It is proved that the (2p)-c. e. e-degrees are not elementarily equivalent to the (2p + 1)-c. e. e-degrees for each nonzero p ∈ ω. It follows that m-c. e. e-degrees are not elementarily equivalent to the n-c. e. e-degrees if 1 < m < n.

It is proved that if 1 $\langle \mathscr{D}_{2n}, \leq, P\rangle$ and $\langle \mathscr{D}_{2n}, \leq, P\rangle$ are not elementary equivalent where P is the predicate P(a) = "a is a Π 0 1 e-degree".

The variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras was introduced in 2011 by the second author as an expansion of semi-Heyting algebras by a dual hemimorphism. In this paper, we focus on the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) from a logical point of view. The paper presents an extensive investigation of the logic corresponding to the variety of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras and of its axiomatic extensions, along with an equally extensive universal algebraic study of their corresponding algebraic semantics. Firstly, we present a (...) Hilbert-style axiomatization of a new logic called "Dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting logic" (\(\mathcal{DHMSH}\), for short), as an expansion of semi-intuitionistic logic \(\mathcal{SI}\) (also called \(\mathcal{SH}\)) introduced by the first author by adding a weak negation (to be interpreted as a dual hemimorphism). We then prove that it is implicative in the sense of Rasiowa and that it is complete with respect to the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). It is deduced that the logic \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) as its equivalent algebraic semantics and that the lattice of axiomatic extensions of \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subvarieties of \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). A new axiomatization for Moisil's logic is also obtained. Secondly, we characterize the axiomatic extensions of \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) in which the "Deduction Theorem" holds. Thirdly, we present several new logics, extending the logic \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\), corresponding to several important subvarieties of the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). These include logics corresponding to the varieties generated by two-element, three-element and some four-element dually quasi-De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras, as well as a new axiomatization for the 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic. Surprisingly, many of these logics turn out to be connexive logics, only a few of which are presented in this paper. Fourthly, we present axiomatizations for two infinite sequences of logics namely, De Morgan Gödel logics and dually pseudocomplemented Gödel logics. Fifthly, axiomatizations are also provided for logics corresponding to many subvarieties of regular dually quasi-De Morgan Stone semi-Heyting algebras, of regular De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras of level 1, and of JI-distributive semi-Heyting algebras of level 1. We conclude the paper with some open problems. Most of the logics considered in this paper are discriminator logics in the sense that they correspond to discriminator varieties. Some of them, just like the classical logic, are even primal in the sense that their corresponding varieties are generated by primal algebras. (shrink)

While many are impressed with the utility of possible worlds in linguistics and philosophy, few can accept the modal realism of David Lewis, who regards possible worlds as sui generis entities of a kind with the concrete world we inhabit.1 Not all uses of possible worlds require exotic ontology. Consider, for instance, the use of Kripke models to establish formal results in modal logic. These models contain sets often regarded for heuristic reasons as sets of “possible worlds”. But the “worlds” (...) in these sets can be anything at all; they can be numbers, or people, or sh. The set of worlds, together with the accessibility relation and the rest of the model, is used as a purely formal structure.2 One can even go beyond establishing results about formal systems and apply Kripke models to English, as Charles Chihara has recently argued.3 Chihara shows, for instance, how to use Kripke models (plus primitive modal notions) to give an account of validity for English modal sentences. In other cases worlds are not really needed at all. It is often vivid to give a counterexample thus: “There is a possible world in which P. Since your theory implies that in all worlds, not-P, your theory is wrong.” But the counterexample could just as easily be given using modal operators: “Possibly, P. Since your theory implies that it is necessary that not-P, your theory is wrong.”. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up to (...) the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

A. M. Pitts in [Pi] proved that HA op fp is a bi-Heyting category satisfying the Lawrence condition. We show that the embedding $\Phi: HA^\mathrm{op}_\mathrm{fp} \longrightarrow Sh(\mathbf{P_0,J_0})$ into the topos of sheaves, (P 0 is the category of finite rooted posets and open maps, J 0 the canonical topology on P 0 ) given by $H \longmapsto HA(H,\mathscr{D}(-)): \mathbf{P_0} \longrightarrow \text{Set}$ preserves the structure mentioned above, finite coproducts, and subobject classifier, it is also conservative. This whole structure on HA op (...) fp can be derived from that of Sh(P 0 ,J 0 ) via the embedding Φ. We also show that the equivalence relations in HA op fp are not effective in general. On the way to these results we establish a new kind of duality between HA op fp and a category of sheaves equipped with certain structure defined in terms of Ehrenfeucht games. Our methods are model-theoretic and combinatorial as opposed to proof-theoretic as in [Pi]. (shrink)

The review of the collective monograph "Running and Philosophy", which has not been introduced into the sphere of domestic research of philosophical aspects of physical culture and sports, is presented. Marathon for the Mind" (published in English in 2007). The publication includes 19 essays prepared by American philosophers. The professional study of the socio-cultural determination and the existential significance of running practices by the authors of the monograph is effectively combined with the analysis of personal experience of participating in stayer (...) races, which provides a confessional and emotional presentation, as well as practical confirmation of the results obtained. It can be assumed that the content of the collection under consideration covers the main thematic repertoire and represents the research techniques of the philosophy of running that has been forming since the second half of the twentieth century. The reviewed monograph reveals the humanistic potential of running as a factor of anthropogenesis (Sh. Kay), a means of achieving "correct" apathy (R. Devitt) and the highest kind of friendship (M. V. Austin). R. A. Belliotti considers running as a way to gain superhuman standing, H. L. Reed and R. S. Reed find in it the embodiment of the values of existentialism. Within the framework of solving the problems of anthropological dualism, running activity is addressed by J. J. Wisniewski, M. Maze, C. Taliaferro and R. Trauber. K. Martin and M. S. Nussbaum consider running as a medium of aesthetic experience generation, R. J. van Arragon and K. Kinghorn reflect on the typology of runners. D. P. Fry and J. P. Moreland The connection between running and religious practices is investigated, G. Basham, K. Kelly, U. P. Kabasench and D. R. Hochstetler analyze the correlation of goals and means of running activity. Thus, the monograph substantiates the understanding of running as a publicly available and effective means of gaining physical, mental and social well-being, which expresses the humanistic essence of running practices and justifies the philosophical and anthropological significance of their research. (shrink)

Author continues the publication which appeared in the Acta Biotheoretica I, p. 113–132, regarding his results obtained in course of research work on superior plants:Picea excelsa trees, and furthermore on unicellular living beings, namely yeast cells . Author made a pure culture with the unicellular culture method, and by occasional inoculation produced successors therefrom. He established the progress in development by measuring, according to weight, the CO2 which arose in course of life. The ontogenetic course of development of the original (...) culture as well as that of the successors took the form ofS but theseS curves were not equally precipitous . When he drew theS-formed development curves in the measure of their time of inoculation in a rectangular co-ordinate system, he received a wave-surface . When he intersected the wave-surface with the abscissa and the plane parallel with the vertical axis, wave-like lines were the result, which resembled vibratory motion evolving around an axis producing a regular picture . Research has ascertained that the axis follows the laws of aperiodic vibratory motion, the undulating curve corresponds with the phenomenon of periodic vibratory motion, both of which are derived from the common differential equationd 2 s/dt 2 + 2r ds/dt +w 2 s=o. Any point of thes h axis following the aperiodic vibratory motion is given by the following equation: sh=a1e−r1t⋅e+tr21−w21√−e−tr21−w21√2⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅while the wave-curve showing thes h periodic movement is given by the following equation: sp=a2e−r2tcos⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅The completey movement is made up of the total of the two vibratory movementsy=s h +s p . The research for the time being refers merely to the aperiodic axis. Calculations show that with thes h equation, the aperiodic axes belonging to all the sections can be followed exactly, as the time function oft, and moreover, the change according to time in the size of the w1, r1, a1 coefficients also shows definite regularity .Author deals separately with the calculation of the axis maximal time =t max and the maximal value = s h max of the wave-curve, and establishes that the development speed of every cell and every organism built up from cells has a maximal point of time and a maximal value. Thet maximum point of time: tmax=Ir12−w12−−−−−−−√logelogr+r12−w12−−−−−−−√r−r12−w12−−−−−−−√−−−−−−−−−−−√⋅⋅⋅⋅If we put thet max value in the place of the original equation of the axis we get the numeric value of thet max .Author finally establishes that the recognition of the fact that a harmonic vibratory motion plays a part in the evolution of living beings and that the axis of this complicated vibration follows the equation of aperiodic vibratory motion is a fundamental result in the theoretic study of the phenomena of life, which, besides, has also a great practical importance in the sphere of the study of improvement, inheritance and the biology of the species.L'auteur continue la publication des résultats de ses recherches faites sur des êtres vivants unicellulaires, notamment desSaccharomyces. Cette publication fut communiquée dans les Acta Biotheoretica I, p. 113–132. Par la méthode de la culture unicellulaire, l'auteur a créé une culture pure et, de celli-ci, au moyen d'inoculations périodiques, il a créé des descendants. Il a mesuré la marche du développement en pesant le CO2 produit au cours de la vie. La courbe d'évolution ontogénétique, tant de la culture-mère que des descendants, a présenté une ligne enS, mais chacun de cesS ne montait pas de la même façon . En représentant ces courbes d'évolution enS en fonction du temps et à l'échelle des périodes d'inoculation sur des coordonnées rectilignes, il obtenait une surface d'ondes . En coupant cette surface par un plan parallèle à l'abscisse et à l'axe vertical, il obtenait des lignes ondoyantes qui ressemblaient à un mouvement oscillatoire se formant autour d'un axe à l'image régulière . Les examens ont révélé que l'axe suit les lois du mouvement vibratoire harmonique apériodique et que la courbe ondoyante répond au phénomène du mouvement vibratoire harmonique périodique. L'un et l'autre provenant de l'équation différentielle communed 2 s/dt 2 + 2r ds/dt +w 2 s=o. N'importe quel point de l'axes h qui suit un mouvement vibratoire harmonique apériodique est déterminé par l'équation suivante: sh=a1e−r1t⋅e+tr21−w21√−e−tr21−w21√2⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅cependant que la courbe ondoyante s p qui montre un mouvement vibratoire harmonique périodique est exprimée par l'équation suivante sp=a2e−r2tcos⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅Le mouvement complety se compose de la somme des deux mouvements oscillatoires,y =s h +s p .Pour le moment, les examens n'ont trait qu'à l'axe apériodique. Les calculs prouvent que par l'équation sh les axes apériodiques appartenant à toutes les coupes peuvent être suivis avec exactitude comme fonctions du tempst, et que même le changement de la valeur des coefficientsw 1 ,r 1 ,a 1, présente aussi une régularité nette .L'auteur examine ensuite le calcul du temps maximum=t max et, en outre, la valeur maximum =s hmax de l'axe de la courbe vibratoire et il énonce que toute cellule et tout organisme composé de cellules ont dans le cours de leur développement un temps maximum et une valeur maximum. Le tempst maximum sera: tmax=Ir12−w12−−−−−−−√logelogr+r12−w12−−−−−−−√r−r12−w12−−−−−−−√−−−−−−−−−−−√⋅⋅⋅⋅En substituant la valeur dut max dans l'équation originale de l'axe , on obtient la valeur numérique dut max .Finalement, après avoir déterminé le fait que dans le développement des êtres vivants, on est en présence d'un mouvement vibratoire harmonique périodique et que l'axe de cette oscillation complexe suit l'équation du mouvement vibratoire harmonique apériodique, l'auteur constate que cette détermination constitue un résultat fondamental pour l'étude théoritique des phénomènes vitaux et ce résultat possède en même temps une grande importance pratique pour l'étude de l'amélioration, du sélectionnement, de l'hérédité et de la biologie de la race. (shrink)

The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...) proposition’ and ‘sceptical hypothesis’ respectively. (SKC), however, fails for familiar reasons: since knowledge entails belief (KB), we can derive the falsity (F) from (SKC) by hypothetical syllogism, and thus reduce (SKC) to absurdity: (KB) Kxt[p] → Bxt[p]. (F) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Bxt[q]. (shrink)

... 243-) INTRODUCTION §§243- constitute the eighth 'chapter' of the book. Its point of departure is a natural query with respect to the conclusion of the ...

Paul Guyer’s Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a collection of essays written over a period of ten years on the roles of freedom, reason, law, and happiness in Kant’s practical philosophy. The centrality of these concepts has always been acknowledged, but Guyer proposes a different way to understand their interconnections. Kant extols respect for moral law and conformity to moral principle for its own sake while at the same time celebrating the value of human freedom and autonomy. Guyer (...) sees tensions between these two poles of Kant’s practical philosophy—obedience to law and the value of freedom. He argues: “A profound paradox can be avoided only if it can be shown that Kant intended obedience to universal law to be mandatory solely as the necessary condition for the realization of human freedom and through that freedom a systematic and unselfish distribution of happiness among all persons” and that “the sheer fact of adherence to universal law is not an end in itself but is rather the means to the realization of the human potential for autonomy or freedom in both choice and action” (p. 1). One guiding theme of Guyer’s book is that Kant’s practical philosophy is based on the fundamental, and hence indemonstrable, intrinsic value of freedom, which Guyer understands as a value that is prior to the moral law, providing both an end to be realized through conformity to universal law and the basis of the authority of moral principles. Conformity to universal law has no intrinsic value in itself; it is the means to the preservation, enhancement, and full realization of human freedom, and is required because of its instrumental connection to the prior value of freedom. As he says, “freedom of choice and its natural expression in action are what human beings value most, and the fundamental principle of morality and the rules for both po-. (shrink)

This paper is about the good side of modal logic, the bad side of modal logic, and how hybrid logic takes the good and fixes the bad.In essence, modal logic is a simple formalism for working with relational structures . But modal logic has no mechanism for referring to or reasoning about the individual nodes in such structures, and this lessens its effectiveness as a representation formalism. In their simplest form, hybrid logics are upgraded modal logics in which reference to (...) individual nodes is possible.But hybrid logic is a rather unusual modal upgrade. It pushes one simple idea as far as it will go: represent all information as formulas. This turns out to be the key needed to draw together a surprisingly diverse range of work . Moreover, it displays a number of knowledge representation issues in a new light, notably the importance of sorting. (shrink)

This study concerns the ideas of one particular philosopher, Henri Bergson, whose views of time, intuition, and creativity have had a significant impact on art, literature, and the humanities, both in his time and in our own. Although it is generally recognized that Bergson's ideas have significantly impacted the arts and the humanities, it has not been recognized how they have also had a creative influence on the sciences as well. Nor has it been realized that this was one of (...) his most basic contentions. Bergson's conception of intuition--his fundamental insight into reality--was not limited to fugitive insights into human existence. By realizing previously unsuspected possibilities for research and discovery, his endeavors were also meant to make possible new advances in the sciences. If it enabled his cousin by marriage, Marcel Proust, to explore human memory in depth, it also inspired psychologists like Daniel Schachter to use Bergson's ideas to make real contributions to contemporary memory science. If his notion of creative evolution brought many thinkers to a belief in human creative freedom, it brought others (notably Alexis Carrel and Pierre Lecomte de Noüy) to a scientific study of biological time. Among his successful speculations was the theory of the Big Bang cosmology. 'Getting Bergson Straight' shows many points at which Bergson's ideas anticipated future developments in the sciences. This was seen clearly by the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis de Broglie who viewed Bergson's physics as presaging quantum physics. Thus, the text is well situated for arts, humanities, social science, and natural science classrooms studying creative thinking and/or intellectual history. (shrink)

Originally published in 1969. This book explains what is wrong with the traditional methodology of "inductive" reasoning and shows that the alternative scheme of reasoning associated with Whewell, Pierce and Popper can give the scientist a useful insight into the way he thinks.

Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism, Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 316 p., e-book.

It may be seen from the foregoing that Pauline's existence is multiply jeopardized; or rather, that my right to use 'Pauline' as a name, the way I said I was going to, is very doubtful, for I agree with Parmenides that one cannot name what is not there to be named. The words I have used to describe Pauline's various perils are full of what Ryle aptly called "systematically misleading expressions"; but we need not worry about that for the moment-enough (...) for now if the words succeed in bringing the various cases before our minds--and we can tidy up our language as we come to see things more clearly. (shrink)

Social evolution theory conventionally takes an externalist explanatory stance, treating observed cooperation as explanandum and the positive assortment of cooperative behaviour as explanans. We ask how the circumstances bringing about this positive assortment arose in the first place. Rather than merely push the explanatory problem back a step, we move from an externalist to an interactionist explanatory stance, in the spirit of Lewontin and the Niche Construction theorists. We develop a theory of ‘social niche construction’ in which we consider biological (...) entities to be both the subject and object of their own social evolution. Some important cases of the evolution of cooperation have the side-effect of causing changes in the hierarchical level at which the evolutionary process acts. This is because the traits that act to align the fitness interests of particles in a collective can also act to diminish the extent to which those particles are bearers of heritable fitness variance, while augmenting the extent to which collectives of such particles are bearers of heritable fitness variance. In this way, we can explain upward transitions in the hierarchical level at which the Darwinian machine operates in terms of particle-level selection, even though the outcome of the process is a collective-level selection regime. Our theory avoids the logical and metaphysical paradoxes faced by other attempts to explain evolutionary transitions. (shrink)

Originally published in 1957, The Uniqueness of the Individual is a collection of 9 essays published from the ten years preceding publication. The essays deal with some of the central problems of biology. These are among the questions put and answered from the standpoint of modern experimental biology. What is ageing and how is it measured? What theories have been held to account for it, and with what success? Did ageing evolve, and if so how? Is Lamarckism and adequate explanation (...) of evolutionary process? Does evolution sometimes go wrong? Do human beings evolve in a way peculiar to themselves? Other essays touch upon the problems of scientific method and of growth and transformation. This book will be of interest to natural historians, evolutionists and anthropologists. (shrink)

This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was shown to (...) be in need of further refinement. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between participant-characteristics variables overall and subscale responses to the ethical scenarios. (shrink)

1. The Tractatus doctrine of saying and showing In a letter to Russell dated 19.4.1919, written shortly after he had finished the Tractatus, Wittgenstein told Russell that the main contention of the book, to which all else, including the account of logic, is subsidiary, ‘is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by prop[osition]s -- i.e. by language -- (and, which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by prop[osition]s, but only shown (gezeigt); (...) which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy’ (CL 68). This was emphasized in both preface and conclusion of the book. The preface observes that the whole sense of the book can be summed up in the following words: ‘what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence’ (TLP p.3). The conclusion of the book (TLP 7) simply repeats this. The preceding three remarks, however, are noteworthy. They make three claims. First, ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical’ (TLP 6.522). This reiterates the leitmotif of the book, namely that there are things that cannot, by the very nature of representation, be said. But though they cannot be said, they are shown by features of the relevant system of representation. Secondly, the correct method in philosophy would really be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. empirical propositions that have nothing to do with philosophy, and then, when someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions (TLP 6.53). This method, of course, is not the method that has been followed throughout the book, which consists almost exclusively of modal assertions concerning what must, can or cannot be thus and so in reality, in language and in the relation between language and reality.. (shrink)

‘I proceed. ‘Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for him: and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable—”’ ‘Found what?” said the Duck. ‘Found it’ the Mouse replied rather crossly: ‘of course you know what “it” means.’ ‘I know what “it” means well enough, when I find a thing’, said the Duck: ‘it's generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?’.

This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. -/- Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims (...) that when consciousness is organized it is found as already organized. -/- This is important for Gurwitsch's philosophical system because if he can establish that consciousness is always originally organized, then his famous claim that the theme, thematic-field, margin structure of consciousness is an invariant patterning impervious to the subject's whim, mood, or possible noetic training, is protected at the very start. (shrink)

The author is critical of russell's theory in that his "analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions is very defective" and has too many complications to serve as a "convention for a symbolic language.".

The place of philosophical medical ethics in medical education and clinical practice has recently been questioned. Although partially valid, the criticisms do not warrant abandoning the enterprise. Instead a reappraised model, based on Aristotelean concepts of intellectual and moral virtue is suggested.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a multitude of cognitive rehabilitation programs proliferated to facilitate recovery after brain injury. However only a few programs provided a framework for ameliorating disturbances in the cognitive, psychological, and interpersonal spheres of the brain-injured patient. Greatly influenced by Leonard Diller and Yehuda Ben-Yishay’s ideas and methods, George P. Prigatano began, in early 1980, a holistic neuropsychological rehabilitation program at the Presbyterian Hospital in Oklahoma City (Oklahoma). The objective of this paper is to summarize the contributions (...) of George P. Prigatano to neuropsychological rehabilitation and clinical neuropsychology during his 50th year of practice. The main body of the paper is structured in three sections. The first section briefly explains the history of neuropsychological rehabilitation in the twentieth century and the emergence of holistic neuropsychological rehabilitation programs in the 1970s. The second section describes the contributions of George P. Prigatano to neuropsychological rehabilitation and clinical neuropsychology (written by AGM). In the third section, the second author (GPP) prepared an autobiographical statement, which attempts to summarize some of the personal and professional experiences which influenced his work. George P. Prigatano’s contributions to neuropsychological rehabilitation and clinical neuropsychology are essential to understanding the therapeutic approaches currently used in the treatment of brain-injured patients. (shrink)

The principle of excluded middle is the logical interpretation of the law V ≤ A v ヿA in an orthocomplemented lattice and, hence, in the lattice of the subspaces of a Hilbert space which correspond to quantum mechanical propositions. We use the dialogic approach to logic in order to show that, in addition to the already established laws of effective quantum logic, the principle of excluded middle can also be founded. The dialogic approach is based on the very conditions under (...) which propositions can be confirmed by measurements. From the fact that the principle of. excluded middle can be confirmed for elementary propositions which are proved by quantum mechanical measurements, we conclude that this principle is inherited by all finite compound propositions. For this proof it is essential that, in the dialog-game about a connective, a finite confirmation strategy for the mutual commensurability of the subpropositions is used. (shrink)

Amazing as it may be, to this day few commentaries on the treatises of Plotinus' Enneads are written. The classic ninth treatise, for example, has hardly been studied. This treatise, however, is of vital importance, because it is in this work that for the first time in the Enneads, the One in its superform emerges and Plotinus dwells on the remarkable phenomenon of a 'mystical union' of the soul with the One. A thorough analysis of the argument and its development (...) next to philosophical and philo-logical support will be welcome to any reader of this in-triguing but difficult treatise. These aims are pursued in the main part of Meijer's work, the commentary. The first part of the book, preceding the commentary, examines the philosophical history of the concept of the One and its status in the first eight treatises. This new approach to the problem of the One leads to striking conclusions. It appears that while Plotinus was writing these first eight treatises, the concept of the One developed from that of a Supreme Entity of a Mesoplatonian character, viz. the upper part of the mind, to One of a Superone above mind. This casts an entirely new light on the position of the One in Plotinus and that of the ninth treatise itself. The third part not only examines the mystical union as pictured in the ninth treatise, but also provides a full scale discussion of Plotinus' descriptions of this union in his en-tire work. The degree of unification, viz. the question whether a part of the mystic self remains intact during the unification, is a matter of vigorous scholarly debate. Meijer shows that, in spite of some inconsistencies in his doctrine about the union, one must accept that Plotinus basically considered the union as a complete absorption of the soul into the Supreme Entity. (shrink)