Following Wiggins’ seminal article, On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time, this article presents the first comprehensive account of the relation of material constitution, an asymmetrical, transitive relation which totally orders distinct ‘entities’ (individuals, pluralities or masses of stuff) which ‘spatially coincide.’ Their coincidence in space is explained by a recursive definition of ‘complete-composition’, weaker than strict mereological indiscernibility, which also explains the variety of logically independent similarities in such cases. This account is ‘analytical’, dealing with ‘putative’ (...) cases in general. The main strategy is to rationally reconstruct Aristotle’s notion of material cause. It is developed more fully with a theory of how to justify admitting generable and perishable things into the natural world, in The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument (Open Court, 1996). (shrink)

The main contribution of this work is to develop the account of material constitution presented in Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio 24, 1982) and a series of related articles. This account was merely ‘analytical’ in that it applied generously to ‘putative’ examples of distinct entities (individuals, pluralities and masses of stuff) in the same place at the same time. The account herein is ‘critical’ in that it seeks justification for recognizing the existence of entities constituted in addition to the entities that (...) allegedly constitute them. While the earlier account used examples such as a clay statue and the clay of the statue for purposes of illustrating material constitution, the present account would consider ‘reducing’ the statue to the clay, and seeks justification for how to resist this and admit the existence of generable and perishable natural objects in general. The justification sought is ‘deep’ in the sense that (unlike the popular ‘method of cases) it does not belong to ‘descriptive’ metaphysics (in Strawson’s sense) but is sufficiently potent to counter ‘revisionist’ views. Transcendental arguments, beginning with austere assumptions of justification itself, are thereby employed. Suggestions are made about what to conclude about our own identity, which amount to supporting animalism. (shrink)

That no member of a natural kind can switch kinds is a consequence of David Wiggins’ view that the identity conditions for such things are given by the natural kind itself. If dog is a natural kind, then dogs must be dogs and one dog cannot ‘turn into’ something else, say, by gradually ‘becoming’ a mass of tissue (as Marjorie Price had held). Were such a transition to involve the persistence of the same thing, then the thing in question would (...) comply with conditions of identity not restricted to dogs. To provide for such transitions James Baillie suggests alternative conditions of identity, based on Andrew Brennan’s notion of ‘survival’ (itself borrowed from Parfit). Survival requires that the earlier thing be ‘structurally similar to’, and ‘play a significant and direct role in the production of’ the later thing (sufficiency is gained if, in addition, they are composed of the same kind of matter). Unlike identity, however, survival is what Wiggins calls a ‘branching’ relation, capable of linking a single thing with two or more equal ‘competitors’ (as apparently happens in cases of brain fission). To provide conditions of identity per se, Baillie follows Parfit, who claimed that our identity is preserved by psychological continuity when there is no branching. Members of natural kinds, such as dogs, are now said to be reidentifiable over time by the relation of non-branching survival. I argue against this on the ground that we can know when this relation obtains only when we are already able to individuate things by a different sort of relation, such as those associated with natural kinds. (shrink)

I defend Locke’s claim that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at that time. In the relevant sense of ‘kind’, a kind is a sortal, which, with an appropriate ostension, is enough to indicate which object is meant. To perform this function sortals must be sufficient to determine the persistence conditions of the thing ostended.

The general account of material constitution presented in my article, Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio vol. 24.1, June 1982), is further developed. There we saw how distinct objects in the same place at the same time can be strictly ordered by an asymmetrical, transitive relation of material constitution. I show herein how this relation can conceivably form ‘upright trees’ in which one object constitutes two other objects, neither of which constitutes the other. It is, however, impossible to have ‘inverted trees’ in (...) which one thing is constituted by two things neither of which constitutes the other. (This impossibility is implied when supposing that there is just one thing which counts as the proximate matter of a thing.). (shrink)

I defend a theory of philosophy, suggested explicitly by Allan Gibbard (and inspired by Kant), in which the main branches may be considered as fundamental inquiry into norms of different kinds. Special attention is given to how even metaphysics fits the description. The theory is defended by explaining a variety of ‘known facts’ about philosophy, understood as facts commonly recognized in academic philosophy. These include: that philosophy spans a diversity of areas, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics; that philosophy (...) has seemed, at least, to be different in kind from other areas of inquiry; that philosophy lacks experts and official procedures of justification; that philosophy appears important to some but not to others. (shrink)

This introductory text offers a coherent treatment of issues in a wide range of areas of philosophy. It begins with logic (in a broad, traditional sense that includes epistemology), since the concepts of this area illuminate metaphysics, covered next in the sequence. (Consider, for example, how material reality is what is known through sensation or how mind is what is known through introspection.). Ethics is covered next, because views on well-being and morality have been deepened by being couched in metaphysical (...) views that yield conceptions of human nature. For similar reasons, the section on ethics comes before that on social philosophy. It is my firm belief that the greatest philosophers achieve the depth for which they are admired by constructing systems in which the various areas of philosophy are unified. With this inspiration, I have put the discussions in a logical order, in which the earlier ones anticipate and illuminate later ones. Something like a story is told. (shrink)

Support is given to Habermas's argument that we interpret thoughts only by seeing persons as actually justified in their circumstances. Habermas holds further that his argument extends to moral thinking, in that we understand it only by actually taking the moral point of view, and he thinks this is illustrated by Kohlberg's theory of moral development. While this illustration is denied here on the ground that Kohlberg's theory accepts Rawls's theory of justice, it is argued that the extension to morality (...) can be made with a theory like Gewirth's, in which morality appears as a form of rationality. (shrink)

‘Second substances’ are Aristotle’s species and genera that reveal the general nature of a thing. Sortals correspond to the most specific, least abstract of these, normally thought of as ‘the’ kind to which a thing belongs. I argue against a common view that artifact terms such as ‘clock’ or ‘pen’ are suitable as sortals and for their being regarded as more like genera. If we can individuate clocks and pens as we do trees and rocks, by a combination of sortal (...) plus ostension, then we must use more specific sortals which indicate the structures by virtue of which the objects perform the functions of clocks or pens. Functions by themselves do not supply the identity conditions of sortals. Similar reasoning supports Wiggins’ view that ‘the kind’ to which we belong is our biological species, not the purely functional kind of being a person. (shrink)

The ‘step’ to individuation is taken when one can perceive an object as a single, countable thing. While Strawson envisages this step as one from feature placing, I argue that the presence of demonstratives renders this problematic. The step is best seen as taken from universal recognition, as explained by Price. This shows that the step is ‘greater’ than we might have expected. There is a mutual dependence of the abilities to individuate, to grasp demonstrative concepts and to draw a (...) distinction between appearance and reality. (shrink)

This study examines the philosophical foundations of Hegel's social theory by articulating the normative standards at work in his claim that the central social institutions of the modern era are rational or good.

Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there (...) is testimony in favor of the proposition deriving from a reliable source. I argue that this Humean individualism also leads to skepticism in a wide range of cases; it makes it impossible for a layperson to be justified on expert testimony. In addition, I argue that the apparent motivation for the Humean view, an insistence on intellectual autonomy in justification, does not succeed in motivating it. I then explore the contours of a collectivist view of justification on testimony, with special attention to the place of a subject's intellectual autonomy in such justification. I try to bring empirical results of the psychology of persuasion to bear on the epistemological issues. (shrink)

This book is addressed to readers who have laid the foundation of a liberal education & are beginning the special study of law.

This book is the first comprehensive study of Rousseau's rich and complex theory of the type of self-love (amour proper) that, for him, marks the central difference between humans and the beasts. Amour proper is the passion that drives human individuals to seek the esteem, approval, admiration, or love--the recognition--of their fellow beings. Neuhouser reconstructs Rousseau's understanding of what the drive for recognition is, why it is so problematic, and how its presence opens up far-reaching developmental possibilities for creatures that (...) possess it. One of Rousseau's central theses is that amour proper in its corrupted, manifestations--pride or vanity--is the principal source of an array of evils so widespread that they can easily appear to be necessary features of the human condition: enslavement, conflict, vice, misery, and self-estrangement. Yet Rousseau also argues that solving these problems depends not on suppressing or overcoming the drive for recognition but on cultivating it so that it contributes positively to the achievement of freedom, peace, virtue, happiness, and unalienated selfhood. Indeed, Rousseau goes so far as to claim that, despite its many dangers, the need for recognition is a condition of nearly everything that makes human life valuable and that elevates it above mere animal existence: rationality, morality, freedom--subjectivity itself--would be impossible for humans if it were not for amour proper and the relations to others it impels us to establish. (shrink)

THE NATURE OF JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL SCIENCE. Professor Holland of Oxford is to be congratulated on ...

A noticeable shift in focus has occurred in public discourse from What is our best course of action? to What are the true facts of the situation? At the center of these debates are questions on the proper use of evidence, Legal scholar Schauer offers clarity based on how legal systems grapple with these questions-and by drawing insights from psychology, philosophy, economics, history, and decision theory.

The reasons-causes debate concerns whether explanations of human behavior in terms of an agent's reasons presuppose causal laws. This paper considers three approaches to this debate: the covering law model which holds that there are causal laws covering both reasons and behavior, the intentionalist approach which denies any role to causal laws, and Donald Davidson’s point of view which denies that causal laws connect reasons and behavior, but holds that reasons and behavior must be covered by physical laws if reasons (...) explanations are to be valid. I defend the intentionalist approach against the two causalist approaches and conclude with reflections on the significance of the debate for the social sciences. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Aim of Hegel's Science of Society The Method of Hegel's Science of Society Comprehension versus Critique.

Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland’s own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.

The main claim of the paper is that there are irreducibly social agents that intentionally perform social actions. It argues, first, that there are social attitudes ascribable to social agents and not to the individuals involved. Second, that social agents, not only individual agents, are capable of what Weber called “subjectively understandable action.” And, third, that although action (if not merely mental) presumes an agent’s moving her body in various ways, actions do not consist of such movements, and hence not (...) only individual persons but social groups are genuine agents. We should be pluralists about individuation, rejecting both individualism and collectivism by granting that social agency is neither more nor less ultimate, well-founded, or basic than non-social agency. (shrink)

This paper sets out the kind of intellectual enterprise Hegel’s science of society is by explaining its aim (reconciliation) and the method it employs to achieve that aim. It argues that Hegel’s science of society, similar to Smith’s and Marx’s, offers an account of the good social order that is grounded in both an empirical understanding of existing institutions and a normative commitment to a certain vision of the good life. It spells out the criteria Hegel appeals to in his (...) judgment that the modern social order is fundamentally good and worthy of affirmation, namely, that its three principal institutions−the family, civil society, and the constitutional state−form a coherent and harmonious whole that promotes the basic interests of all its members in a way that also realizes freedom in all three of the senses relevant to social theory: personal, moral, and social freedom. (shrink)

In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise, Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb's interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume's epistemology. Loeb's case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive (...) textual evidence in favor of the stability interpretation. I will argue here that, for some passages Loeb cites in favor of the stability interpretation, a veritistic interpretation explains the text at least as well as the stability interpretation does. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to unravel the differences, whether real or merely apparent, between Chomsky's linguistics and usage‐based linguistics (UBL). The principal alternative to generative grammar in the world today is a broad umbrella of approaches that fall under the general heading of UBL. UBL is the successor to a Piagetian approach to language acquisition, where experience and general learning principles shape the acquisition process. Functionalism takes the position that properties of grammatical systems are explicable in terms of properties of systems (...) that lie outside of grammar per se. The chapter discusses that the few direct references Chomsky has made to usage‐based linguistics. It presents the most important issues, one‐by‐one, that separate Chomsky's views from those of UBLists. They are the explananda of linguistic theory, grammar design and architecture, semantics, language acquisition and innately‐provided linguistic constructs, functional explanation, and the sources of data on which a linguistic theory might be constructed. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Vorwort von dr. H. Weber. -- Betrachtungen über das denken und träumen und über die Freudsche erklärung der träume. -- Die erstürmung des neuen Jerusalem: ein traum. -- über alpdrücken und Freudsche deutungen. -- Kurze bemerkungen über willensfreihet und erblichkeit. -- Spielleidenschaft. -- Körperbewegung, arbeit, ruhe und schalaf: Aussprüche in bezung auf ihren hygienischen und psychischen wert usw. -- Zur frage des therapeutischen fastens und der beschränkten nahrungsaufnahme. -- Eine betrachtung über den nutzen des schocks oder der aufnahme. -- Eine (...) betrafchtung über den autzen des schocks oder der "abwechslung" bei gewissen körperlichen und seelischen zuständen. -- Die ärztliche versorgung der allgemeinheit und ihre wahrscheinlichen folgen. -- Wirkungen und gegenwirkungen in der pathologie und therapie. -- Zur frage von selbsttätigen, lebenswichtigen, als ein sicherheitsventil anzusehenden wirkungen und gegenwirkungen bei erkrankungen. -- Über den circulus vitiosus bei krankheiten und über die anstrengungen der natur, ihn zu durchbrechen. -- Das teleologische bild des krebses und der neubildungen. -- Samuel Butlers anschauungen : Zellgedächtnis "mneme." -- Die "rechte" der völker im vergleich zu den "rechten" der einzelmenschen und die fragen zwischenstaatlicher schiedsgerichtshöfe. -- Grausamkeit, kriegsgreuel und greuelfabeln. -- Natur und Gott : Bemerkungen über "natur," lebensführung und pflicht vom entwicklungsgeschichtlichen standpunkt aus gesehen. (shrink)

Excerpt from Archives of Philosophy Rhythm as a Distinguishing Characteristic of Prose Style: Assn: Lus. 50 cents. The Field of Distinct Vision: W. O. Bunions. 70 cents. The Influence of Bodily Position on Mental Activities: Ema E. Jonas. 50 cent. A Statistical Study of Literary Merit: Manama]: lyman Warns. 30 cents. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books (...) uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Child labor is often condemned as a form of exploitation. I explore how the notion of exploitation, as used in everyday language, can be made precise in economic models of child labor. Exploitation is defined relative to a specific social welfare function. I first show that under the standard dynastic social welfare function, which is commonly applied to intergenerational models, child labor is never exploitative. In contrast, under an inclusive welfare function, which places additional weight on the welfare of children, (...) child labor is always exploitative. Neither welfare function captures the more gradual distinctions that common usage of the term exploitation allows. I resolve this conflict by introducing a welfare function with minimum altruism, in which child labor in a given family is judged relative to a specific social standard. Under this criterion, child labor is exploitative only in families where the parent (or guardian) displays insufficient altruism towards the child. I argue that this welfare function best captures the conventional concept of exploitation and has useful properties for informing political choices regarding child labor. (shrink)