Twenty-five years after publishing Religion Without Explanation, D. Z. Phillips thought it time to reassess the book in the form of a second edition. With the amount of time passed since the first edition, it is not surprising that he quickly realized the revision must instead be rewriting.

For those familiar with the contributions Robert Solomon has made to philosophy over the years, especially with Hegel, this book may either come as a bit of a shock bit or a bit of a pleasant surprise. Of course the reaction of the reader will mostly depend on what he or she thinks of the rather abstruse word “spirituality.”.

This paper addresses the criticism recently directed at Internet companies who have chosen to do business in China. Currently, in order to conduct business in China, companies must agree to the Chinese government’s rule of self-censoring any information the government deems inappropriate. We start by explaining how some of these companies have violated the human rights of Chinese citizens to freely trade information. We then analyze whether the justifications and excuses offered by these companies are sufficient to absolve them of (...) moral responsibility. We argue that both justifications and excuses offered are insufficient. Wilfully abiding by unjust laws, albeit necessary to do business in China, should not trump moral actions that protect rights. (shrink)

This paper addresses the criticism recently directed at Internet companies who have chosen to do business in China. Currently, in order to conduct business in China, companies must agree to the Chinese government's rule of self-censoring any information the government deems inappropriate. We start by explaining how some of these companies have violated the human rights of Chinese citizens to freely trade information. We then analyze whether the justifications and excuses offered by these companies are sufficient to absolve them of (...) moral responsibility. We argue that both justifications and excuses offered are insufficient. Wilfully abiding by unjust laws, albeit necessary to do business in China, should not trump moral actions that protect rights. (shrink)

Most ethics studies employing accounting subjects have utilized the Defining Issues Test, generally finding the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants to be less advanced than those of the general population. This study assesses the validity of the DIT by examining whether an individual can achieve a higher moral judgment score on the DIT by responding from the role of a political liberal. Accounting undergraduates, defining themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative, completed the DIT once from their own (...) perspective and once from either an "extremely conservative" or "extremely liberal" perspective.The results indicate that DIT scores can be influenced by an aspect of political ideology not reflecting maturation in moral judgment. Subjects decreased their moral judgment scores when responding to the DIT dilemmas from a conservative perspective. Contrary to moral development theory, subjects were able to increase their moral judgment scores when responding from the perspective of a political liberal. These results imply that, given the generally conservative political orientation of the profession, the DIT may systematically understate the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants. (shrink)

This recent publication by professor Kai Nielsen may be best seen as a logical progression of thought that follows from his 1991 study, After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy, and from several articles since this publication. Described by Nielsen as a "metaphilosophical study", On Transforming Philosophy is his on-going treatment of how the aims of the traditional philosophical project have failed and how a transformed conception of philosophy should now focus on the (...) "problems of life." Although many philosophers may doubt that an inquiry of this nature is possible, Nielsen nonetheless sets out to dispel various traditional conceptions of the central task of philosophy. In its place he seeks to establish what he believes to be a more "humanly important" view of philosophy. (shrink)

Perceptually secured knowledge consists of beliefs that amount to knowledge just because they are based on suitable perceptual states. Relationism about the ground of perceptually secured knowledge is the view that if a perceptual state can make a belief based on it amount to knowledge, then it can do that because it constitutes an appropriate kind of relational state, e.g., a state of perceptual acquaintance. I explore the prospects of both maintaining that some beliefs amount to perceptually secured knowledge and (...) developing a relationist account of their ground. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of ordinary multisensory experience that go beyond mere co-consciousness of features (e.g., the experience that results from concurrently hearing a sound in the hallway and seeing the cup on the table). In one case, a sensory experience in one modality creates a perceptual demonstrative to whose referent qualities are attributed in another sensory modality. For example, when you hear someone speak, auditory experience attributes audible qualities to a seen event, a person’s speaking motions. The (...) second kind of multisensory experience attributes features experienced in several sensory modalities to one and the same object via a process of amodal perceptual integration, i.e., integration that occurs separately from processing within the individual sensory modalities. Multisensory experiences arising from holding and seeing a tomato or from seeing the Indian curry boil and smelling it are examples of the second kind of multisensory experience. At the end of the chapter we look at synesthesia, a kind of atypical multisensory experience, and argue that one version of this phenomenon may be able to shed light on the neural mechanism underlying amodally integrated multisensory experience. (shrink)

Von Theoderich zunächst gefördert, dann wegen Hochverrats zum Tode verurteilt, verfasste Boethius seine Schrift im Gefängnis vor seiner Hinrichtung. Sein Werk ist eines der wirkungsmächtigsten der Spätantike und zählt zu den beliebtesten Büchern des Abendlandes überhaupt. Zweifellos war der Autor Christ, doch suchte er Trost und Hoffnung nicht beim Christentum, sondern in der philosophischen Tradition.

ZusammenfassungWenn man davon ausgeht, dass eine der Voraussetzungen für ein gut fundiertes moralisches Urteil im Bereich der Medizin ein adäquates Verständnis der medizinischen Gegebenheiten und Zusammenhänge ist, dann muss diesem Aspekt bei der Beurteilung der künstlichen Ernährung bei fortgeschritten Demenzerkrankten in Zukunft mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden. Damit verbunden ist die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit aktuellen empirischen Untersuchungen, anhand derer es gerechtfertigt scheint, die künstliche Ernährung bei dementen Patienten als erfolglos hinsichtlich des Ernährungszustands, der Verbesserung der Lebensqualität und der Überlebenszeit zu (...) bezeichnen. Unsere Arbeit setzt an drei wesentlichen Punkten an: zum einen soll der Zusammenhang zwischen Ernährungssituation und Demenzerkrankung dargestellt werden, andererseits soll ein Modell vorgestellt werden, das bessere Ergebnisse verspricht als sie in den bisherigen empirischen Studien gefunden worden sind, und drittens soll darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, dass mit dem Erkennen der Möglichkeit der adäquaten Ernährung von fortgeschritten Demenzkranken auch neue Optionen in der normativen Beurteilung von künstlicher Ernährung offen stehen. (shrink)

War Tubingen in der Tat eine Trutzburg der Orthodoxie, in der den Studenten nichts ubrig blieb, als einen Jakobinerclub zu bilden und revolutionare Literatur einschliesslich der grundsturzenden Philosophie Kants zu lesen? Dieser Frage geht der Verfasser zuerst nach und prasentiert dann Quellen, die das skizzierte Klischee aufheben. Es handelt sich um Archivalien, die Aufschluss uber die akademische Lehre geben. Die Autoren sind u.a. Holderlins Freunde Magenau und Neuffer, der kantische Enrage Diez und der spatere Begrunder des Philosophischen Journals Niethammer.

In diesem Aufsatz gibt der Verfasser eine präcisere und vollständigere Darstellung des Inhalts seiner früheren Veröffentlichung über dasselbe Thema. Im Falle eines biologischen Systems, dessen innerer Zustand sich durch ein einziges Parameterc bestimmen lässt, werde seine zeitliche Entwicklung durch die Gleichung dctdt=f1+∫t−λtf2dτ......dargestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Differentiation dieser Gleichung nacht nicht zu einer gewöhnlichen Differentialgleichung zweiter Ordnung führt. Im Gegensatz zur Theorie gewöhnlicher Differentialgleichungen, werden die Eigenschaften von Gleichung und ihren Derivaten nach der Zeit diskutiert. Es lässt sich Gleichung auf (...) eine gewöhnliche Differentialgleichung höherer Ordnung reduzieren. nur im ausgeschlossenen Fall, dasst-λ ein bestimmter Zeitpunkt wäre.Wolle man einwenden, dass Gleichung und ihre Derivaten nach der Zeit die zeitliche Entwicklung von Systemen darstellen, die zu jedem Moment nur ein „Punktgedächtnis” besitzen, dann lässt sich das Integralglied leicht derart transformieren, dass keine weitere Differentiation nach der Zeit auf eine Gleichung ohne Integralglied führen kann. Beispiele solcher Transformationen werden gegeben. Die neuen Gleichungen beschreiben die Entwicklung von Systemen die sicher ein „lineäres” Gedächtnis besitzen, d.h. ein Gedächtnis das sich zu jedem Moment auf ein endliches Kontinuum von Zeitpunkten und Zuständen erstreckt.Es ergibt sich aus der vollständigeren Betrachtung, dass Gleichung der früheren Abhandlung einer Revision bedarf.L'auteur fait un examen plus exact et plus approfondi du sujet traité dans sa première publication. Pour le cas d'un système biologique dont l'état intérieur est défini par un seul paramètrec, l'évolution au cours du temps se laisse decrire par l'équation dctdt=f1+∫t−λtf2dτ......Une différentiation d'après le tempst ne peut pas réduire l'équation à une équation différentielle ordinaire. Cela est possible seulement dans le cas exclu quet-λ soit un moment fixé. Au contraste des équations différentielles ordinaires, l'auteur explique comment se différent les propriétés de l'équation et de ses dérivés d'après le temps.Pour éviter la critique que l'équation et ses dérivés d'après le temps décrivent l'évolution de systèmes qui à tout moment donné ne possèdent qu'une „mémoire à une seule valeur”, l'auteur expose comment l'intégrale peut se transformer afin qu'aucune nouvelle différentiation d'après le temps ne conduise à une équation sans intégrale. Plusieurs exemples d'une telle transformation sont donnés. Les équations transformées décrivent sans aucun doute l'évolution de systèmes qui à tout moment possèdent une mémoire qui s'étend sur une intervalle continue du temps passé. L'examen plus approfondi démontre que l'équation de la première publication doit être corrigée. (shrink)

Titus Livius (59 v. Chr. - 17 n. Chr.) hat in seiner "Römischen Geschichte" die Ereignisse von der Gründung der Stadt bis zum Tod des Drusus 9 v. Chr. dargestellt. Das Werk umfasste 142 Bücher, von denen 35 erhalten sind: Buch 1-10 (bis 293 v. Chr.) und 21-45 (219-167 v. Chr.). Von den übrigen Partien haben wir neben einigen Fragmenten Kunde durch antike Inhaltsangaben und andere Auszüge sowie durch die Benutzung des livianischen Werkes bei einer Reihe späterer Historiker. Livius' Darstellung (...) der Geschichte seines Volkes steht in engem Zusammenhang mit den Bemühungen des Augustus um eine Neuordnung des römischen Staates. Seine hohe Sprach- und Darstellungskunst und sein Einfühlungsvermögen ließen ein Werk entstehen, das rasch allgemeine Anerkennung fand und die früheren Darstellungen der römischen Geschichte in Vergessenheit geraten ließ. Als Geschichtsquelle, als Zeitdokument und als Kunstwerk ist die "Römische Geschichte" des Livius von höchstem Rang. Im ersten Buch seines monumentalen Geschichtswerks berichtet Livius von der Landung des Aeneas in Italien, der sagenumwobenen Gründung Roms und der Herrschaft der legendären sieben Könige bis zum Sturz der tarquinischen Gewaltherrschaft und der Einführung der Republik (509 v. Chr.). Die beiden folgenden Bücher stellen die Entwicklung bis 446 v. Chr. dar. Zunächst musste die errungene Freiheit gegen Gefährdungen von innen und außen verteidigt werden. Dann bestimmte der Ständekampf zwischen den Plebejern und den Patriziern weitgehend das Geschehen; er führte 493 v. Chr. zur Einrichtung des Volkstribunats und 451-449 v. Chr. zum Decemvirat und zur Aufzeichnung der Gesetze. Dazu sind die Kämpfe mit den benachbarten Sabinern und Etruskern, Volskern und Aequern und das Ringen um die Vormachtstellung in Latuum dargestellt. Die ersten Bücher haben den Ruhm des Livius begründet. Die Gestalten der römischen Frühzeit sind in seiner meisterhaften Darstellung zum gemeinsamen Besitz der Kulturwelt geworden. "Als Geschichtsquelle, als Zeitdokument und als Kunstwerk ist die 'Römische Geschichte' des Livius von höchstem Rang." Helvetia archaeologia "Die mustergültige Übersetzung ist eine treffende, unverzichtbare Hilfe." Lesenswert. (shrink)

Wenn man davon ausgeht, dass eine der Voraussetzungen für ein gut fundiertes moralisches Urteil im Bereich der Medizin ein adäquates Verständnis der medizinischen Gegebenheiten und Zusammenhänge ist, dann muss diesem Aspekt bei der Beurteilung der künstlichen Ernährung bei fortgeschritten Demenzerkrankten in Zukunft mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden. Damit verbunden ist die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit aktuellen empirischen Untersuchungen, anhand derer es gerechtfertigt scheint, die künstliche Ernährung bei dementen Patienten als erfolglos hinsichtlich des Ernährungszustands, der Verbesserung der Lebensqualität und der Überlebenszeit zu (...) bezeichnen. Unsere Arbeit setzt an drei wesentlichen Punkten an: zum einen soll der Zusammenhang zwischen Ernährungssituation und Demenzerkrankung dargestellt werden, andererseits soll ein Modell vorgestellt werden, das bessere Ergebnisse verspricht als sie in den bisherigen empirischen Studien gefunden worden sind, und drittens soll darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, dass mit dem Erkennen der Möglichkeit der adäquaten Ernährung von fortgeschritten Demenzkranken auch neue Optionen in der normativen Beurteilung von künstlicher Ernährung offen stehen. (shrink)

The most important thing to know about this book is that it is mostly not by Rorty. Twenty pages of this small book were transcribed from an audio recording of a public lecture by Rorty including portions of his discussion with the audience, in Turin, Spain, in 2005. A Spanish translation appeared in 2008, followed by this English version in 2011. Jeffrey W. Robbins wrote a foreword, “Richard Rorty: A Philosophical Guide to Talking About Religion,” (vii–xxii). The introduction at the (...) lecture was by Gianni Vattimo (1–5). Rorty’s section is twenty pages long (7–26). By far the largest portion of the book is the conclusion, by G. Elijah Dann, “Philosophy, Religion, and Religious Belief After Rorty” (27–76, including .. (shrink)

NOTE: this is a substantial revision of a previously uploaded draft. Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. (...) According to inferential internalists, in order to gain justification for believing the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument one must “see” that the premises support the conclusion. I motivate this view and endorse the idea that one’s “seeing” such a support relation consists of one’s having an intuition. In a number of recent papers, Paul Boghossian has pressed a regress argument against inferential internalism inspired by Lewis Carroll’s dialogue “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I develop a response to Bogossian’s argument according to which intuitions work like mental imperatives and inferences are mental actions performed by obeying them. After developing this response to Boghossian’s argument, I take up the question of what it is in virtue of which intuitions play a guidance role, when they do so. (shrink)

Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...) to defend cognitive phenomenology. I argue that reflection on intellectual gestalts provides a basis for developing a case for cognitive phenomenology that is immune to many of the worries that beset more familiar arguments for cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force.

Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality.

What is the epistemic significance of taking a veridical perceptual experience at face value? To first approximations, the Minimal View says that it is true belief, and the Maximal View says that it is knowledge. I sympathetically explore the prospects of the Maximal View.

In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...) and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions. (shrink)

Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of (...) cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought and cognition. Does cognition have its own phenomenal character? Can introspection tell us either way? If consciousness flows in an unbroken ‘stream’ as William James argued, how might a punctuated sequence of thoughts fit into it? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a clarification of the nature of the debate about cognitive phenomenology and the network of concepts and theses that are involved in it. He then examines the following topics: • Introspection and knowledge of our own thoughts • Phenomenal contrast arguments • The value of consciousness • The temporal structure of experience • The holistic character of experience and the interdependence of sensory and cognitive states • The relationship between phenomenal character and mental representation -/- Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology. (shrink)

First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.

What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...) upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument. (shrink)

Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of (...) their content. Epistemic elitists deny this and think that there is some further constraint the contents of experience must satisfy to be immediately justified. Here I defend epistemic elitism, propose a phenomenological account of what the further constraint is, and explore the resulting view's consequences for our knowledge of other minds, and in particular for perceptual theories of this knowledge. (shrink)

A blindfolded clairvoyant walks into a room and immediately knows how it is arranged. You walk in and immediately see how it is arranged. Though both of you represent the room as being arranged in the same way, you have different experiences. Your experience doesn’t just represent that the room is arranged a certain way; it also visually presents the very items in the room that make that representation true. Call the felt aspect of your experience made salient by this (...) contrast its presentational phenomenology. Many philosophers have observed that perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology. In this paper I explore its nature, scope, and significance. I argue that in addition to perceptual experiences, presentational phenomenology can be found in intuitive, introspective, imaginative, and recollective experiences. I also argue that presentational phenomenology is epistemologically significant: it plays a central role in explaining why the experiences that have it justify beliefs and give us knowledge. (shrink)

Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this article we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were (...) so composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall below the threshold of epistemic significance. (shrink)

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant (...) difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items such as universals and functions, which contrast with concrete objects such as solids and liquids. It is uncontroversial that we are sometimes aware of concrete objects. In this paper I explore the more controversial topic of awareness of abstract objects. I distinguish two questions. First, the Existence Question: are there any experiences that make their subjects aware of abstract objects? Second, the Grounding (...) Question: if an experience makes its subject aware of an abstract object, in virtue of what does it do so? I defend the view that intuitions, specifically mathematical intuitions, sometimes make their subjects aware of abstract objects. In defending this view, I develop an account of the ground of intuitive awareness. (shrink)