This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the (...) entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences. (shrink)

It is a common complaint against moral philosophers that their abstract theorising bears little relation to the practical problems of everyday life. Professor Braithwaite believes that this criticism need not be inevitable. With the help of the Theory of Games he shows how arbitration is possible between two neighbours, a jazz trumpeter and a classical pianist, whose performances are a source of mutual discord. The solution of the problem in the lecture is geometrical, and is based on the (...) formal analogy between the logic of the situation and the geometry of a parabola. But an appendix provides the alternative algebraic treatment of a general two-person collaboration situation. (shrink)

In Theory of Games, Braithwaite shows that mathematical theory of games can be used to shed light upon such notions as prudence and justice in situations involving human choices and co-operation between individuals. In his work on the Nature of Religious Belief he argues that just as a moral assertion is an expression of an intention to act in accordance with certain policy, so a religious assertion must be understood as a declaration of adherence to a (...) system of moral principles governing 'inner life' as well as external behaviour. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, (...) at the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science. (shrink)

It is a common complaint against moral philosophers that their abstract theorising bears little relation to the practical problems of everyday life. Professor Braithwaite believes that this criticism need not be inevitable. With the help of the Theory of Games he shows how arbitration is possible between two neighbours, a jazz trumpeter and a classical pianist, whose performances are a source of mutual discord. The solution of the problem in the lecture is geometrical, and is based on the (...) formal analogy between the logic of the situation and the geometry of a parabola. But an appendix provides the alternative algebraic treatment of a general two-person collaboration situation. (shrink)

Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic groups will face a multitude of strategic choices. I illustrate several contexts where individuals who are concerned solely with the discovery of truth will nonetheless face difficult game theoretic problems. Examples of purely epistemic coordination problems (...) and social dilemmas will be presented. These show that there is a far deeper connection between economics and epistemology than previous appreciated. (shrink)

This collection of papers in epistemic logic is oriented towards applications to game theory and individual decision theory. Most of these papers were presented at the inaugural conference of the LOFT (Logic for the Theory and Games and Decisions) conference series, which took place in 1994 in Marseille. Among the notions dealt with are those of common knowledge and common belief, infinite hierarchies of beliefs and belief spaces, logical omniscience, positive and negative introspection, backward induction and (...) rationalizable equilibria in game theory. (shrink)

An extension of game theory to the two-person game involving collaboration. In a detailed discussion of a simple case, the author argues persuasively that his methods yield a strategy which is sensible, prudent and fair for both participants. One of the more interesting by-products is a method for comparing inter-personal preference scales, thus providing an answer to one of the standard objections to the Hedonistic calculus. Braithwaite's approach is novel, and should be of interest to game-theorists as well as (...) philosophers.--A. R. A. (shrink)

Being scientific research a process of social interaction, this process can be studied from a game-theoretic perspective. Some conceptual and formal instruments that can help to understand scientific research as a game are introduced, and it is argued that game theoretic epistemology provides a middle ground for 'rationalist' and 'constructivist' theories of scientific knowledge. In the first part , a description of the essential elements of game of science is made, using an inferentialist conception of rationality. In the second part (...) , some ideas for the reconstruction of case studies are introduced, and applied to one example: Latour's analysis of Joliot's attempt to build an atomic bomb. Lastly, in the third part , a formal analysis of the constitution of scientific consensus is offered. (shrink)

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, (...) at the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science. (shrink)

The fetching title of this little book is explained by the fact that its author, an esteemed philosopher of science, was made Knightsbridge professor of moral philosophy. His inaugural lecture seems to show the unwisdom of such a proceeding in these difficult days of philosophical specialisation. The author maintains that the mathematical theory of games, elaborated in recent years by Von Neumann and Borel for fields as diverse as economics and military strategy, will provide an exact solution of (...) the problems of “fair play” with which he supposes the “moralist” to deal. (shrink)

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.

John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism engages our interest and sympathy because it is flawed. It reflects the crisis in Mill’s life, when he lost his faith. He had been brought up by his father in the straitest tenets of utilitarianism, but had had nervous breakdown in early adult life from emotional ill-nourishment. Utilitarianism might work as a guide for the well-governing of India by James Mill and his colleagues, but gave little sustenance to the aspiring spirit of the Romantic Movement. It (...) treats people as units, not individuals. It takes no account of the “projects” that people pursue, as Bernard Williams.. (shrink)

Les notions logiques de conséquence sont fréquemment reliées à des concepts de solution de la théorie des jeux. Dans ce contexte domine la correspondance entre une formule classiquement valide et l’existence d’une stratégie gagnante pour un joueur dans un jeu à deux joueurs. Nous proposons une extension conservative de la notion classique de conséquence basée sur une généralisation du concept de solution de jeu d’équilibre de Nash.

Les notions logiques de conséquence sont fréquemment reliées à des concepts de solution de la théorie des jeux. Dans ce contexte domine la correspondance entre une formule classiquement valide et l’existence d’une stratégie gagnante pour un joueur dans un jeu à deux joueurs. Nous proposons une extension conservative de la notion classique de conséquence basée sur une généralisation du concept de solution de jeu d’équilibre de Nash.

This article discusses the use of computer-based simulation games to teach business ethics. The current theory of business ethics simulation games (BESGs) is built on two axioms. The first is that BESGs are best used to teach students ethical principles, and the second is that this is best accomplished by presenting students with ethical dilemmas. This article disputes both of these axioms and proposes new theory. The purpose of BESGs, on the new theory, is to (...) induce in students certain thought processes, not to simulate business situations. According to this new theory, simulation games should be designed to induce in players decision-making processes analogous to those of managers and employees confronted with ethically fraught decisions that have no obvious right or wrong answer. These ethical conundrums involve balancing risks to others and benefits for oneself in the course of ordinary, everyday work. This new theory is illustrated by describing a BESG designed by the author and currently used at several colleges and universities. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the analysis of the maximin principle, which is one of the key theoretical concepts of John Rawls’s theory of justice, and the problem that this principle creates for any attempt to provide a naturalistic interpretation of Rawls’s concept of fairness . Analysis shows that maximin principle is, in fact, incompatible with the Bayesian decision theory. This paper is intended to show that recent breakthroughs in evolutionary game theory could help to reconcile the (...) maximin principle with a certain naturally emerging and evolutionary stable pattern of human social behaviour.Keywords: Maximin principle, Nash bargaining game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, learning rules. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1991, offers an integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioural sciences. The theory presented here unifies both the representation of the social environment and the equilibrium concept. The theory requires that all alternatives that are available to the players be specified in an explicit and detailed manner, and this specification is defined as a social 'situation'. A situation, therefore, not only consists of the alternatives currently available to (...) the players, but also includes the set of opportunities that might be induced by the players from their current environment. The theory requires that all recommended alternatives be both internally and externally stable; the recommendation cannot be self-defeating and, at the same time, should account for alternatives that were not recommended. In addition to unifying the representation and the solution concept, the theory also extends the social environments accommodated by current game theory. (shrink)

The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive game theory gives bad (...) advice in some cases, is reducible to rational choice theory in other cases, while it makes no sense in yet other cases. (shrink)

John Maynard Smith is the person most responsible for the use of game theory in evolutionary biology, having introduced and developed its major concepts, and later surveyed its uses. In this paper I look at some rhetorical work done by Maynard Smith and his co-author G.R. Price to make game theory a standard and common modelling tool for the evolutionary study of behavior. The original presentation of the ideas — in a 1973 Nature article — is frequently cited (...) but almost certainly rarely read. It took reformulation of the approach to create a usable model and an object of study. Perhaps paradoxically, the new model dealt with more abstract objects than did its predecessor, but because of that a better case could be made for its realism. The particular strategy of abstraction allowed game-theoretic modelling to gain a certain measure of autonomy from empirical problems, and thus to flourish. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of the interpretation of game theory. Game theory is viewed as an abstract inquiry into the concepts used in social reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict and not as an attempt to predict behavior. The first half of the paper..

This volume is a collects papers originally presented at the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT), held at the University of Liverpool in July 2006. LOFT is a key venue for presenting research at the intersection of logic, economics, and computer science, and this collection gives a lively and wide-ranging view of an exciting and rapidly growing area.