ZusammenfassungAngesichts begrenzter anderweitiger Behandlungsmöglichkeiten wird der Gabe von Antidementiva in der gegenwärtigen medizinischen Demenz-Behandlung eine besondere Bedeutung zugeordnet. Eine evidenzbasierte ethische Analyse unter den Kriterien des Wohlergehens, des Nicht-Schadens, der Autonomie und der Gerechtigkeit zeigt jedoch, dass die Bedeutung von Antidementiva oftmals überschätzt wird und die Erwartungen zu hoch sind: Die Wirksamkeit von Antidementiva ist rein symptomatisch, sie fällt bei einer großen Anzahl an Patienten nur gering aus und bleibt für manche Patienten ohne Nutzen. Zudem sind Antidementiva mit Schadensrisiken behaftet (...) und verbrauchen finanzielle Ressourcen, deren Verteilung auf verschiedenen Ebenen zur Diskussion steht. Angesichts dieser Schwierigkeiten tritt eine bislang nur unzureichend beantwortete Grundfrage des Umgangs mit Demenz-Patienten in den Vordergrund: An welchen Zielen soll sich die Behandlung orientieren? Der folgende Artikel analysiert diese Frage vor dem Hintergrund der Grundstrukturen der derzeitigen Demenz-Behandlung und fordert hier zu einem grundlegenden Umdenken auf. (shrink)

Angesichts begrenzter anderweitiger Behandlungsmöglichkeiten wird der Gabe von Antidementiva in der gegenwärtigen medizinischen Demenz-Behandlung eine besondere Bedeutung zugeordnet. Eine evidenzbasierte ethische Analyse unter den Kriterien des Wohlergehens, des Nicht-Schadens, der Autonomie und der Gerechtigkeit zeigt jedoch, dass die Bedeutung von Antidementiva oftmals überschätzt wird und die Erwartungen zu hoch sind: Die Wirksamkeit von Antidementiva ist rein symptomatisch, sie fällt bei einer großen Anzahl an Patienten nur gering aus und bleibt für manche Patienten ohne Nutzen. Zudem sind Antidementiva mit Schadensrisiken behaftet (...) und verbrauchen finanzielle Ressourcen, deren Verteilung auf verschiedenen Ebenen zur Diskussion steht. Angesichts dieser Schwierigkeiten tritt eine bislang nur unzureichend beantwortete Grundfrage des Umgangs mit Demenz-Patienten in den Vordergrund: An welchen Zielen soll sich die Behandlung orientieren? Der folgende Artikel analysiert diese Frage vor dem Hintergrund der Grundstrukturen der derzeitigen Demenz-Behandlung und fordert hier zu einem grundlegenden Umdenken auf. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAngesichts begrenzter anderweitiger Behandlungsmöglichkeiten wird der Gabe von Antidementiva in der gegenwärtigen medizinischen Demenz-Behandlung eine besondere Bedeutung zugeordnet. Eine evidenzbasierte ethische Analyse unter den Kriterien des Wohlergehens, des Nicht-Schadens, der Autonomie und der Gerechtigkeit zeigt jedoch, dass die Bedeutung von Antidementiva oftmals überschätzt wird und die Erwartungen zu hoch sind: Die Wirksamkeit von Antidementiva ist rein symptomatisch, sie fällt bei einer großen Anzahl an Patienten nur gering aus und bleibt für manche Patienten ohne Nutzen. Zudem sind Antidementiva mit Schadensrisiken behaftet (...) und verbrauchen finanzielle Ressourcen, deren Verteilung auf verschiedenen Ebenen zur Diskussion steht. Angesichts dieser Schwierigkeiten tritt eine bislang nur unzureichend beantwortete Grundfrage des Umgangs mit Demenz-Patienten in den Vordergrund: An welchen Zielen soll sich die Behandlung orientieren? Der folgende Artikel analysiert diese Frage vor dem Hintergrund der Grundstrukturen der derzeitigen Demenz-Behandlung und fordert hier zu einem grundlegenden Umdenken auf. (shrink)

The main public health advantages of examining gene by environment interactions in externalizing behavior lie in the realm of personalized interventions. Nevertheless, the incorporation of genetic data in randomized controlled trials is fraught with difficulties and raises ethical questions. This paper has been written from the perspective of developmental psychologists who, as researchers, see themselves confronted with important and in part new kinds of ethical questions arising from G × E research in social sciences. The aim is to explicate and (...) discuss ethical questions, based on the conviction that what is ethically salient in a research setting will also be relevant in that area of public healthcare incorporating research findings. The ethical questions discussed include: whether it is ethically responsible to withhold an effective treatment; to what extent genetic results should be disclosed; whether researchers should be allowed to collect genetic data of both child and parent; and what are costs and benefits of personalized interventions based on screening. We made an attempt to address these questions, but it is up to researchers to determine whether the solutions are suitable for their G × E research in social sciences. (shrink)

The human genome project's lasting legacies are the emerging insights into human physiology and disease, and the ascendance of biology as the dominant science of the 21st century. Sequencing revealed that >90% of the human genome is not coding for proteins, as originally thought, but rather is overwhelmingly transcribed into non‐protein coding, or non‐coding, RNAs (ncRNAs). This discovery initially led to the hypothesis that most genomic DNA is “junk”, a term still championed by some geneticists and evolutionary biologists. In contrast, (...) molecular biologists and biochemists studying the vast number of transcripts produced from most of this genome “junk” often surmise that these ncRNAs have biological significance. What gives? This essay contrasts the two opposing, extant viewpoints, aiming to explain their bases, which arise from distinct reference frames of the underlying scientific disciplines. Finally, it aims to reconcile these divergent mindsets in hopes of stimulating synergy between scientific fields. (shrink)

Views from one of the most original cultural critics of the twentieth century, Walter Benjamin.

The idea that consciousness and complexity are closely related has been a major driver of the popularity of integrated information theory of consciousness, despite its major formal, phenomenological, and neuroscientific shortcomings. Here, I argue that we can recover this intuition by replacing its biologically neutral notion of complexity with an evolutionary one that I shall dub “pathological complexity.”.

"Local History/Global Designs" is one of the most important books in the historical humanities to have emerged since the end of the Cold War University. This is vintage Mignolo: packed with insights, breadth, and intellectual zeal.

Benenson et al. provide a compelling case for treating greater investment into self-protection among females as an adaptive strategy. Here, we wish to expand their proposed adaptive explanation by placing it squarely in modern state-based and behavioural life-history theory, drawing on Veit'spathological complexityframework. This allows us to make sense of alternative “lifestyle” strategies, rather than pathologizing them.

Argument for the role of the human conscience in determining right and wrong, good and evil.

Walter applies the methodology of neurophilosophy to one of philosophy's centralchallenges, the notion of free will. Neurophilosophical conclusions are based on, and consistentwith, scientific knowledge about the brain and its functioning.

A translation of the main text for only published version J. G. Fichte's later WL. (Hitzig: Berlin 1810). It excludes Fichte's Preface.

Starting from the study of the physical world, we develop the concept of a dual pair, Comparing dual pairs is known as duality. We show that duality is a basic mechanism for our intellectual curiosity.

Renaissance logician, philosopher, humanist, and teacher, Peter Ramus (1515-72) is best known for his attack on Aristotelian logic, his radical pedagogical theories, and his new interpretation for the canon of rhetoric. His work, published in Latin and translated into many languages, has influenced the study of Renaissance literature, rhetoric, education, logic, and--more recently--media studies. Considered the most important work of Walter Ong's career, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue is an elegant review of the history of Ramist scholarship (...) and Ramus's quarrels with Aristotle. A key influence on Marshall McLuhan, with whom Ong enjoys the status of honorary guru among technophiles, this challenging study remains the most detailed account of Ramus's method ever published. Out of print for more than a decade, this book--with a new foreword by Adrian Johns--is a canonical text for enthusiasts of media, Renaissance literature, and intellectual history. (shrink)

Husserl's theory of perception is remarkable in several respects. For one thing, Husserl rigorously distinguishes the parts and properties of the act of consciousness - its content -from the parts and properties of the object perceived. Second, Husserl's repeated insistence that perceptual consciousness places its subject in touch with the perceived object itself, rather than some representation that does duty for it, vindicates the commonsensical and phenomenologically grounded belief that when a thing appears to us, it is precisely that thing, (...) rather than some other thing (its 'appearance'), that we perceive. Third, his distinction between empty and intuitive acts, and his descriptions of their complex interplay in perceptual consciousness, provides a way of making sense of the fact that an object can be perceived even when some of its parts and properties are not. Finally, his theory of perceptual acts as constituents of higher-order acts of fulfilment provides one of the few detailed accounts in the philosophical literature of how a perceptual experience can transform a mere thought into knowledge, despite the fact that the relation between perception and belief is not a logical or inferential one. Because Husserl's theory of perception is a serious candidate for truth, it is also a serious candidate for philosophical criticism. As such, in what follows I will treat it as a live force to be reckoned with rather than a historical curiosity. (shrink)

Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion, contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has independent justification, because it is (...) also needed to solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts of mental causation and is defended against objections. (shrink)

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical (...) events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties. (shrink)

It is frequently alleged that a round plate viewed from an oblique angle looks elliptical, and that when one tree is in front of another that is the same intrinsic size, the front one looks larger than the rear one. And yet there is also a clear sense in which the plate viewed from an angle looks round, and a clear sense in which the two trees look to be the same size. According to the Dual Content Theory (DCT), what (...) explains these and other similar phenomena is that perceptual experiences present us with two different sorts of spatial properties: intrinsic and perspectival spatial properties. I will argue that the Dual Content Theory is false because it rests on flawed phenomenological descriptions of the experience of spatial properties. The only conditions under which a plate tilted away and an ellipse look alike, or two objects which are different in size look the same size, is when at least one of the objects being compared is misperceived. I will consider several responses to the arguments I present, and conclude by suggesting that abandoning DCT would constitute an improvement upon Noë’s enactive theory of perception. (shrink)