Composed of a substantial introduction, twelve original essays produced for this volume, and a new English translation of a personal, intriguing, and little ...

Although much has been written about Deleuze’s engagement with the arts, _Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosoph_y concerns the art of his philosophy. Gregory Flaxman suggests that Deleuze’s notorious rejection of representation gives rise to a singular task—to create new concepts and invent new means of philosophical expression. Tracing this task throughout Deleuze’s vast oeuvre, Flaxman argues that Deleuze’s ambition to think and write “otherwise” constitutes the fabulation of philosophy itself. For Flaxman, Deleuze’s philosophy is (...) organized around the notion of the friend __. This book dramatizes the practice of friendship in Deleuze’s intimate affairs with philosophers—including Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and Foucault—and close encounters with a range of writers, including Homer, More, Kafka, Woolf, and Borges. Flaxman traces Deleuze’s relationship with Nietzsche, the friend from whom he learned to write “in his own name,” to explain how apprenticeship becomes the initial condition of Deleuze’s philosophical method. Detailing the transformation of Nietzsche’s genealogy into “geophilosophy,” Flaxman goes on to show how Deleuze’s philosophy of the earth precipitates his return to ancient Greece and induces his resolution to overturn Platonism. In this spirit, the book demonstrates Deleuze’s evocation of the “powers of the false” by examining how, in his battle against representation, he makes fiction the basis for a minor philosophy. This first volume draws to a close with a timely elaboration of Deleuze’s avowed, if enigmatic, “style as politics” in an age when capitalism and communication challenge the claims of philosophy as never before. A stunning and original contribution, Flaxman’s book restores the question of aesthetics to Deleuze’s thinking and writing. _Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy_ not only revitalizes our sense of the philosopher but revises the sense of his philosophy, provoking critical problems and novel possibilities with which readers will wrestle for years to come. (shrink)

While every discipline in the humanities worries about its future, film studies is caught in the thrall of a particular anxiety, namely the possibility that it lacks a consistent object and a compelling reason. Behind the question of film studies looms the question of cinema itself, an aging techn? that seems to have hung around in the midst of new(er) media that lay claim to the image as their province. Why cinema? Against so many digital incursions, more traditionally minded critics (...) have defended film on the basis of its indexical powers, but this article envisions an entirely different reason to return to the cinema. Where both the return to the index and the recourse to the digital effect tend to regard the cinema as a matter of visibility, I suggest that we might reclaim our faith in the cinema by virtue of what remains unseen and off-screen. Hence, this essay undertakes a brief history of the out of frame in order to induce a conceptualization of the cinema (pace Deleuze) as the art of the ?Outside.? Turning to Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey, the essay concludes by analyzing how an ostensibly older sense of images nevertheless augurs the critical and philosophical developments with which we can learn to believe in the cinema once more. (shrink)

Asked to characterize the critical history of cinema studies over the past several decades, one could do much worse than to speak of the age of affect of affect.1 This is a big claim, of course, but it’s not without precedent or parallel. The engagement with affect describes a remarkably widespread shift in the humanities, social sciences, and the neurosciences. Cinema studies is among a number of disciplines that have sought to prioritize matters of sensation and feeling, and for roughly (...) the past thirty years the persistence of affect has played a critical role in the field. In the historicist recovery of the “cinema of attractions” and the feminist reappraisal of film melodrama, in the cognitivist... (shrink)

Andrew Murphie 'Is Philosophy Ever Enough?' _Film-Philosophy_, Deleuze Special Issue vol. 5 no. 38, November 2001.

In this paper, I explain the curious role played by the Argument from Absolute Terms in Peter Unger's book Ignorance, I provide a critical presentation of the argument, and I consider some outstanding issues and the argument’s contemporary significance.

Landini discusses the second edition of Principia Mathematica, to show Russella (TM)s intellectual relationship with Wittgenstein and Ramsey.

Virtually all historical treatments of just war recognize the importance of the account given by Thomas Aquinas in Summa theologiae II-II, q. 40, ?De bello?, where he outlines three conditions ? legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention ? for a justifiable use of armed force. It is, however, less well known that within the same section of the work (q. 50, a. 4) Aquinas extended his reflection on just war into a theory of military prudence. By placing generalship under (...) the category of ?prudence?, rather than ?art? or ?science?, he held that military command involves more than a morally neutral skill with victory as its sole aim. Building on the premise that service to the common good constitutes the overarching purpose of the military profession, Aquinas showed how the virtue of prudence provides an inner compass for decision-making amid the uncertainty and confusion of the battlefield. (shrink)

In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it (...) is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing--especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact--is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing. "In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema has made an immensely important contribution to the discussion of group morality and collective responsibility both within and far beyond professional academic philosophy. His clearly written book will be essential reading." --Fergus Kerr, Honorary Fellow, University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

Now in its twentieth year of publication, this rich collection, popular among teachers and students alike, provides an in-depth look at major cases that have shaped the field of medical ethics. The book presents each famous (or infamous) case using extensive historical and contextual background, and then proceeds to illuminate it by careful discussion of pertinent philosophical theories and legal and ethical issues.

Preliminary Abstract: -/- The late Mary Midgley (1919-2018) was one of the most relevant and wide-ranging moral philosophers of the last century. For over forty years, she drew attention to the necessity of philosophy in everyday life while making significant contributions on such topics as human nature, ethics, animals and the environment, science, religion, and other real-world issues. Midgley’s remarkable career saw the publication of over 250 books, journal articles, pamphlets, and other materials, concluding with the publication of What Is (...) Philosophy For? at age 99, just one month before her death. This work was the last in a series of publications late in Midgley’s career that underscored her reputation as a singular thinker and a shining example of the significant presence of women in philosophy. -/- Mary Midgley on What Matters offers a window into this noteworthy period late in Midgley’s career. This volume invites the reader into a series of visits and conversations between Gregory McElwain and Mary Midgley at her home in Newcastle from 2011-2018. Framed and thematically curated by McElwain, these conversations present Midgley’s thoughts, reminiscences, and concerns on life and the topics for which she is best known, with special emphasis on her influential perspective on animals and the environment. Midgley’s witty and lively voice is emphasized throughout this accessbile book, engaging the reader with one of the more vibrant philosophers in living memory. (shrink)

Exploring Aristotle's concept of logos, this volume advances our understanding of it as a singular feature of human nature by arguing that it is the organizing principle of human life itself. Tracing its multiple meanings in different contexts, including reason, logic, speech, ratio, account, and form, contributors highlight the ways in which we can see logos in human thinking, in the organizing principles of our bodies, in our perception of the world, in our social and political life, and through our (...) productive and fine arts. Through this focus, logos reveals itself not as one feature amongst others, but instead as the feature that organizes all others, from the most "animal" to the most "spiritual." By presenting logos in this way, readers gain a complex account of the philosophy of human nature. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Non‐Darwinian Revolution 1870–1880: The Struggle for Existence and Cultural Evolution 1880–1882: Nietzsche contra Spencer 1883–1888: The Will to Power as Bildungstrieb Conclusion.

ArgumentContrary to common portrayals of social Darwinism as a transference of laissez-faire values, the widely read evolutionism of Japan's foremost Darwinist of the early twentieth-century, Oka Asajirō (1868–1944), reflects a statist outlook that regards capitalism as the beginning of the nation's degeneration. The evolutionary theory of orthogenesis that Oka employed in his 1910 essay, “The Future of Humankind,” links him to a pre-Darwinian idealist tradition that depicted the state as an organism that develops through life-cycle stages. For Oka, laissez-faire capitalism (...) marked the moment when the state began to decline toward extinction due to the orthogenetic overdevelopment of hitherto subordinate individual egos. Because conservative bureaucrat-intellectuals had been drawing upon this same organicist-developmental tradition since the 1880s in an attempt to forestall the social ills of industrialism, Oka's call for statist measures, including eugenics, to lessen and delay the atomizing, enervating, and corrupting influence of capitalism articulated the political vision of officialdom. Statist evolutionism, not social Darwinism, might be the term that best describes Oka's approach. (shrink)

_Evolution and Human Culture_ surveys disciplines of evolutionary studies to posit that hominin evolved moral sentiments have been integral to the development of artistic culture.

Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since (...) the lottery is fair, it is rational to accept that ticket 2 won’t win either—indeed, it is rational to accept for any individual ticket i of the lottery that ticket i will not win. However, accepting that ticket 1 won’t win, accepting that ticket 2 won’t win, . . . , and accepting that ticket 1000 won’t win entails that it is rational to accept that no ticket will win, which entails that it is rational to accept the contradictory proposition that one ticket wins and no ticket wins. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the close link between technology and death in the philosophical writings of Lewis Mumford. Mumford famously argued that throughout the history of western civilization we find intertwined two competing forms of technics; the democratic biotechnic form and the authoritarian monotechnic form. The former technics were said to be strongly compatible with an organic form of life while the latter were said to be allied to a mechanical power complex. What is perhaps less (...) well known is the extent to which Mumford characterizes the authoritarian technical form as being a technics of death. This article will argue that the connection between death and technics is a key theme in Mumford’s philosophy of technology. In addition to elaborating this theme and detailing how it informs Mumford’s other positions on the nature of technology, this article will also argue that Mumford’s theory of a technics of death bears witness, both implicitly and explicitly, to the influence of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death instinct. Freud’s account of the death instinct will be outlined briefly and its influence on Mumford’s writings will be explained. Death, in Mumford’s technological writings, has a generally negative function and serves to warn humanity of the perilous course that its technological civilization is set upon. However it also has a positive function in that it encourages man to transcend its biological existence in acts of creativity and purpose. Death, in this positive sense, serves the purpose of life whereas, in the negative sense, it hinders it. The role of death, in both aspects, will be explored and related to Mumford’s overall perspective on technics and life. It is argued that Mumford’s philosophy of technology cannot be fully understood without an awareness of his views on death and its role in the life of technological society. (shrink)

The Nicomachean Ethics is generally thought to be a “dialectical” work, aimed at resolving aporia in a set of endoxa, which it takes as its starting-point. I argue that Aristotle’s aim in the treatise is, rather, to produce definitions of key ethical terms, and that his starting-points are limited to evaluative and discriminative judgments of a certain sort, which are demanded by the nature of the discipline and are not endoxa. I discuss also how the definitions are reached (focusing on (...) the cases of the virtues of character) and the roles that aporiai do play in the process. (shrink)

_On the Genealogy of Morality_ is a history of ethics, a text about interpreting that history, and a primer on interpretation in general. It also has elements of archaeology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and etymology. Nietzsche’s history-based approach to the development of morality, as well as his keen understanding of how power relations—especially the role played in this process by social, class, and racial divisions—continue to shape our ethical norms and standards of behavior. His reading of history and the human capacity (...) for rationalization anticipated, influenced, and underpinned the interpretative techniques and strategies that emerged as dominant in the humanities and social sciences over the past several decades. In this age of “alternative truths,” Nietzsche’s insight into the nature of interpretation is more valuable than ever before. (shrink)

Stoicism, a philosophy and set of practices developed in ancient times, commands ever-growing interest. Its present day, students, practitioners, teachers, and scholars adapt it to the challenges of modern life. This third volume brings together fifty pieces previously published in the Stoicism Today blog, ranging from personal essays to conference presentations, from bits of practical advice to history and interpretation, from polemics to symposia grappling with controversies, key issues, and central concepts. There is something for everyone in this volume. The (...) selections in this volume range over a vast array of topics. You will encounter authors applying Stoicism to parenting, medicine, psychotherapy, culinary arts, time-management, exercise and fitness, the emotions, relationships, the workplace, and the environment. Some selections examine useful practices, the nature and scope of the virtues, how to develop equanimity, resilience, and happiness. Comparative studies bring Stoicism into connection with Buddhism, mindfulness, self-help and productivity authors, and modalities of psychotherapy. This book bridges the gaps between philosophical reflection and practical wisdom, between study and interpretation of Stoicism, and its application to present-day issues and problems. The essays in this volume speak to anyone intending to start or to deepen a thoughtful Stoic life in the modern world. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Vasconcelos and Essentialist Conceptions of Mestizaje Gloria Anzaldúa: The New Mestizaje María Lugones: Mestizaje and Hybridity The New Mestizaje and Race Mestizaje and Pan‐Hispanic Identity References Further Reading.

The thirteenth century mystic Ibn ʻArabi was the foremost Sufi theorist of the premodern era. For more than a century, Western scholars and esotericists have heralded his universalism, arguing that he saw all contemporaneous religions as equally valid. In Rethinking Ibn ʻArabi, Gregory Lipton calls this image into question and throws into relief how Ibn ʻArabi's discourse is inseparably intertwined with the absolutist vision of his own religious milieu-- that is, the triumphant claim that Islam fulfilled, superseded, and therefore (...) abrogated all previous revealed religions. Lipton juxtaposes Ibn ʻArabi's absolutist conception with the later reception of his ideas, exploring how they have been read, appropriated, and universalized within the reigning interpretive field of Perennial Philosophy in the study of Sufism. The contours that surface through this comparative analysis trace the discursive practices that inform Ibn ʻArabi's Western reception back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century study of 'authentic' religion, where European ethno-racial superiority was wielded against the Semitic Other - both Jewish and Muslim. Lipton argues that supersessionist models of exclusivism are buried under contemporary Western constructions of religious authenticity in ways that ironically mirror Ibn ʻArabi's medieval absolutism. (shrink)

Given its title, one might expect Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE) to outline her positions on the issues normally covered in introductory courses and texts on epistemology. In particular, one might expect to find discussions of epistemic justification- i.e., "our right to the beliefs we have" (Dancy 2005, 263). Justification and the nature of knowledge are widely regarded as the essential subject matter of the field, and, as we will see, Rand effectively agrees with this consensus. 1 Yet (...) her monograph says little directly on these subjects. Rather, it is devoted entirely to the presentation of a theory of concepts. My subject in this essay is how a theory of concepts can be an introduction to an epistemology. More specifically, I will show how Rand's theory and the view of consciousness that it embodies relate to some concerns about justification that are familiar from the contemporary, analytic literature on epistemology. Though I will present some exegesis of Rand and some arguments in support of her positions and related theses of my own, this essay is not primarily exegetical or argumentative. My aim is, rather, to sketch the outlines of an epistemology in a way that brings out the relations between a seldom studied theory of concepts and some much debated questions about justification. I hope in doing so to shed light both on the theory and on the questions. I hope this paves the way for others to argue in greater detail for (or against) the theses I sketch here, and to do so in a way that engages more substantially with the analytic literature. In my view, the chief obstacle to work of this kind has been the lack of a big-picture account of the relation between the subject matter of ITOE and the central concern of analytic epistemology. This is the lack that I aim to remove. (shrink)