Salutary reading for all philosophers, and not only for inductive logicians, philosophers of science and law, this important book presents an elaborate theory of inductive reasoning whose substantive features are as strikingly original as the approach is rare. First, the theory is based on concrete, real, actual, and significant instances of inductive reasoning, e.g., Karl von Frisch’s work on bees; that is, though its aim is genuinely theoretical in the sense that it engages in the proper amounts of idealization, (...) abstraction, systematization, precision, and rigor, it never loses sight of the fact that "theories in the philosophy of science, like theories in science itself, have to face up to the challenge of appropriately accredited experience within their appointed domains". Second, a central subject matter being analyzed is legal reasoning, that is, the types of proofs and arguments used by juries, judges, and lawyers in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, where criminal charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and civil cases have to be argued on the balance of probability. Thus, in effect, Cohen’s synthesis of juridical and of scientific reasoning is an admirable example of the bridging of two "cultures." Third, and most importantly, the concept of "inductive probability," in terms of which Cohen makes sense out of his subject matter, is incommensurable with that of "mathematical probability," namely the classical calculus of chance according to which probability is measurable, additive, transitive, and obeys a multiplicational principle for conjunction and a complementational one for negation. This is not to say that "inductive probability" is a hazy, mysterious, or unstructured concept, and Cohen goes to great lengths to show that it is ordinal, modal, and formally analyzable; what it does mean is that essential types of reasoning in science and in law involve probable inferences whose probabilities are nonquantitative. Hence, though Cohen does not stress the qualitative nature of inductive probability, his book will be welcome by those who conceive of philosophy as scientia qualitatum. Specific conclusions reached by Cohen are that, in general, probability may be conceived as degree of provability, that differences in proof-rules generate different special cases of probability, that inductive probability may be viewed as the special case where the proof-rules are incomplete, that inductive probability is to inductive support as deducibility is to logical truth, and that some recent epistemological scepticism may be refuted by Cohen’s inductive logic. Finally, he sees himself in the British inductivist tradition, interpreting his predecessors as groping toward a logic of inductive support and probability rather than a methodology of discovery: from Bacon he develops the notion of eliminative induction but rejects that of induction by enumeration; Mill’s canons are analyzed as special cases of Cohen’s own "method of relevant variables," except for the method of residues, which is rejected as invalid ; he takes his critique of mathematical probability as a vindication of Hume’s thesis that "probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds, viz., that which is founded on chance and that which arises from causes" ; Whewell’s consilience of induction is justified ; and from Keynes, he develops the notion of the "weight" of evidence but rejects his mathematicist approach.—M. A. F. (shrink)

One of the first volumes to appear in "The Princeton Series--Humanistic Scholarship in America," this book sustains a vigorous defense of religion as a proper field of study within the liberal arts curriculum. A comprehensive description of the present status of religious studies at undergraduate, seminary and graduate levels is combined with the attempt to raise and answer the numerous problems associated therewith. Candid and persuasive answers are given to such concrete questions as departmental vs. diffusionist structures, curriculum balance, (...) and the relation of religion to pre-theological training, but the touchy subjects of indoctrination and sectarian influence suffer from a lapse into generalities.--M. W. (shrink)

The present book is an interesting essay on Origen's place in the history of Western thought, or better, about the question whether he was a philosopher at all, and if so, in what sense. Because of his intense speculative drive and his wide learning in Neoplatonic thought Origen has been considered to be the "most philosophical" of the Greek Fathers. Such a view very often entails the attempt at "reorganizing" his thought as systematic philosophical reflection. The author's final thesis is (...) that such an approach is doomed to failure in really understanding the Origenian mind. This "pupil" of Ammonius Saccas was above all a Christian theologian and as such an outsider to philosophy. Philosophy had not been taken for granted by him but it was to be probed into from the depth of Christian experience and its theological self-interpretation. Philosophy itself-which means to his mind pagan philosophy—should be treated within the framework of that vast theological enterprise Origen had been carrying through in his whole life. It is only after the analysis of his philosophy of theology that Origen's contribution to philosophy proper can be evaluated. It is in this sense that the author considers his work as a prolegomenon to "Origenian philosophy."—M. J. V. (shrink)

This is an articulate and intelligent book on the greatest German thinker of the period between Leibniz and Kant. Lessing's position had been a rather complex one. Irritated by the flatness of the Aufklärung and its deism yet opposed to the historical claims of Christianity, he attempted to elaborate a philosophy of history in which the tenets of historical religion would receive their just appreciation. The author of the present book is extremely well versed in the philosophical and theological context (...) of Lessing's thought and it is only after a most valuable first part on "Historical Background" that he initiates us into Lessing's thought proper. Attacks on Lessing, especially after the publication of Reimarus' writings, were frequent and we are given our share of some of the best or at least most interesting criticisms raised against Lessing. At the end of the book there is a particularly fine chapter on the Leibnizean roots of his philosophy of religion.--M. J. V. (shrink)

κ-M-proper forcing, introduced in [K00] when κ = ω1, is a very powerful new technique for generic stepping up, subsuming all previous generic steppings up using auxiliary functions. A general framework for using κ-M-proper forcing is set out, and a couple of examples of such forcings, adding κ−-thin-very tall scattered spaces and long chains in P(κ) modulo <κ−, are given. These objects are not currently obtainable by the previously known techniques.

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant. The epistemic features (...) I’m concerned about are experiences that should generate a believed defeater but don’t. I’ll argue that proper functionalism as it stands cannot account for the epistemic effects of these defeating experiences—or, at least, that it can only do so by embracing a deeply implausible view of our cognitive faculties. I’ll conclude by arguing that the only plausible option Bergmann has for modifying his theory undercuts the consideration that motivates proper functionalism in the first place. (shrink)

In this paper we pursue the study of the variety of m -generalized Łukasiewicz algebras of order n which was initiated in [1]. This variety contains the variety of Łukasiewicz algebras of order n . Given , we establish an isomorphism from its congruence lattice to the lattice of Stone filters of a certain Łukasiewicz algebra of order n and for each congruence on A we find a description via the corresponding Stone filter. We characterize the principal congruences on A (...) via Stone filters. In doing so, we obtain a polynomial equation which defines the principal congruences on the algebras of . After showing that for m > 1 and n > 2, the variety of Łukasiewicz algebras of order n is a proper subvariety of , we prove that is a finitely generated discriminator variety and point out some consequences of this strong property, one of which is congruence permutability. (shrink)

The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem (...) to totally demolish the theories under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

What is the proper relation between the scientific worldview and other parts or aspects of human knowledge and experience? Can any science aim at "complete coverage" of the world, and if it does, will it undermine--in principle or by tendency--other attempts to describe or understand the world? Should morality, theology and other areas resist or be protected from scientific treatment? Questions of this sort have been of pressing philosophical concern since antiquity. The Proper Ambition of Science presents ten (...) particular case studies written by prominent philosophers, looking at how this problem has been approached from the ancient world right up to the present day. Contributors: Bob Sharples, M.W.F. Stone, G.A.J. Rogers, J.R. Milton, Aaron Ridley, Christopher Hookway, Dermot Moran, Thomas E. Uebel, David Papineau, and Nancy Cartwright. (shrink)

So much of Africana philosophical research and scholarship has focused on personal, anecdotal experiences to tell/disclose larger intellectual narratives of race, nation, history, time, and space.1 Yet the personal nature in which Africana philosophy articulates itself has often been seen as particular and not yet universal—in other words, not rightly or properly “philosophical.” But understood methodologically, the sort of introspection inherent in Africana philosophy becomes not only one way of “doing” philosophy but the grounding for philosophical insight.2 Kendrick Lamar’s album (...) good kid, m.A.A.d. city provides for us an example of such methodological insight, proper for “doing” philosophy.3In characterizing... (shrink)

In the transition to Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity (SR), certain concepts that had previously been thought to be univocal or absolute properties of systems turn out not to be. For instance, mass bifurcates into (i) the relativistically invariant proper mass m0, and (ii) the mass relative to an inertial frame in which it is moving at a speed v = βc, its relative mass m, whose quantity is a factor γ = (1 – β2) -1/2 times the (...) class='Hi'>proper mass, m = γm0. (shrink)

‘The proper treatment of events’ is the title of a recent book [LH04] by M. van Lambalgen and F. Hamm, applying the event calculus from [Sha97] to natural language semantics. Some basic ideas behind that treatment are presented in a technically different form below, shaped by a concrete formulation of events as strings of sets of fluents ([Fer04]). These strings can be read as comic strips that are (I think) easy to grasp and work with, providing a friendly (if (...) not altogether proper) approach to events. (shrink)

In this paper we pursue the study of the variety $ L_n ^ m $ of m - generalized? ukasiewicz algebras of order n which was initiated in [ 1 ]. This variety contains the variety of? ukasiewicz algebras of order n. Given A? $ \ in L_n ^ m $, we establish an isomorphism from its congruence lattice to the lattice of Stone filters of a certain? ukasiewicz algebra of order n and for each congruence on A we find (...) a description via the corresponding Stone filter. We characterize the principal congruences on A via Stone filters. In doing so, we obtain a polynomial equation which defines the principal congruences on the algebras of $ L_n ^ m $. After showing that for m > 1 and n > 2, the variety of? ukasiewicz algebras of order n is a proper subvariety of $ L_n ^ m $, we prove that $ L_n ^ m $ is a finitely generated discriminator variety and point out some consequences of this strong property, one of which is congruence permutability. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relative merits of two accounts of the semantics of proper names. The enterprise is of particular interest because the theories are very similar in fundamental respects. In particular, they can agree on three major features of names: names are rigid designators; different co-extensive names can have different cognitive significance; empty proper names can be meaningful. Neither theory by itself offers complete explanations of all three features. But each theory is (...) consistent with them and goes some way towards explaining them. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the semantic function of an ordinary proper name (e.g. 'Aristotle') is inexplicable in terms of the semantic function of an ordinary definite description (e.g. 'the last great ancient philosopher'), given a Russellian analysis of the latter. This paper questions this belief by suggesting a possible semantic explication. In brief, I propose that an ordinary proper name is a mere placeholder for an arbitrary ordinary definite description true of a given individual. The proposal is (...) set out and justified in detail, as well as compared with both traditional description theories of ordinary proper names and the theory that an ordinary proper name just means its referent. I contend that the proposed theory is better than the former sort of theory, and at least as good as the latter one. (shrink)

It will be argued that Minkowski's implementation of distances is inconsistent. An alternative implementation will be proposed. In the new model the proper time of an object is taken as its fourth coordinate. Distances will be measured according to a four dimensional Euclidean metric. In the present approach mass is a constant of motion. A mass can therefore be ascribed to photons and neutrinos. Mechanics and dynamics will be reformulated in close correspondence with classical physics. Of particular interest is (...) the equation of motion for the proper time momentum. In the classical limit it reduces to the classical law of conservation of (kinetic+potential) energy. In the relativistic limit it is similar to the conservation of energy of the theory of relativity. The conservation of proper time momentum allows for an alternative explanation for Compton scattering and pair annihilation. On the basis of the proper time formulation of electrodynamics also an alternative explanation will be offered for the spectra of hydrogenic atoms. The proper time formulation of gravitational dynamics leads to the correct predictions of gravitational time dilation, the deflection of light and the precession of the perihelia of planets. For this no curvature will be needed. That is, spacetime is flat everywhere, even in the presence of sources of gravitation. Some cosmological consequences will be discussed. The present approach gives a new notion to energy, antiparticles and the structure of spacetime. The contents of the present paper will have important implications for the foundations of physics in general. (shrink)

Principally under the influence of Saul Kripke (1972), philosophical semantics since the closing decades of 20th century has been dominated by thephenomenon Nathan Salmon (1986) aptly dubbed Direct Reference “mania.” Accordingly, it is now practically orthodox to hold that the meanings of proper names are entirely exhausted by their referents and devoid of any descriptive content. The return to a purely referential semantics of names has, nevertheless, coincided with a resurgence of some of the very puzzles that motivated description (...) theories of names in the first place, to wit: the informativeness of true identity statements of the form ‘a=b’ and the failure of substitutivity salve veritate for co-referential names in propositional attitude ascriptions. I argue that a Metalinguistic Description Theory of proper names, which treats the meaning of an arbitrary proper name as roughly equivalent to the definite description ‘the bearer of NN,’ offers a novel, semantically innocent solution to these puzzles when synthesized with Keith Donnellan’s (1966) insight that descriptions are semantically ambiguous between attributive and referential meanings. The ensuing account is then defended against two well-known Kripkean objections to metalinguisticsemantics: the Circularity Objection and the Paderewski Puzzle. (shrink)

Kathrin Koslicki argues that ordinary material objects like tables and motorcycles have formal proper parts that structure the material proper parts. Karen Bennett rejects a key premise in Koslicki's argument according to which the material ingredient out of which a complex material object is made is a proper part of that object. Koslicki defends this premise with a principle motivated by its power to explain three important phenomena of material composition. But these phenomena can be equally well (...) explained by a weaker principle that does not support the questioned premise in Koslicki's argument, Bennett argues. I show that Bennett's weaker principle, together with an appropriate strengthening of a different premise in Koslicki's original argument, still yields a sound argument for the existence of formal parts. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Armstrong’s theory of laws and causation may be articulated as something like the following, which we may refer to as the received view: “Laws are intrinsic higher-order relations of ensuring between properties. The instantiation of laws is identical with singular causation. This identity is a posteriori.” Opponents and advocates of this view, believe that it may fairly and correctly be attributed to Armstrong. I do not deny it; instead I seek to reconsider (...) the received view, specifically by treating it as a part of Armstrong’s metaphysics. The main features that should concern us are truthmaker theory and the formal account of the constitutive parts of states of affairs. I also discuss Bird’s ultimate argument against Armstrong and show how its impact is weakened by this proper reading. (shrink)

Spontaneous inferences are unconscious, automatic, and apparently ubiquitous. Research has documented their variety (particularly in the social domain) and impact on memory and judgment. They are good candidates for Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) Forming spontaneous inferences is highly context sensitive, varying with the perceiver's conscious and unconscious goals, and implicit and explicit theories about the domain in question.

Intuitions play an important role in contemporary philosophy. It is common for theories in epistemology, morality, semantics and metaphysics to be rejected because they are inconsistent with a widely and firmly held intuition. Our goal in this paper is to explore the role of epistemic intuitions in epistemology from a naturalistic perspective. Here is the question we take to be central: (Q) Ought we to trust our epistemic intuitions as evidence in support of our epistemological theories? We will understand this (...) question as employing an epistemic ‘ought’ – insofar as we aim at developing a correct epistemological theory, ought we to trust our epistemic intuitions as evidence for or against our epistemological theories? As it stands, (Q) needs further clarification. Whether something is trustworthy is relative to what (a) what it is and (b) what we’re asking it to do. Sam might trust Marie but not George to care for his children, while he might trust both to care for his pet fish. So in order to address (Q), we first need to explore two questions: What are epistemic intuitions? And what sort of epistemological theories do we want? We will take up each of these questions in the following sections. (shrink)

To hold that only one conscious thing is sitting in your chair, philosophers have appealed to maximality: If a property M is maximal, then anything that has property M does not have large proper parts that have property M. Philosophers have said that ordinary objects are maximal, including houses, cats, rocks, and have argued by analogy that consciousness is maximal. I argue that the maximality principle mistakenly excludes some members of a kind. Thus, it is not the correct principle (...) to explain why, for example, you are conscious but the proper part that is all-of-you-but-your-arm is not conscious. (shrink)

Öz: Frege özel adların (ve diğer dilsel simgelerin) anlamları ve gönderimleri arasında ünlü ayrımını yaptığı Anlam ve Gönderim Üzerine (1948) adlı makalesinde, bu ayrımın önemi, gerekliliği ve sonuçları üzerine uzun değerlendirmeler yapar ancak özel adın anlamından tam olarak ne anlaşılması gerektiğinden yalnızca bir dipnotta kısaca söz eder. Örneğin “Aristoteles” özel adının anlamının Platon’un öğrencisi ve Büyük İskender’in öğretmeni ya da Stagira’da doğan Büyük İskender’in öğretmeni olarak alınabileceğini söyler. Burada dikkat çeken nokta örnekteki özel adın olası anlamları olarak gösterilen belirli betimlemelerin (...) de özel ad içeriyor olması. Anlamın Frege için bileşimsel olduğu, bir başka deyişle bir dilsel simgenin anlamının (varsa) parçalarının anlamlarınca belirlendiği düşünülürse, örnekteki belirli betimlemelerin anlamlarının saptanabilmesi için içerdikleri özel adların da anlamları saptanıp betimleme içinde geçtikleri yere konmalıdır. Bu işlem hiçbir özel ad kalmayana kadar sürdürülmelidir. Ancak biraz düşünülünce bir özel adın nesnesini tekil olarak betimleyecek ve içinde özel ad geçmeyecek bir betimleme bulmanın kolay olmadığı görülür. Örneğin yukarıdaki betimlemelerde geçen “Platon”, “Büyük İskender” ve “Stagira” gibi özel adların anlamları olabilecek ancak özel ad içermeyen betimlemeler bulmak pek kolay görünmüyor. Ortaya bir sonsuz gerileme sorunu çıkmış gibi duruyor. Frege’nin anlamgönderim ayrımını için ciddi sonuçları olabilecek bu sorunu Frege çözebilir mi? Bu yazıda bu sorunun yanıtını arayacağım. Sorunu betimledikten sonra Frege’nin önündeki seçenekleri (örneğin bağlama duyarlı terimlerden (gösterme adılları veya belirteçler) yararlanma veya bağlamı sınırlama gibi) değerlendireceğim. Abstract: In his Sense and Reference (1948), Frege makes his famous distinction between the sense and the reference of a proper name (and other signs) and discusses at length the significance, necessity and consequences of the distinction, but he explains how the sense of a proper name should be understood very briefly in a footnote. According to him, for example, the sense of the proper name “Aristotle” can be taken as the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great or the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. What is interesting here is that the definite descriptions given as the possible senses of this proper name do themselves contain proper names too. Since the sense is something compositional for Frege, which means the sense of a linguistic sign is determined by its constituents (if there are any), in order to determine the senses of the definite descriptions in question, we should first determine the senses of proper names they contain and substitute these senses with the proper names themselves. This process should continue until no proper name remains. However, it does not seem easy to find a definite description which describes the object of a proper name uniquely but contains no proper name itself. For instance, could we find appropriate senses that contain no proper name for “Plato”, “Alexander the Great” and “Stagira”? It does not seem likely. A problem of infinite regress appears to arise. Can Frege solve this problem, which poses a serious threat for his sense-reference distinction? I will explore this problem in this paper. After explaining the problem, I will discuss the options (e.g. turning to indexicals or context restriction) Frege can take to deal with it. (shrink)

What are the norms governing the pursuit of happiness? Presumably not just anything goes. But are the rules any more interesting than platitudes like “do whatworks, as long as you don’t hurt anyone”? Such questions have become especially salient in light of the development of positive psychology. Yet so far these matters have received relatively little attention, most of it from skeptics who doubt that the pursuit of happiness is an important, or even legitimate, enterprise. This paper examines the normative (...) issues in this realm, arguing that the pursuit of happiness is indeed a legitimate and important endeavor, contra recent criticisms by Aristotelian and other skeptics. Yet it is also subject to strong, nonobvious normative constraints that extend well beyond those typically posited by commonsense and consequentialist thought. (shrink)

I’m going to present a new idea about how to find the right place for the indexical and demonstrative expressions in Gottlob Frege’s semantics. My main thesis is: that it is possible to find such interpretation of Frege’s view on indexicals and demonstratives which is entirely “fregean” and is not vulnerable to the counterexamples given by Kaplan and Perry. According to the interpretation I propose, these expressions are functional and they denote first-level functions defined on objects. These functional expressions taken (...) together with an object form a hybrid proper name. (shrink)

Olfert argues that Aristotle's account of practical reason pays equal deference to the value of truth and to the value of acting well; she further argues that the key to a proper understanding of the relationship between these two values lies in Aristotle's heretofore overlooked notion of practical truth.Practical truth is not the truth of a motivational state, nor is it a truth that is made true by actions, nor is it even a correct assertion about the means to (...) the obtainment of one's desires, though this last view is closest to Olfert's own. Instead, practical truth is "the truth about what is unqualifiedly good relative to a particular person in a particular situation". In context... (shrink)

My little girl has leukemia; she has had it for over a year, and now she needs at least five pints of blood a day. Not the whole blood, just the platelets. Most of our relatives and friends have given at least a few times. But we need more. Now I have to go to strangers.So begins Roberta Silman's short story, “Giving Blood,” a story about illness and charity. When the narrator's husband solicited blood donations at his workplace, “he thought (...) everyone would help…He must have asked a hundred people. Thirty gave. His officemate…turned green and said, ‘Oh, no, anything but that. I'm scared of needles.'”. (shrink)

While thinking philosophically we see problems in places where there are none. It is for philosophy to show that there are no problems. Those of us who are not colour blind have a happy command of colour concepts. We say of trees that they are green in spring, that they are the same colour as grass and a different colour from the sky. If we shine a torch with a red bulb upon a white surface, we say that the surface (...) looks pink although it is white. And if we suffer a bout of jaundice we claim that white things look yellowish to us, although they are not yellow, nor do they look yellow. We employ this tripartite distinction unworriedly and unthinkingly. But when, in doing philosophy, we are called upon to elucidate colour concepts it becomes evident that these elementary concepts present intricate problems to the philosophical understanding. It is extraordinarily difficult to obtain a proper surview of colour grammar, and the temptations of philosophical illusion are legion. We go wrong before the first step is even taken, and hence do not notice our errors, for they are implicit in every move we make. We multiply impossibilities seriatim , getting better, like the White Queen, with practice. We then either slide into scepticism, or alternatively exclude it on empirical grounds - appealing, as is so popular in American philosophical circles, to the wonders of science, in particular physics and neurophysiology, to keep the malin genie from the door. (shrink)