It is proved that the (2p)-c. e. e-degrees are not elementarily equivalent to the (2p + 1)-c. e. e-degrees for each nonzero p ∈ ω. It follows that m-c. e. e-degrees are not elementarily equivalent to the n-c. e. e-degrees if 1 < m < n.

The variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras was introduced in 2011 by the second author as an expansion of semi-Heyting algebras by a dual hemimorphism. In this paper, we focus on the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) from a logical point of view. The paper presents an extensive investigation of the logic corresponding to the variety of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras and of its axiomatic extensions, along with an equally extensive universal algebraic study of their corresponding algebraic semantics. Firstly, we present a (...) Hilbert-style axiomatization of a new logic called "Dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting logic" (\(\mathcal{DHMSH}\), for short), as an expansion of semi-intuitionistic logic \(\mathcal{SI}\) (also called \(\mathcal{SH}\)) introduced by the first author by adding a weak negation (to be interpreted as a dual hemimorphism). We then prove that it is implicative in the sense of Rasiowa and that it is complete with respect to the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). It is deduced that the logic \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) as its equivalent algebraic semantics and that the lattice of axiomatic extensions of \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subvarieties of \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). A new axiomatization for Moisil's logic is also obtained. Secondly, we characterize the axiomatic extensions of \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) in which the "Deduction Theorem" holds. Thirdly, we present several new logics, extending the logic \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\), corresponding to several important subvarieties of the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). These include logics corresponding to the varieties generated by two-element, three-element and some four-element dually quasi-De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras, as well as a new axiomatization for the 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic. Surprisingly, many of these logics turn out to be connexive logics, only a few of which are presented in this paper. Fourthly, we present axiomatizations for two infinite sequences of logics namely, De Morgan Gödel logics and dually pseudocomplemented Gödel logics. Fifthly, axiomatizations are also provided for logics corresponding to many subvarieties of regular dually quasi-De Morgan Stone semi-Heyting algebras, of regular De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras of level 1, and of JI-distributive semi-Heyting algebras of level 1. We conclude the paper with some open problems. Most of the logics considered in this paper are discriminator logics in the sense that they correspond to discriminator varieties. Some of them, just like the classical logic, are even primal in the sense that their corresponding varieties are generated by primal algebras. (shrink)

While many are impressed with the utility of possible worlds in linguistics and philosophy, few can accept the modal realism of David Lewis, who regards possible worlds as sui generis entities of a kind with the concrete world we inhabit.1 Not all uses of possible worlds require exotic ontology. Consider, for instance, the use of Kripke models to establish formal results in modal logic. These models contain sets often regarded for heuristic reasons as sets of “possible worlds”. But the “worlds” (...) in these sets can be anything at all; they can be numbers, or people, or sh. The set of worlds, together with the accessibility relation and the rest of the model, is used as a purely formal structure.2 One can even go beyond establishing results about formal systems and apply Kripke models to English, as Charles Chihara has recently argued.3 Chihara shows, for instance, how to use Kripke models (plus primitive modal notions) to give an account of validity for English modal sentences. In other cases worlds are not really needed at all. It is often vivid to give a counterexample thus: “There is a possible world in which P. Since your theory implies that in all worlds, not-P, your theory is wrong.” But the counterexample could just as easily be given using modal operators: “Possibly, P. Since your theory implies that it is necessary that not-P, your theory is wrong.”. (shrink)

The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...) proposition’ and ‘sceptical hypothesis’ respectively. (SKC), however, fails for familiar reasons: since knowledge entails belief (KB), we can derive the falsity (F) from (SKC) by hypothetical syllogism, and thus reduce (SKC) to absurdity: (KB) Kxt[p] → Bxt[p]. (F) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Bxt[q]. (shrink)

A. M. Pitts in [Pi] proved that HA op fp is a bi-Heyting category satisfying the Lawrence condition. We show that the embedding $\Phi: HA^\mathrm{op}_\mathrm{fp} \longrightarrow Sh(\mathbf{P_0,J_0})$ into the topos of sheaves, (P 0 is the category of finite rooted posets and open maps, J 0 the canonical topology on P 0 ) given by $H \longmapsto HA(H,\mathscr{D}(-)): \mathbf{P_0} \longrightarrow \text{Set}$ preserves the structure mentioned above, finite coproducts, and subobject classifier, it is also conservative. This whole structure on HA op (...) fp can be derived from that of Sh(P 0 ,J 0 ) via the embedding Φ. We also show that the equivalence relations in HA op fp are not effective in general. On the way to these results we establish a new kind of duality between HA op fp and a category of sheaves equipped with certain structure defined in terms of Ehrenfeucht games. Our methods are model-theoretic and combinatorial as opposed to proof-theoretic as in [Pi]. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up to (...) the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

The review of the collective monograph "Running and Philosophy", which has not been introduced into the sphere of domestic research of philosophical aspects of physical culture and sports, is presented. Marathon for the Mind" (published in English in 2007). The publication includes 19 essays prepared by American philosophers. The professional study of the socio-cultural determination and the existential significance of running practices by the authors of the monograph is effectively combined with the analysis of personal experience of participating in stayer (...) races, which provides a confessional and emotional presentation, as well as practical confirmation of the results obtained. It can be assumed that the content of the collection under consideration covers the main thematic repertoire and represents the research techniques of the philosophy of running that has been forming since the second half of the twentieth century. The reviewed monograph reveals the humanistic potential of running as a factor of anthropogenesis (Sh. Kay), a means of achieving "correct" apathy (R. Devitt) and the highest kind of friendship (M. V. Austin). R. A. Belliotti considers running as a way to gain superhuman standing, H. L. Reed and R. S. Reed find in it the embodiment of the values of existentialism. Within the framework of solving the problems of anthropological dualism, running activity is addressed by J. J. Wisniewski, M. Maze, C. Taliaferro and R. Trauber. K. Martin and M. S. Nussbaum consider running as a medium of aesthetic experience generation, R. J. van Arragon and K. Kinghorn reflect on the typology of runners. D. P. Fry and J. P. Moreland The connection between running and religious practices is investigated, G. Basham, K. Kelly, U. P. Kabasench and D. R. Hochstetler analyze the correlation of goals and means of running activity. Thus, the monograph substantiates the understanding of running as a publicly available and effective means of gaining physical, mental and social well-being, which expresses the humanistic essence of running practices and justifies the philosophical and anthropological significance of their research. (shrink)

Author continues the publication which appeared in the Acta Biotheoretica I, p. 113–132, regarding his results obtained in course of research work on superior plants:Picea excelsa trees, and furthermore on unicellular living beings, namely yeast cells . Author made a pure culture with the unicellular culture method, and by occasional inoculation produced successors therefrom. He established the progress in development by measuring, according to weight, the CO2 which arose in course of life. The ontogenetic course of development of the original (...) culture as well as that of the successors took the form ofS but theseS curves were not equally precipitous . When he drew theS-formed development curves in the measure of their time of inoculation in a rectangular co-ordinate system, he received a wave-surface . When he intersected the wave-surface with the abscissa and the plane parallel with the vertical axis, wave-like lines were the result, which resembled vibratory motion evolving around an axis producing a regular picture . Research has ascertained that the axis follows the laws of aperiodic vibratory motion, the undulating curve corresponds with the phenomenon of periodic vibratory motion, both of which are derived from the common differential equationd 2 s/dt 2 + 2r ds/dt +w 2 s=o. Any point of thes h axis following the aperiodic vibratory motion is given by the following equation: sh=a1e−r1t⋅e+tr21−w21√−e−tr21−w21√2⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅while the wave-curve showing thes h periodic movement is given by the following equation: sp=a2e−r2tcos⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅The completey movement is made up of the total of the two vibratory movementsy=s h +s p . The research for the time being refers merely to the aperiodic axis. Calculations show that with thes h equation, the aperiodic axes belonging to all the sections can be followed exactly, as the time function oft, and moreover, the change according to time in the size of the w1, r1, a1 coefficients also shows definite regularity .Author deals separately with the calculation of the axis maximal time =t max and the maximal value = s h max of the wave-curve, and establishes that the development speed of every cell and every organism built up from cells has a maximal point of time and a maximal value. Thet maximum point of time: tmax=Ir12−w12−−−−−−−√logelogr+r12−w12−−−−−−−√r−r12−w12−−−−−−−√−−−−−−−−−−−√⋅⋅⋅⋅If we put thet max value in the place of the original equation of the axis we get the numeric value of thet max .Author finally establishes that the recognition of the fact that a harmonic vibratory motion plays a part in the evolution of living beings and that the axis of this complicated vibration follows the equation of aperiodic vibratory motion is a fundamental result in the theoretic study of the phenomena of life, which, besides, has also a great practical importance in the sphere of the study of improvement, inheritance and the biology of the species.L'auteur continue la publication des résultats de ses recherches faites sur des êtres vivants unicellulaires, notamment desSaccharomyces. Cette publication fut communiquée dans les Acta Biotheoretica I, p. 113–132. Par la méthode de la culture unicellulaire, l'auteur a créé une culture pure et, de celli-ci, au moyen d'inoculations périodiques, il a créé des descendants. Il a mesuré la marche du développement en pesant le CO2 produit au cours de la vie. La courbe d'évolution ontogénétique, tant de la culture-mère que des descendants, a présenté une ligne enS, mais chacun de cesS ne montait pas de la même façon . En représentant ces courbes d'évolution enS en fonction du temps et à l'échelle des périodes d'inoculation sur des coordonnées rectilignes, il obtenait une surface d'ondes . En coupant cette surface par un plan parallèle à l'abscisse et à l'axe vertical, il obtenait des lignes ondoyantes qui ressemblaient à un mouvement oscillatoire se formant autour d'un axe à l'image régulière . Les examens ont révélé que l'axe suit les lois du mouvement vibratoire harmonique apériodique et que la courbe ondoyante répond au phénomène du mouvement vibratoire harmonique périodique. L'un et l'autre provenant de l'équation différentielle communed 2 s/dt 2 + 2r ds/dt +w 2 s=o. N'importe quel point de l'axes h qui suit un mouvement vibratoire harmonique apériodique est déterminé par l'équation suivante: sh=a1e−r1t⋅e+tr21−w21√−e−tr21−w21√2⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅cependant que la courbe ondoyante s p qui montre un mouvement vibratoire harmonique périodique est exprimée par l'équation suivante sp=a2e−r2tcos⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅Le mouvement complety se compose de la somme des deux mouvements oscillatoires,y =s h +s p .Pour le moment, les examens n'ont trait qu'à l'axe apériodique. Les calculs prouvent que par l'équation sh les axes apériodiques appartenant à toutes les coupes peuvent être suivis avec exactitude comme fonctions du tempst, et que même le changement de la valeur des coefficientsw 1 ,r 1 ,a 1, présente aussi une régularité nette .L'auteur examine ensuite le calcul du temps maximum=t max et, en outre, la valeur maximum =s hmax de l'axe de la courbe vibratoire et il énonce que toute cellule et tout organisme composé de cellules ont dans le cours de leur développement un temps maximum et une valeur maximum. Le tempst maximum sera: tmax=Ir12−w12−−−−−−−√logelogr+r12−w12−−−−−−−√r−r12−w12−−−−−−−√−−−−−−−−−−−√⋅⋅⋅⋅En substituant la valeur dut max dans l'équation originale de l'axe , on obtient la valeur numérique dut max .Finalement, après avoir déterminé le fait que dans le développement des êtres vivants, on est en présence d'un mouvement vibratoire harmonique périodique et que l'axe de cette oscillation complexe suit l'équation du mouvement vibratoire harmonique apériodique, l'auteur constate que cette détermination constitue un résultat fondamental pour l'étude théoritique des phénomènes vitaux et ce résultat possède en même temps une grande importance pratique pour l'étude de l'amélioration, du sélectionnement, de l'hérédité et de la biologie de la race. (shrink)

Advocates have sought to prove that underdetermination obtains because all theories have empirical equivalents. But algorithms for generating empirical equivalents simply exchange underdetermination for familiar philosophical chestnuts, while the few convincing examples of empirical equivalents will not support the desired sweeping conclusions. Nonetheless, underdetermination does not depend on empirical equivalents: our warrant for current theories is equally undermined by presently unconceived alternatives as well-confirmed merely by the existing evidence, so long as this transient predicament recurs for each theory and body (...) of evidence we consider. The historical record supports the claim that this recurrent, transient underdetermination predicament is our own. (shrink)

Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism, Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 316 p., e-book.

A Turing degreedis the degree of categoricity of a computable structure${\cal S}$ifdis the least degree capable of computing isomorphisms among arbitrary computable copies of${\cal S}$. A degreedis the strong degree of categoricity of${\cal S}$ifdis the degree of categoricity of${\cal S}$, and there are computable copies${\cal A}$and${\cal B}$of${\cal S}$such that every isomorphism from${\cal A}$onto${\cal B}$computesd. In this paper, we build a c.e. degreedand a computable rigid structure${\cal M}$such thatdis the degree of categoricity of${\cal M}$, butdis not the strong degree of categoricity (...) of${\cal M}$. This solves the open problem of Fokina, Kalimullin, and Miller [13].For a computable structure${\cal S}$, we introduce the notion of the spectral dimension of${\cal S}$, which gives a quantitative characteristic of the degree of categoricity of${\cal S}$. We prove that for a nonzero natural numberN, there is a computable rigid structure${\cal M}$such that$0\prime$is the degree of categoricity of${\cal M}$, and the spectral dimension of${\cal M}$is equal toN. (shrink)

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘pantokratōr’; and both this Greek word, (...) like the more classical ‘pankratēs’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘pantocratōr’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything. (shrink)

Paul Guyer’s Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a collection of essays written over a period of ten years on the roles of freedom, reason, law, and happiness in Kant’s practical philosophy. The centrality of these concepts has always been acknowledged, but Guyer proposes a different way to understand their interconnections. Kant extols respect for moral law and conformity to moral principle for its own sake while at the same time celebrating the value of human freedom and autonomy. Guyer (...) sees tensions between these two poles of Kant’s practical philosophy—obedience to law and the value of freedom. He argues: “A profound paradox can be avoided only if it can be shown that Kant intended obedience to universal law to be mandatory solely as the necessary condition for the realization of human freedom and through that freedom a systematic and unselfish distribution of happiness among all persons” and that “the sheer fact of adherence to universal law is not an end in itself but is rather the means to the realization of the human potential for autonomy or freedom in both choice and action” (p. 1). One guiding theme of Guyer’s book is that Kant’s practical philosophy is based on the fundamental, and hence indemonstrable, intrinsic value of freedom, which Guyer understands as a value that is prior to the moral law, providing both an end to be realized through conformity to universal law and the basis of the authority of moral principles. Conformity to universal law has no intrinsic value in itself; it is the means to the preservation, enhancement, and full realization of human freedom, and is required because of its instrumental connection to the prior value of freedom. As he says, “freedom of choice and its natural expression in action are what human beings value most, and the fundamental principle of morality and the rules for both po-. (shrink)

By the time of his death in 2006, Sir Peter Strawson was regarded as one of the world's most distinguished philosophers. Unavailable for many years,_ Scepticism and Naturalism_ is a profound reflection on two classic philosophical problems by a philosopher at the pinnacle of his career. Based on his acclaimed Woodbridge lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1983, Strawson begins with a discussion of scepticism, which he defines as questioning the adequacy of our grounds for holding various beliefs. He then (...) draws deftly on Hume and Wittgenstein to argue that we must distinguish between 'hard', scientific naturalism; or 'soft', humanistic naturalism. In the remaining chapters the author takes up several issues in which sceptical doubts play an important role, in particular the nature of transcendental arguments and including the objectivity of moral philosophy, the mental and the physical, and the existence of abstract entities. _Scepticism and Naturalism_ is essential reading for those seeking an introduction to the work of one of the twentieth century’s most important and original philosophers. This reissue includes a substantial new foreword by Quassim Cassam and a fascinating intellectual autobiography by Strawson, which together form an excellent introduction to his life and work. (shrink)

This fourth and final volume of the monumental commentary on Wittgenstein's _Philosophical Investigations_ covers pp 428-693 of the book. Like the previous volumes, it consists of philosophical essays and exegesis.

First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

By the time of his death in 2006, Sir Peter Strawson was regarded as one of the world's most distinguished philosophers. Unavailable for many years,_ Scepticism and Naturalism_ is a profound reflection on two classic philosophical problems by a philosopher at the pinnacle of his career. Based on his acclaimed Woodbridge lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1983, Strawson begins with a discussion of scepticism, which he defines as questioning the adequacy of our grounds for holding various beliefs. He then (...) draws deftly on Hume and Wittgenstein to argue that we must distinguish between 'hard', scientific naturalism; or 'soft', humanistic naturalism. In the remaining chapters the author takes up several issues in which sceptical doubts play an important role, in particular the nature of transcendental arguments and including the objectivity of moral philosophy, the mental and the physical, and the existence of abstract entities. _Scepticism and Naturalism_ is essential reading for those seeking an introduction to the work of one of the twentieth century’s most important and original philosophers. This reissue includes a substantial new foreword by Quassim Cassam and a fascinating intellectual autobiography by Strawson, which together form an excellent introduction to his life and work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Daemonic Figures: Shakespeare and the Question of ConscienceEric SpencerDaemonic Figures: Shakespeare and the Question of Conscience, by Ned Lukacher; x & 228 pp. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, $37.50 cloth, $15.95 paper.Daemonic Figures is a specialist’s book twice over. Profiting from it requires not only considerable familiarity with Heidegger, but also unquestioning acceptance of the rhetorical conventions and critical methods of contemporary theory. Lukacher uses these conventions and (...) methods to argue that conscience, properly understood, poses uncomfortable questions about the origins of self-knowledge, and leads to a mysterious but presumably enriching encounter with the limits of our certainty. Shakespeare enters the argument as the supreme example of a poet who discovers, through sensitivity to the ambiguities of language, how to peer without flinching into the Heideggerian abyss. Although the book relies too heavily on Heidegger’s unforgiving idiom, and pauses too seldom to justify suggestive but tenuous claims, at its heart lie hard, interesting questions about what having a conscience means.Lukacher wishes to restore to the idea of conscience all its paradoxical force. As a silent inner voice carrying a moral imperative from elsewhere, conscience immediately suggests an internally divided self. And although, according to Lukacher, Christian tradition locates the source of the imperative in God, and classical tradition in natural law, conscience remains irreducibly “uncanny,” because “the most intimate site of human habitation [i.e., the self] is also the strangest of places, for it is there that the (unfamiliar) god comes to presence through the language of moral judgment that tells us that we are and that because we are what we are we should act thus” (p. 7). For Lukacher, then, the question of conscience is the question of being, a question without an answer because it involves the unthinkable idea of something prior to and beyond being. The book argues that whatever speaks to us under the name of conscience must be both within and without any categories we have to explain it.Hence “daemonic figures”: drawing on the Greek notion of a realm of daimones dwelling between the human and divine worlds, Lukacher claims that the “daemon is the cipher, the name, and the figure for the incontrovertible [End Page 240] ghostliness, the familiar strangeness, that dwells between the perceptions and reflections of consciousness and the enigmatic ground of Being itself” (p. 2), or “the medium in which we come to ourselves as precisely that which is divided from itself... from the outset” (p. 6). And because, in Lukacher’s scheme, language articulates this daemonic mediation, we must seek in literary works which explore conscience—like Hamlet and Macbeth—traces of uncanniness welling up through ostensibly coherent words. Literary value accordingly involves “giving us the words with which to bring that enigmatic lack to presence” (p. 92). Simultaneously ubiquitous and inscrutable, conscience both calls to and evades us, and literature makes its home in such paradoxical territory.It follows that Lukacher seeks in texts brief flashes of something else in the midst of what’s apparently going on, a procedure which constantly risks arbitrary idiosyncrasy. For instance, in his chapter on Hamlet, Lukacher notes that the Player’s description of Priam’s death includes a line—“and with a hideous crash / Takes prisoner Pyrrhus’ ear”—whose sequence of sounds produces a ghostly authorial signature: sh... akes... Pyr... ear. And because this “countersignature” appears fragmented, in a context of hesitation, destruction and decline, Lukacher claims it creates an allegory of the “nonrelation at the heart of self-revelation” (p. 135). That is, it (and the larger drama of Hamlet’s revenge to which it obliquely gestures) reveals that at the heart of authorship, of authorized speech, of the moral law of conscience, lies “the silent play of the letter” (p. 135), the “daemonic figure” of dissolution in the midst of self-assertion, which unsettles all authorization. Hence Hamlet’s famous difficulties—he hears the whisper of Otherness in what ought to be a straightforward moral imperative to vengeance.Lukacher justifies this procedure by noting that “Derrida’s writing, no less than that of Heidegger [and presumably Shakespeare], relies on the invention of figures and metaphors through which... (shrink)

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional conception of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial condition fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches respectively. In (...) the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

When I offered this title, I was engaging myself to investigate an apparent difference between two kinds of intentionality, in the hope that I should be able to find some firm logical criterion to distinguish them. I was less successful in this than I had hoped. I think I have gained a certain amount of insight into the logic and semantics of one kind of intentional context, largely due to the work I was doing while visiting the University of Pennsylvania (...) on Frege and on Michael Dummett’s monumental commentary on Frege. But as regards the other variety of intentionality I am still very much in the dark; so I am giving you thus far merely a progress report on that. (shrink)

Collection of works on literature theory, translated into Mongolian language.