimer, contains textual variants, commentary upon them, and an editorial discussion of the position of this work in the development of Critical Theory. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

To write of “the” philosophy of transhumanism is a little daring. The growth of transhumanism as a movement and philosophy means that differing perspectives on it have formed.

In their contribution ‘Ethics of the algorithmic prediction of goal of care preferences’1 Ferrario et al elaborate a from theory to practice contribution concerning the realisation of artificial intelligence (AI)-based patient preference prediction (PPP) systems. Such systems are intended to help find the treatment that the patient would have chosen in clinical situations—especially in the intensive care or emergency units—where the patient is no longer capable of making that decision herself. The authors identify several challenges that complicate their effective development, (...) application and evaluation—and offer solutions to them. One of these issues is the question of who should ultimately use said systems. While it is undisputed that clinicians should use these AI systems for their decision-making process, there is an ongoing debate about whether next of kin should use them as well. The authors advocate that ‘’access should be provided to both clinicians and loved ones with due explanations and as desired’. We will disagree with this assessment and explain in our commentary why it is important that surrogates provide their own assessments with as little external (AI) influence as possible. Why do next of kin actually participate in the process of preference finding and treatment decision-making? A key reason is that clinicians usually …. (shrink)

In the past, it was possible to approach transhumanism as primarily involving philosophical discussion and technological speculation. While transhumanist goals such as radical life extension, uploading, and cognitive, sensory, and physical enhancement were speculative they were also considered scientifically feasible, even if the technologies to achieve those goals appeared remote.

The paper sketches the historical development from emotion as a mysterious entity and the source of maladaptive behaviour, to emotion as a collection of ingredients and the source of also adaptive behaviour. We argue, however, that the underlying mechanism proposed to take care of this adaptive behaviour is not entirely up for its task. We outline an alternative view that explains so-called emotional behaviour with the same mechanism as non-emotional behaviour, but that is at the same time more likely to (...) produce adaptive behaviour. The phenomena that were initially seen as requiring a separate emotional mechanism to influence and cause behaviour can also be explained by a goal-directed mechanism provided that more goals and other complexities inherent in the goal-directed process are taken into account. (shrink)

In his contribution, ‘Represent me: please! Towards an ethics of digital twins in medicine’1, Braun shows that there is a fundamental ambivalence inherent in digital twins: they can either open up new freedoms for the simulated persons, or, conversely, endanger and restrict their freedom. To prevent digital twins from restricting people’s freedom, Braun suggests a strong focus on control. Braun’s focus on control is insufficient, I will argue, because his idea of control works only retroactively: it can only react to (...) restrictions of freedom that have already occurred, but it cannot prevent them, nor can it restore any lost freedom. Control is therefore insufficient to defend people’s freedom. To prove my claim, I will first use an everyday example to illustrate the fundamental ambivalence inherent in digital twins. Second, I will show that digital twins endanger people’s freedom in a hermeneutic way. Finally, I will demonstrate why controllability cannot prevent this hermeneutic endangerment. I understand digital twins, like Braun, as simulation of a person, as their dynamic and precise effigy. Simulated twins use machine-learning and artificial intelligence capabilities to make predictive analyses about the simulated person and the future development of her health. Imagine: You are eating dinner. Meanwhile, your partner lectures you about the calorie density and nutrient composition of your food, warns you that your portion size exceeds your daily calorie requirement by x calories. It calculates how your dinner will negatively impact your body mass index and physical fitness, and predicts what the consequences will be for your overall health. Based on these data and predictions, it creates an individualised diet plan for you—and at the same time shows you by how much you could improve your vital values by sticking to that plan. This example helps to illustrate the fundamental …. (shrink)

Studies of the history of 20th century philosophy usually suggest a sharp antagonism between Martin Heidegger on the one hand and Philosophical Anthropology, as founded by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, on the other. In contrast I will argue that one of Heidegger′s texts, namely his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World – Finitude – Solitude, held in the 1929/30 winter semester is in fact very close to the theoretical approach of Philosophical Anthropology. The measure for determining this proximity (...) is taken from Joachim Fischer′s study Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts . Its main systematic thesis posits that the theoretical approach of Philosophical Anthropology is constituted by a core identity, which can be accurately defined by a set of features. In my paper I use these features heuristically to examine the question whether Heidegger, who prima facie is not an adherent of the theoretical approach, in his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics actually does argue like an exponent of Philosophical Anthropology. (shrink)

Two seminal articles by a founder of the Gestalt school of psychology, newly translated and accompanied by essays that connect his work to current research.

Dear Mother Nature: Sorry to disturb you, but we humans – your offspring – come to you with some things to say. (Perhaps you could pass this on to Father, since we never seem to see him around.).

This paper develops a critique of the concept of ‘ethical identity’ as this has been used recently to distinguish between ‘cynical’ and ‘authentic’ forms of corporate responsibility. Taking as our starting point Levinas’ demanding view of responsibility as ‘following the assignation of responsibility for my neighbour’, we use a case study of a packaging company—PackCo—to argue that a concern with being seen and/or seeing oneself as responsible should not be confused with actual responsibility. Our analysis of the case points first (...) to the allure of programmes of strategic corporate responsibility and the ways in which, through identification, they can provide a tacit form of moral sanction to managers in their aggressive pursuit of profit. It then contrasts the responses of different managers to negative staff feedback to illustrate the difference between managers’ attempts to defend their identity of being ‘responsible’ managers, and responsible conduct itself. The paper concludes that a potent danger of programmes of corporate responsibility is that they allow managers to deceive not just others, but also themselves in relation to the exercise of responsibility. (shrink)

Use of electronic health records within clinical encounters is increasingly pervasive. The digital record allows for data storage and sharing to facilitate patient care, billing, research, patient communication and quality-of-care improvement—all at once. However, this multifunctionality is also one of the main reasons care providers struggle with the EHR. These problems have often been described but are rarely approached from a philosophical point of view. We argue that a postphenomenological case study of the EHR could lead to more in-depth insights. (...) We will focus on two concepts—transparency and multistability—and translate them to the specific situation of the EHR. Transparency is closely related to an embodiment relation in which the user becomes less aware of the technology: it fades into the background, becoming a means of experience. A second key concept is that of multistability, referring to how a technology can serve multiple purposes or can have different meanings in different contexts. The EHR in this sense is multistable by design. Future EHR design could incorporate multistable information differently, allowing the provider to focus on patient care when interacting with the EHR. Moreover we argue that the use of the EHR in the daily workflow should become more transparent, while awareness of the computer in the specific context of the patient-provider relationship should increase. (shrink)