Tra le figure più importanti del dibattito filosofico italiano del Novecento, Antonio Banfi ha svolto nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra anche un ruolo politico di rilievo come senatore del PCI. La sua interpretazione del marxismo ha presentato una forte accentuazione umanistica. Tra i suoi scolari filosofi e storici della filosofia come Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni, Paolo Rossi. Il saggio prende in esame la prima fase della riflessione filosofica di Banfi, nella quale ha una importanza decisiva la conoscenza diretta del (...) dibattito tedesco tra le due guerre mondiali, in primo luogo della fenomenologia di Husserl e della ontologia di N. Hartmann. I Principi di una teoria della ragione - libro apparso alla fine degli anni '20 - e poi una serie di incisivi saggi degli anni '30 documentano una conoscenza approfondita e critica di un dibattito di cui mostrerà di nutrirsi in misura decisiva l'interpretazione di Banfi non solo di Hegel, ma anche di Marx. Among the leading philosophers in Italy during the 20th century, Antonio Banfi played an important role not only in the cultural debate during the 1930s and the 1940s, but also in the political scene of post-war Italy, advocating - as a representative of the Italian Communist Party in Italian Senate - a liberal, humanist view of Marxism. Among his students were influential philosophers and historians of philosophy such as Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni and Paolo Rossi. This paper investigates the first phase of Banfi's philosophical development, an analysis of which must include a scrutiny of Banfi's deep indebtedness to German debate between the two World Wars, primarily Husserl's phenomenology and Hartmann's critical ontology. Banfi's phenomenological apprenticeship at the school of Husserl, and the sensitive and critical attitude of his presentation of the German debate in his Principi di una teoria della ragione, are of substantial importance in nourishing his later interpretation of Hegel and Marx. (shrink)

In 19th century Germany, the number of publications in the history of philosophy increased dramatically. According to Ulrich Schneider’s calculations, from 1810 through 1899, 148 original textbooks by 114 authors were published in German. The aim of this article is to analyse how the documented in these publications canonic vision of 19th century German philosophy evolved. An analysis of 66 treatises published from 1802 through 1918 allows dividing 19th century philosophers (...) into groups based on the frequency of their names across the tables of contents, describing the changes in the leading group composition and in the share of attention received by a given philosopher over time. The paper presents thus a formal analysis of how historical reputations of philosophers were made, how they stabilised, or faded. The authors claim that the current understanding of the history of 19th century philosophy differs significantly from the one recorded in the German textbooks of the era. (shrink)

Though this chapter is co-authored, I was responsible for eight of its nine sections. Rather than foreshadowing the chapters to come in this edited volume, I have attempted to synthesize and supplement them in order to present an initial picture of the significance of Stoicism for German philosophy roughly since the late 19th century. With the exception of Friedrich Nietzsche, this vast field of Stoic reception has received almost no attention before. Particularly noteworthy elements in this (...) chapter include sections on the relationship between German specialist scholarship since the 1850s and German philosophy and a long section on Karl Löwith. (shrink)

In his The Poverty of Historicism 1 K.R. Popper and before him F. Kaufmann2 distinguish two broad classes of epistemological and methodological positions held in the social sciences: Antinaturalistic positions and pronaturalistic positions. These positions are distinguished with respect to their attitude regarding the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences, or rather what the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions assume to be the method of the natural sciences. According to Popper and Kaufmann the representatives of antinaturalistic (...) positions hold that the methods of the natural sciences can not be applied in the social sciences, whereas the representatives of the pronaturalistic positions have the opposite view. This of course raises the question what views the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions embrace with respect to the methods of the natural sciences. It is interesting to note, however, that Popper in his The Poverty of Historicism, indicates those views only briefly, the reasons presumably being the special tasks and aims he set himself in that analysis. These are primarily to show the disastrous political and social consequences of a false social science methodology and the invalidity of the ideas of historical necessity and that of laws of historical development. But it is well known that Popper analysed and discussed the methods and the philosophy of science with great rigour and acumen in his other books and articles and that he triggered a philosophical revolution in that field.3 Before Popper the prevailing. (shrink)

In this chapter, Rosa Luxemburg examines the basic structure of wage labor. For Luxemburg, wage labor is a condition for the systemic, economical exploitation of one free human being by another. Luxemburg analyzes the capitalists’ thinking about wages, their interest in extending the workday and in lowering the pay, and the conflict of interest between the worker and the owner of capital. She also discusses the role of trade unions in keeping not only the real wages but also the social (...) wages above the level of mere sustenance for the individual worker. (shrink)

This volume constitutes the first collective critical study of German philosophy in the nineteenth century. A team of leading experts explore the influential figures associated with the period--including Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Frege--and provide fresh accounts of the philosophical movements and key debates with which they engaged.

The long Nineteenth Century spans a host of important philosophical movements: romanticism, idealism, socialism, Nietzscheanism, and phenomenology, to mention a few. Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Marx are well-known names from this period. This, however, was also a transformative period for women philosophers in German-speaking countries and contexts. Their works are less well-known, yet offer stimulating and path-breaking contributions to nineteenth-century thought. In this period, women philosophers explored a wide range of philosophical topics and styles. Throughout (...) the movements of romanticism, idealism, socialism, and phenomenology, women philosophers helped shape philosophy's agenda and provided unique approaches to existential, political, aesthetic, and epistemological questions. While during the Nineteenth Century women continued to be (largely) excluded from formal education and positions, they developed ways of philosophizing that was accessible, intuitive, and activist in spirit. The present volume makes available to English-language readers--often for the first time--the works of nine significant women philosophers, with the hope of stimulating further interest in and scholarship on their works. The Editors' introductions offer a comprehensive introduction to the contributions of women philosophers in the period, but also to individual figures and movements. The translations are furnished with explanatory footnotes and are designed to be accessible to students as well as scholars. (shrink)

Aristotelian philosophy played an important part in the history of 19th century philosophy and science but has been largely neglected by researchers. A key element in the newly emerging historiography of ancient philosophy, Aristotelian philosophy served at the same time as a corrective guide in a wide range of projects in philosophy. This volume examines both aspects of this reception history.

Presenting a comprehensive portrayal of the reading of Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in early 20th-century German thought, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought examines the implications of these readings for contemporary issues in comparative and intercultural philosophy. Through a series of case studies from the late 19th-century and early 20th-century, Eric Nelson focuses on the reception and uses of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in German philosophy, (...) covering figures as diverse as Buber, Heidegger, and Misch. He argues that the growing intertextuality between traditions cannot be appropriately interpreted through notions of exclusive identities, closed horizons, or unitary traditions. Providing an account of the context, motivations, and hermeneutical strategies of early twentieth-century European thinkers' interpretation of Asian philosophy, Nelson also throws new light on the question of the relation between Heidegger and Asian philosophy. Reflecting the growing interest in the possibility of intercultural and global philosophy, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought opens up the possibility of a more inclusive intercultural conception of philosophy. - See more at: http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/chinese-and-buddhist-philosophy-in-early-twentieth-century-german-thought-9781350002562/#sthash.1lY6OTYj.dpuf. (shrink)

Les remarques des jeunes Marx et Engels relatives à la Révolution française sont bien connues et ont été largement commentées. Mais on oublie souvent qu’ils appartiennent à une génération d’intellectuels contestataires allemands qui, dans les années 1830-1840, ne cesse de se référer au XVIIIe siècle français dans le but de le comparer à la philosophie et à la vie politique allemandes de leur temps. L’article propose une analyse de deux positions divergentes sur ces questions, formulées par deux représentants de cette (...) génération : celle de Ludwig Börne, qui ressortit à ce que l’on peut considérer comme une version allemande du jacobinisme, et celle de Bruno Bauer, Jeune hégélien promoteur d’une révolution philosophique allemande susceptible de surpasser la Révolution française en radicalité et en profondeur spirituelle. Ainsi, le rapport des intellectuels allemands à la Révolution française pendant le Vormärz apparaît dans toute l’ambiguïté relevée par Lucien Calvié : tel le renard aux raisins de la fable de La Fontaine, partagés entre attirance et frustration, les Allemands de gauche ont les yeux rivés sur une France révolutionnaire à la fois enviée et décriée. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition ed. by Kristin Gjesdal and Dalia NassarAlison StoneKristin Gjesdal and Dalia Nassar, editors. Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 336. Hardback, $99.00."How plausible, [Dalia Nassar and I] kept asking, is it that women published philosophy in the early modern period and (...) then simply ceased to think and publish philosophy in the nineteenth century?" remarked Kristin Gjesdal recently (interview with Richard Marshall, 3:16am [blog], https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/gadamer-herder-and-the-womenphilosophers-of-the-long-nineteen-century?c=end-times-series). Not plausible at all—yet this is what historians of women in philosophy often seem to have assumed, judging by the remarkably small amount of scholarship on nineteenth-century women philosophers compared with those of the early modern period or the twentieth century. Eileen O'Neill, for instance, claims that it was "not a particularly friendly century for women philosophers" (1). In fact, as Gjesdal and Nassar observe, women were "significant contributors" to the "thriving intellectual cultures in German-speaking countries" at this time (1). Gjesdal and Nassar contrast Germanic countries to France and Britain in this regard, yet I would add that nineteenth-century Britain too had a vibrant print and periodical culture that created openings for women philosophers such as Harriet Martineau, Anna Jameson, Frances Power Cobbe, and many others. The broader point remains: the nineteenth century has only seemed empty of women philosophers because we have not yet investigated the women thinkers of this period or challenged the canons and narratives from which they have been excluded.Recognizing German women philosophers is particularly important because the vast majority of scholarship on the nineteenth century focuses on the German tradition. Consequently, unless we recover the work of German-speaking women, we will never change the narrative about this period. This makes the present anthology invaluable for both teaching and research. Edited by Gjesdal and Nassar, it contains new translations, nearly all by Anna Ezekiel, of texts by historical German-speaking women philosophers.Regarding teaching, many courses on post-Kantian European philosophy include no women until Beauvoir or Arendt. Such courses typically cover Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger. The editors have clearly designed this volume to enable instructors easily to bring women into such courses, by providing extracts—of suitable lengths for teaching—from women affiliated respectively with German idealism and Romanticism (Germaine de Staël, Karoline von Günderrode, and Bettina von Arnim), Marxism (Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg), Nietzscheanism (Hedwig Dohm, Lou Salomé), and phenomenology (Edith Stein, Gerda Walther). Some of these women are already well-known as political activists, as with Luxemburg and Zetkin, or under the elastic heading of "writers," as with Staël and von Arnim. But this collection presents these women's writings in a new light, showcasing their philosophical side. After all, we have learned to read Marx and Nietzsche philosophically: why not extend the same courtesy to Staël or Luxemburg?For researchers, this collection will likewise be invaluable. Post-Kantian European philosophy has been slow to respond to the wider questioning and broadening of the traditional philosophical canon. It remains sadly common for narratives of nineteenth-century German philosophy to discuss men only—a position that this book makes untenable. [End Page 336] Hopefully it will galvanize philosophers to integrate these women into the historiography of the post-Kantian tradition at last.In the introduction, the editors helpfully contextualize the selected writings, arguing that these women's exclusion from academic institutions led them to philosophize in ways that spoke to general audiences, connected with lived experience, and addressed practical and political concerns. In short, these women did a type of philosophy that was not purified but socially engaged, and can be a model for us today. Thereafter the book consists of sections on nine women philosophers, ordered chronologically. Each section begins with an editorial introduction to the philosopher and her interests, ideas, writings, and interlocutors.The writings included from Staël—whose work spans the period from the French Revolution into Romanticism—are "On Women Writers" from... (shrink)

The long 19th century was a period of many developments and technical innovations in agriculture and animal biology, during which actors sought to incorporate new practices in light of new information. By the middle of the century, however, while heredity steadily became the dominant concept in animal husbandry, some policies related to livestock improvement in Brazil seemed to have been tailored following a climate-deterministic concept established in the mid-18th century by the French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, (...) the Comte de Buffon. His theory of animal degeneration posited, among other things, the necessity of recurrent crossbreeding to preserve animal species living in nonnative environments from climate-induced degeneration. Although largely discredited by the early 19th century, the teachings of the French naturalist seem to have found supporters in a Brazilian program to modernize national agriculture through the application of the natural sciences. Herein I examine the revival of Buffon’s theories in that government-sponsored program to improve animal husbandry and breeding techniques, including actual applications of this theory in the real world. Ultimately, I argue that Buffon’s theory of degeneration was used to tailor public policies and funding for the improvement of domesticated animals in Brazil between 1856 and 1860. (shrink)

This article explores a German philosophy of metaphor, which proposed a close link between the body and the mind as the basis for metaphor, debunked the view that metaphor is just a decorative rhetorical device and questioned the distinction between the literal and the figurative. This philosophy of metaphor developed at the intersection between a reflection on language and thought and a reflection on the nature of beauty in aesthetics. Thinkers such as Giambattista Vico, Johann Wolfgang von (...) Goethe, Jean Paul and others laid the foundations for this philosophy and it was successively refined by Gustav Gerber, Alfred Biese and Friedrich Nietzsche. It influenced in its turn in various ways the linguistic study of metaphor and the psychology of metaphor as elaborated, for instance, by a lesser-known American scholar, Gertrude Buck. All these thinkers contributed to a philosophy and psychology of the metaphoric according to which metaphors are not only nice, but necessary for the structure and growth of human thought and language. Obvious parallels between this 19th-century philosophy of metaphor and the 20th-century theory of metaphor developed by Lakoff and his followers are examined throughout. (shrink)

This article unearths little-studied accounts of the status and role of hypotheses in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany. German thinkers regarded hypotheses, including those about unobservable causes for visible effects, as legitimate and necessary ingredients of scientific inquiry. They debated the nature of probable hypotheses resulting from inductions, proposed heuristics for making causal hypotheses, and advanced criteria for assessing and testing them. My survey of these rich and multifaceted discussions shows that many themes and topics that we (...) commonly associate with modern philosophy of science were discussed decades earlier by authors of educational and practice-oriented books on logic: consequential testing, underdetermination, auxiliary hypotheses, the problem of unobservable entities, fallibility, and elaborate methodologies of observation and experimentation. It also illuminates the long-term history of present-day criteria for hypothesis evaluation. (shrink)

This chapter explores some of the major developments in the philosophical understanding of suicide in 19th Century Western thought. Two developments in particular are considered. The first is a widespread shift towards thinking about suicide in medical terms rather than moral terms. Deploying methods initiated by a number of French and German thinkers in the preceding century who worked at the then emerging interface between the social and biological sciences, a number of 19th century (...) thinkers ejected what they took to be old metaphysical superstitions about ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and replaced them with (allegedly) hard-nosed scientific diagnoses of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’. Dismissing traditional moral arguments against the permissibility of suicide, the phenomenon came to be viewed as a symptom of decline or degeneration. How variations of this view, in biological and social contexts, reorientated practical responses to suicide in terms of treatment rather than moral condemnation is explored. The second 19th century development in philosophical thought with respect to suicide the chapter considers concerns its place in one of the most significant controversies in Germany from 1860 to the turn of the century: the Pessimismusstreit or ‘pessimism dispute’. While philosophical pessimism might be thought to vindicate or even entail suicide, many of the most prominent pessimists—including Arthur Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann—denied that this was the case, and perhaps surprisingly took suicide to involve a special kind of moral and/or epistemic failing. The chapter aims to elucidate the different arguments which pessimists appealed to in order to ground this position. (shrink)

Eukaryotic genomes are packaged into a nucleoprotein complex known as chromatin. The term was introduced in 1879 by German cytologist Walther Flemming. While observing the processes of mitosis in a light microscope, Flemming coined the term to describe the easily stainable threads in the nucleus. He predicted that it would not have a long life: “The word chromatin may serve until its chemical nature is known, and meanwhile stands for that substance in the cell nucleus which is readily (...) stained”. However, Flemming’s prediction did not come true. Although the chemical nature of chromatin—a complex of nucleic acid and proteins—was already elucidated at the end of the 19th century, the.. (shrink)

In this chapter, which includes four independent essays, Hedwig Dohm develops arguments for women’s emancipation, articulates a critique of essentialism, and assesses the claims of anti-feminists, including Friedrich Nietzsche. Although Dohm was influenced by Nietzsche, she was also one of his fiercest critics. Dohm offers some of the most acute observations of the situation of women at various stages of life––from young adulthood to old age. While her conceptualization of the self as creative and her support of single mothers and (...) unmarried women were radical for the time, her ideas prefigure some of the key claims made by twentieth-century feminists. (shrink)

The late 19th century debate among German-speaking physicists about theoretical entities is often regarded as foreshadowing the scientific realism debate. This paper brings out differences between them by concentrating on the part of the earlier debate that was concerned with the conceptual consistency of the competing conceptions of matter—mainly, but not exclusively, of atomism. Philosophical antinomies of atomism were taken up by Emil Du Bois-Reymond in an influential lecture in 1872. Such challenges to the consistency of atomism (...) had repercussions within the physics community, as can be shown for the examples of Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. The latter developed a series of counter-arguments, culminating in an ingenious attempt to turn the tables on the critics of atomism and prove the inconsistency of non-atomistic conceptions of nature. Underlying this controversy is a disagreement over specific goals of physical research which was considered crucially relevant to the further course of physical inquiry. It thereby exemplifies an attitude towards the realism issue that can be contrasted with a different, more neutral attitude of construing the realism issue as merely philosophical and indifferent with respect to concrete research programs in physics, which one also occasionally finds expressed in the 19th century controversy and which may be seen as the prevailing attitude of the 20th century debate. (shrink)

Weltschmerz is a study of the pessimism that dominated German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Pessimism was essentially the theory that life is not worth living, and was introduced into German philosophy by Schopenhauer. Frederick C. Beiser examines the intense and long controversy that arose from Schopenhauer's pessimism, which changed the agenda of philosophy in Germany away from the logic of the sciences and toward an examination of the value (...) of life. He examines the major defenders of pessimism and its chief critics, especially Eugen Dühring and the neo-Kantians. The pessimism dispute of the second half of the century has been largely ignored in secondary literature and this book is a first attempt since the 1880s to re-examine it and to analyze the important philosophical issues raised by it. The dispute concerned the most fundamental philosophical issue of them all: whether life is worth living. (shrink)

This chapter presents selections from Bettina Brentano von Arnim’s 1840 Günderode. Günderode is based on a correspondence between Brentano von Arnim and her friend Karoline von Günderrode. In its attempt to convey an intimate and engrossing dialogue between the two friends, Günderode is an exemplary realization of the romantic ideals of sym-philosophy and sociability. A hit in Germany and the United States, Günderode delves into fundamental philosophical questions, including the value of philosophy and its potential to grasp and (...) describe human experience, and the relationship between philosophy and art. (shrink)

This chapter presents three unpublished works by Karoline von Günderrode. In them, Günderrode discusses and assesses the moral philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schelling’s philosophy of nature, while also developing her own ethical account of the human relation to the earth in the essay “Idea of the Earth.” Widely regarded as her most important and radical contribution, “Idea of the Earth” distinguishes Günderrode among her contemporaries and places her in proximity to current environmental thought.

Discusses the encounter between German philosophy and Judaism in the 18th-19th centuries, focusing on the Hegelian and Kantian systems, and analyzes their negative evaluation of Judaism. Explores also the views of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and Jewish responses.

The late 19th century debate among German-speaking physicists about theoretical entities is often regarded as foreshadowing the scientific realism debate. This paper brings out differences between them by concentrating on the part of the earlier debate that was concerned with the conceptual consistency of the competing conceptions of matter---{}mainly, but not exclusively, of atomism. Philosophical antinomies of atomism were taken up by Emil Du Bois-Reymond in an influential lecture in 1872. Such challenges to the consistency of atomism (...) had repercussions within the physics community, as can be shown for the examples of Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. The latter developed a series of counter-arguments, culminating in an ingenious attempt to turn the tables on the critics of atomism and prove the inconsistency of non-atomistic conceptions of nature. Underlying this controversy is a disagreement over specific goals of physical research which was considered crucially relevant to the further course of physical inquiry. It thereby exemplifies an attitude towards the realism issue that can be contrasted with a different, more neutral attitude of construing the realism issue as merely philosophical and indifferent with respect to concrete research programs in physics, which one also occasionally finds expressed in the 19th century controversy and which may be seen as the prevailing attitude of the 20th century debate. (shrink)

In this chapter, Lou Andreas-Salomé explores the erotic (widely conceived), as it discloses a pre-reflective and foundational aspect of life. The erotic, for Salomé, is prior to the split between mind and body, even between the individual and nature, as a totality. In her view, the erotic is related to sexuality but also to art, creativity, and even religion. The chapter establishes Salomé as a philosopher who carves out an independent intellectual space between Nietzsche and Freud.

The article focuses on understanding some of the self-evident premises of the philosophy of the 17th–19th centuries that make up the horizon of the Enlightenment. One of these premises is Immanuel Kant’s idea of independent thinking. Based on the analysis of the polemics of Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi about the “extrasensible abilities” of the reason, the question is raised about the possibility of understanding someone else’s concept based on other existential preferences. Answering this question, we distinguish between (...) the concept of the Enlightenment and the practical principle of the Enlightenment and show that the supporter of the ideology of the Enlightenment (Kant) and his critic (Jacobi) appear in the light of the principle of independent thinking as the spokesmen of the spirit, not the letter of the Enlightenment. A condition for understanding someone else’s concept is a productive misunderstanding, which is one of the aspects of the principle of independent thinking: the acceptance of the self-evident as incomprehensible, the shift of one’s attention to one’s own how-being and the perception of thought as a gift. (shrink)

Among the most striking aspects of modern literature—expecially of modern German literature—are its frequent references to a notion called ‘reality’. The philosophical question this raises, ‘What is reality?’, is to one side of this enquiry, and so is the question whether or not this is a sensible question: this essay is intended as a contribution not to philosophy but to its connections with literary history and criticism. My present purpose, which determines my procedure, is to outline the various (...) closely related meanings of the word ‘Wirklichkeit’ throughout its very long history; to describe the polarization of meanings which occurred in the course of the nineteenth century, and Nietzsche's part in making the new polarity available to his literary heirs; to illustrate the way German literature became involved in this process in the first decade of our century; and, finally, to point to some of its political implications. My argument is part of a much larger topic, one that is not confined either to the German-speaking countries or indeed to literature. The topic, the ideologizing of ‘ reality ’, is relevant to all modern cultures. The present paper offers no more than a sketch of this development in one cultural area of our world. (shrink)

Lecture 1. What is intellectual history? -- Lecture 2. The scientific origins of the Enlightenment -- Lecture 3. The emergence of the modern intellectual -- Lecture 4. The cultural meaning of the French Revolution -- Lecture 5. The new conservatism in post-revolutionary Europe -- Lecture 6. The new German philosophy -- Lecture 7. Hegel's philosophical conception of history -- Lecture 8. The new liberalism -- Lecture 9. The literary culture of Romanticism -- Lecture 10. The meaning of the (...) romantic hero -- Lecture 11. The Industrial Revolution and classical economics -- Lecture 12. Early critiques of industrial capitalism -- Lecture 13. Hegelianism and the young Marx -- Lecture 14. Marx's social critique -- Lecture 15. Feminism in the 19th century culture -- Lecture 16. Women's rights in a man's world -- Lecture 17. Tocqueville & Mill, rethinking liberal theory -- Lecture 18. Nationalisms and national identities -- Lecture 19. The novel as art and social criticism -- Lecture 20. Science and its literary critics -- Lecture 21. Charles Darwin and the new biology -- Lecture 22. Controversies of social Darwinism -- Lecture 23. The heroic critic in mass society -- Lecture 24. Nietzsche's critique of European culture. (shrink)

The concept of second nature has a long and complex history, having been widely employed by several philosophers and even scientists. In recent times, the most famous thinker who has employed the concept of second nature, and has actually grounded his philosophical program precisely on this notion, is probably John McDowell. However, it is also possible to find some occurrences of the concept of second nature, “zweite Natur”, in Nietzsche’s writings, both published and unpublished. In this contribution I will (...) develop a discussion of this important topic, the nature of the human being, in Nietzsche and McDowell, and attempt to establish a comparison between them on the basis of this concept. It is the guiding idea of this article that McDowell’s “Naturalism of Second Nature”, though representing one of the most original and indeed ambitious philosophical programs today, actually suffers from some problems in defining the peculiar nature of the human being, and that referring to some of Nietzsche’s ideas on this topic may be of help in order to broaden and strengthen McDowell’s own philosophical perspective. There is almost no reference to Nietzsche in McDowell’s several philosophical works, notwithstanding his great interest in, and his careful attention to, other authors belonging to the tradition of modern German philosophy, and nobody has inquired yet into the potential Nietzsche/McDowell relationship. The paper will trace the development of certain philosophical-anthropological insights from 19th- and 20th-century German thought up to the present age, and provide an original and relevant contribution both to the specific field of Nietzsche studies and to the more general domain of inquiries into contemporary philosophical problems. Comparing the ideas of Nietzsche/ McDowell on the question concerning the nature of the human being relationship is intriguing from a philosophical point of view and may lead to a better understanding of this subject and disclose new perspectives in this field. There is a lot of philosophical insight to be gained in comparing these two figures. (shrink)

Among the most striking aspects of modern literature—expecially of modern German literature—are its frequent references to a notion called ‘reality’. The philosophical question this raises, ‘What is reality?’, is to one side of this enquiry, and so is the question whether or not this is a sensible question: this essay is intended as a contribution not to philosophy but to its connections with literary history and criticism. My present purpose, which determines my procedure, is to outline the various (...) closely related meanings of the word ‘Wirklichkeit’ throughout its very long history; to describe the polarization of meanings which occurred in the course of the nineteenth century, and Nietzsche's part in making the new polarity available to his literary heirs; to illustrate the way German literature became involved in this process in the first decade of our century; and, finally, to point to some of its political implications. My argument is part of a much larger topic, one that is not confined either to the German-speaking countries or indeed to literature. The topic, the ideologizing of ‘reality’, is relevant to all modern cultures. The present paper offers no more than a sketch of this development in one cultural area of our world. (shrink)

Over the last two decades there has been a growing interest in the transcendental dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason in Germany. Authors, however, often do not pay enough attention to the fact that Kant’s theory of reason (in the narrow sense) and the concept of ideas derived from it is not limited to this text. The purpose of this article is to compare and analyze the functionality of mind as a subjective ability developed by Kant and Fichte with the (...) Hegelian expansion of the mind to the idea of universal rationality. The relevance of such a comparison is connected with the need to demonstrate how the Hegelian paradigm of absolute rationality causes either the subsequent rejection of reason as a philosophical principle in the 19th and´20th centuries counter-discourse, or reduction of reason to the concept of pragmatic rationality. In the first part of this paper, the author intends to differentiate between at least 7 different types of ideas and their functions in Kant’s works. In the second part, he demonstrates how Fichte tries to systematize them beginning with reason, which at first creates an idea of itself. Special attention is paid to the way that Fichte categorizes them with the help of 5 spheres of action or 5 worldviews. The third and final part of the article discusses how Hegel goes beyond the frame of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness using different demands linked to the concepts of “reason” and “ideas”. Although these requirements are not found in Kant and Fichte, they entail a set of difficulties, which the author considers in conclusion. The author’s interpretation of the theory of ideas and their functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel demonstrates the dynamic character of the theories of reason in classical German philosophy, as well as the relevance of the 7 types of ideas that retain their significance for philosophy of the 21st century. Keywords: Kant and German idealism, types of ideas, functions of reason, worldviews, the problem of different demands. В Германии на протяжении последних двух десятилетий возрос интерес к трансцендентальной диалектике «Критики чистого разума». Однако авторы часто не обращают внимания на то, что кантовская теория разума (в узком смысле), в которой разворачивается работа с идеями, не ограничивается этим текстом. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ разработанной Кантом и Фихте функциональности разума как субъективной способности с гегелевским расширением разума до идеи всеобщей разумности. Актуальность такого сравнения связана с необходимостью продемонстрировать то, каким образом гегелевская парадигма абсолютной разумности вызывает либо последующий отказ от разума как философского принципа в контрдискурсе XIX–XX вв., либо редукцию разума к понятию прагматической рациональности. В первой части данной статьи вводится различение по меньшей мере семи различных видов идей и связанных с ними функций в философии Канта. Во второй части демонстрируется попытка Фихте их систематизировать исходя из утверждения том, что разум должен сначала создать идею о самом себе. Проанализировано также предложенное Фихте распределение идей на пять сфер действенности или типов мировоззрения. В третьей, итоговой части статьи рассмотрен выход гегелевской мысли за рамки трансцендентальной философии сознания. Автор статьи связывает этот процесс с выдвижением не осуществимых в контексте философии Канта и Фихте требований к понятиям «разум» и «идея» и анализирует ряд сложностей, вызванных этими требованиями. Таким образом, интерпретация учения об идеях и их функциях у Канта, Фихте и Гегеля демонстрирует динамический характер теорий разума в классической немецкой философии и актуальность семи видов идей, которые сохраняют свое значение для философии XXI в. Ключевые слова: Кант и немецкий идеализм, виды идей, функции разума, мировоззрение, проблема различных требований. (shrink)

The present paper explores diffident and dissident practices reflected by the political talk at the end of the 19th-century in Romania. Relying on Jacques Rancière’s theories on the ‘aesthetic regime of politics,’ the introduction sketches a historical frame and proposes a focus change: the relation between ‘politics’ and ‘aesthetics’ does not stand on a set of literary cases, but on political scripts as such. Thus, the hypotheses investigated by the next three parts can be formulated as follows: 1. (...) though determined by an ideological direction (Conservative or Liberal), the political speech still preserves his tendency towards aesthetic autonomy. 2. oratorical merits (hinting at aesthetic autonomy) can turn into practices of political autonomy, diffidence and, then, dissidence. Methodologically, two types of aesthetic practices organize the chosen materials; both the diffident script and the theatre of dissidence help us to perceive how the philosophical and moral meaning of these practices could change into an ideology of dissidence. The formalization of diffident practices, their conversion to outspoken dissidence, also corresponds to the symmetrical symptom of unlimited authority; when old-time politicians warned on ‘Caesarism,’ ‘Vizierate,’ ‘Despotism,’ ‘Omnipotence’ or ‘Tyranny,’ the Romanian society had already been training for a long experience of ‘dictatorship.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:378 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY these churches to deal reasonably with frontier conditions and popular prejudices is common knowledge, but it is often forgotten that their founder and guide during the critical days of growth was also an exponent of the late Scottish Enlightenment. To make this careful analysis of Campbell's philosophy, as an extraordinary specimen of empirical method, is a welcome achievement by an experienced empiricist. The (...) volume also contains a Foreword by President Perry E. Gresham of Bethany College, and a comprehensive bibliography of Campbell's writings compiled by Claude E. Spencer. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Cali]ornia Hegel's First American Followers, The Ohio Hegelians: J. B. Stallo, Peter Kau]mann, Moncure Conway, August WiUich. By Loyd D. Easton. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. Pp. lx + 353. $7.00.) This expansion of the theme outlined in Professor Easton's article of 1962 gives us fulllength accounts of the careers and ideas of four picturesque characters of the Ohio River Valley during the 19th century. The four had little in common except Hegel, and even him they did not really share, for they interpreted him differently and used him for different interests. The author is somewhat generous in calling them "Hegelians" and "followers" of Hegel, for like practically all those Americans who have been influenced by Hegel, they followed him at a safe distance and not very long. But this diversity makes Easton's account all the more fascinating. He portrays not only four characters but also the culture of Cincinati and its environment. J. B. Stallo is better known among American historians and philosophers than the other three, and deservedly so, for he was more philosophical. But he gains in stature here, noteworthy not only for his philosophy of nature but also as a prominent citizen, judge of a Superior Court, and political leader of a large German community. Stallo had two very different careers: the early Catholic student and teacher of Oken's philosophy of nature, mixed liberally with Schelling's similar system and with Hegel's Encyclopedia and his Phenomenology. Emerson was probably right in getting out of Stallo's General Principles an idea of "nature's rhythmic unfolding" rather than an idea of historical dialectic. Then came the later Stallo (after 1855), a convert from Catholicism and transcendentalism to empiricism, and a devoted follower of Ernst Mach. It is this later Stallo, author in 1881 of The Concepts and Theories oJ Modern Physics, who is better known, and who used the term "relativity" to indicate that physics deals not with things-in-themselves but with the data given to observers. Peter Kaufmann is an excellent representative of those pietists who, when they came to the open spaces and free manners of America, made serious attempts to give their religious "perfectionism" a practical social embodiment in utopian, communal economies. He became a teacher in the Rappite "Community of Equality and Social Harmony" and after a few years founded his own "Society of Germans at Teutonia." The members of this society agreed to devote their communal surplus to the education of orphans, the conversion of Indians, the spreading of the Gospel to "the four corners of the earth", and publishing a weekly Herald o] Better Times. After four years of this Society he moved northward to Canton, Ohio, where he settled down comfortably as a publisher and promoter of public education. His major publication, The Temple oJ Truth, incorporated some ideas on dialectic taken from Hegel. He continued his contacts with many utopian communities and urged his fellow citizens to help in making the United States of America "a saviour nation of the rest of mankind." Moncure Conway, a native of Virginia and graduate of Dickinson College, became an itinerant Methodist minister. But in 1853 the Harvard Divinity School made a Unitarian of him and an enthusiast for the higher criticism of Strauss and the transcendentalism of Hegel. In 1858 his wife introduced him to her home town, Cincinnati, and there he became BOOK REVIEWS 379 the minister of a very influential and liberal congregation. In 1860 he began publication in Cincinnati of The Dial, successor to the New England transcendentalist journal, and used its... (shrink)

At the time of the crisis culminating in the First World War, Bloch, a long time opponent of the authoritarian German state, was taking liberal, pacifist and finally even socialist positions. This criticism was also directed at German scholarly philosophy. In order to elaborate the fundamental idea of his theory – a metaphysics of inwardness – without being affected by current trends, Bloch refers back to the classical antique and neoplatonic gnostic metaphysics as well as to (...) Manichaeism. These elements, which constitute the very basis of his idea of the anticipating consciousness, are then related to a central problem facing the 19th century: the fate of subjectivity in the context of capitalist reification. In essayistic style Bloch develops and exemplifies classical themes using references to contemporary culture in all its complexity. (shrink)

James Warren, Facing Death, Epicurus and his Critics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. viii, 240. ISBN 0-19-925289-0. $45.00. Reviewed by Thornton Lockwood, Sacred Heart University Word count: 2152 words ------------------------------- To modern ears, the word Epicurean indicates an interest in fine dining. But at least throughout the early modern period up until the 19th century, Epicureanism was known less for its relation to food preparation and more so, if not scandalously so, for its doctrine about the annihilation of (...) the human soul at death, its denial of human immortality, and its attempt to justify the claim that death should not be feared since "Death is nothing to us". Epicureans -- like many ancient schools of thought -- sought to establish an objective "morality of happiness" or rational teaching about right conduct which allowed its practitioners to arrive at a kind of well-being. Epicureans identified such well-being or happiness with "freedom from disturbance" taraci/a ), and insofar as the fear of death undermined such contentedness in life, they presented arguments against the claim that death was a bad thing. Put more concisely, Epicureans believe that, "if we think about death correctly, we think about living a good life correctly, and vice versa". But whereas other ancient thinkers -- most famously Socrates and his students -- had sought to cure the fear of death by positing an immortal soul which philosophy was to prepare for life after the death of one's body, Epicureans took the opposite route and argued that in part it was the longing for an impossible immortality that contributed to the fearfulness of death. JW has done both classicists and philosophers the service of presenting a detailed analysis of the philosophical arguments which Epicureanism -- as found principally in the sayings and correspondence of Epicurus, Lucretius' De Rerum Natura, and Philodemus' De Morte -- presented about facing death. As the book's title accurately reflects, the presentation of the arguments is organized in large part as a response to the criticisms which both ancient and modern thinkers such as Cicero, Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams have made against the Epicurean belief about death. JW is principally concerned with the accurate presentation and fair evaluation of philosophical arguments. Much of his analysis will appeal to philosophers interested in the problem of death or the cogency of ancient ethical thought, but, as he also notes, questions about death and how to live a good life are hardly the problem only of philosophical specialists. "If any questions are worth pursuing, these are". Insofar as JW's task requires careful scrutiny of ancient texts, he also sheds light on the proper understanding of difficult Epicurean texts, especially in those cases where different passages from different Epicurean authors appear to be in tension.[[1]] For the aid of philosophers coming to Epicurus without the skills of classicists, JW translates all Greek and Latin texts into English; at the same time, all translations are accompanied by the passage in its original language. The citations and corresponding bibliography are extensive, covering not only the relevant works of contemporary philosophers such as Nagel, Williams, Feldman, and Parfit, but also the philological works of classicists writing on Epicureanism in English, French, Italian, and German. The volume concludes with a helpful index locorum. The Epicurean belief that "death is nothing to us" is meant to correct the mistaken beliefs which people have that generate a fear of death. But as JW acutely notes, precisely what is fearful about death is ambiguous. On his analysis, it could include at least four analytically distinct fears: 1) the fear of being dead ; 2) the fear that one will die ; 3) the fear of premature death ; and 4) the fear of the process of dying. JW claims that "there is no single Epicurean 'argument against death'. Rather, they had an armoury of arguments which could be deployed against the various different kinds of fear of death". Thus, JW organizes his book into chapters which consider the "armoury"of arguments made against each of these four fears. After an initial introductory chapter which analytically distinguishes the different fears of death, JW next devotes chapters to: the argument that, since humans are without perception of death and the process of death, neither should be feared ; the "symmetry argument" which seeks to prove that apprehension about the coming end of life is as irrational as apprehension that one's life did not begin earlier ; and the Epicurean analysis of what constitutes "completeness" in life. In these first four chapters, JW lays out all the arguments which the Epicurean makes against each of the four fears, considers counterarguments which have been made by ancient and modern authors, and then evaluates the overall strengths and weaknesses of each argument. A fifth chapter considers a slightly different argument, namely one which alleges that either the historical fact that Epicurus wrote a will or the Epicurean attitude towards suicide generate inconsistencies between Epicurean theories and actual Epicurean practice. Finally, a sixth chapter summarizes and evaluates as a whole the Epicurean project to rid humans of their fear of death. Although all of JW's analyses are thorough and detailed, let me focus upon his evaluation of some of the more central -- and more difficult to justify -- claims which Epicureans make to give a sense of JW's argumentation. With respect to the fear of being dead or not existing, Epicureans claim that since the atoms which make up a person dissipate upon death, then there is no person who could perceive any postmortem harm, and thus there is nothing to fear about death itself. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel have raised against this argument examples which appear to justify the belief that postmortem non-perceived harms are something in fact that should be feared.[[2]] For instance, there seems to be something fearful about the death of an individual who does not get the chance to see his or her children grow up, but such a scenario seems to be an example of something which "harms" that individual even though the individual is dead and incapable of feeling or perceiving anything. The case is related to the problem of dying before one's life is "complete," but a merit of JW's analyses of the different fears of death is that it shows that the Epicurean has two distinct arguments against the claim that such a scenario is fearful, one of which concerns the question of fearing something which happens after one's death, the other which concerns the question of fearing that one's life ends before it is complete. With respect to the first question, JW suggests that the source behind our intuition that premature death could be an unperceived harm is a "comparative" evaluation with a non-tragic death. For instance, it is not implausible to say that a child raised in a less developed country has been "harmed" in comparison to a child growing up in a country with adequate access to schooling and health care.[[3]] Even if the child raised in the less developed country never perceives the harm, in comparison to the life she or he might have lived elsewhere such lowered access to resources seems to be a "harm". But, although the case of children being raised with different levels of access to resources may have a place within the question of global justice, the case of such "unperceived" comparative posthumous harms fails as a counter argument to the Epicurean position. In the original example, it was thought that dying before seeing one's children grow up is an unperceived harm because we know of other individuals who have had that opportunity, and comparatively the former individual seems to be "harmed." One of the main problems with such a counter argument, according to JW, is that it ends up proving too much. Since one could imagine for almost every death a comparative case which was better, the counter argument makes almost every conceivable death a "harm" to the individual who died. In JW's words, "given the thought that death may rob us of goods we would have experience were we to die later, it is difficult to resist the thought that any death will fit this description". But the force of the counter argument is supposed to seize upon the case of a "tragic death" where someone is prematurely struck down before life is complete. If all deaths are tragic, none is. If the claim that death is to be feared because of unperceived harms in the case of comparative loss is unpersuasive, what about the claim that death is to be feared instead because it sometimes strikes before one has arrived at completeness or fullness in life? Solon famously claimed that we must "look to the end" and call no man happy until his life is complete; Aristotle picks up on Solon's remarks in part because eudaemonists have traditionally placed special emphasis on "completeness" as a criterion of a life well-lived. Should not all fear death because death can strike prematurely, before one has reached the various goals and stages of a life well-lived? JW persuasively argues that Epicureans were concerned with addressing the fear of premature death but that they countered such a fear on the basis of their understanding of completeness and pleasure. A complete life is a good life, but for the Epicureans, the good is pleasure and the highest pl. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century British PhilosophersHeiner F. KlemmeJohn W. Yolton, John Valdimir Price, John Stephens, general editors. The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century British Philosophers. Vols. 1, 2. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999. Pp. xxiii + 1,013. Cloth, $550.00.Good dictionaries are like good maps of a city: they indicate the main and minor quarters, give you an impression of its internal developments, and they indicate to where its highways (...) eventually lead. In philosophy, comprehensive subject dictionaries have a long history, and they do seem to experience a revival these days. To be sure, the lives and works of the leading figures of the history of ideas are generally well explored and documented. We even know which French dishes Hume liked to cook or which types of wine Kant preferred. But the lives and works of lesser known philosophers and men of letters still seem to be more or less neglected. The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century British Philosophers fills this gap for the period and the subject it covers. It comprises entries on almost six hundred persons as well as a number of entries on anonymous works. The work of close to a hundred scholars from several countries, it is unique in its attempt to bring together in two extensive volumes all minor and major British philosophers of the period between John Locke and Dugald Stewart. Since "British" is to be understood in a broad sense meaning authors who lived under British rule, it also includes Americans writing before 1776, Irish philosophers (like George Berkeley) and the French thinker Pierre Desmaizeaux, who lived and worked for a long period in Britain. Nor is the Dictionary restricted to philosophers in today's sense of the word, comprising entries on people who made in one way or the other a contribution to the history of ideas, even if their contributions are of marginal importance. Besides historians, poets, translators, mathematicians and physicists, dissenting ministers and physicians are well represented.In almost all cases, the selection makes sense. The boundaries between philosophy and, say, natural sciences were not as nicely drawn in the eighteenth century as they are today. But there are a few entries where one might wonder whether the subject's work had any specific philosophical importance or influence at all, as for example: Charles Burnet, author of a history of music; John Ellicott, who wrote on Electricity, and Thomas Innes, who published in 1729 a book on "Ancient Inhabitants on the Northern Parts of Britain or Scotland." One might also wonder if Gaelic scholar Beg Eolach Moidhach would appreciate being remembered today as a British philosopher.The length of the entries varies from several lines to up to seven pages. Generally, each entry gives the details of the life and work of the person covered, provides a bibliography of his or her main works, references to "other relevant works," and a section of "further reading." While the larger entries are naturally devoted to the better known figures, most of the authors dealt with in the minor sections cannot complain either. In many cases, information about the life and work of these minor authors is scarce and the entries are useful for this reason alone. But unfortunately, there are also cases in which essential references to "classical" biographical accounts are not listed in the bibliography, like Williams Smellie´s account of James Gregory or George Skene Keith´s biography of John Campbell.The entries on Lord Kames and George Turnbull lay, as far as their length is [End Page 282] concerned, somewhere in the middle between the shorter and longer contributions. They nevertheless are highly informative, densely argued, and are good reading. Knud Haakonssen sees in Kames "perhaps the most complete 'Enlightenment man' among the eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers´" because he covers like no other author "the whole spectrum of human knowledge and its applicability to his society" (503). The most philosophical work of Kames is his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751). According to Haakonssen, it is important because in it Kames "turns the previous moral-sense criticism of moral scepticism into a refutation of general epistemological scepticism" (504). By arguing that our... (shrink)