RÉSUMÉ: Les philosophes de la période moderne sont souvent présentés comme ayant commis une erreur élémentaire: celle de confondre la force propositionnelle avec le contenu propositionnel. Par l'examen de deux cas saillants, à savoir les philosophes de Port-Royal et John Locke, je montre que l'accusation n'est pas fondée, et que Locke en particulier a les ressources requises pour construire une théorie des attitudes propositionnelles.

Ken López-Escobar questions the timeless status of various entities—propositions, numbers, etc.—as well as my characterization of pure propositional logic as an ontological theory. In my response I argue that my characterization of propositional logic does not depend on timeless propositions, or on other abstract truth bearers, but is a characterization in terms of truth relations between any truth bearers. I also discuss his views on numbers as cultural constructs, as well as his use of quantification in propositional logic.Ken (...) López-Escobar questiona o estatuto atemporal de vários entes—pro-posições, números, etc.— assim como minha caracterização da lógica proposicional pura como teoria ontológica. Na réplica argumento que minha caracterização não depende de proposições atemporais, ou de outros portadores de verdade abstratos, mas é uma caracterização em termos de relações de verdade entre quaisquer portadores de verdade. Examino também suas considerações sobre números como construtos culturais, assim como seu uso de quantificação na lógica proposicional. (shrink)

In §1 I reply to Jairo’s objections to my account of truth and falsity showing that my account of falsity does not imply that false sentences refer to something. In §2 I argue that Jairo’s main objection to my account of propositions as abstract properties is based on a misunderstanding concerning the purpose of this account. In §3 I examine Jairo’s suggestion that contradictory sentences can be said to describe possible states of affairs.

A new line of self projection magazines that started blooming in Lagos, Nigeria, about the mid-1990s defined itself by filling almost completely every issue with photographs that depict politicians, businesspeople, sports and show business stars enjoying fruits of their extraordinary achievements on festive occasions. The magazine’s cozy coverage of the rich and famous irks a lot of serious cultural and literary critics who believe that this style resembles praise singing too closely. This paper, unlike mainline criticisms of the pictorial magazines, (...) takes praise singing to be a serious subject. Its central proposition is that the Nigerian magazine culture embraced these magazines because they have successfully translated into photography the panegyric tendency that pervades popular, self-projection arts in the underlying Yorùbá cultural environment of southwestern Nigeria. The sub-genre of Yorùbá panegyric that the magazines rework into the photographic medium is oríkì bọ̀rọ̀kìnní, or praise chants of the eminent. The paper analyzes sample issues of Ovation magazine to outline ways of placing contemporary African cultural forms in a long perspective and to propose an example of how inter-mediality operates today in popular cultures. In the concluding section, the essay proposes that a “poetic” understanding of photography, as opposed to “theatricality” and or melancholic substitution, represents the best way to think about the type of festive portraiture practiced in Ovationand its imitators. (shrink)

We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...) equivalent to any k -valued logic with k < n. (shrink)

This article argues that history played a larger role in the thought of Gottlob Frege than has usually been acknowledged. Frege’s logical writings frequently employed statements about the past as examples that included references to historical persons. Frege also described history as a science and argued that historical propositions could support valid inferences and reliably identify historical persons and events. But Frege’s eternalist theory of reference, designed primarily for formal concepts and objects, struggled to accommodate such propositions. Identifying (...) an objective referent for the subjectivity of historical actors was particularly problematic. The article suggests that Frege’s writings are interesting for the philosopher of history for at least two reasons: first, his work is clarificatory when considering the key features that historical propositions must have to count as objective knowledge, and second, it foreshadowed the issues with historicity that analytical philosophy experienced in the twentieth century. It concludes that the problems Frege raised exposed the need for a new concept of inter-subjectivity to replace his own Platonic foundation for objectivity. (shrink)

Danielle Macbeth disagrees with the view that there are logical truths in an ontological sense, and argues that we have no adequate epistemological account of our access to such features of reality. In my response I recall some main aspects of my ontological and epistemological formulation of logic as a science, and argue that neither Quine’s considerations against meaning, nor Benacerraf’s considerations against Gödel’s realism, show the untenability of an approach to logical truth in terms of logical propositions that (...) denote logical states of affairs.Danielle MacBeth discorda da tese que há verdades lógicas em um sentido ontológico e argumenta que não há um tratamento adequado de nosso acesso epistêmico à tais aspectos da realidade. Em minha réplica relembro algumas características principais de minha formulação ontológica e epistemológica da lógica como ciência, e argumento que nem as considerações de Quine contra a noção de significado, nem as considerações de Benacerraf contra o realismo de Gödel, mostram a invalidade de uma concepção de verdade lógica em termos de proposições que denotam estados de coisa lógicos. (shrink)

Truth exists in the form of true propositions. Therefore identification of the nature of truth means identification of the conditions in which a proposition is true. A proposition is true if its content is not dependent upon the knower, and it constitutes a reflection of objective reality. Such a proposition yields knowledge. We shall call it a cognitive proposition.

In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of falsity (...) and negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions. (shrink)

In his paper John Corcoran examines in detail many issues relating to logical form, and raises some questions about my formulations. In my response I emphasize two main distinctions that may clear up some of the issues. One is the distinction between logical forms, in the sense of logical properties of an abstract character, and logical form, in the sense in which we speak of the logical form of a sentence, or of a proposition. Another is the distinction, emphasized by (...) Boole, between primary propositions , and secondary propositions —which I illustrate through the distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation.Em seu artigo John Corcoran examina em detalhe muitas questões sobre forma lógica e levanta alguns problemas relativos à minhas formulações. Na réplica enfatizo duas distinções principais, que podem esclarecer algumas questões. A primeira é a distinção entre formas lógicas, no sentido de propriedades lógicas de caráter abstrato, e forma lógica, no sentido em que falamos da forma lógica de uma sentença ou de uma proposição. A segunda é a distinção, enfatizada por Boole, entre proposições primárias e proposições secundárias , exemplificada com a distinção entre negação predicativa e negação sentencial. (shrink)

(1) For much of this century, moral philosophy has been constrained by the supposed absolute gap between is andought, and the consequent belief that the facts of life cannot of themselves yield an ethical blueprint for future action. For this reason, ethics has sustained an eerie existence largely apart from science. Its most respected interpreters still believe that reasoning about right and wrong can be successful without a knowledge of the brain, the human organ where all the decisions about right (...) and wrong are made. Ethical premises are typically treated in the manner of mathematical propositions: directives supposedly independent of human evolution, with a claim to ideal, eternal truth. (shrink)

Why do people who disagree about one subject tend to disagree about other subjects as well? In this paper, we introduce a model to explore this phenomenon of ‘epistemic factionization’. Agents attempt to discover the truth about multiple propositions by testing the world and sharing evidence gathered. But agents tend to mistrust evidence shared by those who do not hold similar beliefs. This mistrust leads to the endogenous emergence of factions of agents with multiple, highly correlated, polarized beliefs.

Management and business literature affirm the role played by stakeholders in corporate social responsibility practices as crucial, but what constitutes a true business–society partnership remains relatively unexplored. This paper aims to improve scholarly and management understanding beyond the usual managers’ perceptions on salience attributes, to include how stakeholders can acquire missing attributes to inform a meaningful partnership. In doing this, a model is proposed which conceptualises CSR practices and outcomes within the frameworks of stakeholder salience via empowerment, sustainable corporate social (...) performances and partnership quality. A holistic discussion leads to generation of propositions on stakeholder salience management, corporate social performance, corporate–community partnership systems and CSR practices, which have both academic and management implications. (shrink)

(1) For much of this century, moral philosophy has been constrained by the supposed absolute gap between is andought, and the consequent belief that the facts of life cannot of themselves yield an ethical blueprint for future action. For this reason, ethics has sustained an eerie existence largely apart from science. Its most respected interpreters still believe that reasoning about right and wrong can be successful without a knowledge of the brain, the human organ where all the decisions about right (...) and wrong are made. Ethical premises are typically treated in the manner of mathematical propositions: directives supposedly independent of human evolution, with a claim to ideal, eternal truth. (shrink)

A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful (...) role in truthmaker theory, by helping to explain the truth of certain propositions as precisely as possible. (shrink)

. John Cottingham suggests that “only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives.” Two main reasons for endorsing this proposition are assessed: the religious origins of conscience, and the need to explain its normative authority. I argue that Graeco-Roman conceptions of conscience cast doubt on this first historical claim, and that secular moral realisms can account for the obligatoriness of conscience. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for an objective (...) foundation for conscience which emerges from these debates should be embraced by both secular and religious ethicists alike. (shrink)

Where exactly did Hegel go wrong on race? Moellendorf helpfully tells us that Hegel's treatment of race begins systematically in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and that he went wrong philosophically in the use of the biological category of race. This is basically correct but requires precisification. This article considers why Hegel's category of race is not unambiguously biological. Race's biological status can be problematized from the standpoint of contemporary biology and from the standpoint of Hegel's system. The textual placement (...) of Hegel's systematic discussion of race in the philosophy of spirit makes clear that Hegel conceived of race in spiritual terms. Hegel took race to be a biospiritual category. Hegel was clearly committed to the now-controversial proposition that there is such a thing as human biological race, that there is a plurality of biological human races. He regarded race as a robust natural kind. His preferred list of races includes Caucasians, Negros, Mongolian, Malaysians and Americans. One noteworthy feature of his understanding of race's physical aspect was his focus on the formation of the skull and the face. At the same time, he clearly held that there were other deeper physical differences that accounted for the spiritual differences of race. Hegel was perfectly clear that race has a spiritual as well as physical aspect. He held that that the members of racial groups essentially shared certain fundamental, heritable, moral, intellectual and cultural characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other race and that these differences were such as to support an objective ranking. This shows that Hegel took the category of race to be the sort of category we today would characterize as ‘racialist’. Hegel's concept of race was the racialist concept of race. (shrink)

Many accounts of informed consent in medical ethics claim that it is valuable because it supports individual autonomy. Unfortunately there are many distinct conceptions of individual autonomy, and their ethical importance varies. A better reason for taking informed consent seriously is that it provides assurance that patients and others are neither deceived nor coerced. Present debates about the relative importance of generic and specific consent do not address this issue squarely. Consent is a propositional attitude, so intransitive: complete, wholly specific (...) consent is an illusion. Since the point of consent procedures is to limit deception and coercion, they should be designed to give patients and others control over the amount of information they receive and opportunity to rescind consent already given. (shrink)

Recent critics of the coherence theory of truth (notably Ralph Walker) have alleged that the theory is incoherent, since its defence presupposes the correctness of the contrary correspondence theory of truth. Coherentists must specify the system of propositions with which true propositons cohere (the specified system). Generally, coherentists claim that the specified system is a system composed of propositions believed by a community. Critics of coherentism maintain that the coherentist’s assertions about which system is the specified system must (...) be true, not because they cohere with a system of beliefs, but because of facts about what a community believes. I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (shrink)

In this paper we describe, in a purely algebraic language, truth-complete finite-valued propositional logical calculi extending the classical Boolean calculus. We also give a new proof of the Completeness Theorem for such calculi. We investigate the quasi-varieties of algebras playing an analogous role in the theory of these finite-valued logics to the role played by the variety of Boolean algebras in classical logic.

Recent critics of the coherence theory of truth (notably Ralph Walker) have alleged that the theory is incoherent, since its defence presupposes the correctness of the contrary correspondence theory of truth. Coherentists must specify the system of propositions with which true propositons cohere (the specified system). Generally, coherentists claim that the specified system is a system composed of propositions believed by a community. Critics of coherentism maintain that the coherentist’s assertions about which system is the specified system must (...) be true, not because they cohere with a system of beliefs, but because of facts about what a community believes. I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (shrink)

Leon Goldstein’s critical philosophy of history has suffered a relative lack of attention, but it is the outcome of an unusual story. He reached conclusions about the autonomy of the discipline of history similar to those of R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott, but he did so from within the Anglo-American analytic style of philosophy that had little tradition of discussing such matters. Initially, Goldstein attempted to apply a positivistic epistemology derived from Hempel’s philosophy of natural science to historical knowledge, (...) but gradually formulated an anti-realistic epistemology that firmly distinguished historical knowledge of the past not only from the scientific perspective but also from fictional and common-sense attitudes to the past. Among his achievements were theories of the distinctive nature of historical evidence and historical propositions, of the constructed character of historical events, and of the relationship between historical research and contemporary culture. Taken together, his ideas merit inclusion among the most important twentieth-century contributions to the problem of historical knowledge. (shrink)

ABSTRACTLeon Goldstein's critical philosophy of history has suffered a relative lack of attention, but it is the outcome of an unusual story. He reached conclusions about the autonomy of the discipline of history similar to those of R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott, but he did so from within the Anglo‐American analytic style of philosophy that had little tradition of discussing such matters. Initially, Goldstein attempted to apply a positivistic epistemology derived from Hempel's philosophy of natural science to historical knowledge, (...) but gradually formulated an anti‐realistic epistemology that firmly distinguished historical knowledge of the past not only from the scientific perspective but also from fictional and common‐sense attitudes to the past. Among his achievements were theories of the distinctive nature of historical evidence and historical propositions, of the constructed character of historical events, and of the relationship between historical research and contemporary culture. Taken together, his ideas merit inclusion among the most important twentieth‐century contributions to the problem of historical knowledge. (shrink)

Contrary to prevailing views, productivity and propositional construal are not problematic for perceptual views of representation. Glenberg's embodied representations contribute to our understanding of how these two important processes might be implemented perceptually.

Reports of increasing family violence abound in Nigeria. Although studies have implicated cultural constructs as the basis for this trend, this study specifically contemplated the nexus between the increased violence and Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPD). The purpose of this study was to connect these abusive and violent behaviours in their specific contexts as evidence of ASPD. The study was hinged on autoethnographic research which I systematically analysed as lived experiences with a sociopath. Data for the analyses was drawn from purposively (...) sampled participants (n-70) of victims of family violent abuse. Thematic, interpretative analytical approach and the theories of sociopathy, particularly Hare, Psychopathy Checklist-revised (PCL-R) were used to analyse the data from my personal experiences, and the interviews. The results indicated that only five participants representing 7.14% of the purposively selected population, admitted knowing sociopaths as conscienceless murderers and serial killers. The majority of participants (90%) contemplated sociopaths in religious terms (as incarnated evil beings). Only 2.86% rightly expressed their understanding of sociopathy and related personality disorders in a much-informed manner. Although the results of this study contrast with conventional propositions on ASPD, they revealed how religious belief and superstition among Nigerians frame the conversation on sociopathy and other variants of ASPD. Findings suggested that the growing superstitious beliefs on the causes, nature and remedy to ASPD particularly those associated with sociopathy provide the space for people living with these behavioural conditions (particularly violent sociopaths) to continue abusing unsuspecting individuals in the society. Contribution: The finding of this study specifically challenged the faith-based misconceptions associated with ASPD. Therefore, it is expected that the new insight on ASPD, particularly sociopathy ushers in proper understanding and ways of dealing with the morally insane. (shrink)

Reports of increasing family violence abound in Nigeria. Although studies have implicated cultural constructs as the basis for this trend, this study specifically contemplated the nexus between the increased violence and Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPD). The purpose of this study was to connect these abusive and violent behaviours in their specific contexts as evidence of ASPD. The study was hinged on autoethnographic research which I systematically analysed as lived experiences with a sociopath. Data for the analyses was drawn from purposively (...) sampled participants (n-70) of victims of family violent abuse. Thematic, interpretative analytical approach and the theories of sociopathy, particularly Hare, Psychopathy Checklist-revised (PCL-R) were used to analyse the data from my personal experiences, and the interviews. The results indicated that only five participants representing 7.14% of the purposively selected population, admitted knowing sociopaths as conscienceless murderers and serial killers. The majority of participants (90%) contemplated sociopaths in religious terms (as incarnated evil beings). Only 2.86% rightly expressed their understanding of sociopathy and related personality disorders in a much-informed manner. Although the results of this study contrast with conventional propositions on ASPD, they revealed how religious belief and superstition among Nigerians frame the conversation on sociopathy and other variants of ASPD. Findings suggested that the growing superstitious beliefs on the causes, nature and remedy to ASPD particularly those associated with sociopathy provide the space for people living with these behavioural conditions (particularly violent sociopaths) to continue abusing unsuspecting individuals in the society. Contribution: The finding of this study specifically challenged the faith-based misconceptions associated with ASPD. Therefore, it is expected that the new insight on ASPD, particularly sociopathy ushers in proper understanding and ways of dealing with the morally insane. (shrink)

In his book, Theory of Knowledge , Roderick Chisholm distinguishes very precisely between, amongst others, what he calls acceptable, reasonable and evident propositions. A proposition is acceptable if with-holding it is not more reasonable than believing it; a proposition is reasonable if believing it is more reasonable than with-holding it; and a proposition is evident for a person provided it is reasonable for him, and there is no other proposition such that the latter is more reasonable than the former. (...) The notion of being more reasonable is obviously pivotal, and Chisholm explains what it is for an attitude to be more reasonable than another in the following words: “If the person in question were a rational being, if his concerns were purely intellectual, and if he were to choose between the two attitudes, then he would choose the more reasonable in preference to the less reasonable”. The wording of this conditional suggests that Chisholm does not think a person is necessarily rational, so it is imperative that we ask: When is a person rational? (shrink)

Austrian philosopher Heinrich Gomperz attempted to reconcile the Vienna Circle’s project of a unified science with the autonomy of historical knowledge. This article situates him in the context of the ongoing reassessment of the Vienna Circle in the history of philosophy. It argues that Gomperz’s synthesis of positivism with historicity was a response to difficulties raised by Rudolf Carnap and Otto von Neurath. Gomperz achieved his reconciliation via a theory of language and action that had affinities with both neo-Kantian and (...) pragmatist thought, combining Dilthey’s hermeneutics with Carnap’s requirements for scientific propositions. (shrink)

What are the relationships between doubt and truth, thinking and writing in Montaigne’s Essais? We usually see Montaigne’s doubt through the lens of ancient schools of Scepticism and yet he notes that the Pyrrhonians ‘ne peuvent exprimer leur generale conception en aucune maniere de parler’: these philosophers describe their doubtful thought in negative affirmations but these are affirmations – ‘propositions affirmatives’ – all the same. This thesis approaches Montaigne’s doubt differently: I investigate the Essais not as an attempt to (...) indicate or describe doubtful, ‘double et divers’ thought but as a tool for thinking doubtfully in writing. Montaigne’s literary use of language is therefore central to my analysis. Irony, ambiguity, the practices of rewriting and overwriting, the ‘polyphony’ of cited authors who advocate different positions: these afford ways of thinking that sustain duality and doubt. I focus on Montaigne’s engagement with Seneca and Plutarch, ancient authors who are, superficially, unrelated to doubt: the Essais constitute a particular form of humanistic engagement with ancient texts, concerned with practices and forms of writing as much as, if not more than, with philosophical concepts. These ‘dogmatic’ authors – they defend philosophical positions of certainty – were, counter-intuitively, seen by Montaigne to have a ‘forme d’escrire douteuse et irresolue’. This doubtful ‘forme’ shaped Montaigne’s own and it was, I argue, in working with and on these authors – reading, writing, and thinking with them – that he constructed a way of writing doubtful in both form and thought: a text that is double, unresolved, ambiguous, and yet ‘truthful’ in its capacity to perform and make legible the complex, multiple nature of his thought and his thinking. (shrink)

In the article, the problem of formation of innovation potential of human capital as a fundamental condition for development of innovative-oriented economy in the present-day Russia is considered. It is shown that the conception of human capital as an economic factor of social production, which is ingrained in contemporary social science, does not take into account the dynamics and strategy of human capital development that are conditioned by its socio-anthropological basis and are the condition for the formation of its innovative (...) potential. The authors substantiates the proposition that the innovative potential of human capital should be deliberately formed by the administrative and managerial subjects of the society on the basis of developing the creative abilities and strengths of employees of business and economic spheres of social production. Implementation of a complex of social technologies is proposed to ensure the formation of innovative activity of producers in such spheres of social production as administrational, cultural, and educational. It is substantiated that the design and implementation of these technologies should be carried out on the basis of a complex methodology that integrates the tools of social philosophy, sociology and socio-philosophical anthropology. The application of the principles of an integrated methodology in the process of realizing administrational, cultural, and educational social technologies is necessary because it provides the dialectic connection of the objective and subjective conditions of the process of formation of the innovative potential of human capital on macro, micro, and meso-levels of society. It also gives an opportunity to include in the structure of human capital formation a broad set of personal qualities of workers, their ideological attitudes, and value orientations that should be accumulated in the system of innovative potential of labor motivation of employees constituting the human capital of the production organization. It is proved that the set of knowledge, skills, and social experience acquired by social actors in the process of realizing administrational, cultural, and educational social technologies in production organizations creates the actors’ need for self-actualization and development of their creative potential. (shrink)

In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. What’s needed is (...) a species of intentionality distinct from both the industrial-strength version beloved by philosophers and the intentionality lite recommended by Hutto and Satne. We briefly motivate and sketch this alternative, and say a few words about the account of cognition that it spawns. (shrink)

We prove strong completeness of the □-version and the ◊-version of a Gödel modal logic based on Kripke models where propositions at each world and the accessibility relation are both infinitely valued in the standard Gödel algebra [0,1]. Some asymmetries are revealed: validity in the first logic is reducible to the class of frames having two-valued accessibility relation and this logic does not enjoy the finite model property, while validity in the second logic requires truly fuzzy accessibility relations and (...) this logic has the finite model property. Analogues of the classical modal systems D, T, S4 and S5 are considered also, and the completeness results are extended to languages enriched with a discrete well ordered set of truth constants. (shrink)

We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely combine the semantics of propositional intuitionistic (...) logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers ∀ new and ∃ new which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels. (shrink)

Rubinoff is a moralist standing firmly in the tradition of Paul Goodman, Jules Henry, Edgar Friedenberg, et al., and as such he measures up well. The signal point of difference between Rubinoff and these others is that they speak with a sociological voice, Rubinoff with a philosophical one; but the messages are similar: we are floundering in a world decaying because it is filled with people who are floundering, stupid, and/or evil. As philosopher, Rubinoff draws upon his philosophical resources to (...) score points in his battle against the status quo. In this role as philosopher many would want more rigor from him; but rhetoric, not rigor, is what he is about, and images, not propositions, are what he is dealing in. The only real casualty in this decision of style is the title of the book. One is never really sure what he means by pornography. One feels he might have spent a little more time elaborating his contention that power must be the key commodity in a "progress-oriented" society, and that power "is extrinsically an expression of irrationality." Rubinoff stands with those who suspect that man is essentially demonic. We must recognize and accept our evil. If we don't, we release it pornographically in war, racism, hate, violence. One of the many institutions that receives a stinging blow from Rubinoff's flailing around is the social sciences, which too often discover the cause of a social ill, but then use that discovery plus their commitment to objectivity as an equivocation and an excuse for not declaring it wrong. Even though the book is written in an almost journalistic simplicity, making full use of dramatic and literary references as well as philosophic literature, there are a number of enigmas and obscurities which, as with a good film, can enhance your involvement and enjoyment. The book is provocative reading whether you end up agreeing that Rubinoff has successfully made his point or not.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) have rejected logic in favor of probability theory for reasons that are irrelevant to mental-logic theory, because mental-logic theory differs from standard logic in significant ways. Similar to O&C, mental-logic theory rejects the use of the material conditional and deals with the completeness problem by limiting the scope of its procedures to local sets of propositions.