Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 1 Seiten: 51-74.

Busca-se neste artigo fazer alguns breves apontamentos acerca do conceito de modernidade na obra do pensador dinamarquês Søren Kierkegaard. Com efeito, argumentarei que ainda que tal conceito não esteja presente em sua produção enquanto tal, sua presença, não obstante, se faz sentir de diversas maneiras, o que, por sua vez, faz de sua produção um dos constructos teóricos mais importantes em termos de uma reflexão crítica acerca desse mesmo tema.

De novembro de 1833 a agosto de 1834 foi publicado em fascículos no Reino Unido o Bildungsroman de título Sartor Resartus, o qual, escrito em 1830 pelo pensador e crítico social escocês Thomas Carlyle, profundamente influenciado pelo movimento do romantismo alemão, e mais particularmente por Goethe, do qual era correspondente, buscava atrair os leitores britânicos para a tarefa da formação subjetiva tal qual formulada a partir deste. Neste sentido, busca-se neste artigo abordar as compreensões carlyleanas tanto do processo de autoconhecimento (...) ou formação individual tal qual desenvolvida nessa obra, quanto de sua contrapartida, ou seja, a ideologia da modernidade, uma vez que Sartor Resartus se coloca polemicamente como uma obra em oposição a tal ideologia. Assim, argumentaremos que Sartor Resartus se caracteriza por ser uma obra efetivamente existencialista, uma vez que tem como um de seus temas principais precisamente a existência humana. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt realized through her confrontation with Eichmann in Jerusalem that totalitarian regimes and, in a more general sense, modernity promote “thoughtlessness,” understood as the inability to think from an ethical point of view. As such, I argue that Eichmann’s figure is entirely comprehensible from a Kierkegaardian perspective, inasmuch as Kierkegaard had already comprehended in the mid-nineteenth century that modernity was accountable for the fomenting of “nobodies” characterized precisely by “thoughtlessness.” In this sense, my article seeks to promote an approximation (...) between Kierkegaard’s and Arendt’s works (with special reference to Eichmann in Jerusalem) with the intention of discussing the centrality of the Socratic-Augustinian notions of “conscience” and “individuality” in their conceptions of ethics and politics. In sum, I argue that what links both Kierkegaard’s and Arendt’s thought is a form of “Socratic citizenship.”. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) works have as their starting point, aside from a couple of newspaper articles published around the middle of the decade of the 1830s, a literary review of a novel written by a contemporary of his who was to achieve international fame still in life, viz. the writer Hans Christian Andersen (1805-1875). Notwithstanding, I argue that what was meant to be a literary review hides a vigorous anticipation of a problem that was meant to interest Kierkegaard throughout his (...) entire production, that is, the problem of nihilism. In this sense, the present article is based on a reading of both Andersen’s novel as well as Kierkegaard’s review, which leads me to explore the more profound connotations of Kierkegaard’s critique of the former also in terms of the context these works were produced. In sum, my argument is that both Andersen and Kierkegaard were dealing with the first signs of the arrival of nihilism in Denmark. (shrink)

Resumo: Em 1835, Kierkegaard escrevia que “o que de fato falta para mim é encontrar uma verdade que seja uma verdade para mim, encontrar a ideia pela qual eu viverei e morrerei”. Ora, mais de 50 anos antes Rousseau escrevera que “[s]ua filosofia [a dos filósofos sistemáticos] é para os outros; ser-me-ia necessária uma para mim”. O curioso, porém, é que Kierkegaard desenvolveria sua produção independentemente da de Rousseau, com a qual ele viria a ter contato apenas por volta de (...) 1850, quando a maior parte de seus escritos já havia sido produzida e publicada. Assim, diante de tais coincidências, proponho uma confrontação entre alguns dos principais conceitos existenciais presentes nas obras desses pensadores, com o que pretendo não apenas iluminar os laços existentes entre suas obras, como também reavaliar o papel de proeminência de Rousseau em termos do desenvolvimento da chamada filosofia da existência. Palavras-chave: existência; indivíduo; subjetividade; consciência; sistema; filosofia da existência. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é trazer à luz os pressupostos românticos que animam o livro de Hannah Arendt de título Eichmann em Jerusalém. De maneira a fazê-lo, explorarei na parte II a concepção romântico-alemã de “cultura” enquanto formação subjetiva da alma ; após isso, abordarei na parte III determinadas teses de cunho romântico articuladas por diferentes pensadores do século XIX relativas ao processo de massificação e, no seu entender, ao esvaziamento dos indivíduos na modernidade; por fim, na parte IV, a (...) sutil reelaboração arendtiana de várias dessas teses. Argumentarei, portanto, que o conceito romântico de “cultura” opera como premissa central na interpretação que Arendt fez do criminoso nazista Otto Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann, em suma, teria cometido os crimes que cometeu por não ter sido formado, cultivado, como um verdadeiro ser humano. (shrink)

Resumo: Lopes dos Santos, ao colocar o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus no que denomina “tradição crítica”, mostra que Wittgenstein delimita o alcance da filosofia ao eliminar sua pretensão de ser um tipo de conhecimento que, como a ciência, possa formular proposições verificáveis sobre objetos. E Wittgenstein faz isso de modo distinto da crítica moderna à metafísica, pois elimina o sujeito do problema: não é preciso recorrer a faculdades subjetivas para fazer essa delimitação, mas apenas à linguagem na qual o pensamento se expressa. (...) Por outro lado, na perspectiva da “tradição lógica”, há na mesma obra uma identificação entre a essência do “logos” que pode enunciar algo verdadeiro sobre o ser e do próprio ser do qual se fala nesse discurso. Nosso objetivo é destacar este vínculo com a “tradição lógica” para defender que, para além de uma “virada linguística”, há no Tractatus uma espécie de “metafísica silenciosa” que coloca problemas tais como o do sujeito e o da “essência” do mundo em seu correto lugar após passá-los pelo crivo da crítica. (shrink)

Em O ser e o nada, para que haja o fenômeno, é preciso o concurso de um ser que seja suaprópria descompressão de ser, um ser que, sendo seu próprio nada, faça com que o mundo sefenomenalize enquanto assombrado (hanté) por este nada, em direção a uma totalização que nuncapode se totalizar, pois o fechamento em uma totalidade compacta seria anular a descompressão de serque é abertura do próprio fenômeno enquanto fenômeno. Este movimento de totalização que nunca sepreenche caracteriza a (...) ipseidade do para-si. O fenômeno, quer o consideremos da perspectiva ôntica doque nos aparece no mundo cotidiano ou da perspectiva ontológica dos modos de ser implicados no queaparece, pressupõe a estrutura ontológica da ipseidade. Além disso, a questão do fenômeno em O ser eo nada não se resume a uma questão ontológica, pois, ao interrogar à gênese do fenômeno, Sartrecircunscreve o problema em uma metafísica que indaga sobre o que teria ocorrido para que o em-si,antes do surgimento da realidade-humana, se descomprimisse para tornar-se para-si. A concepção defenômeno como tendo origem no próprio modo de ser do para-si como ipseidade e a passagem entre aontologia e a metafísica marcam a originalidade do modo como Sartre assimila a fenomenologia em Oser e o nada. Com esta leitura, apoiada em Flajoliet e Bento Prado Jr, reforçamos as linhasinterpretativas que exigem o estudo da obra de Sartre em toda sua variedade de expressões, pois estavariedade não está circunscrita apenas na relação entre filosofia e ficção, visto que na própria obrafilosófica de Sartre há “modalidades” distintas de expressões filosóficas como a ontologiafenomenológica e a metafísica que, ao serem atravessadas, tornam mais profunda a compreensão daipseidade. (shrink)

O debate contemporâneo nas teoria das relações internacionais é marcado por duas perspectivas: de um lado a perspectiva do realismo político que concebe a paz como um ideal inacessível e a guerra como meio necessário para a aquisição e manutenção do poder; e de outro lado a perspectiva do normativismo ou idealismo que pensa o fim das relações internacionais para além dos conflitos de interesse e da luta por poder. A primeira perspectiva trata as relações internacionais em nível do ser, (...) a segunda em nível do dever ser. Tendo em vista esse cenário, a nossa ideia neste artigo consiste em abordar o problema da guerra e da paz a partir de um estudo interdisciplinar mediante contribuições do Direito Internacional Público e da Filosofia de Kant. Num primeiro momento analisaremos o paradoxo da guerra, em seguida o papel do Direito Internacional Público para a problemática da paz, e por último as contribuições de Kant para a redefinição normativa do direito internacional a partir do seu projeto republicano da liga de paz. (shrink)

Research on unethical leadership has predominantly focused on interpersonal and high-intensity forms of harmful leader behavior such as abusive supervision. Other forms of harmful leader behavior such as excessively pressuring subordinates or acting in self-centered ways have received less attention, despite being harmful and potentially occurring more frequently. We propose a model of four types of harmful leader behavior varying in intensity and orientation : Intimidation, Lack of Care, Self-Centeredness, and Excessive Pressure for Results. We map out how these relate (...) to other constructs in the unethical leader behavior field in order to integrate the existing work on how leaders can cause harm to followers. Next, in five studies, we develop and test a new survey instrument measuring the four proposed types of perceived HLB. We provide initial validity evidence for this new measure, establish its psychometric properties, and examine its nomological network by linking the four types of HLB to related leadership constructs and soft and hard outcome correlates at the individual and team level. We find that HLB is negatively related to constructive forms of leadership and positively to unethical ones. HLB is also related in the expected direction to job satisfaction, engagement, psychological safety, knowledge sharing, knowledge hiding, deviance, and objectively recorded team-level stress-related absenteeism. (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision-making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we (...) argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating a prima facie sense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is justified, then (...) assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish theoretical guidelines for understanding the relationship between ethics and anthropology in Kant's thought. Contrary to a particular line of interpretation dominant in specialized research on Kant, this article seeks to promote a historical-philosophical investigation, which contextualizes in Kant's thought the moment when three philosophical currents intersected, causing the guidelines of his debate about the concept of autonomy and perfectibility, namely: the philosophies of Hutcheson, Wolff and Rousseau. In this first part, Kant's discussion with Hutcheson and (...) Wolff is discussed. From a more specific point of view, in this first part, the present article goes through Kant's reflections between 1755 and 1764 in order to present how the need to think about a relation between ethics and anthropology is constituted within Kantian thought. (shrink)

In recent years, many disciplines have become interested in the scientific study of morality. However, a conceptual framework for this work is still lacking. In The Moral Background, Gabriel Abend develops just such a framework and uses it to investigate the history of business ethics in the United States from the 1850s to the 1930s. According to Abend, morality consists of three levels: moral and immoral behavior, or the behavioral level; moral understandings and norms, or the normative level; and (...) the moral background, which includes what moral concepts exist in a society, what moral methods can be used, what reasons can be given, and what objects can be morally evaluated at all. This background underlies the behavioral and normative levels; it supports, facilitates, and enables them. Through this perspective, Abend historically examines the work of numerous business ethicists and organizations--such as Protestant ministers, business associations, and business schools--and identifies two types of moral background. "Standards of Practice" is characterized by its scientific worldview, moral relativism, and emphasis on individuals' actions and decisions. The "Christian Merchant" type is characterized by its Christian worldview, moral objectivism, and conception of a person's life as a unity. The Moral Background offers both an original account of the history of business ethics and a novel framework for understanding and investigating morality in general. (shrink)

The principle of proportionality demands that a war (or action in war) achieve more goods than bads. In the philosophical literature there has been a wealth of work examining precisely which goods and bads may count toward this evaluation. However, in all of these discussions there is no mention of one of the most certain bads of war, namely the psychological harm(s) likely to be suffered by the combatants who ultimately must fight and kill for the purposes of winning in (...) conflict. This paper argues that harms to one’s own soldiers must be included in proportionality judgments, and goes on to argue that one of the most significant harms one’s soldiers face are the psychological stresses and traumas associated with combat. The arguments draw on a growing wealth of psychological literature exploring the connections between combatancy and psychological trauma, and highlight, in particular, the uniquely negative impact which killing has on a combatant’s mental well-being. The paper concludes that these factors place an almost certain and rather weighty negative weight in any proportionality calculations concerning wars with ground combatants who must fight “up close and personal”, and that for more remote warfighters, there is also evidence to show that they may suffer deep psychological harm as a result of their combat roles as well. The argument, however, does not attempt to demonstrate that these factors render war impermissible. Rather, it merely shows that these harms, or bads, which can be quite significant, must be factored into our considerations of proportionality. The arguments themselves are rather uncontroversial, but they bring to light an element in the moral calculus which is sadly overlooked in most discussions of the ethics of war. (shrink)

This discussion of pride, shame, and guilt centers on the beliefs involved in the experience of any of these emotions. Through a detailed study, the author demonstrates how these beliefs are alike--in that they are all directed towards the self--and how they differ. The experience of these three emotions are illustrated by examples taken from English literature. These concrete cases supply a context for study and indicate the complexity of the situations in which these emotions usually occur.

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. (...) While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed. (shrink)

In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...) are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn’t warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—that is, why we should care about it at all. In light of these arguments, I call for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment. (shrink)

The results of tests carried out using next-generation genomic sequencing (NGS) possess a peculiar and perhaps unique ‘diagnostic durability’. Unlike most other forms of testing, if genomic results or data are stored over time, then it remains possible to interrogate that information indefinitely, without having to retest the patient. Another peculiar property of genomic results is that their interpretations are subject to change within relatively short time frames. For instance, a genomic variant that is of uncertain significance (VUS) at the (...) time of testing may shortly afterwards come to be understood as pathogenic (P) or benign (B). Moreover, variant classifications might be downgraded from likely pathogenic to VUS or B, or regraded from B to VUS. These two properties of genomic testing have important implications for the responsible implementation of genomic testing in healthcare. One of these is that they prompt the question whether diagnostic laboratories are morally required to routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. We take up this question in our paper, in which we argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications (as had been argued for by Appelbaum et al 1). Still, we maintain that a restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised.2 We thank the authors of the commentaries on our paper for their attention to our argument and for their thoughtful responses to (and expansions of) our position. Oerlemans et al address …. (shrink)

The history of the field of business ethics in the U.S. remains understudied and misunderstood. In this article I begin to remedy this oversight about the past, and I suggest how it can be beneficial in the present. Using both published and unpublished primary sources, I argue that the business ethics field emerged in the early twentieth century, against the backdrop of the establishment of business schools in major universities. I bring to light four important developments: business ethics lectures at (...) the University of California and Yale University, Leon Marshall’s curriculum at the College of Commerce of the University of Chicago, and the William A. Vawter Foundation on Business Ethics at Northwestern University. Then, I consider the payoffs of my historical account for business ethics theory, pedagogy, and practice. Specifically, I present four implications of my account under these headings: business ethics as a public problem; the place of ethics in business schools; historicizing business ethics; and historical self-knowledge. (shrink)

Innovation is a key driver of care provision in assisted reproductive technologies (ART). ART providers offer a range of add‐on interventions, aiming to augment standard in vitro fertilization protocols and improve the chances of a live birth. Particularly in the context of commercial provision, an ever‐increasing array of add‐ons are marketed to ART patients, even when evidence to support them is equivocal. A defining feature of ART is hope—hope that a cycle will lead to a baby or that another test (...) or intervention will make a difference. Yet such hope also leaves ART patients vulnerable in a variety of ways. This article argues that previous attempts to safeguard ART patients have neglected how the use of add‐ons in commercial ART can exploit patients’ hopes. Commercial providers of ART should provide add‐ons only free of charge, under a suitable research protocol. (shrink)

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

Diante de inúmeras consequências que a Covid-19 trouxe sobre a educação básica, destaca-se a desigualdade social e educacional, especialmente para populações que não têm acesso ao ensino remoto. Diante de inseguranças e incertezas que as novas configurações de ensino estão passando, a logoteoria pode ser pensada como uma possibilidade de enfrentamento de realidades adversas pela busca do sentido, auxiliando na busca de fatores de proteção e resiliência. A Partir de um estudo bibliográfico filiados ao estudo qualitativo conseguimos ir em busca (...) do objetivo primário do presente estudo que se estabelece como compreender a partir de uma abordagem fundamentada na logoteoria qual o sentido da vida na educação básica e os desafios da pandemia. O que por sua vez se mostrou pertinente como se vê no estudo. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper I argue that Hume’s decision to include an account of curiosity within his theory of the passions is what gives Book 2 of the Treatise its distinctive shape, in which an account of what Hume calls “indirect” passions precedes an account of the nature of the will, which is itself followed by an account of the “direct” passions, then curiosity. On my reading, Hume concludes his theory of the passions with an account of curiosity because this is (...) where it ought to go, given how Hume understands the love of truth to arise in human nature. Not only this, but I contend that Hume’s need to account for the nature of curiosity within his theory of the passions can explain his decision to open Book 2 with a discussion of the indirect passions, rather than the direct passions. (shrink)

Concepts of decision, choice, decision-maker, and decision-making are common practical tools in both social science and natural science, on which scientific knowledge, policy implications, and moral recommendations are based. In this article I address three questions. First, I look into how present-day social scientists and natural scientists use decision/choice concepts. What are they used for? Second, scientists may differ in the application of decision/choice to X, and they may explicitly disagree about the applicability of decision/choice to X. Where exactly do (...) these disagreements lie? Third, I ask how scientists should use decision/choice concepts. What are they correctly and incorrectly used for? I argue that scientists must responsibly attend to a methodological demand: you have to have a principled, non-ad hoc, well-argued-for way of telling where decision/choice applicability ends. Thus, I aim to minimize the risk of conceptual stretching and foster responsible conceptual practices in a large body of scientific work. (shrink)

This commentary discusses the dynamic systems (DS) approach to communication over an information-processing (IP) model. The commenters suggest that the authors of the target article, in their treatment of the issue, do not identify the central failing of the IP model. Further, it is suggested that the DS approach should include examination of mechanisms in the emergence of symbolic communication.

In this paper I set out what I call a ‘conquest’ conception of Hume's experimental science of man. It is notable, I claim, that Hume regards what he calls the ‘capital’ of the sciences – ‘the science of MAN’ – as occupied territory, and that he views his ‘direct’ method of approach upon the science of human nature as a ‘conquest’. I expand upon such statements by leveraging the comparison that Hume draws between experimental moral philosophy and the experimental tradition (...) in natural philosophy inaugurated by Francis Bacon. Overall, I suggest that Hume's decision to ground his science of human nature upon experience and observation is as much about overthrowing the epistemic authority of speculative dogmas as it is about establishing a secure foundation for his system of the sciences, and I contend that Hume's application of his hypotheses to animals is central to this conception of his philosophical project in the Treatise. (shrink)

This paper provides a reception history of Book Two of the Treatise-Of the passions-as well as an attempt to reconcile Hume's ambitions to systematicity in Book Two with the distracted and distracting nature of the text. We currently have, I think, a good sense of the philosophical importance of Book Two within Hume's science of human nature. Yet we have not made much progress on understanding Book Two on its own terms, and especially why Book Two so often seems on (...) the verge of falling into an explanatory heap. I aim to rectify this situation by giving a reading of Book Two that makes sense of the philosophical importance of Hume's system of the passions, yet also explains why he encounters so many difficulties in setting out his system; such that he is often forced to stretch his explanations to the very edge of the credible. I contend that Hume's system of the passions is best viewed as an unstable explanatory compound, one that progressively dissolves as Hume's explanatory intentions become increasingly ambitious. (shrink)

I develop an interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of motor intentionality, one that emerges out of a reading of his presentation of a now classic case study in neuropathology—patient Johann Schneider—in Phenomenology of Perception. I begin with Merleau-Ponty's prescriptions for how we should use the pathological as a guide to the normal, a method I call triangulation. I then turn to his presentation of Schneider's unusual case. I argue that we should treat all of Schneider's behaviors as pathological, not only (...) his abstract movements, as is commonly acknowledged in the secondary literature, but also crucially his concrete movements. Using these facts of Schneider's illness, I reconstruct a ‘fundamental function’ of consciousness, as Merleau-Ponty called it, in which there are two kinds of bodily agency: the power of the body to be solicited by a situation and the power of the body to project a situation. I propose that these powers became dissociated in Schneider's case, as evidenced by his abstract and concrete movements, while in the normal case, these powers comprise a dynamic unity, enacted as motor intentionality. I also discuss how my interpretation complements Merleau-Ponty's assertion that motor intentions exist between mind and matter. (shrink)

A semantics of pictorial representation should provide an account of how pictorial signs are associated with the contents they express. Unlike the familiar semantics of spoken languages, this problem has a distinctively spatial cast for depiction. Pictures themselves are two-dimensional artifacts, and their contents take the form of pictorial spaces, perspectival arrangements of objects and properties in three dimensions. A basic challenge is to explain how pictures are associated with the particular pictorial spaces they express. Inspiration here comes from recent (...) proposals that analyze depiction in terms of geometrical projection. In this essay, I will argue that, for a central class of pictures, the projection-based theory of depiction provides the best explanation for how pictures express pictorial spaces, while rival perceptual and resemblance theories fall short. Since the composition of pictorial space is itself the basis for all other aspects of pictorial content, the proposal provides a natural foundation for further pictorial semantics. (shrink)

Public reason liberalism is defined by the idea that laws and policies should be justifiable to each person who is subject to them. But what does it mean for reasons to be public or, in other words, suitable for this process of justification? In response to this question, Kevin Vallier has recently developed the traditional distinction between consensus and convergence public reason into a classification distinguishing three main approaches: shareability, accessibility and intelligibility. The goal of this paper is to defend (...) the accessibility approach by demonstrating its ability to strike an appealing middle course in terms of inclusivity between shareability and intelligibility. We first argue against Vallier that accessibility can exclude religious reasons from public justification. Second, we use scientific reasons as a case study to show that accessibility excludes considerably fewer reasons than shareability. Throughout the paper, we connect our discussion of accessibility to John Rawls’s model of public reason, so as to give substance to the accessibility approach and to further our understanding of Rawls’s influential model. (shrink)

Gabriele Taylor presents a philosophical investigation of the "ordinary" vices traditionally seen as "death to the soul": sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. In the course of a richly detailed discussion of individual and interrelated vices, which complements recent work by moral philosophers on virtue, she shows why these "deadly sins" are correctly so named and grouped together.

This work presents the case of the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil that were the object of US ethnography initiated in the 1960s. The research brought harmful repercussions to the life of the Indigenous people of Brazil for several decades, and it took more than 40 years until the beginning of a process of reparation involving the Brazilian government and American universities. Objective: to discuss the meaning of the return of Yanomami blood samples, as well as contributions from the epistemologies (...) of traditional Indigenous knowledge to the debate about research ethics and the structuring of means for the social control of researchers and the protection of participants in scientific studies, having as an example the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil, subjected to noxious ethnography in the 1960s and the 1970s. This work used data reports recorded in secondary sources. In this article we argue that Bioethics needs to further diversify its epistemological foundations and to consider epistemologies and cosmologies beyond the frontiers of Western science, as the case of the abusive research involving the Yanomami indigenous people in Brazil reveals. We argue that traditional knowledge, such as those of indigenous and quilombolas, with their epistemologies and cosmologies, are fundamental for the election of less colonized and more efficient principles of research ethics, regarding the protection of the participants' rights in scientific studies. Traditional indigenous populations can teach us a great deal about doing research. (shrink)

What is it for a picture to depict a scene? The most orthodox philosophical theory of pictorial representation holds that depiction is grounded in resemblance. A picture represents a scene in virtue of being similar to that scene in certain ways. This essay presents evidence against this claim: curvilinear perspective is one common style of depiction in which successful pictorial representation depends as much on a picture's systematic differences with the scene depicted as on the similarities; it cannot be analyzed (...) in terms of similarity alone. The same problem arises for many other kinds of depiction. The essay concludes that depiction in general is not grounded in resemblance but geometrical transformation. (shrink)

I make a contribution to the sociology of epistemologies by examining the neuroscience literature on love from 2000 to 2016. I find that researchers make consequential assumptions concerning the production or generation of love, its temporality, its individual character, and appropriate control conditions. Next, I consider how to account for these assumptions’ being common in the literature. More generally, I’m interested in the ways in which epistemic communities construe, conceive of, and publicly represent and work with their objects of inquiry—and (...) what’s thereby assumed about them and about the world. I argue that these implicit or explicit assumptions are a distinct type of explanandum, whose distinctiveness sociology hasn’t adequately appreciated and taken advantage of. I think it should and I hope it will. (shrink)

Adam Smith é considerado um dos fundadores do liberalismo clássico. Ele é apresentado, com razão, como o organizador da nova ciência da economia, que tem por objetivo compreender, prover e maximizar as riquezas e os confortos de uma sociedade. Descreveu em certa medida uma nova sociabilidade engendrada nas transações econômicas, emergindo a partir disso uma sociedade comercial, materialmente próspera dentro da ordem política. A riqueza advém da oportuna e correta divisão do trabalho. O trabalho se vê e se faz, a (...) partir da obra smithina, autêntico substrato da ordem econômico-social. Mas Adam Smith não limitou exclusivamente a vida em sociedade às relações econômicas, notadamente as comerciais. Também não reduziu a motivação humana ao estrito autointeresse, vinculado ao amor-próprio. Como filósofo moral, ele nunca se declarou economista, e considerou que a sensibilidade, a consciência e as virtudes morais têm papel primordial na constituição de uma sociedade humana genuinamente desenvolvida. A apropriação que seus seguidores atuais e a abordagem econômica neoliberal fazem de Smith desfigurou o seu legado. Neste artigo, depois de introduzirmos brevemente a apropriação neoliberal do pensamento smithiano, apresentamos a crítica de Noam Chomsky e de Amartya Sem a esta perspectiva, desvelando o processo de redução e distorção dos conceitos originais do pensador escocês, buscando ao mesmo tempo resgatar um pouco de sua rica contribuição à compreensão do agir e da vida social humanos, notadamente o modo pelo qual estes se manifestam em nosso tempo. (shrink)

Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under-regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism—a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of alienation. We can (...) infer that Durkheim presents us with a notion of an “optimal” human condition that exists between anomie and fatalism. The structure of modern societies, it will be argued, is characterized not just by excessive control leading to alienation or by a lack of integrative restraint leading to anomie but also by active efforts to optimally regulate social life. (shrink)