BackgroundDecision-making in out-of-hospital cardiac arrest should ideally include clinical and ethical factors. Little is known about the extent of ethical considerations and their influence on prehospital resuscitation. We aimed to determine the transparency in medical records regarding decision-making in prehospital resuscitation with a specific focus on ethically relevant information and consideration in resuscitation providers’ documentation.MethodsThis was a Danish nationwide retrospective observational study of out-of-hospital cardiac arrests from 2016 through 2018. After an initial screening using broadly defined inclusion criteria, two experienced (...) philosophers performed a qualitative content analysis of the included medical records according to a preliminary codebook. We identified ethically relevant content in free-text fields and categorised the information according to Beauchamp and Childress’ four basic bioethical principles: autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. ResultsOf 16,495 medical records, we identified 759 (4.6%) with potentially relevant information; 710 records (4.3%) contained ethically relevant information, whereas 49 did not. In general, the documentation was vague and unclear. We identified four kinds of ethically relevant information: patients’ wishes and perspectives on life; relatives’ wishes and perspectives on patients’ life; healthcare professionals’ opinions and perspectives on resuscitation; and do-not-resuscitate orders. We identified some “best practice” examples that included all perspectives of decision-making. ConclusionsThere is sparse and unclear evidence on ethically relevant information in the medical records documenting resuscitation after out-of-hospital cardiac arrests. However, the “best practice” examples show that providing sufficient documentation of decision-making is, in fact, feasible. To ensure transparency surrounding prehospital decisions in cardiac arrests, we believe that it is necessary to ensure more systematic documentation of decision-making in prehospital resuscitation. (shrink)

Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...) in virtue of there being something – a truth-maker – in the world that makes them so.2. (shrink)

Stig Kanger made important contributions to logic and formal philosophy. Kanger's dissertation Provability in Logic, 1957, contained significant results in proof theory as well as the first fully worked out model-theoretic interpretation of quantified modal logic. It is generally accepted nowadays that Kanger was one of the originators of possible worlds semantics for modal logic. Kanger's most original achievements were in the areas of general proof theory, the semantics of modal and deontic logic, and the logical analysis of the (...) concept of rights. He also contributed to action theory, preference logic, and the theory of measurement. This is the first of two volumes dedicated to the work of Stig Kanger. The present volume is a complete collection of Kanger's philosophical papers. The second volume contains critical essays on Kanger's work, as well as biographical essays on Kanger written by colleagues and friends. (shrink)

Stig Kanger made important contributions to logic and formal philosophy. Kanger's most original achievements were in the areas of general proof theory, the semantics of modal and deontic logic, and the logical analysis of the concept of rights. But he contributed significantly to action theory, preference logic and the theory of measurement as well. This is the second of two volumes dedicated to the work of Stig Kanger. The first volume is a complete collection of Kanger's philosophical papers. (...) The present volume contains critical essays on the various aspects of Kanger's work as well as some biographical sketches. Lennart Åqvist, Jan Berg, Brian Chellas, Anatoli Degtyarev, Lars Gustafsson, Sören Halldén, Kaj Børge Hansen, Sven Ove Hansson, Risto Hilpinen, Jaakko Hintikka, Ghita Holmström-Hintikka, Lars Lindahl, Sten Lindström, Ingmar Pörn, Dag Prawitz, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Krister Segerberg, Amartya Sen, Sören Stenlund, Göran Sundholm, and Andrei Voronkov have contributed to this volume. (shrink)

Lewis, D. Semantic analyses for dyadic deontic logic.--Salomaa, A. Some remarks concerning many-valued propositional logics.--Chellas, B. F. Conditional obligation.--Jeffrey, R.C. Remarks on interpersonal utility theory.--Hintikka, J. On the proper treatment of quantifiers in Montague semantics.--Mayoh, B.H. Extracting information from logical proofs.--Åqvist, L. A new approach to the logical theory of actions and causality.--Pörn, I. Some basic concepts of action.--Bouvère, K. de. Some remarks concerning logical and ontological theories.--Hacking, I. Combined evidence.--Äberg, C. Solution to a problem raised by Stig Kanger (...) and a set theoretical statement equivalent to the axiom of choice.--Lindström, P. On characterizing elementary logic.-- Scott, D. Rules and derived rules.--Hansson, B. A program for pragmatics.--Hermerén, G. Models.--Fenstad, J.E. Remarks on logic and probability.--Stenlund, S. Analytic and synthetic arithmetical statements. (shrink)

En del moraliska dilemman och samhällsproblem uppstår ur många sinsemellan orelaterade individuella handlingar eller underlåtelser, samtidigt som problemen bara kan åtgärdas genom kollektiv handling. Vi kritiserar tre sätt att resonera om ostrukturerade gruppers moraliska plikter och ansvar i sådana situationer. Därefter föreslår vi att intuitionen att en sådan grupp kan ha moraliska plikter och vara ansvarig bäst förklaras med utgångspunkt i att individer åtminstone i småskaliga fall kan identifiera sig med gruppen i en stark mening, och betrakta beslutssituationen ur gruppens (...) perspektiv. (shrink)

Vann McGee claims that open-ended schemas are more innocuous than ordinary second-order quantification, particularly in terms of ontological commitment. We argue that this is not the case.

According to one influential philosophical view of human agency, for an agent to perform an action intentionally is essentially for her to manifest a kind of self-knowledge: An agent is intentionally φ-ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that this is what she is doing. I here argue that this self-knowledge view faces serious problems when extended to account for intentional actions performed by several agents together as a result of a joint (...) decision. This suggests that practical and non-observational knowledge is not essential to intentional action as such, since a theory of intentional action ought to be able to make sense of such paradigm cases of joint intentional action as well as cases of singular intentional action. Existing attempts to extend the self-knowledge view to joint intentional action face an unfortunate trilemma. These attempts must (i) require that participants have non-observational knowledge of each other’s non-observational knowledge, which in turn requires that the participants are either really one and the same agent, or that they are, for all relevant purposes, clones of each other; (ii) limit their explanatory scope to intentional actions performed by groups with a single decision maker at the top of an organisational hierarchy, which arguably are not really shared or jointly performed; or (iii) require that the intention of the group is the result of a public representational act that the group members will have observational knowledge of in a way that is incompatible with a core commitment of the self-knowledge view. I argue that each of these options is unacceptable given a self-knowledge view of intentional action. (shrink)

A “we-intention” is the kind of intention that an individual acts on when participating in joint intentional action. In discussions about what characterises such a we-intention, one fault line concerns whether the “we-ness” is a feature of a we-intention’s mode or content. According to Björn Petersson, it is an agent-perspectival feature of its mode. Petersson argues that content accounts are incompatible with theories of so-called “group identification” and “team reasoning”. Insofar as such group identification and team reasoning are commonplace in (...) many joint action situations, such an incompatibility would be a serious problem for content accounts. I here argue, however, that Petersson’s incompatibility thesis should be rejected. (shrink)

This book explores two questions that are integral to the question of the existence of God. The first question concerns the meaning of "existence" and the second concerns the meaning of "God". Regarding the first question, this book motivates, presents and defends the meta-ontology found in Gottlob Frege's writings and defended by Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. Frege's approach to questions of existence has mainly found use in connection with abstract objects such as numbers. This is one of (...) the first studies to systematically present Fregean meta-ontology and apply it to theology. Frege's meta-ontology is informed by his context principle. According to this, logico-syntactic notions such as "singular term" and "predicate" are pivotal to questions of what exists. These notions serve to throw light on the second question. Through thorough engagement with Old as well and New Testament texts, the book shows how Frege's logico-syntactic notions are of crucial importance when seeking to understand the meaning and use of "God". To complete the defence of Fregean meta-ontology, the book concludes by pointing to important differences between the otherwise closely associated concepts of an object found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Frege's writings. (shrink)

Including empirical examples and theoretical clarifications on many of the analytical issues raised in his recently published Down to Earth, this conversation with Bruno Latour and his collaborator, Danish sociologist Nikolaj Schultz, offers key insights into Latour’s recent and ongoing work. Revolving around questions on political ecology and social theory in our ‘New Climatic Regime’, Latour argues that in order to have politics you need a land and you need a people. This interview present reflections on such politics, such (...) land and such people, and it ends with a call for a sociology that takes up the task of connecting the three by investigating what he and Schultz call ‘geo-social classes’. The interview was conducted by Jakob Stein in Paris in November 2018. (shrink)

The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...) in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first of its kind—the first collection of papers focused specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. An additional reason to look at truth pluralism with interest is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature—the debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide being cases in hand. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates. (shrink)

In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn offer substantially different (...) approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible. (shrink)

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.

The article examines the conjunction of writing and the Hegelian theory of recognition as it appears in Jean-Paul Sartre's text "Why Write?" The author argues that Sartre's theory of literature is not only a theory of literature as conversation and communication, but also a theory about the relation to a certain silence, and since literature and recognition go together in Sartre's text, the presence of silence has consequences for his theory of recognition.

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 (...) presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions— have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism. Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism. (shrink)

Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like “chose to believe” are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of “chosen beliefs” is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense (pace Turri et al. 2018). While we employ the (...) methods of experimental philosophy, our argument also concerns the fundamental question as to what those methods can achieve: as is typical of philosophical debates, the debate over doxastic voluntarism involves a refined theoretical concept, specifically a refined concept of voluntary belief. In such debates, we cannot determine our pre-theoretical position by conducting surveys on those who may not yet own the requisite theoretical concepts. (shrink)

What is reality? What are the diverse ways of being? Can God be known from nature? These and other quintessentially metaphysical questions are addressed in the newest volume from the American Maritain Association, Distinctions of Being. Metaphysicsas conceived by Aristotle, extended by Thomas Aquinas, and given modern expression by prominent philosophers such as Jacques Maritaindeals principally with the question of being, the basis of reality. This work considers the necessary distinctions at the heart of metaphysics, the distinctions between nature and (...) spirit; the world and God; and the different forms of knowing in science, philosophy, and being. (shrink)

How do Mallarmé’s writings speak to the present? To answer this question, this article establishes a dialogue between one of Mallarmé’s early prose poems, ‘Le Démon de l'analogie’, and texts by the...

v. 1. Religija Njegoša. Besede pod gorom -- v. 2. Reči o svečoveku. Indijska pisma. Iznad istoka i zapada. Srednji sistem. Niče i Dostojevski. Šekspir--svečovek -- v. 3. Homilogija. Simboli i signali. Rat i biblija. Carev zavet. Vasionik. Rahabilitacija tela. U harmoniji sa beskrajnim. Pravoslavna crkva u uzročost u svetu -- v 4. Omilije -- v. 5. Omilije -- v. 6. Nove besede pod gorom. Iznad greha i smrti. Oče Naš. Rajska piramida. Ljubostinjski stoslov. Misli o dobru i zlu -- (...) v. 7. Tesdul. Kroz tamnički prozor -- v 8. Misionarska pisma -- v. 9. Srpski narod kao Teodul. Divan. Emanuel. Kasijana. Zemlja nedođija -- v. 10. Molitve na jezeru. Pesme molitvene. Molitve. Žetve Gospodnje. Ledini čovekoljubac -- v. 11. Vladika Nikolaj u službi Bogu i rodu. Život svetog Save. Članci, besede i poslanice. Sveri srbi. Blažena Stojna -- v. 12. Kosovo i vidovdan. Dobrovoljci. Mudra igumanija Ljubostinjska. O srpskom patriotizmu. O znamenitim ličstima. Konkordatska borba 1937. godine -- v. 13. Ustanak robova. Srbija u svetlosti i mraku. O istoriji. Duhovni preporod Evrope. O Evropi. Agonija crkve. O zapadnom hrišćanstvu -- v. 14. Biblijske teme. Jevanđelske teme. Egzegeza. O vrlinama. Eseji -- v. 15. Bogomoljački pokret. Duhovne pouke. O ekologiji -- v. 16. Besede -- v. 17. Knjiga o Isusu Hristu. Vera obrazovanih ljudi. Vera svetih. Prvi zakon božji. Molitva gospodnja. Misli o dobru i zlu -- v. 18. knj. 1. Ohridski prolog -- v. 19. knj. 2. Ohridski prolog -- v. 20. knj. 3. Ohridski prolog. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the methods of determining monetary values of biodiversity depend on one's ethical point of departure. After a short summary of the ethical principles of anthropocentrism and biocentrism, the paper discusses the problem wether we shouldextend the market system and let the price mechanism encompass biological diversity, i.e. put prices on biodiversity. Basically, the anthropocentric approach leads to an ethics of freedom, where the individual has the right to decide what is good (...) and to implement it. Then the individual's willingness to pay for biodiversity is a relevant criterion for its price. But the biocentric approach rather implies that an ethic of law is more important, valuing the real needs of Nature higher than the preferences of the individual consumers. Then the costs for protection or replacement are relevant, because they reflect what Nature needs.One further question concerns who is to decide the proces of biodiversity. If the willingness to pay is the criterion, then obviously the market should decide, using well-developed methods. If on the other hand the costs of protection or replacement are relevant, technical and economic experts have to calculat them—given the politically decided level of biodiversity to be restored.The basic question, whether the market and the price mechanism should be considered acceptable instruments to protect biodiversity, is not discussed in the paper. However, some environmentalists find the wish to maximize one's utility incompatible with environmental ethics. Also, the price mechanism may take various roles. Thus, prices may convey different information about the value of biodiversity, depending on which role we assign to them. (shrink)