Ostensibly a directory of philosophical terms, this book is actually far more: a relatively sophisticated introduction into the thinking of Greek philosophers through a historical examination of key terms and concepts. Seeking as far as possible to set the terms in their own context without the ramifications of later context and connotation, Peters approaches each as it were both vertically and horizontally. Entries, given in Roman alphabetization, are arranged in dictionary style and range from a line or so to (...) eight or ten pages for crucial terms like noûs or psyche. An English-Greek index provides the Greek equivalent for English terms. Each entry is generously cross-referenced, and the whole preceded by a brief but stimulating preface and preliminary note on language and philosophy. "To lighten the historical baggage" Peters substitutes generally a terminology transliterated from the Greek; this offers the enormous advantage of breaking through the frustrating ambiguity of would-be English translations; it also makes the terminology available to the many without a knowledge of Greek. On the other hand it might have been useful to have retained the original Greek alphabetization alongside the Romanized transliteration--partly as a bridge to the recognition of the Greek terms as they occur in the literature, and partly as a bridge in the reverse direction for those for whom the Romanized transliteration likewise requires a pause of recognition. Again, the book is geared to "the intermediate student"--rather than to either the beginner who, as Peters himself observes, would be better served by a history of ancient philosophy and perhaps a dictionary of basic terms, or the professional scholar who would require a treatment "both more massive and more nuanced." Thus it offers far less in the way of detailed references but far more meat in terms of substantial content than, say, Liddell and Scott. Any frustration experienced by the professional scholar in the treatment of his own particular interest and competence is, however, outweighed by the value of the book as a tool of reference useful not only to students and scholars in philosophy, but also to those in classics, theology, and even linguistics.--R. D. (shrink)

Ostensibly a directory of philosophical terms, this book is actually far more: a relatively sophisticated introduction into the thinking of Greek philosophers through a historical examination of key terms and concepts. Seeking as far as possible to set the terms in their own context without the ramifications of later context and connotation, Peters approaches each as it were both vertically and horizontally. Entries, given in Roman alphabetization, are arranged in dictionary style and range from a line or so to (...) eight or ten pages for crucial terms like noûs or psyche. An English-Greek index provides the Greek equivalent for English terms. Each entry is generously cross-referenced, and the whole preceded by a brief but stimulating preface and preliminary note on language and philosophy. "To lighten the historical baggage" Peters substitutes generally a terminology transliterated from the Greek; this offers the enormous advantage of breaking through the frustrating ambiguity of would-be English translations; it also makes the terminology available to the many without a knowledge of Greek. On the other hand it might have been useful to have retained the original Greek alphabetization alongside the Romanized transliteration--partly as a bridge to the recognition of the Greek terms as they occur in the literature, and partly as a bridge in the reverse direction for those for whom the Romanized transliteration likewise requires a pause of recognition. Again, the book is geared to "the intermediate student"--rather than to either the beginner who, as Peters himself observes, would be better served by a history of ancient philosophy and perhaps a dictionary of basic terms, or the professional scholar who would require a treatment "both more massive and more nuanced." Thus it offers far less in the way of detailed references but far more meat in terms of substantial content than, say, Liddell and Scott. Any frustration experienced by the professional scholar in the treatment of his own particular interest and competence is, however, outweighed by the value of the book as a tool of reference useful not only to students and scholars in philosophy, but also to those in classics, theology, and even linguistics.--R. D. (shrink)

Ernst Lubitsch, the great author of Hollywood comedy and pioneer of such genres as the sophisticated romantic comedy, the musical, and the screwball comedy, is a relatively overlooked figure in mainstream film theory. In this collection, renowned world thinkers and philosophers position Lubitsch as the premium director of subversive cinema, reflecting on his attitude toward love and politics which correspond to contemporary issues.Followers of the Hegelian, Marxist, Freudian, Lacanian, and Deleuzian traditions discuss thephilosophical, political, and ethical dimensions of Lubitsch's (...) late Hollywood work. They focus on love as stealing, the ethics of style, and comedy in times of austerity in the director's masterpiece, _Trouble in Paradise_ (1932); answer the question of why comedy is always polygamous; discuss links between masochism, melancholia, and ideology in _Ninotchka_(1939); celebrate the ethical gesture of comedy in _To Be or Not to Be_ (1942); and promote the revolutionary comic spirit of Lubitsch's last directorial effort, _Cluny Brown_ (1946). These essays' witty, subversive, and provocative approaches highlight Lubitsch's unique understanding of love, sex, comedy, and politics and idiosyncratic conception of totalitarian"nightmares" and capitalistic "paradise," countering the non-dialectic and politically correct discourse of mainstream and independent cinema today. (shrink)

In 1798 the French Directory began to collect moral statistics systematically for the first time in history. The bureaucratic and scientific developments that preceded this policy are well known. Yet the reasons for its abrupt adoption, and the intellectual origins of moral statistics (as distinguished from the topographical statistics previously practiced), have until now remained obscure. This paper contends that, in the aftermath of the Terror, Joseph de Maistre sketched philosophical tools and made political observations that aided the rise of (...) the new state science. In particular, Maistre’s anti-Rousseauian essay On the State of Nature (composed 1794-1796), a critique of Rousseau’s second Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), outlined theoretical concepts crucial to moral statistics. Maistre’s widely read Considerations on France (1797) later made these concepts available to the French public in an accessible and memorable style. In On the State of Nature Maistre set down his ideas on reason, human nature, human perfectibility, justice, conscience, Providence and chance. These ideas presented the agency of the moral in an innovative way that not only suggested immediate systematic applications, but also helped prepare the French sociological project. Indeed if any text made the theoretical shift away from the model of human nature to the paradigm of normal people with laws of dispersion that Ian Hacking claims set French sociology apart, it is On the State of Nature. Moreover, Maistre’s realist critique of Rousseau’s imagination augured the notion of the social fact that Comte transformed, and Durkheim defined. (shrink)

The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract idea (...) of non-linearity, however, can be easily misunderstood and has, in the past, led to incorrect and counterintuitive conclusions about what may count as part of one’s overall cognitive system. In order to prevent any further mistakes I revisit dynamical systems theory to study the nature of the continuous mutual interactions that give rise to the aforementioned non-linear relations. Moreover, focusing on these interactions will allow us to provide two distinct arguments in support of the ontological postulation of extended cognitive systems, as well as an objective criterion of constitution. Accordingly, I put forward a version of HEC that treats continuous mutual interactions (and the resultant non-linear relations) not just as sufficient but also as necessary for cognitive extension. Such a qualified version of HEC may exclude certain alleged cases of cognitive extension where the agent does not mutually interact with his artifacts (e.g., shopping lists and directory services), but it is immune both to the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and it can be sharply distinguished from HEMC. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bioethics ConsultationPat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)(John La Puma, M.D., from the Department of Medicine at Lutheran General Hospital in Chicago, contacted the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature and suggested bioethics consultation as a topic for the Scope Note Series. He provided an extensive list of citations about ethics consultations collected by him and by David Schiedermayer, M.D., for their new book Ethics Consultation: A Practical Guide.)In Ethics Consultation in (...) Health Care, editors John Fletcher, Norman Quist, and Albert R. Jonsen (I, 1989) define ethics consultation as "the provision of specialized help in identifying, analyzing, and resolving ethical problems that arise in clinical care. In medical ethics the area of consultation has grown rapidly since 1978 when Edmund D. Pellegrino (II, 1978) noted, "we cannot separate technical-moral decisions from the philosophic principles we use to justify them. Medicine and ethics must be engaged with each other at every level."In 1980 Albert Jonsen raised the question of whether an ethicist could be a consultant and said that the ethicist as consultant is a casuist, one whose moral reasoning is based on a system of reasoning that is applied to particular cases. He describes historical casuistry in Western culture, comparing it to modern moral philosophy, and suggests that a "new casuistry seems timely" for ethics consultation (II, Jonsen 1980). By 1984 ethicist Ruth Purtilo recorded her thoughts following an ethics consultation. She raised questions about the ethicist's place on a hospital staff and how to make that role appropriate and beneficial to all concerned, saying that "the ethicist retreats after the consultation; under no circumstances would the outcome of an ethics consultation be that the ethicist became the primary care giver or assumed ongoing responsibility for the clinical management of a case" (II, Purtilo 1984). Nevertheless, in 1992 two physician-ethicists who had been called as ethics consultants for a patient who had requested that he be removed from his ventilator reported that they became the persons who turned off the ventilator and administered the drugs that eased his dying (II, Edwards and Tolle 1992).In recognition of the growing number of persons identifying themselves as [End Page 433] consultants, the Society for Bioethics Consultation was founded in October 1985 as a professional society of persons engaged in bioethics consultation. It encourages and supports consultation, assists in establishing clinical education programs, and raises funds for consultation education. Although the Society has no permanent office, the president (currently, George Kanoti in the Cleveland Clinic Foundation's Bioethics Department) conducts its work and plans an annual meeting.The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) established new criteria concerning ethics in its 1992 Manual (III, JCAHO 1992) and in a special issue of QRB devoted to ethics consultation (I, Defining Quality 1992). These publications undoubtedly have contributed to the increased use of experts in medical ethics. The Manual notes that all organizations seeking accreditation should have some sort of "mechanism for the consideration of ethical issues arising in the care of patients and to provide education to care givers and patients on ethical issues in health care." A health care institution's eligibility for JCAHO accreditation, which is required for federal reimbursement, requires adherence to this specification (III, JCAHO 1992).The new International Directory of Bioethics Organizations provides an index of 129 different groups that indicated to the authors that they offer bioethics consultations. Of these, 83 are in the United States and 46 are in other countries. The ethics consultants included in the directory encompass a broad group of professionals who will assist patients, families, and primary care medical staff in finding solutions to ethical dilemmas resulting from use of new technologies or new treatments in health care. Consultants often come from the health fields: physicians, nurses, and other health personnel, but other professionals are also active as ethics consultants. Lawyers, pastoral counselors, philosophers, and social workers also offer bioethics consultation services (III, Nolen and Coutts 1993).Drs. Siegler, Pellegrino, and Singer wrote in 1990 that "Physician-ethicists and professional ethicists will continue to work side by side in the future. One is not likely to replace the other, nor is this desirable, because... (shrink)

The aim of this article is to sketch the procedural nature of the modus in which Deleuze reads the other philosophers. The hermeneutical problem indicated by the indecision to consider his books on different authors as an authorized interpretation or as fantasist utilization may be scattered if we understand his hermeneutical attempts both as interpretation and construction. In addition, this indecision affects the guild of Deleuzian exegetes in respect to the directory idea which could point out the general strategy (...) of his philosophy. (shrink)

Haci Bektash Veli (d. 1271[?]), considered to be the founder of the Bektashism, is one of the leading representatives of Turkish-Islamic thought and belief traditions. He is a person whose influence continues today, as in the past, not only in Anatolia, but also in many countries such as Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and even Hungary, both as historical personality and with his mythical aspects, and his teachings. Haci Bektash Veli and his influence in the entire Turkish-Islamic world, especially (...) in Anatolia, have caught the attention of the researchers from the fields of History, Language, Literature, Sociology, etc. Since the first studies on Haci Bektash Veli and Bektashism have been revealed, many works have been written in this field in various societies. Moreover, these studies become an independent research area over time. In particular, orientalists, including many turkologists, historians, philologists and experts in Islamic studies, were involved in this field, wondering about Turkish-Islamic world. In other words, many researches about Haci Bektash Veli and Bektashism have been carried out both in our country and abroad; original works and translations, such as articles, encyclopaedia articles, monographs, journal special issues, tribute books, surveys and publications, annuals, bibliographic studies, etc. were published in this field. These studies also found their own expression in the scientific events, such as special national and international congresses, symposiums and conferences. Russian-Soviet researchers, who mostly include turkologists, historians, philologists, ethnologists and experts in Islamic historical researches and have a large expert staff, have focused on the great role and effects of Haci Bektash Veli in the preservation of Turkish-Islamic thought and culture. Correspondingly, the essence and philosophical foundations of Bektashism have also attracted their attention. As a result of this process, that began with curiosity and turned into academic interest, a significant literature in Russian on Haci Bektash Veli and Bektashism has emerged. The aim of this paper is to identify- within the available possibilities- Russian written sources on Haci Bektash Veli and Bektashism, to reveal the prominent studies among them and to present comments and evaluations of Russian researchers and other authors who have written their academic publications in Russian in this field, by using the method of description and evaluation. We should specify that in the paper we followed a chronological order taking into account the dates on which these studies were conducted. Finally, this paper aims to contribute to the literature in Turkish on Haci Bektash Veli and Bektashism. Thus, the author of the paper hopes that the paper will be useful in terms of the directory of sources and materials for the ongoing and future researches in our country. (shrink)

PERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE of professional philosophy in North America at this historic juncture is its scope and scale. The historian Bruce Kuklick entitled his informative study of academic philosophy in the United States, The Rise of American Philosophy: 1860-1930, even though his book dealt only with the Department of Philosophy of Harvard University. This institution's prominence on the American philosophical scene in the early years of the century was such that this parochial-seeming narrowing of focus to one single (...) department--with its half-dozen or so philosophers--was not totally absurd for the period at issue. But today it would certainly be so. The American Philosophical Association, to which most United States academic practitioners of the discipline belong, presently has more than eight thousand members, and the comprehensive Directory of American Philosophers for 1992-1993 lists well over ten thousand philosophers affiliated to colleges and universities in the United States and Canada. Admittedly, this profession is small potatoes compared with other academic enterprises; the Scientific Research Society Sigma XI currently has a membership of more than one hundred thousand scientists, and the Modern Language Association has more than thirty-two thousand members. All the same, a small town of not inconsiderable size could be populated exclusively with contemporary North American academic philosophers. To be sure, its demographics would be rather unusual. Only just under twenty percent would be women; and blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans would constitute just over one percent of the population. The social classes above and below the middle are underrepresented in this community, and a disproportionate fraction of its members comes from families of professional status. Moreover, for reasons that require a deeper sociological analysis than can be attempted here, the profession attracts a disproportionately larger fraction of Catholics, Jews, and immigrants. (shrink)

Philosophy Born of Struggle is an ambitious undertaking. It is explicitly conceived, the editor explains, as “a guide to the ideas of modern Afro‐American philosophers,” and “a historical resource directory for their works.”1 An anthology of texts with bibliographical apparatus, the volume has an implicit hortatory purpose as well. In representing Afro‐American philosophy as a “unidimensional text of divergent components”—concerned with the meaning of democracy and the human costs of “capitalism, colonial domination, and ontological designation by race”—the editor dignifies (...) Afro‐American philosophy conceptually, as a subject in its own right, calling in effect for its sustained historical treatment as such.2. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:504 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Earle's position, needless to say, is a radical one. If taken seriously it appears to commit him either to a private language doctrine or, more likely, to silence. If the concepts embodied in our language are public, intersubjective concepts, then either a minimal characterization of singular human existence is possible or Earle is stranded in a hopeless, speechless solipsism. I shall mention just one other (...) paper, Natanson's "Alienation and Social Role." Natanson distinguishes role-taking from the more basic activity which he refers to as the intentionality of role-taking or, as he terms it, "role-action." He attempts to give a phenomenological grounding to the notion of role-taking, thereby showing the relevance of phenomenology to problems in social philosophy and sociology. Though a difficult paper, "Alienation and Social Role" is a helpful study of various structures presupposed in social interaction. Natanson's analyses go a long way toward dispelling the view that a phenomenological starting point commits one to subjectivism. I might have mentioned other, equally instructive essays. These, however, give some indication of the diversity of concerns inherent in the American phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology in America documents these concerns well. STEPHEN A, ERICKSON Pomona College Heimkehr ins Eigentliche. By Walter Robert Corti. (Amriswil, Switzerland, Amriswiler BiichereL 1969. Pp. 152. n.p.) This collection of essays written between 1935 and 1966 gives a fine example of the changes in the concern for the meaning of human existence during these thirty years both in the mind and emotions of an individual philosopher and in Western culture generally. The essay from which the title is taken dates from 1958. It is a charming, poetic autobiography, describing the growth of philosophic and scientific wonder from the author's childhood, when he was thrilled by the wonders of biology and chemistry, to his more general wonder at being in and of the world of wonders, culminating in a self-conscious wonder about the implications of a wondering being in a wonderful world. The early essay of 1935, entitled Zu den Dingen is a vivid statement of a Heidegger-inspired existentialism, which analyses the difference between the attempt of Husserl to understand Sachen by his search for the essence of an object ;rod his formulation of phenomenology, and the very different appreciation of things in nature, which demands a non-verbal familiarity or "communion" with another natural being in existential terms, not in terms of the concept of "essence." The later essay of 1958 contains a critical history of the relations between the theories of explication, evolution, and development as cosmologies. After the historical survey it describes the physiological and mental restlessness of man. In this context, the problem of the meaning of existence is explored, not as a question to be answered, but as a significant form of human restlessness which has implications for a kind of restlessness in nature and in cosmic process. Beside these essays which are contributions to the history of recent philosophy, there are several other essays related to the varied and remarkable interests and BOOKS RECEIVED 505 achievements of Dr. Corti, partly in his activities as a distinguished Swiss public leader, partly in connection with his work as director of the Archly fiir genetische Philosophie in Winterthur. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California BOOKS RECEIVED First Editions Adler, Mortimer. The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I970. Pp. xiii+361. $7.95. Allen, Gay Wilson. William lames. Pamphlets on American Writers, Number 88. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota, 1970. Pp. 48. $.95. Bahm, Archie. Directory o[ American Philosophers. V 1970-71. Alburquerque: Archie I. Bahm, I970. Pp. 436. $I4.95. Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 463. Paper. $2.95. A review of this book appeared in the Journal, ~ 4, Vol. 6. Cailliet, Emile. Journey Into Light. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 117. $3.95. Cantore, Enrico. Atomic Order: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Microphysics. (~mbridge (Mass.): The MIT Press, 1969. Pp. xi+334. $12.50. Caponigri, A. Robert. Philosophy from the Renaissance to the Romantic Age. A History of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:78 Discussion c:\users\kenneth\documents\type3401\rj 3401 193 red.docx 2014-05-14 8:54 PM MORE WIT IN PM Michael E. Berumen 37155 Dickerson Run Windsor, co 80550, usa [email protected] eldom does one find a piece by Bertrand Russell without a morsel of humour or wryness. Sometimes the Russellian wit is obvious. Other times it is more subtle, maybe even requiring a second look just to be sure. Headlong into some of his most technical (...) and difficult works, a delightful bon mot might suddenly punctuate the philosophical solemnity. One doesn’t ordinarily think of Principia Mathematica as a sourcebook for Russellian waggishness, but it is there, to be sure—albeit one will negotiate many pages of symbols and scant prose before finding a specimen. Perhaps the best-known witticism amongst cognoscenti is, after having proved 1 + 1 = 2 (PM ∗110.643, 2: 83), the authors observe, “The above proposition is occasionally useful.” The most complete directory for these jewels that I know is by Kenneth Blackwell.1 I thought it unlikely another would be found, so imagine my surprise when, after having dusted off my seldom-used Volume 3 to look something up, I came across a droll nugget that (to the best of my knowledge) has not been highlighted before. Something tells me Russell was biting down on his pipe stem and had a twinkle in his eye when he (I assume Russell, but they, anyway) wrote in the summary of Section A of Part vi, “Quantity”: Great difficulties are caused, in this section, by the existence-theorems and the question of types. These difficulties disappear if the axiom of infinity is assumed, but it seems improper to make the theory of (say) 2/3 depend upon the assumption that the number of objects in the universe is not finite. (PM 3: 234; italics mine) “Improper” indeed, the erstwhile Victorian says! By way of explanation, he goes on to say, We have, accordingly, taken pains not to make this assumption, except where, as in the theory of real numbers, it is really essential, and not merely convenient. Even that has a bit of Russellian sarcasm. So, accept the challenge and find another. In the meantime, take comfort in the knowledge that the sometimes controversial Axiom of Infinity is an unnecessary assumption in mixing one part soda and two parts Red Hackle. 1 “The Wit and Humour of Principia Mathematica”, Russell 31 (2011): 151–60. S... (shrink)

This guide accompanies the following articles: Sonia Roca‐Royes, ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00363.x. Sonia Roca‐Royes, ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00364.x. Author’s Introduction Intuitively, George Clooney could lose a finger and he would still be him. Also intuitively, he could not lose his humanity without ceasing to be altogether. So while he could have one less finger, he could not be other than human. These intuitions suggest that (...) there are two kinds of properties: on the one hand, there are essential properties and, on the other, there are accidental properties. Essentialism is the view that captures those intuitions and claims that some of an object’s properties are essential and some are accidental. Essential properties are often appealed to in metaphysical arguments. Consider the famous Goliath–Lumpl example. Goliath is a clay‐statue, and Lumpl is the piece of clay from which Goliath is made. Are Goliath and Lumpl the same entity, or are they distinct, despite coinciding in the same spatial region (at least for a period of time)? An argument in favour of their distinctness appeals to essential properties. Let s be Goliath’s shape. Lumpl’s current shape is therefore also s. It seems that Lumpl could lose its current shape and still exist. Yet, if Goliath – the statue – were melted, for instance, it would cease to exist. Behind this reasoning is the belief that having shape s is essential to Goliath but not to Lumpl. Goliath and Lumpl can therefore be distinguished by their essential properties. Consequently, and by Leibniz’s Indiscernibility of Identicals– according to which identicals cannot be distinguished – Goliath and Lumpl are distinct objects. The essentialist intuition appealed to in this argument is that shapes are essential to statues but not to pieces of clay. Of course, this particular argument – like any other – can be resisted. It is all the same a good illustration of how essentialism is put to work in metaphysics. A good understanding of the broad phenomenon of essentialism is therefore an unavoidable task, since the credit of a lot of metaphysical arguments partially depends on it. Although the topic has been studied for millenniums, the two papers that this guide accompanies are focused on contemporary issues in essentialism, and so will do this guide too. Author Recommends Fine, Kit. ‘Essence and Modality.’Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16. One of the most cited and influential papers against the modal account of the notion of essence and in favour of what has subsequently been referred to in the literature as ‘the Finean account of the notion of essence’. Forbes, Graeme. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. A foundational work in modality and essentialism. The first two chapters provide a valuable introduction to propositional and first order modal logic. Chapters 5–8 constitute a comprehensive essentialist theory and contain some of the most cited arguments for individual essences. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Another foundational work. With this book – which is, among other things, a defence of a Direct Theory of Reference – Kripke rescues, after Quine’s powerful attacks against it, and using the semantic rigidity of proper names, (Aristotelian) essentialism. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. An extremely valuable recent contribution to the field. Here, Mackie defends that, although essentialism is a real phenomenon, there are much fewer essential properties than is standardly believed, and labels this view ‘Minimalist Essentialism’. Beyond the intrinsic interest of the defence of Minimalist Essentialism, the book is also highly recommended for its clear reconstructions – and discussions – of some of the most influential essentialist arguments. In addition, the book’s bibliography is very comprehensive and updated, and it might be a useful resource for students. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: OUP, 1974. Yet another foundational work. Here, Plantinga offers his essentialist theory which, like Forbes’, also incorporates individual essences although of a very different sort from Forbes’. Plantinga believes in purely non‐qualitative individual essences, whereas Forbes’ aims at purely qualitative ones. The book is also excellent to provide a solid background to those unfamiliar with the topic. Roca‐Royes. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011): 54–64, doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00363.x. This is one of the two papers this guide accompanies. It contains a comparative examination of two opposed responses to the problem of possibilia. One solution crucially appeals to individual essences and another – compatible with them, but not dependent on them – makes existence a necessary‐whenever‐possible property. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Against what Kripke’s Naming and Necessity might have induced us to believe, Salmon’s Reference and Essence argues that essentialism cannot be derived from the Direct Theory of Reference. Our commitments to essentialism should therefore come from somewhere else. It also contains one of the most cited and influential arguments against the transitivity of the accessibility relation between worlds, which relies on flexible essential properties. Online Materials The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy publishes extremely valuable entries on a vast variety of topics which are conveniently updated and revised. On essentialism, the following are to be highlighted: Teresa Robertson, ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties’: Takashi Yagisawa, ‘Possible Objects’: Penelope Mackie, ‘Transworld Identity’: PhilPapers is an interactive directory of online philosophical publications to which one can subscribe, and which allows authors to submit their latest work. One might find it useful to check this on a regular basis, since contents are constantly updated. The following link is to the site’s resources on essentialism:. Sample Syllabus Because the phenomenon of essentialism is very broad, one can design an entire course on it, thereby having enough time to see some of the issues in considerable depth. The sample syllabus suggested here is of one such course, focusing exclusively on contemporary issues in essentialism. Less deeply, the topic of essentialism can also be introduced in a general course on metaphysics or on modality. To this effect, focusing on some of the topics suggested in weeks 1–6 below would perhaps be more appropriate than focusing on the more complex issues suggested for weeks 7–10. Week 1. Introduction to Essentialism. Two Notions of Essential Property: The Modal Account and the Finean Account Fine, Kit. ‘Essence and Modality.’Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16. Robertson, Teresa. ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties.’Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 1–2. Week 2. Essentialist Principles, I: Three Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III. Mackie, Penelope. ‘Identity, Time and Necessity.’Proceedings for the Aristotelian Society 98 (1998): 59–78. Rohbraugh, Guy and deRosset, Louis. ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin.’Mind 133 (2004): 705–25. Week 3. Essentialist Principles, II: Essentiality of Kind Brody, Baruch. ‘Natural Kinds and Real Essences.’Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 431–46. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapters 7 and 8. Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Chapter 3. Week 4. Essentialist Principles, III: Natural Kind Essentialism Kripke, Saul. ‘Identity and Necessity.’Identity and Individuation, Ed. M. K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press, 1971. 135–64. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III. Putnam, Hilary. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”.’Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 215–71. Week 5. Sufficient‐for‐Existence Properties (and Cross‐World Identification Principles) Chisholm, Roderick. ‘Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions.’Noûs 1.1 (1967): 1–8. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapter 3. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Chapter 7. Week 6. Individual Essences Mackie, Penelope. ‘Transworld Identity.’The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Section 4. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 3–4. Week 7. Flexible Essential Properties and S4 Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 3. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Appendix 1. Week 8. Individual Essences and Possibilia Peacocke, Christopher. ‘Principles for Possibilia.’Noûs 36.3 (2002): 486–508. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 2. Week 9. Necessitism and Essentialism: A Third Notion of Essential Property Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. ‘In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete.’Philosophical Studies 84 (1996): 283–94. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 5. Williamson, Timothy. ‘Bare Possibilia.’Erkenntnis 48 (1998): 257–73. Week 10. Essentialism and Modal Logic: The Barcan Formula Menzel, Christopher. ‘Actualism.’The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Section 2. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 4. Focus Questions • There is a debate as to whether essential properties– as well as individual essences and sufficient‐for‐existence properties– should be specified in purely qualitative terms or whether, by contrast, non‐purely qualitative – or even purely non‐qualitative – specifications are allowed. What are the main arguments against the availability of purely qualitative specifications? • Flexible essential properties seem to be more plausible than non‐flexible ones. Yet, together with sufficient‐for‐existence properties, they imply flexible individual essences. How plausible are these? Should we revise our intuitions supporting flexible essential properties? • What are, ultimately, the ontological differences between a necessitist approach to possibilia and an individual‐essences‐based approach? • According to necessitism, essential properties do not impose necessary conditions for an object’s existence. Can the necessitist, nonetheless, capture this role of essential properties by saying that, when it comes to possibly concrete entities, essential properties provide necessary conditions for an object’s concreteness? Can they, on a similar vein, also offer sufficient‐for‐concreteness properties as a surrogate for the (non‐necessitist’s) sufficient‐for‐existence properties? • Even after the enormous amount of literature that essentialism has generated, we are far from reaching a general agreement as to which properties are essential and which are accidental. Should this be a reason to reflect, critically, on the methodology that is being used in the arguments for or against essential properties? Is reliance on intuitions inescapable? (shrink)

Bangladesh Bioethics Society (BBS) is inviting all National and International individuals and institutions from any discipline those who are interessted in bioethicsto to become a member of BBS. Bioethics is interdisciplinary study of philosophical, ethical, social, legal, medical, ethnological, environmental, economic, therapeutic, religious, and other related issues arising from biological sciences and technologies, and their applications in human society and the biosphere. Membership Benefits: Leadership Opportunities: Hold elective committee / Subcommittee of BBS Voting right: Right to vote in BBS election. (...) Networking: Be listed in and access online BBS member directory. Free Journal Subscription Access to attend bioethical meetings/ conferences/ seminars/ workshops on bioethics in county and abroad. Access to attend in research / training on bioethics. Access to attend Annual General Meeting Receiving the Societies Newsletters and other mailings concerning Society activities. Get priority for registration waiver, free accommodation and meals during conferences/ Seminars of BBS, in some cases travel grants. Reviews articles for the Journal and would be invited for lecture, book writing etc Please contact to Bangladesh Bioethics Society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Unsaying Life Stories:The Self-Representational Art of Shirin Neshat and GhazelAphrodite Désirée Navab (bio)What connects the two artists in Figures 1 and 2 across time and place? (See pages 40 and 41.) The protagonists seem to be so "at home" in their landscape that they do not stand out as disruptions to a cultural rhythm. They are wearing clothing that symbolizes Iran, and they are in an environment that evokes (...) Iranian art and architecture. In Figure 1, a scene in Shirin Neshat's video Soliloquy (1999), a woman stands near the kind of dome one often sees in Islamic architecture; the compatibility of the curved and the straight lines is striking. The woman is washing herself, possibly in preparation for prayer. Her hands are artistically dyed with henna. Her eyes are closed as the water runs down her face. She seems to be unaware of the camera, involved in a private moment, a purification ritual perhaps. Her clothing, her hands, and the architectural background are all consistent with familiar images of the Middle East. The woman marching in a black chador in a video still by Ghazel (Figure 2) also seems to be quite "at home." The text underneath the image says that both her grandfathers were colonels. This "bothness" is repeated by the text written underneath the image, which appears both in English and in French. She marches to the right of the frame with the straight posture and hint of pants and boots characteristic of a soldier. Like the protagonist in Neshat's video, she neither looks at the camera nor seems to care that it is there. She seems to be re-enacting a private moment of family history.At least, this is what the images say at first glance. Upon closer inspection, the viewer learns that the two protagonists are the artists themselves. They are more than conscious of the camera; they have actually directed these visual narratives. They are posing. This is one role from among many that they could have played. Both artists are native to Iran, but they are [End Page 39] acting in their own productions. They are playing a particular role. They have made the directorial decisions about camera angle and distance, about the time and place, and about the final look of the production. They make images: they are fully aware that they have pictured themselves alongside symbols of Iran. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.Shirin Neshat. Soliloquy, 1999, production still.So why are they pretending not to be conscious of the camera? The conscious decisions of the artists point to an issue that is left unsaid but whose absence says a lot. Perhaps, beneath all this effort to seem comfortable, there is discomfort as well. Are these people in fact "at home," or has home become foreign to them? Has this alienation propelled these artists to picture themselves together with readily identifiable, traditional markers of Iranian culture? Are these productions a way of re-negotiating their place with their native land, to find a voice, a space from which to speak?Culturally hybrid persons are often caught in the crossfire of prejudices. For hybrid Iranians, these prejudices are exacerbated by international political tensions that fall along three dimensions of limited visions. They include historical prejudice, where each nation dominates the other in the telling of history; cultural prejudice, stemming from mutual suspicion and ignorance; and political prejudice, as a result of inflexibility, of an unwillingness to [End Page 40] envision the other's view. Art can be a powerful means for challenging the stereotypes of mutually antagonistic nations. In autobiographical art, moreover, artists may use the "telling-self" to "unsay" what has been attributed to them through these stereotypes. By literally and metaphorically engaging the public in seeing alternative realities and histories, these artist-philosophers offer an alternative of historical collaboration, cultural knowledge, and political flexibility. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 2.Ghazel, Me series, 1997–2000, video still.This deconstructive approach to representation is a significant feature of the camera-based work of two contemporary Iranian women artists: Shirin Neshat (b. 1957) and Ghazel (b. 1966... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Who Hears?A Zen Buddhist PerspectiveRobert AitkenWestern psychologists and neurologists have attempted to use their concepts to explain East Asian religions for more than seventy-five years. Carl Jung (1875–1961) wrote a long foreword to Richard Wilhelm's The Secret of the Golden Flower back in 1931, which gave many readers in Europe and the Americas their first glimpse of philosophical Daoism.1 A generation later, Erich Fromm's conversations with D. T. Suzuki (...) were recorded in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis.2 In our own time, the Dalai Lama's collaborative work with neuroscientists and psychologists has received widespread attention,3 while academia has given James H. Austin's Zen and the Brain hearty approval.4The process of mutual understanding between Western scientists and teachers of East Asian religion is still incomplete, however, and in earlier times it had barely begun. I remember my amusement back in the 1970s, watching a video of monks trailing streams of wires attached to biofeedback instruments while they were walking formally and solemnly. Even in those early days it was apparent to me that for all their academic credentials, the scholars had started with an ignorance of the subject of their study. They were successful in measuring something in the brain relating to a samādhi condition, but while the monks may have grounded themselves more or less in a settled practice, who is to measure their appreciation of the mejiro chirping in the camellia bush just outside? Great masters of Zen, Zhaozhou, and Deshan and their successors did not talk about being settled, any more than neuroanataomists discuss the importance of the alphabet.The chirping of the mejiro might have reminded the monks of a case, a case that would lie in a dimension even further from the world of wires and dials. "Who is the master of hearing that sound?"5 This was the gist of a question by Bassui Tokushō Zenji—a question that became a public case, one kōan among many other kōans that have not been studied by science. It is time for such a study.My directory of Chinese kōans holds more than 5,500 neatly framed traditional stories set forth to guide the student.6 The modern Zen teacher is conversant with some 550 of these kōans, a number that is sufficient if... if.... There are several caveats. If the teacher treats kōans as historical artifacts, then the stories are no [End Page 89] longer kōans, and the teaching is perniciously misleading. Sometimes the teacher has gone only part way in kōan study. The great house of conventional wisdom has fallen, but he or she doesn't know it is ruined and holds forth in the old explanatory way. Sometimes the teacher has completed the long course of study, but elects to pontificate from within the wreckage of the old manor. Finally there are those who abandon the ruins completely for practice on the open road. Here is my gāthā pointing to that way:Stepping forth on the open road,I vow with all beingsTo distinguish the voices of birds,And make good use of my time.Bassui Zenji's kōan "Who is the master of hearing that sound?" could be paraphrased here at the Pālolo Zen Center as "Who is hearing that thrush singing on the railing outside?" If, in the days before I retired, a student were to respond, "I hear the thrush," I would not have approved. Bassui would not have approved. Intimacy would be missing, and intimacy is the Dao. Intimacy is the way of all the Buddhas. There is no Zen without intimacy; intimacy with what? Both the self and the thrush. That was Bassui's intention, you can be sure.Fayan met Dizang while on pilgrimage. Dizang asked, "What are you up to these days?"Fayan said, "I'm going around one pilgrimage, wherever my feet will carry me."Dizang asked, "What to you expect from pilgrimage?"Fayan said, "I don't know."Dizang said, "Not knowing is most intimate." Fayan underwent great realization. 7Zen Buddhism stresses intimacy, while in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:504 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Earle's position, needless to say, is a radical one. If taken seriously it appears to commit him either to a private language doctrine or, more likely, to silence. If the concepts embodied in our language are public, intersubjective concepts, then either a minimal characterization of singular human existence is possible or Earle is stranded in a hopeless, speechless solipsism. I shall mention just one other (...) paper, Natanson's "Alienation and Social Role." Natanson distinguishes role-taking from the more basic activity which he refers to as the intentionality of role-taking or, as he terms it, "role-action." He attempts to give a phenomenological grounding to the notion of role-taking, thereby showing the relevance of phenomenology to problems in social philosophy and sociology. Though a difficult paper, "Alienation and Social Role" is a helpful study of various structures presupposed in social interaction. Natanson's analyses go a long way toward dispelling the view that a phenomenological starting point commits one to subjectivism. I might have mentioned other, equally instructive essays. These, however, give some indication of the diversity of concerns inherent in the American phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology in America documents these concerns well. STEPHEN A, ERICKSON Pomona College Heimkehr ins Eigentliche. By Walter Robert Corti. (Amriswil, Switzerland, Amriswiler BiichereL 1969. Pp. 152. n.p.) This collection of essays written between 1935 and 1966 gives a fine example of the changes in the concern for the meaning of human existence during these thirty years both in the mind and emotions of an individual philosopher and in Western culture generally. The essay from which the title is taken dates from 1958. It is a charming, poetic autobiography, describing the growth of philosophic and scientific wonder from the author's childhood, when he was thrilled by the wonders of biology and chemistry, to his more general wonder at being in and of the world of wonders, culminating in a self-conscious wonder about the implications of a wondering being in a wonderful world. The early essay of 1935, entitled Zu den Dingen is a vivid statement of a Heidegger-inspired existentialism, which analyses the difference between the attempt of Husserl to understand Sachen by his search for the essence of an object ;rod his formulation of phenomenology, and the very different appreciation of things in nature, which demands a non-verbal familiarity or "communion" with another natural being in existential terms, not in terms of the concept of "essence." The later essay of 1958 contains a critical history of the relations between the theories of explication, evolution, and development as cosmologies. After the historical survey it describes the physiological and mental restlessness of man. In this context, the problem of the meaning of existence is explored, not as a question to be answered, but as a significant form of human restlessness which has implications for a kind of restlessness in nature and in cosmic process. Beside these essays which are contributions to the history of recent philosophy, there are several other essays related to the varied and remarkable interests and BOOKS RECEIVED 505 achievements of Dr. Corti, partly in his activities as a distinguished Swiss public leader, partly in connection with his work as director of the Archly fiir genetische Philosophie in Winterthur. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California BOOKS RECEIVED First Editions Adler, Mortimer. The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I970. Pp. xiii+361. $7.95. Allen, Gay Wilson. William lames. Pamphlets on American Writers, Number 88. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota, 1970. Pp. 48. $.95. Bahm, Archie. Directory o[ American Philosophers. V 1970-71. Alburquerque: Archie I. Bahm, I970. Pp. 436. $I4.95. Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 463. Paper. $2.95. A review of this book appeared in the Journal, ~ 4, Vol. 6. Cailliet, Emile. Journey Into Light. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 117. $3.95. Cantore, Enrico. Atomic Order: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Microphysics. (~mbridge (Mass.): The MIT Press, 1969. Pp. xi+334. $12.50. Caponigri, A. Robert. Philosophy from the Renaissance to the Romantic Age. A History of... (shrink)

This is a series of essays by a group of young writers on the influence of the ecumenical dialogue on the fuller understanding and consequently on the development of Christian doctrine. As Fr Lash puts it in his introduction: ‘if the contemporary Christian is going to discover the life-giving word in its wholeness, then the ecumenical movement becomes a critical factor in doctrinal development’. That is quite patently true. But what appears to the present reviewer as less exact and in (...) a certain sense misleading is the statement made in the same introduction : ‘The one sure way of betraying the truth which enlivens it would be for the church merely to repeat the formulas of yesterday. Significantly, a persistence in the repetition of dead formulas is the best way of ensuring the death of effective Christian witness, for if you can convince yourself that nothing new needs to be said, you are more than half-way to convincing yourself that nothing new needs to be done’. When Pope John XXIII pointed out the difference between the substance of the deposit of faith and the way in which it is presented, he assuredly had not in mind the dogmatic formulas in which the church expressed its faith in the course of its history. Or are the formulas of Nicea dead? or those of Chalcedon and Trent? One fails to see in what precise sense a formula can be termed dead. The first part of the book deals in five essays rather with the abstract principles behind the relationship between ecumenism and the development of doctrine, that is, between ecumenism and the church’s fuller understanding of the Christian message. The second part consists of a long essay by the Dutch Jesuit Fr Frans Jozef van Beeck, entitled: ‘Towards an ecumenical understanding of the sacraments’, dealing with the theologically very important and practically very delicate problem of communicatio in sacris. This essay deserves a very attentive but critical reading. One is somewhat surprised to find no mention anywhere in the book of the ecumenical directory published by the Secretariat of Christian Unity on Pentecost Monday 1967. It has, as is well known, a direct bearing on the practical problem of communicatio in sacris. Fr Lash’s introduction is dated: July 1967. (shrink)

"This rich compendium on the lives and doctrines of philosophers ranges over three centuries, from Thales to Epicurus (to whom the whole tenth book is devoted); 45 important figures are portrayed. Diogenes Laertius carefully compiled his information from hundreds of sources and enriches his accounts with numerous quotations. Diogenes Laertius lived probably in the earlier half of the 3rd century CE, his ancestry and birthplace being unknown. His history, in ten books, is divided unscientifically into two 'Successions' or sections: (...) 'Ionian' from Anaximander to Theophrastus and Chrysippus, including the Socratic schools; 'Italian' from Pythagoras to Epicurus, including the Eleatics and sceptics. It is a very valuable collection of quotations and facts." -- Publisher description. (shrink)

Should philosophers prefer simpler theories? Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) argues that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.

An original and provocative book that illuminates the origins of philosophy in ancient Greece by revealing the surprising early meanings of the word "philosopher" Calling Philosophers Names provides a groundbreaking account of the origins of the term philosophos or "philosopher" in ancient Greece. Tracing the evolution of the word's meaning over its first two centuries, Christopher Moore shows how it first referred to aspiring political sages and advice-givers, then to avid conversationalists about virtue, and finally to investigators who focused (...) on the scope and conditions of those conversations. Questioning the familiar view that philosophers from the beginning "loved wisdom" or merely "cultivated their intellect," Moore shows that they were instead mocked as laughably unrealistic for thinking that their incessant talking and study would earn them social status or political and moral authority. Taking a new approach to the history of early Greek philosophy, Calling Philosophers Names seeks to understand who were called philosophoi or "philosophers" and why, and how the use of and reflections on the word contributed to the rise of a discipline. Drawing on a wide range of evidence, the book demonstrates that a word that began in part as a wry reference to a far-flung political bloc came, hardly a century later, to mean a life of determined self-improvement based on research, reflection, and deliberation. Early philosophy dedicated itself to justifying its own dubious-seeming enterprise. And this original impulse to seek legitimacy holds novel implications for understanding the history of the discipline and its influence. (shrink)

I argue that reflection on philosophers who could have been working among us but aren’t can lead us to give up our philosophical beliefs.

"The translation is based on the most authoritative edition of the Greek text. 'Lives of the Eminent Philosophers' is a crucial source for much of what we know about the origins of philosophy in ancient Greece. Accompanied by dozens of artworks and newly commissioned essays that shed light on Diogenes' context and influence, this new, complete translation provides a revealing glimpse into the philosophers of Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, and Epicurus' Garden."--Provided by publisher.

We examined the effects of framing and order of presentation on professional philosophers’ judgments about a moral puzzle case (the “trolley problem”) and a version of the Tversky & Kahneman “Asian disease” scenario. Professional philosophers exhibited substantial framing effects and order effects, and were no less subject to such effects than was a comparison group of non-philosopher academic participants. Framing and order effects were not reduced by a forced delay during which participants were encouraged to consider “different variants (...) of the scenario or different ways of describing the case”. Nor were framing and order effects lower among participants reporting familiarity with the trolley problem or with loss-aversion framing effects, nor among those reporting having had a stable opinion on the issues before participating the experiment, nor among those reporting expertise on the very issues in question. Thus, for these scenario types, neither framing effects nor order effects appear to be reduced even by high levels of academic expertise. (shrink)

Some generic generalizations have both a descriptive and a normative reading. The generic sentence “Philosophers care about the truth”, for instance, can be read as describing what philosophers in fact care about, but can also be read as prescribing philosophers to care about the truth. On Leslie’s account, this generic sentence has two readings due to the polysemy of the kind term “philosopher”. In this paper, I first argue against this polysemy account of descriptive/normative generics. In response, (...) a contextualist semantic theory for generic sentences is introduced. Based on this theory, I argue that descriptive/normative generics are contextually underspecified. (shrink)

There are some philosophical questions that can be answered without attention to the social context in which evidence is produced and distributed.ing away from social context is an excellent way to ignore messy details and lay bare the underlying structure of the limits of inference. Idealization is entirely appropriate when one is essentially asking: In the best of all possible worlds, what am I entitled to infer? Yet, philosophers’ concerns often go beyond this domain. As an example I examine (...) the debate on mechanistic evidence and then reevaluate a canonical case study in this debate. I show that for the assessment of actual evidence, produced in a world that is far from ideal, omission of the social aspects of medical epistemology leads philosophers to draw the wrong lessons from cases they take as paradigmatic cases for their views. I close by arguing that social epistemology provides an avenue to incorporate these complications and provides the necessary framework to understand medical evidence. (shrink)

The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described (...) here are not shared in all PP accounts. Some may not be necessary for an individual model; others may be contested. Indeed, not even all authors of this collection will accept all of them. To make this transparent, we have encouraged contributors to indicate briefly which of the features are necessary to support the arguments they provide, and which (if any) are incompatible with their account. For the sake of clarity, we provide the complete list here, very roughly ordered by how central we take them to be for “Vanilla PP” (i.e., a formulation of predictive processing that will probably be accepted by most researchers working on this topic). More detailed explanations will be given below. Note that these features do not specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of “predictive processing”. All we currently have is a semantic cluster, with perhaps some overlapping sets of jointly sufficient criteria. The framework is still developing, and it is difficult, maybe impossible, to provide theory-neutral explanations of all PP ideas without already introducing strong background assumptions. (shrink)

The first philosophers paved the way for the work of Plato and Aristotle - and hence for the whole of Western thought. Aristotle said that philosophy begins with wonder, and the first Western philosophers developed theories of the world which express simultaneously their sense of wonder and their intuition that the world should be comprehensible. But their enterprise was by no means limited to this proto-scientific task. Through, for instance, Heraclitus' enigmatic sayings, the poetry of Parmenides and Empedocles, (...) and Zeno's paradoxes, the Western world was introduced to metaphysics, rationalist theology, ethics, and logic, by thinkers who often seem to be mystics or shamans as much as philosophers or scientists in the modern mould. And out of the Sophists' reflections on human beings and their place in the world arose and interest in language, and in political, moral, and social philosophy. This volume contains a translation of all the most important fragments of the Presocratics and Sophists, and of the most informative testimonia from ancient sources, supplemented by lucid commentary. (shrink)

This paper argues that there were women involved with philosophy on a fairly constant basis throughout Greek antiquity. It does so by tracing the lives and where extant the writings of these women. However, since the sources, both ancient and modern, from which we derive our knowledge about these women are so sexist and easily distort our view of these women and their accomplishments, the paper also discusses the manner in which their histories come down to us as well as (...) the histories themselves. It discusses in detail the following women: the Pythagorean women philosophers of the 6th and 5th centuries B.C., Aspasia and Diotima of the 5th century B.C., Arete, Hipparchia, Pamphile and the women Epicureans-all from the 4th century B.C. the five logician daughters of a famous Stoic philosopher of the 3rd century B.C., and finally Hypatia who lived in the 4th century A.D. (shrink)