Drawing upon two independent national samples of 201 and 241 psychology graduate students, this article describes the development and psychometric evaluation of 4 Web-based student self-report scales tapping student socialization in the responsible conduct of research (RCR) with human participants. The Mentoring the Responsible Conduct of Research Scale (MRCR) is composed of 2 subscales assessing RCR instruction and modeling by research mentors. The 2 subscales of the RCR Department Climate Scale (RCR-DC) assess RCR department policies and faculty and student RCR (...) practices. The RCR Preparedness scale (RCR-P) and the RCR Field Integrity scale (RCR-FI) measure respectively students' confidence in their ability to conduct research responsibly and their belief in the RCR integrity of psychology as a discipline. Factor analysis, coefficient alphas, correlations, and multiple regression analyses demonstrated each of the scales had good internal consistency and concurrent and construct validity. (shrink)
This article examines J. G. Farrell’s depictions of colonial medicine as a means of analysing the historical reception of the further past and argues that the end-of-Empire context of the 1970s in which Farrell was writing informed his reappraisal of Imperial authority with particular regard to the limits of medical knowledge and treatment. The article illustrates how in The Siege of Krishnapur (1973), Farrell repeatedly sought to challenge the authority of medical and colonial history by making direct use of period (...) material in the construction of his fictional narrative; by using these sources with deliberate critical intent, Farrell directly engages with the received historical narrative of colonial India, that the British presence brought progress and development, particularly in matters relating to medicine and health. To support these assertions the paper examines how Farrell employed primary sources and period medical practices such as the nineteenth-century debate between miasma and waterborne Cholera transmission and the popularity of phrenology within his novels in order to cast doubt over and interrogate the British right to rule. Overall the paper will argue that Farrell’s critique of colonial medical practices, apparently based on science and reason, was shaped by the political context of the 1970s and used to question the wider moral position of Empire throughout his fiction. (shrink)
This is unarguably the best short introduction to the whole of Bertrand Russell’s philosophical work. I am sure it is the best introduction of any length to Russell, and I suspect that it might serve as one of the best introductions to modern philosophy. Its greatest virtues are conciseness, comprehensiveness, and lucidity: virtues generally associated with Professor Ayer, but here found in unhoped for abundance. Ayer begins with a brief, austere, and balanced account of Russell’s life: as in Russell’s autobiography (...) this means his thought, books, women, and politics. Tacitus would have found the account exemplary. Ayer ends with a sympathetic and surprisingly detailed survey of Russell’s social philosophy. But the bulk of this book consists of a chapter on Russell’s work in logic and the foundations of mathematics, followed by a chapter on his epistemological views and one on metaphysics: descending in that order, also, in length and emphasis. The chapter on philosophical logic manages a clear and comprehensive elucidation of Russell’s "supreme maxim": "Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." Both the theory of types and of definite descriptions fall into place within this general project; and the reader is given a crisp, though unavoidably rudimentary, account of how the axioms of infinity and reducibility came to seem indispensable if the logical reduction of numbers and classes were to succeed. The chapter on Russell’s theory of knowledge is also admirably comprehensive and concise. One finds here a very striking, sympathetic but critical, account of the attempt to take tables and chairs, etc., as logical constructions out of sense data. Both Quine and Goodman come into the discussion : This attempt to understand and criticize Russell in terms of contemporary philosophical arguments seems to contribute both vitality and clarity to the discussion. I find it impossible to imagine that this book will not remain indefinitely the very best book of its sort.—J. L. (shrink)
The author reviews the various Anglo-American philosophies which align themselves directly in one way or another with mathematics, physics, and logic; this has been done in many ways, but this book does it in such a way that it seems to give more a feel for what is going on in a rather complicated corner of the world than the various histories and anthologies. Radnitzky is engaged in an ambitious critical project, which, put quite simply, says that English-speaking philosophies of (...) science are exercises in irrelevance. His point of view is the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition, and continental philosophy of science; moreover his point of view is that he has a point of view, and he insists that the Anglo-Americans do not; to be ignorant and uncritical insofar as one's own assumptions are concerned is to be open to many serious mistakes, many of which have been made by Americans: they have shifted their attention to less rewarding areas of interest, they have accepted models which are not fruitful, they have not been able to relate to actual scientific activity or methodology, etc. This sweeping criticism is of little value; it is partisan in precisely the manner that English speaking "program" philosophy strenuously attempts to avoid; it suggests that its own philosophy corrects major systematic mistakes in the areas surveyed. But in spite of what might be viewed as divisive and arrogant interference, this book could be of value to two groups of readers: those who are simply interested in what goes on in metascience; those who have some dissatisfaction with the self-knowledge that is displayed in these areas. A fair criticism of the book would be to say that the author exaggerates the lack of self-knowledge, and tends to devaluate the efforts of people like Quine and Goodman to bring logical empiricism to a less strictly positivistic position.--J. J. E. (shrink)
An introduction for German readers to the logistic method of treating the problem of universals. The author discusses the theories of Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Lesniewski, Quine and Goodman, with the principle purpose of convincing readers who may have been prejudiced by the anti-metaphysics of logical positivism that the logical analysis of language can clarify the traditional problems of ontology.—J. J.
Mohanty’s work is a collection of essays whose range of interest is quite astounding: phenomenology, analytic philosophy and Indian thought. Part One is concerned with the problem of the given, a problem of great interest to both analytic and phenomenological philosophy, and argues against a theory of raw, uninterpreted sense data. The title of the book is drawn from one of the essays contained in this part, which makes a plea for a non-speculative, descriptive ontology of the given. Part Two (...) offers a series of critical essays on the work of Quine, Goodman, Ryle and Moore on the one hand, and Husserl and Hartmann on the other. The last part is devoted to a study of the Indian "Nyaya" philosophy, and shows its relevance to the epistemological issues that Mohanty has raised throughout this volume. Perhaps the major interest of this book is the striking unity the author finds among these diverse philosophical strains.—J. D. C. (shrink)
This is an exciting book by one of the most respected philosophers of our time. It includes almost all of Goodman’s published articles as well as a number of papers not previously published. There are a total of forty-four papers divided into ten chapters according to topic. The chapters are: Philosophy, Origins, Art, Individuals, Meaning, Relevance, Simplicity, Induction, Likeness, and Puzzle. Each chapter is preceded by a forward which provides historical notes concerning the papers in the chapter and which (...) frequently suggests new ideas of the problem under investigation. The book demonstrates Goodman’s wide philosophical interests from discussions of art from his Languages of Art to technical analyses in philosophical logic. It affords a unique opportunity to witness the development of a philosopher’s thought over a span of over thirty years.—J. J. F. (shrink)
The bulk of this book is the second series of John Dewey Lectures, delivered by Professor Ayer in April 1970. To this, Ayer has added a criticism of Roy Harred’s purported refutation of Hume and a chapter about "non-truth-functional" conditionals that rounds out the lectures. Leaving Harred aside, this book provides an elegant, concise, and up-to-date introduction to the problem of induction and related issues concerning probability. Hume is here vindicated. Beginning by giving what may be the best, updated paraphrase (...) of Hume’s negative argument about causal judgments, Ayer explicates the subsumed atomicity, the denial of natural necessity, and the claimed vacuity or circularity of introducing the "uniformity of nature." Ayer goes on to distinguish a priori or logical probabilities, statistical or frequency judgments, and credibility or ground floor inductive judgments, and he summarily argues that the admissibility of the first two forms of judgment, properly understood, provides no real justification for credibility judgments, which, though not defined as subjective, turn out to need some support from our decision to project and therefore entrench certain predicates, or take as lawlike certain generalizations, rather than others. Ayer here includes a very clear explication and criticism of Carnap’s way out in the Logical Concept of Probability, and elsewhere. Ayer acutely summarizes and discusses the Hempel and Goodman paradoxes, taking a position substantially in agreement with Quine and Goodman, and welds this discussion into a Humean conclusion: "In a certain sense cases are what we choose them to be. We do not decide what facts habitually go together but we do decide what combinations are to be imaginatively projected. The despised savages who beat gongs at solar eclipses to summon back the sun are not making any factual error. It is a true generalization that whenever they beat the gongs the sun does shine again, and if they always keep up the ceremony, it is also a true generalization that the sun comes out again only when they beat the gongs. If we despise them, it is because they tell a fictional story about what would happen if they did not beat the gongs, which we do not accept. They see what goes on as well as we do; it is just that we have a different and, we think, a better idea of the way the world works." To say all this is just, of course, to summarize and refurbish Hume’s position on causality. But to do that has two very real values now: 1) It underlines and exposes the epistemic basis of the position taken by Hume’s heirs; 2) It makes clear what are the departures required if one is to differ in substance from Hume and Ayer.—J. L. (shrink)
Saltman and Goodman show how corporate-produced curricula, films, and corporate-promoted books often use depictions of family love, childhood innocence, and compassion in order to sell the public on policies that ironically put the profit of multinational corporations over the well-being of people. In doing so, the authors reveal the extent to which globalization depends upon education and also show how battles over culture, language, and the control of information are matters of life, death, and democracy.
The Ikhwan al-Safa (Brethren of Purity), the anonymous adepts of a tenth-century esoteric fraternity based in Basra and Baghdad, hold an eminent position in the history of science and philosophy in Islam due to the wide reception and assimilation of their monumental encyclopaedia, the Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa (Epistles of the Brethren of Purity). This compendium contains fifty-two epistles offering synoptic accounts of the classical sciences and philosophies of the age; divided into four classificatory parts, it treats themes in mathematics, logic, (...) natural philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, and theology, in addition to didactic fables. The Rasa'il constitutes a paradigmatic legacy in the canonization of philosophy and the sciences in mediaeval Islamic civilization, as well as having shown a permeating influence in Western culture. The present volume is the first of this definitive series consisting of the very first critical edition of the Rasa' il in its original Arabic, with a complete, fully annotated English translation. This epistle, The Case of the Animals versus Man Before the King of the Jinn (Epistle 22), prepared by Professors Lenn E. Goodman and Richard McGregor, is arguably the best known, on account of its prominent ecological fable which casts the exploited and oppressed animals pursuing a case against mankind. Perhaps yet more relevant in modern times, the Ikhwan demonstrate the arrogance of man's claim to superiority, in contrast to the animals' pious understanding of their respective roles within nature. The fable complements and expands upon the short exposition on zoology featured at the beginning of the epistle. (shrink)
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems identify and track objects, animals and, in principle, people. The ability to gather information obtained by tracking consumer goods, government documents, monetary transactions and human beings raises a number of interesting and important privacy issues. Moreover, RFID systems pose an ensemble of other ethical challenges related to appropriate uses and users of such systems. This paper reviews a number of RFID applications with the intention of identifying the technology’s benefits and possible misuses. We offer an (...) overview and discussion of the most important ethical issues concerning RFID, and describes and examine some methods of protecting privacy. (shrink)
Participants in clinical research sometimes view participation as therapy or exaggerate potential benefits, especially in phase I or phase II trials. We conducted this study to discover what methods might improve cancer patients’ understanding of early-phase clinical trials. We randomly assigned 130 cancer patients from three U.S. medical centers who were considering enrollment in a phase I or phase II cancer trial to receive either a multimedia intervention or a National Cancer Institute pamphlet explaining the trial and its purpose. Intervention (...) participants were 32 times more likely to believe that the trial’s purpose was to examine safety and 60 % less likely to believe they would experience long-term benefit or cure. There was no difference in enrollment decision. However, while patients’ understanding of the trial’s purpose improved and expectations of long-term benefit diminished, half the respondents still believed they would experience long-term benefit or cure from participation. Therefore, we conclude that multimedia interventions such as this one may help oncologists to explain the risks and benefits of early-phase cancer trials in a way that patients can more easily understand, helping them to make more informed decisions about participation. But further research into other factors that influence patients’ beliefs about the outcome of enrollment is needed, both to modify the interventions and to determine how malleable patient beliefs are. (shrink)
Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)
M. I. Finley in his Politics in the Ancient World , 92–6 has recently cast doubt on the extent to which religious phenomena were taken seriously in ancient times. We believe that in stressing the reasons for scepticism he has overlooked much positive evidence for the impact of religious scruples on political behaviour and that in generalising he has undervalued the differences in this respect between ancient societies. The significance of some of this positive evidence is admittedly uncertain since in (...) civilian life scruples might be easy to observe without great suffering. The acid test is in time of war, so that is the concern of our present enquiry. That attitudes varied can be shown only by comparing societies. We have here limited our discussion to three for which the evidence is well preserved: the world of the Greek city before Alexander the Great, Rome before Constantine, and the Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman period. Elucidation of the reasons for their distinct attitudes would reveal much about each of these societies and its religious practices and conceptions, but there will be space here only to show that considerable variety did indeed exist. Most ancient peoples assumed that their gods approved of war; the pacifism of some pre-Constantinian Christians was exceptional. Nor did such rules in combat as were observed necessarily have a religious foundation. Ancient like modern scruples were often based on moral and humanitarian grounds, as in the treatment of corpses and civilians; the gods, as the guardians of general morality, might be involved in such matters, but only at a remove. (shrink)