Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in (...) the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced. (shrink)

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. Discussing the matter in connection with the status (...) of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. This paper appeals to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and argues that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

In vitro gametogenesis is the process of deriving gametes from embryonic stem cells or induced pluripotent stem cells. While not as well-known as in vitro fertilization, IVG could lead to more moral issues that would require corresponding responses from the Magisterium. Because IVG remains at the experimental stage, mainly using mice, the Magisterium has not issued any such responses in a document along the lines of Donum vitae and Dignitas personae. This essay situates IVG within Catholic moral teachings for those (...) who are unfamiliar with the teachings of the Church but who are interested in forming their consciences and those of others on what is undoubtedly a peculiar medical technique with many moral ramifications. (shrink)

Introduction: Empathy is a complex human experience that involves the subjective intersection of different individuals. In the context of nursing care in the geriatric setting, the benefits of empathetic relationships are directly related to the quality of the practice of nursing. Objective: Analyze scientific production on the benefits of empathy in the nurse–patient relationship in the geriatric care setting. Methods: An integrative review of the literature was performed using the PubMed, Cochrane, CINAHL, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Web of Science databases. The (...) articles retrieved were organized, evaluated, and classified based on the level of scientific evidence. Results: Relationships of empathy between nurses and older people were analyzed in quasi-experimental studies using different assessment tools, the majority of which had moderate levels of validity and reliability. Studies with a qualitative approach discussed the meaning of empathy in terms of the quality of care offered, compassion, and vulnerability. Discussion: Levels of empathy increase when activities are developed with the aim of teaching, sensitization, and training for relational care between nursing staff and older people. The analysis of empathetic relationships is important to the evaluation of the quality of care provided to older people. Conclusion: Empathy in the nurse–patient relationship in the geriatric care setting is an important ethical aspect that contributes to the quality of the practice of nursing. The present findings indicate the need for more robust assessment tools with adequate psychometric properties and the descriptive analysis of empathy. (shrink)

What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s Formula (...) of Humanity. Lastly, I discuss the overall merits of what I call ‘Kantian moral love’. I argue that while Kantian moral love might rightly identify, from the moral point of view, how we ought to act and think when loving other people, it fails to provide a complete account of love, crucially leaving out certain key elements from the wide range of loving relationships we find ourselves in, especially romantic love. That is, while Kantian moral love might successfully identify a morally ideal way to love other people, it falls short of capturing the full essence of love—mainly because love is not simply a moral affair but also a matter of the heart. (shrink)

In the last decade, the importance of Simone de Beauvoir’s contribution to 20th-century French philosophy has been beyond debate. However, it can be tempting to read her contributions as the dated beginnings of feminist philosophy, and to believe that her work is only interesting from the perspective of the history of philosophy. To the contrary, this article claims that contemporary philosophers can and should take Beauvoirian philosophy as a source of fruitful insights on contemporary issues in political and moral philosophy (...) by showing the limited scope of two classic critiques of Beauvoir and by defending the relevance of her work for thinking about female submission and the importance of erotic experience. (shrink)

I argue that the consumption of illegally shared pornography is often morally problematic. My argument is not based on any general condemnation of pornography or even illegal content sharing as such. Instead, my argument emphasizes that commercial pornography that is illegally shared risks violating the consent and thus the dignity of its performers. In this way, illegally shared pornography is akin to ‘revenge porn’, involving the non-consensual distribution and consumption of sexually intimate images or videos. The idea is that if (...) viewing sexually explicit content shared without the permission of the people featured within it is unethical, then the same is often true of the consumption of commercial pornographic content that has been shared illegally. My primary focus is on the commercial pornography produced and distributed by the performers themselves, but I also consider the moral status of more traditional forms of pornographic content. (shrink)

A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not (...) as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature. (shrink)

Daniel K. Finn’s Moral Agency Within Social Structures and Culture: A Primer on Critical Realism for Christian Ethics (Moral Agency for short) contributes well to the mutual enrichment of critical...

El artículo se propone elucidar el papel que juegan los usos de “raza” en los escritos de Nietzsche, situándolos e interpretándolos en conjunto con el léxico de transformación del ser humano y de su crítica de la cultura. Para ello, se estudia su empleo junto a otros conceptos fronterizos e ideas análogas como el tratamiento de la cuestión judía, su crítica del nacionalismo, la figura de los buenos europeos, la metáfora de la bestia rubia, los tipos humanos y el pensamiento (...) de la cría. Se concluye que “raza” posee un indudable carácter fisiológico y evolutivo, pero a través del proceso de incorporación (Einverleibung), el ámbito de la cultura y la moral intervienen de manera fundamental en su conformación, y como concepto, forma parte del mismo proyecto de transvaloración de los valores, la reforma de la cultura y de la humanidad. El artículo finaliza con una reflexión de la llamada a superar la raza (Über-Rasse). (shrink)

This review note surveys some important aspects of a recent publication by Amos Edelheit, A Philosopher at the Crossroads: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Scholastic Philosophy. While focus over the last decades has been placed on Pico’s thought in relation to Jewish Kabbalah and mysticism, Edelheit hopes to emphasize the importance of the scholastic tradition (or, rather, the pluriform and various tradition of late medieval and Renaissance scholasticism) in Pico’s thought, and the ways in which this intellectual context places (...) this unique Renaissance thinker at a sort of ‘crossroads’. Beyond providing a brief overview of the three main parts of the text, this note examines more closely Edelheit’s study of Pico’s 900 Theses and the methodological approach which involves a reconstruction of the dialectical context for each thesis. The Latin scholastics are real conversational partners for Pico: he is versed in the 13th-century scholastic sources, is certainly familiar with contemporaneous scholastic thought, and is able to employ scholastic methods and terminology within his wider philosophical project. While scholastic philosophy was very much alive at the end of the fifteenth century, Pico’s new and inclusive approach to philosophy and the history of philosophy, never eschewing the Latin masters, departs from both scholastic and humanist trends. (shrink)

I present a novel position vis-à-vis the views in the Latin American philosophy literature regarding whether subjects more aptly use "Hispanic" or "Latinx" to refer to Hispanic- or-Latinx people. To this end, I will argue (C) the term "Afro-Latinx" is more apt than "Hispanic" or "Latinx" in a significant number of cases. This conclusion is based on three premises. The first premise (P1) is that use of "Afro-Latinx" provides subjects with understanding of how certain events depend on anti-Black racism, US (...) society's racially unjust structure and US colonial policy. The second premise (P2) is that that neither the term "Hispanic" nor the term "Latinx" provide subjects with this understanding of how certain events depend on anti-Black racism, US society's racially unjust structure and US colonial policy. The third premise (P3) is that the term "Afro-Latinx" provides subjects with more understanding of these events than the terms, "Hispanic" and "Latinx.” I present three cases which feature the experiences of Afro-Dominican people. The 1992 murder of Dominican man Kiko García by New York Police officer O’Keefe is first case. The second case is the Washington Heights Uprising that ensued Kiko García’ murder. An instance where a nightclub bouncer in the Dominican Republic denies a Dominican women entry because of her hair texture composes the third case. (shrink)

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. This is glaringly revealed by the contrasting recent (...) takes on the issue by writers such as Soames (2005) – who adopts the view by Donnellan (1979) to be outlined presently – and Jeshion (2001), otherwise sharing a similar direct-reference approach to the prototypical expression of those contents. Discussing the matter in connection with the status of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori in the just mentioned article, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent; he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. (Thus, for instance, if, while listening to an utterance in a language that I do not know, I am told by a reliable person who knows the language and whom I trust that the utterance is true, I come thereby to know that the sentence expresses a truth, without knowing the truth that it expresses.) Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. In this paper, I will appeal to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and I will argue that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

La inteligencia artificial transforma el derecho. No es solo un modo de facilitar la actividad jurídica. Tiene implicaciones epistemológicas y sociales. El derecho se reduce a datos y a cálculos. Prospera un jurista maquinal. Se empobrece la racionalidad jurídica. Se olvida que la clave del derecho no es el procesamiento de datos sino la creación de sentido.

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, (...) it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self‐defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges. (shrink)

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.

The work of Emmanuel Levinas has been both abundantly recognized and criticized in moral philosophy. This Janus-faced attitude is also present in ecological theories, which find fertile ground in Levinas’ thought without being able to explain its apparent anthropocentrism. Opposing hermeneutical paths tend to focus either on otherness as an absolute alterity, implying a potentially unlimited responsibility for all alterities, or on otherness as a re-foundation of humanism, leading to the conclusion that responsibility is unlimited only among humans. Here I (...) seek to disentangle Levinas from these two extreme interpretations, first by reviewing ecological readings of his philosophy, in both the Francophone and Anglophone spheres, and second by analyzing specific Levinasian terms that might be particularly helpful for a non-anthropocentric or deep ecology. The main results of this investigation are a distinction between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of vulnerability, an explanation of Levinasian compulsory or methodological humanism, and a schematic model of sensibility as enjoyment/vulnerability capable of supporting deep ecology without the traditional notions of free will, rights, or values. (shrink)

Online Public Shaming is a form of norm enforcement that involves collectively imposing reputational costs on a person for having a certain kind of moral character. OPS actions aim to disqualify her from public discussion and certain normal human relations. We argue that this constitutes an informal collective punishment that it is presumptively wrong to impose on others. OPS functions as a form of ostracism that fails to show equal basic respect to its targets. Additionally, in seeking to mobilise unconstrained (...) collective power with potentially serious punitive consequences, OPS is incompatible with due process values. (shrink)

O presente trabalho objetiva demonstrar uma experiência em contexto de educação online em um curso superior de tecnologia no qual um modelo de avaliação formativa, com foco em competências, foi efetivamente modelado e utilizado. Para o seu desenvolvimento, foram consideradas as proposições de Pereira et al. (2009), sobre as metacompetências essenciais a serem desenvolvidas em estudantes na contemporaneidade, e Pereira et al. (2015) sobre uma cultura de avaliação baseada em competências.

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.

*Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize*: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a (...) third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (shrink)

El trabajo somete a discusión algunos elementos y argumentos del ensayo "Anti-Nietzsche. La crueldad de lo político" de Jorge Polo Blanco. Analizo el libro de Polo considerando el problema de la diversidad de caracterizaciones parciales que obtiene la figura de Nietzsche en el pensamiento filosófico contemporáneo y el desafío que supone actualizar a Nietzsche a la luz de nuestras sensibilidades democráticas. Examino los capítulos del libro apuntando algunas de las incorrecciones y aspectos más dudosos de su argumentario “anti-nietzscheano” e incidiendo (...) en la importancia del estudio de fuentes (Quellenforschung) y de la historia de las ediciones de la obra de Nietzsche para una interpretación filosófica rigurosa. Palabras clave: Nietzsche, Política, Democracia, Crítica genética, Fuentes, Ediciones. -/- Abstract: This article discusses some elements and arguments of Jorge Polo Blanco’s book, Anti-Nietzsche. La crueldad de lo político. I analyze Polo’s book while considering the problem of the diversity of characterizations that Nietzsche receives in contemporary philosophical thought and the challenge of evaluating his philosophy in light of our democratic sensibilities. I examine the different chapters and identify some of the inaccuracies and most dubious aspects of Polo’s “anti-Nietzschean” argument. In doing so, I stress the importance of source research (Quellenforschung) and the history of the editions for rigorous philosophical analyses. Keywords: Nietzsche, Politics, Democracy, Genetic Criticism, Sources, Editions. (shrink)

Some, if not most, philosophy program admissions committee members assume that they can determine that one applicant will likely manifest a higher degree of philosophical skill than another applicant on the basis of differences between their materials. I challenge this assumption by explaining how applicants’ materials in significant measure reflect the racially unjust environment in which they manifest their philosophical skill. I explain how applicants’ racial-group membership in similar measure determines what these materials consist in.

Education is a fundamental pillar in human development, and its evolution throughout history has been influenced by a variety of factors, including imaginative culture and human nature. In this study, we explore how educational methods have evolved in response to the interaction between these two aspects. We look at how human creativity, imagination, and adaptation have influenced the way we teach and learn, from early forms of knowledge transmission to more contemporary approaches focused on active student engagement and the development (...) of practical skills. Our research is based on a comprehensive review of the academic literature in the fields of education, evolutionary psychology, cultural anthropology, and imagination studies. We explore how societies have used imagination as a tool to transmit knowledge and values, as well as to foster creativity and individual expression. We also examine how adaptive aspects of human nature, such as the ability to learn collaboratively and adapt to changing environments, have influenced the way educational methods are designed. Our results show a clear evolution in educational methods over time, from approaches focused on the one-way transmission of knowledge to more interactive and participatory models that encourage exploration and discovery. We identify common patterns in the way societies have used imagination and adaptation to promote learning and socialization and discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary education. In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between imaginative culture, human nature, and education. It provides a solid foundation for the design of educational methods that harness the innate creativity and adaptability of human beings and offers guidance for educators and policymakers on how to promote meaningful and lasting learning in today's world. (shrink)