La recherche de qualité dans le système de santé est un objectif commun des professionnels, des décideurs et des usagers. L’évaluation des technologies médicales et la formalisation de l’état des connaissances scientifiques en médecine sont deux démarches ayant pour objectif l’amélioration de la prise de décision pour les autorités publiques et pour les professionnels de santé et usagers. L’innovation ne devrait pas être mise en cause par les procédures d’évaluation, ni par les divers liens d’intérêts des membres des groupes de (...) travail, y compris des experts. L’éducation des acteurs, dont les enseignants et décideurs, doit améliorer la qualité de l’expertise scientifique en médecine.The goal of quality in the health-care system is common to professionals, policy-makers and users. Assessments of medical technologies and formalised expressions of the state of the art of medical knowledge both aim to improve decision-making for the public authorities and for health care professionals and users. Innovation should not be brought into question by the assessment procedure itself or by the various interested connections of working group members, including experts : the quality of expert scientific assessments in medicine must rely on the education of all those involved, including teachers and decision-makers. (shrink)

We consider the question of when, given a subset A of M, the setwise stabilizer of the group of automorphisms induces a closed subgroup on Sym(A). We define s-homogeneity to be the analogue of homogeneity relative to strong embeddings and show that any subset of a countable, s-homogeneous, ω-stable structure induces a closed subgroup and contrast this with a number of negative results. We also show that for ω-stable structures s-homogeneity is preserved under naming countably many constants, but under slightly (...) weaker conditions it can be lost by naming a single point. (shrink)

A close examination of the relationship between media, art, and the "Electra complex" The feminist counterpart to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, Anti-Electra is a philosophy of "the girl" as a model of contemporary transgressive subjectivity. Elisabeth von Samsonow asserts that focusing on the girl's escape from the Oedipus complex leads to a fundamental shift in our most common views on media and art. Presenting an interpretation of contemporary technics, Anti-Electra argues that technology today encompasses Electra's gadgets and toys. According to (...) von Samsonow, satellite drive technologies such as wireless telephones, WLAN, and GPS echo the "preoedipal constellation" that the girl specializes in. And with the help of the girl, the cartography of overlapping zones between humankind and animals, as well as between humankind and apparatuses, is redesigned through what the book holds as a "radical totemism." Anti-Electra ultimately offers a new view on gender, the contemporary world dyed by symbolic girlism, and the (universal) girl in critical dialogue with media, ecology, and society. (shrink)

Psychoanalytica Elisabeth Young-Bruehl gaat nader in op de bewering van Jonathan Sacks in diens openingslezing dat het Verbond van Noach gold voor alle mensen, niet slechts een groep uitverkorenen, en dat het daarmee ruim baan gaf tolerantie en vrijheid van godsdienst. Young-Bruehl is eerder van het tegendeel overtuigd: het Verbond legt wetten op die al wie ze niet gehoorzaamt, uitsluiten. De monotheïstische godsdiensten blijven daarmee bij uitstek intrinsiek autoritair en sadomasochistisch van aard.

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl illuminates the psychological and intellectual demands writing biography makes on the biographer and explores the complex and frequently conflicted relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis. She considers what remains valuable in Sigmund Freud's work, and what areas - theory of character, for instance - must be rethought to be useful for current psychoanalytic work, for feminist studies, and for social theory. Psychoanalytic theory used for biography, she argues, can yield insights for psychoanalysis itself, particularly in the understanding of creativity.

After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through (...) which the phenomenology of action is generated and the processes involved in the specification and control of action are strongly interconnected. I argue in favor of a three-tiered dynamic model of intention, link it to an expanded version of the internal model theory of action control and specification, and use this theoretical framework to guide an analysis of the contents, possible sources and temporal course of complementary aspects of the phenomenology of action. (shrink)

This book provides linguists with a clear, critical, and comprehensive overview of theoretical and experimental work on information structure. Leading researchers survey the main theories of information structure in syntax, phonology, and semantics as well as perspectives from psycholinguistics and other relevant fields. Following the editors' introduction the book is divided into four parts. The first, on theories of and theoretical perspectives on information structure, includes chapters on topic, prosody, and implicature. Part 2 covers a range of current issues in (...) the field, including focus, quantification, and sign languages, while Part 3 is concerned with experimental approaches to information structure, including processes involved in its acquisition and comprehension. The final part contains a series of linguistic case studies drawn from a wide variety of the world's language families. This volume will be the standard guide to current work in information structure and a major point of departure for future research. (shrink)

Renowned anthropologist Pierre Lemonnier presents a refreshing new look at the anthropology of technology: one that will be of great interest to ethnologists and archaeologists alike.

Elisabeth Lloyd is an American philosopher of science whose work is centered in the field of philosophy of biology. The material in this archive documents her work in philosophy of biology. The materials extend over the whole of her career and include manuscript materials, working notes on articles and books in progress, professional correspondence, teaching materials, documents relating to work with professional organizations, talks given to professional audiences, as well as annotated books, manuscripts and preprints. Elisabeth Lloyd's publications include both (...) books and professional articles. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant development of metacontrol processes that can be (...) used to shape and balance it. (shrink)

Tradução de correspondências trocadas entre Descartes e Elisabeth no ano de 1643, nas quais discutem a tese cartesiana da alma como imaterial e inextensa. [Trad. Marcelo Fischborn].

Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to (...) shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding. (shrink)

The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on (...) the sense of agency for a given action, understood as the sense the agent has that he or she is the author of that action. I argue that the sense of agency can be analyzed as a compound of more basic experiences, including the experience of intentional causation, the sense of initiation and the sense of control. I further argue that the sense of control may itself be analysed into a number of more specific, partially dissociable experiences. (shrink)

The chapter deals both with the changing relations boys and men have had and have with ‘classic’ cars of the 1950s–1960s, and with the social relations classic cars aficionados have had and have between them apropos these machines that have survived and are still used, and therefore illustrate what has to be done so that artefacts do not become archaeological items. It raises an anthropological question having to do with what is at the core of the anthropology of objects, techniques, (...) and material actions, namely: What do interactions with the material world do that words alone could not do? The answer the chapter proposes is that by doing and making things in relation to these cars, men build, in a partially non-verbal way, a core of shared representations. In turn, this shared mixture of thoughts and actions is central to diverse social groupings and manifestations. (shrink)

Chez les Ankave-Anga, des agriculteurs forestiers de Papouasie Nouvelle-Guinée, les initiations masculines et les cérémonies de secondes funérailles restent des temps forts de la vie collective. L'étude ethnographique de tels rites contemporains d'une société «non-moderne» conduit à nuancer certaines propositions théoriques des abondants travaux récents - cognitivistes ou non - qui tentent de dégager la spécificité des actions rituelles, souvent en marginalisant la signification de ces actions. En particulier, l'opposition entre rite et technique mérite réexamen car elle est fondée sur (...) une vision obsolète des rapports entre techniques, culture et organisation sociale. Chez les Ankave, l'impossibilité de tracer une limite entre mythe, rite et technique souligne au contraire la part des objets et les gestes qui les fabriquent ou les mettent en oeuvre dans la convergence et la redondance de pratiques et de représentations qui donnent leur spécificité aux rituels.In Ankave-Anga, farmers forest of Papua New Guinea, male initiations and ceremonies, funerals remain second moments of collective life. The ethnographic study of such rites contemporary society "non-modern" qualified leads to some theoretical propositions of abundant recent work - cognitive or not - that try to identify the specific ritual actions, often marginalizing the significance of these actions. In particular, the opposition between ritual and technical merit review because it is based on an obsolete vision of the relationship between technology, culture and social organization. In Ankave, unable to draw a line between myth, ritual and draws attention to the technical part of the objects and actions that make or implement the convergence and redundancy practices and representations that give specificity rituals. (shrink)

In Spanish (and other Romance languages) certain predicates select the subjunctive mood in the embedded clause, while others select the indicative mood. In this paper, I present a new analysis for the predicates that select the subjunctive mood in Spanish that is based on a semantics of comparison. The main generalization proposed here is the following: in Spanish, a predicate selects the subjunctive mood in its embedded proposition if the proposition is compared to its contextual alternatives on a scale introduced (...) by the predicate. In this proposal, predicates that select the subjunctive mood are thus analyzed as gradable predicates. Furthermore, the subjunctive mood morpheme is claimed to make a semantic contribution, namely to evaluate the contextual alternatives that are compared by the predicate. In comparing this proposal to other approaches, I show that it can more straightforwardly account for a number of properties of these predicates (entailment relations, practical inferences, and contexts with more than two alternatives). New empirical evidence for two crucial properties of the predicates that select the subjunctive mood is provided: these predicates are focus sensitive and they are gradable, two properties that follow directly from the proposal developed here. In the vast literature on mood, the link between the appearance of the subjunctive mood and these important properties has never been made before. (shrink)

Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...) group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions. (shrink)

Elisabeth Porter's guide to the development of feminist thought on ethics & moral agency surveys feminist debates on the nature of feminist ethics, intimate relationships, professional ethics, politics, sexual politics, abortion and reproductive choices.

This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that (...) people coordinate their plans and actions. I discuss the implications that these coordination requirements might have for the strength of the sense of agency an agent may experience for a joint action. Second, engagement in joint action may involve a transformation of agentive identity and a partial or complete shift from a sense of self-agency to a sense of we-agency. I discuss several factors that may contribute to shaping our sense of agentive identity in joint action. (shrink)

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. (...) A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. (shrink)

This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.

In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus (...) allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution. (shrink)

The first Ukrainian translation of Elizabeth Badenter's work "Condorcet, Prudhomme, Guyomar... Paroles d’hommes (1790-1793)".

I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...) its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1. (shrink)

Can machines be conscious and what would be the ethical implications? This article gives an overview of current robotics approaches toward machine consciousness and considers factors that hamper an understanding of machine consciousness. After addressing the epistemological question of how we would know whether a machine is conscious and discussing potential advantages of potential future machine consciousness, it outlines the role of consciousness for ascribing moral status. As machine consciousness would most probably differ considerably from human consciousness, several complex questions (...) must be addressed, including what forms of machine consciousness would be morally relevant forms of consciousness, and what the ethical implications of morally relevant forms of machine consciousness would be. While admittedly part of this reflection is speculative in nature, it clearly underlines the need for a detailed conceptual analysis of the concept of artificial consciousness and stresses the imperative to avoid building machines with morally relevant forms of consciousness. The article ends with some suggestions for potential future regulation of machine consciousness. (shrink)

L'installation de la Réforme à Millau. Bergon. Laurence4070.

The concept of intention can do useful work in psychological theory. Many authors have insisted on a qualitative difference between prospective and intentions regarding their type of content, with prospective intentions generally being more abstract than immediate intentions. However, we suggest that the main basis of this distinction is temporal: prospective intentions necessarily occur before immediate intention and before action itself, and often long before them. In contrast, immediate intentions occur in the specific context of the action itself. Yet both (...) types of intention share a common purpose,namely that of generating the specific information required to transform an abstract representation of a goal-state into a concrete episode of instrumental action directed towards that goal. To this extent, the content of a prospective and of an immediate intention can actually be quite similar. The main distinction between prospective and immediate intentions becomes one of when, i.e., how early on, the episodic details of an action are planned. We propose that the conscious experience associated with intentional action comes from this process of fleshing out intentions with episodic details. (shrink)

The expression ‘Like’ has a wide variety of uses among English and American speakers. It may describe preference, as in (1) She likes mint chip ice cream. It may be used as a vehicle of comparison, as in (2) Trieste is like Minsk on steroids.

In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among (...) these different forms of intentions. I also hope to show that one further benefit of this approach is to open the way for a more perspicuous account of the phenomenology of action and of the role of conscious thought in the production of action. (shrink)