Like many, though of course not all, philosophers, I believe in propositions. I take propositions to be structured, sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sentences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere. In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar to the structures of the sentences that express them. Further, I shall (...) assume that ordinary names are devices of direct reference and contribute only their bearers to propositions, that n-place predicates contribute n-place properties or relations to propositions, and that verbs of propositional attitude contribute to propositions two-place relations between individuals and propositions. The broad outline of a framework that includes these assumptions is one that I think many, though again not all, philosophers of language find congenial. I am concerned here to investigate and explain, from the standpoint of this framework, a puzzling phenomenon. The explanation I give of the phenomenon could be adapted to fit with frameworks somewhat different from the one adopted here. I adopt the present framework in part simply for definiteness. (shrink)

Well over a century after its introduction, Frege's two-dimensional Begriffsschrift notation is still considered mainly a curiosity that stands out more for its clumsiness than anything else. This paper focuses mainly on the propositional fragment of the Begriffsschrift, because it embodies the characteristic features that distinguish it from other expressively equivalent notations. In the first part, I argue for the perspicuity and readability of the Begriffsschrift by discussing several idiosyncrasies of the notation, which allow an easy conversion of logically equivalent (...) formulas, and presenting the notation's close connection to syntax trees. In the second part, Frege's considerations regarding the design principles underlying the Begriffsschrift are presented. Frege was quite explicit about these in his replies to early criticisms and unfavorable comparisons with Boole's notation for propositional logic. This discussion reveals that the Begriffsschrift is in fact a well thought-out and carefully crafted notation that intentionally exploits the possibilities afforded by the two-dimensional medium of writing like none other. (shrink)

In most modal logics, atomic propositional symbols are directly representing the meaning of sentences (such as sets of possible worlds). In other words, they use only rigid propositional designators. This means they are not able to handle uncertainty in meaning directly at the sentential level. In this paper, we offer a modal language involving non-rigid propositional designators which can also carefully distinguish de re and de dicto use of these designators. Then, we axiomatize the logics in this language with respect (...) to all Kripke models with multiple modalities and with respect to S5 Kripke models with a single modality. (shrink)

Propositions are posited to perform a variety of explanatory roles. One important role is being what is designated by a dedicated linguistic expression like a "that"-clause. In this paper, the case that propositions are needed for such a role is bolstered by defending that there are other expressions dedicated to designating propositions. In particular, it is shown that natural language has anaphors for propositions. Complement "so" and the response markers "yes" and "no" are argued to (...) be such expressions. (shrink)

The paper proposes a way for adherents of Fregean, structured propositions to designate propositions and other complex senses/concepts using a special kind of functor. I consider some formulations from Peacocke's works and highlight certain problems that arise as we try to quantify over propositional constituents while referring to propositions using "that"-clauses. With the functor notation, by contrast, we can quantify over senses/concepts with objectual, first-order quantifiers and speak without further ado about their involvement in propositions. The (...) functor notation also turns out to come with an important kind of expressive strengthening, and is shown to be neutral on several controversial issues. (shrink)

The Substitution Anomaly is the failure of intuitively coreferential expressions of the corresponding forms “that S” and “the proposition that S” to be intersubstitutable salva veritate under certain ‘selective’ attitudinal verbs that grammatically accept both sorts of terms as complements. The Substitution Anomaly poses a direct threat to the basic assumptions of Millianism, which predict the interchangeability of “that S” and “the proposition that S”. Jeffrey King has argued persuasively that the most plausible Millian solution is to treat the selective (...) attitudinal verbs as lexically ambiguous , having distinct meanings associated with the different sorts of complement terms. In opposition this approach, I argue that there are independent reasons for maintaining the univocality of these verbs and that this can be done while accommodating the Substitution Anomaly and without sacrificing the transparency of the relevant attitude ascriptions. In particular, I show how, by employing an extended version of Edward Zalta’s system of intensional logic for abstract objects, one can construct for a regimented fragment ℜ of English containing the relevant vocabulary a semantical theory ℑ which (a) treats ℜ’s selective attitudinal verbs as univocal, (b) regards genuine terms as occurring transparently under such verbs in sentences of ℜ, and yet (c) predicts the occurrence of the Substitution Anomaly in ℜ. (shrink)

A specific issue for argumentation theory is whether information and communication technologies play any role in governing argument — that is, as parties engage in practical activities across space and time via ICTs, does technology matter for the interplay of argumentative content and process in managing disagreement? The case made here is that technologies do matter because they are not merely conduits of communication but have a role in the pragmatics of communication and argumentation. In particular, ICTs should be recognized (...) as communication-information services that are delegated degrees of responsibility for managing disagreements arising from practical activities. These services are organized around practical theories for designing disagreement space. However, recognizing this relationship between argument and technology requires accounting for procedures, techniques, or rules and speech acts that are not argumentative propositions in any strict sense but that are consequential for what becomes argumentation in any setting. An account about designing disagreement space, grounded in Jackson and Jacobs’s theory of Disagreement Management, is put forward to address these issues while more generally contributing to understanding argument in context. (shrink)

Identification of propositions as the core of attitudes and beliefs (De Houwer, 2014) has resulted in the development of implicit measures targeting personal evaluations of complex sentences (e.g., the IRAP or the RRT). Whereas their utility is uncontested, these paradigms are subject to limitations inherent in their block based design, such as allowing assessment of only a single belief at a time. We introduce the Propositional Evaluation Paradigm (PEP) for assessment of multiple propositional beliefs within a single experimental block. (...) Two experiments provide first evidence for the PEP’s validity. In Experiment 1 endorsement of racist beliefs measured with the PEP was related to criterion variables such as explicit racism assessed via questionnaire and indicators of behavioral tendencies. Experiment 2 indicates that the PEP’s implicit racism scores may predict actual behavior over and above explicit, self-report measures. Finally, Experiment 3 tested the PEP's applicability in the domain of hiring discrimination. Whereas general PEP based gender stereotypes were not related to hiring bias, results suggest a possible role of female stereotypes in hiring discrimination. In the context of these findings, we discuss both the potential and possible challenges in adopting the PEP to different beliefs. In sum, these initial findings suggest that the PEP may offer researchers a reliable and easily administrable option for the indirect assessment of propositional evaluations. (shrink)

Propositions are traditionally regarded as performing vital roles in theories of natural language, logic, and cognition. This chapter offers an opinionated survey of recent literature to assess whether they are still needed to perform three linguistic roles: be the meaning of a declarative sentence in a context, be what is designated by certain linguistic expressions, and be the content of illocutionary acts. After considering many of the relevant choice-points, I suggest that there remains a linguistic basis for propositions, (...) but not for some of the traditional reasons. (shrink)

The folk Psychology frames propositional attitudes as fundamental theoretical entities for the construction of a model designed to predict the behavior of a subject. A trivial, such as grasping a pen and writing reveals - something complex - about the behavior. When I take a pen and start writing I do, trivially, because I believe that a certain object in front of me is a pen and who performs a specific function that is, in fact, that of writing. When I (...) believe that the object that stands before me is a pen, I am in relation to "believe" with the propositional content: that in front of me is a pen. Philosophers of the proposition, from Frege onwards, have dedicated their studies to the analysis of what kinds of entities are the propositional attitudes. Jerry Fodor says that now, the proper prediction of the psychology of common sense, can not be questioned and that the propositional attitudes represent the most effective way to describe our behavior. What Fodor says, however, is that propositional attitudes function, but not how they work. Most philosophers interested in the issue, we are dedicated to the search for a theory that can account consistently both a semantics for propositional attitudes, both of these entities that seem to cause the behavior of a rational subject. There are two main paradigms in the theory of the proposition that contributed to the discussion of the propositional attitudes. One is the one that begins with Gottlob Frege, the other with Bertrand Russell. Defenders of Frege argue that the paradigm scrub objects and properties can not be constituents of the propositional content which have a purely conceptual. In other words, the philosophers belonging to the paradigm of Frege, but not all, mean that you can test in a rigorous way the truth conditions of propositional attitudes. Who defends the russellian’s paradigm argues that the propositional content are made by the objects and properties on which propositional attitudes relate. The purpose of this article is not to rebuild - in detail - both paradigms, nor to reconstruct one but, in a sense, my work will be a completely partial objective is to demonstrate how the paradigm is more profitable russell not only to make a coherent semantic theory for propositional attitudes2 but also to predict the behavior of a rational subject thing, completely innovative, given the repeated objections in contemporary literature3. At the end of this paper will be drafted a proposal to build a consistent model to predict the behavior,of a rational agent, based on a referential theory of propositional attitudes. (shrink)

David Kaplan observed in Kaplan that the principle \\) cannot be verified at a world in a standard possible worlds model for a quantified bimodal propositional language. This raises a puzzle for certain interpretations of the operator Q: it seems that some proposition p is such that is not possible to query p, and p alone. On the other hand, Arthur Prior had observed in Prior that on pain of contradiction, ∀p is Q only if one true proposition is Q (...) and one false proposition is Q. The two observations are related: ∀p is elusive in that it is not possible for the proposition to be uniquely Q. Kaplan based his model-theoretic observation on Cantor’s theorem, but there is a less well-known link between this simple set-theoretic observation and Prior’s remark. We generalize the link to develop a heuristic designed to move from Cantor’s theorem to the observation that a variety of sentences of the bimodal language express propositions that cannot be Q uniquely. We highlight the analogy between some of these results and some set-theoretic antinomies and suggest that the phenomenon is richer than one may have anticipated. (shrink)

Recently there has been a surge of new Fregeans who claim that the direct designation theory, as understood by contemporary Russellians, does not, and cannot, account for the different cognitive significance of statements containing different but codesignative names or indexicals. Instead, they say we must use a fine grained notion of propositions; one which builds a mode of presentation into proposition in addition to including in them the object referred to by the name or indexical in the sentence expressing (...) the proposition. Thus we have Mark Richard, John Perry, and Mark Crimmins championing theories that build the mode of presentation into propositions, making the mode of presentation affect the truth conditions of belief reports. What is interesting, though, is that all three accept the direct designationalists claim that proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives are directly referential.I present four problems for the direct designation theorists and argue that the problem the new Fregeans use to motivate their move to include cognitive significance in propositions is the least basic of the four problems. I then provide an account of beliefs of singular propositions which does not require us to build modes of presentations into propositions and which solves the problems posed for the direct designation theory. (shrink)

The possible-worlds analysis of propositions identifies a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. This analysis has the hitherto unnoticed consequence that a proposition depends for its existence on the existence of every proposition that entails it. This peculiar consequence places the possible-worlds analysis in conflict with the conjunction of two compelling theses. One thesis is that a phrase of the form ‘the proposition that S’ is a rigid designator. The other thesis is that a (...) proposition which is directly about an object – a singular proposition – depends for its existence on the existence of the object. I defend these theses and conclude that the cost of the possible-worlds analysis is prohibitively high. (shrink)

A detailed interpretation is provided of the ‘Gray's Elegy’ passage in Russell's ‘On Denoting’. The passage is suffciently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a proposition about the thing designated (...) instead of the content expressed. In light of this collapse, argues Russell, the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms must accept that all propositions about a description's content represent it by means of a higher-level descriptive content, so that knowledge of a description's content is always ‘by description’, not ‘by acquaintance’. This, according to Russell, renders our cognitive grip on definite descriptions inexplicable. Separate responses on behalf of Fregeans and Millians are offered. (shrink)

Is it possible to advance democracy by empowering ordinary citizens to make key decisions about the design of political institutions and policies? In 2004, the government of British Columbia embarked on a bold democratic experiment: it created an assembly of 160 near-randomly selected citizens to assess and redesign the province's electoral system. The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly represents the first time a citizen body has had the power to reform fundamental political institutions. It was an innovative gamble that has been (...) replicated elsewhere in Canada and in the Netherlands, and is gaining increasing attention in Europe as a democratic alternative for constitution-making and constitutional reform. In the USA, advocates view citizens' assemblies as a means for reforming referendum processes. This book investigates the citizens' assembly in British Columbia to test and refine key propositions of democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

Propositions, the abstract, truth-bearing contents of sentences and beliefs, continue to be the focus of healthy debates in philosophy of language and metaphysics. This article is a critical survey of work on propositions since the mid-90s, with an emphasis on newer work from the past decade. Topics to be covered include a substitution puzzle about propositional designators, two recent arguments against propositions, and two new theories about the nature of propositions.

Inspired by an economic interpretation of the Faustus drama allegorically disclosing the ‘alchemical’ nature of modern economy, the paper presents a critical view on the development of technology as concomitant phenomenon of work practices with particular focus on manufacturing. It starts with a theoretical perspective on the dynamics of creating explicit propositional knowledge and its re-appropriation for practical use. This lays the ground for understanding how technical artefacts emerge from and, in turn, affect social practices. It further helps to understand (...) the development of human reflective action competence and working capacity as most relevant forces of production in complex and dynamic market environments. These relationships are exemplified in some detail by looking at the problematic development and use of IT in manufacturing’s value creating processes. The paper finally advocates reflective attitudes and evolutionary procedures as basic principles for designing useful and useable IT systems according to human needs and for protecting oneself from the Faustian omnipotence delusion of endless and effortless wealth creation. (shrink)

Three kinds of knowledge usually recognised by epistemologists are identified and their relevance for curriculum design is discussed. These are: propositional knowledge, know-how and knowledge by acquaintance. The inferential nature of propositional knowledge is argued for and it is suggested that propositional knowledge in fact presupposes the ability to know how to make appropriate inferences within a body of knowledge, whether systematic or unsystematic. This thesis is developed along lines suggested in the earlier work of Paul Hirst. The different kinds (...) of know-how and their relationships are discussed and it is suggested that they occupy different places and different relationships in any curricular hierarchy. The changing role that knowledge by acquaintance plays within this hierarchy is also discussed. Implications of this account for the current National Curriculum and for curriculum design more generally are discussed, looking at History, Science and Design Technology as examples. (shrink)

Three kinds of knowledge usually recognised by epistemologists are identified and their relevance for curriculum design is discussed. These are: propositional knowledge, know-how and knowledge by acquaintance. The inferential nature of propositional knowledge is argued for and it is suggested that propositional knowledge in fact presupposes the ability to know how to make appropriate inferences within a body of knowledge, whether systematic or unsystematic. This thesis is developed along lines suggested in the earlier work of Paul Hirst. The different kinds (...) of know-how and their relationships are discussed and it is suggested that they occupy different places and different relationships in any curricular hierarchy. The changing role that knowledge by acquaintance plays within this hierarchy is also discussed. Implications of this account for the current National Curriculum and for curriculum design more generally are discussed, looking at History, Science and Design Technology as examples. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss card games designed to supplement or replace exercise sets on derivability and entailment in propositional logic. I present rules for two propositional logic card games that introduce chance and competition into discussions of propositional logic. The latter sections provide brief practical and theoretical notes on this kind of game, including ways courses that use these games can be more effective than courses that do not.

This paper is a continuation of dag-like proof compression research initiated in [9]. We investigate proof compression phenomenon in a particular, most transparent case of propositional DNF Logic. We define and analyze a very efficient semi-analytic sequent calculus SEQ*0 for propositional DNF. The efficiency is achieved by adding two special rules CQ and CS; the latter rule is a variant of the weakened substitution rule WS from [9], while the former one being specially designed for DNF sequents. We show that (...) dag-like SEQ*0 has good deterministic proof search strategy. Furthermore, we expose six examples showing that dag-like deducibility in SEQ*0 admits exponential-size proof compression, as compared to familiar proof systems like cutfree sequent calculi, resolution and cutting plane proof systems. (shrink)

A new road map for design is emerging out of interdisciplinary research across biology and design. Whilst in the second part of the twentieth century, the emergence of the digital realm altered and radically challenged conventional design and manufacturing processes, the beginning of the twenty-first century marks a strong shift towards the amalgamation of the binary code with biological systems. With advances in synthetic biology, we can now ‘biofabricate’ like Nature does. By tinkering and altering the DNA code or the (...) environment of growth of living organisms, we can effectively ‘design’ and grow new biomaterials. The role of design is shifting from working with inanimate matter such as plastic and metals to making with animate living entities such as mycelium, yeast and bacteria. This paradigm shift promises to open up new possibilities for biofabricating future intelligent materials as well as for engaging with new sustainable processes. This paper examines strategies and tools for designing with living systems and proposes a framework for design to engage with our future bio-materiality. From biofabrication experiments to synthetic biology propositions, the paper will investigate a series of design artifacts that explores strategies such as co-designing with natural organisms or actuating a new synthetic nature and develop a critique of how biodesign can help shifting towards the crafting of a future sustainable intelligent bio-materiality. (shrink)

Peter Anstey rejects the widespread view that all knowledge for Locke is propositional. He argues, instead, that Locke accepts a form of non-propositional knowledge. The perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas, according to Anstey's interpretation, is akin to what Bertrand Russell called “knowledge by acquaintance.” He presents a careful, four-step analysis of Locke’s view of the acquisition of knowledge, which is designed to show how the mind proceeds from perceiving to affirming, then to assenting, and finally to verbalizing (...) propositions. This comprehensive account takes into account a variety of remarks Locke makes about perception, knowledge and true or false propositions, and Anstey claims that overall this interpretation is a better fit than the orthodox view that Locke held all knowledge to be propositional. (shrink)

Design has usually been linked to art and applied in scenarios related to everyday life. Even when design has, on occasion, made its way into the world of academia, it has always been closely linked to art and scenarios related everyday life. At last, however, the idea of design has reached the field of epistemology: an area within the very heart of philosophy that has always focused, in theory, on the foundations of knowledge. Consequently, design is being studied from different (...) approaches interested in the foundation of knowledge, theoretical and practical. This is one of the reasons why abduction and pragmatism have been considered relevant from a design perspective. This paper first shows the main features of abduction and pragmatism, describes their evolution and considers their mutual implications. Second, the epistemology of design is analysed considering its most relevant characteristics. Third, the connection between abduction and, on the one hand, pragmatism and, on the other, design epistemology is addressed. Finally, the role of abductive inference in grounding a real epistemology for design theory from the naturalised cognitive perspective of abduction is outlined. The central proposition is that this approach is essential as a methodological innovation, as it allows us to analyse both the inquiry process and the design process as interdependent when dealing with practical problems of a social and cultural nature. This approach allows us to analyse how human actions determine changes in the theoretical framework from which we make our inquiry. In short, the world is an open-ended project that humans design through our daily inquiry. (shrink)

Obtaining a sufficient amount of measurable and reliable results of student surveys has always posed a challenge for university teams tasked with the provision of the quality of education. This is especially visible at faculties where education is based on the classic classroom-based model, which then transfers to clinical units, hospital wards, and specialist laboratories. The highly unpredictable pandemic situation caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus raises the bar for the evaluation of didactics. Fortunately, the continuous technological progress in the area (...) of Artificial Intelligence makes it possible to design the implementation of tools that would improve the position of systems for the management of courses of studies. The evaluation survey for didactic classes, as one of the last output data obtained during the process, may finally become a fully recognized source of information about the conducted classes and the teachers themselves. On the other hand, it may become a tool for those surveyed to influence the quality of classes, express their opinion, present suggestions and propositions generally pertaining to changes in the process of education. New information technologies not only make it possible to improve the effectiveness of reaching the recipients, but also provide completely new, very reliable methods of acquisition of credible behaviour, used as integration data in solutions based on machine communication. Using Artificial Intelligence coupled with data may make it possible to use intelligent communication for effective management of the process of surveying – a solution that has so far been used in business, in the form of the so-called bots. As a result, this would lead to an ongoing, fully quantitative and qualitative, assessment of classes. (shrink)

A widely held rights-based view asserts that individuals should be permitted to self-designate characteristics such as race and gender. But some argue that there are opinions that oppose the use only of self-designation, and that these should not be ignored. Kasher and Rubinstein (Logique Anal 160:385–395, 1997) demonstrated that the latter view is equivalent to accepting that one or more of five conditions must be violated. This paper extends their analysis to allow for more than two categories, and focuses on (...) simplifying the conditions without jeopardising their conclusion. In particular, we use significantly weaker conditions of independence and of symmetry than are common in other extensions of the original proposition. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Philosophy of Science Merrit H. Moore contends that it is not only possible but methodologically desirable to separate design in nature from purpose. The main part of his argument is devoted to a support of the proposition that “design” is objective, by which he means that design in the physical world is independent of mind. That which gives interest to Mr. Moore's argument is essentially the Kantian doctrine that the forms of the understanding, and consequently (...) of knowledge, are furnished by the mind and are, in a sense, imposed upon sense-experience thereby making them rational. In contrast to the Kantian view stands the Humean doctrine that knowledge is analyzable into and limited by sense-impressions. (shrink)

Most of the contemporary literature regarding teleology or design in nature assumes that we human beings make some sort of tacit inference when we form "design beliefs" person is causally relevant to the occurrence of some event). It is often held that this inference occurs so quickly that we are unaware of the inferential process. Attempts to reconstruct this inference have met with varying degrees of success, but none of them seem to match the strength with which ordinary design beliefs (...) are held. This dissertation therefore offers a challenge to this "inferential model" of design belief formation by arguing that in many ordinary cases we do not infer to design beliefs at all. Rather, human design beliefs often form spontaneously and properly whenever certain conditions are met, and receive some measure of positive epistemic status just in virtue of their proper and spontaneous formation. This alternative model is called a "Reidian" model because it is analogous to Thomas Reid's account of sense perception. The Reidian model offers the dialectical advantage of shifting the burden of proof from the one arguing for design to the one who claims to have a suitable "defeater" belief. It also better matches our introspective judgments about design beliefs and resolves some puzzling problems that have been noted in recent literature on design inferences. ;The Reidian model can also generate some reasonably persuasive design arguments from the deliverances of the natural sciences , but it does not sanction the inclusion of design hypotheses within the content of the natural sciences. It is also argued that none of the "defeater" propositions one might consider carries enough epistemic "weight" to defeat design beliefs that form according to the model. The resulting Reidian design arguments also have the advantage that they do not require the rejection of the Darwinian paradigm. However, it is also noted that the Reidian model presents several occasions for dialectical impasse between disputants about design in nature. (shrink)

• names and indexicals are directly referential/rigid designators • wide-scope behavior w.r.t. operators • not synonymous with the description giving their ‘descriptive meaning’, as shown by Kripke-Kaplan examples (1) and (2).

For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that (...) it is the truth theory which correctly characterises the notion of truth, per se. When we take into account the considerations required to bring model theory into harmony with truth theory, those considerations undermine the arguments standardly used to motivate supervaluational model theories designed to validate classical logic. But those considerations also show that celebration would be premature for advocates of the most frequently encountered rival approach - many-valued model theory. (shrink)

Designed to make logic interesting and accessible -- without sacrificing content or rigor -- this classic introduction to contemporary propositional logic explains the symbolization of English sentences and develops formal-proof, truth-table, and truth-tree techniques for evaluating arguments. Organizes content around natural-deduction formal-proof procedures, truth tables, and truth trees. Also presents logical statement connectives gradually, one per chapter, and finally, increases readers' awareness of the arguments they read and hear every day by providing examples of actual arguments to which they can (...) readily relate. (shrink)

Following Smiley’s influential proposal, it has become standard practice to characterise notions of relative necessity in terms of simple strict conditionals. However, Humberstone and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley’s now standard account of relative necessity. In their recent article, Hale and Leech propose a novel account of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems facing the standard account. Nevertheless, the current article argues that Hale & Leech’s account suffers from its own defects, some of which Hale & Leech (...) are aware of but underplay. To supplement this criticism, the article offers an alternative account of relative necessity which overcomes these defects. This alternative account is developed in a quantified modal propositional logic and is shown model-theoretically to meet several desiderata of an account of relative necessity. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: The Design Argument The Design Argument in Antiquity Christian Authors Hume's Onslaught William Paley's Natural Theology The Bridgewater Treatises Intelligent Design: A Political Movement Eyes to See No “There” There Blood and Tears Gambling to Non‐existence Natural Selection Natural Selection and Design Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.

The semantic paradoxes, whose paradigm is the Liar, played a crucial role at a crucial juncture in the development of modern logic. In his 1908 seminal paper, Russell outlined a system, soon to become that of the Principia Mathematicae, whose main goal was the solution of the logical paradoxes, both semantic and settheoretic. Russell did not distinguish between the two and his theory of types was designed to solve both kinds in the same uniform way. Set theoreticians, however, were content (...) to treat only the set-theoretic paradoxes, putting aside the semantic ones as a non-mathematical concern. This separation was explicitly proposed, eighteen years after Russell’s paper, by Ramsey, though he, like Russell, advocated a system that addresses both kinds. Since then, the semantic paradoxes have been viewed within the perspective of the theory of truth, where they have occupied a respectable niche, but one of rather specialized interest. (shrink)

According to Scott Soames’ Beyond Rigidity, there are two important pieces of unfinished business left over from Saul Kripke’s influential Naming and Necessity. Soames reads Kripke’s arguments about names as primarily negative, that is, as proving that names don’t have a meaning expressible by definite descriptions or clusters of them. The famous Kripkean doctrine that names are rigid designators is really only part of the negative case. The thesis that names refer to the same object with respect to every possible (...) world is a byproduct of their meaning, not a positive account of what they mean. As well, the hints about causal chains and dubbings are no more than a picture, as Kripke says, and not a positive theory of meaning. Thus one piece of unfinished business, to which Soames devotes the most attention, is to give a positive account of the meanings of names. To do this Soames proposes that the meaning of a singular term is the contribution it makes to the semantic content of the sentences in which it occurs. The semantic content of a sentence is ordinarily a proposition, that proposition expressed by the most commonly intended assertion using the sentence. Soames’ proposal for a positive account is that the meaning of a proper name is its contribution to those propositions, simply the object to which it refers. Arguing for this positive account occupies the bulk of the book but I will not discuss it in my contribution to this symposium. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation (...) of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it. (shrink)

It is proposed in this paper to develop a method by which the most general problem of the algebra of propositions is solved. This problem is to construct all propositions whose truth is independent of the form of the variables. As might be expected this method will enable us to determine without the use of matrices the consistency and independence of propositions, except in the case of those fundamental properties, which taken together define consistency itself. In the (...) discussion which follows no limitations are placed on the meaning of the terms and the word proposition is used simply in the sense of a variable. If we were to say, for example, that our variables must be restricted to zero or one values, we would be introducing a limitation which would reduce the generality of our science. A logic may be false in the sense that its postulates lead to contradictory theorems, or it may be false in the sense that it lacks generality, and the situation is not saved by calling it a two-valued, or a three-valued logic, or a logic of “propositions,” or by designating it by some other euphuism. (shrink)

I. The argument from design or ‘teleological argument’ purports to be an inductive proof for the existence of God, proceeding from the evidence of the order exhibited by natural phenomena to the probable conclusion of a rational agent responsible for producing that order. The argument was severely criticized by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , and it was widely conceded that Hume's objections had cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the teleological argument, if not destroyed its (...) credibility entirely. However, there has been a recent reappraisal of this claim by R. G. Swinburne, who maintains that none of Hume's criticisms have any validity against a ‘carefully articulated version of the argument’. Using an analogical argument based on temporal regularities rather than on spatial regularities , Swinburne claims to have shown that the teleological argument is a legitimate inference to the best explanation whose force depends only on the strength of the analogy and on the degree to which the resulting theory makes explanation of empirical matters simpler and more coherent. Moreover, he claims to have shown that the argument provides support for the Christian monotheistic hypothesis and not merely for the weak claim that the universe was designed . This is an important claim since it has long been thought that Hume's most devastating blow was dealt when he showed that the teleological argument provides just as much support for the negation of certain propositions considered essential to Christian monotheism as it does for their affirmation. (shrink)

It is argued that the design of decisions is a process that in many ways is shaped by social factors such as identities, values, and influences. To be able to understand how these factors impact organizational decisions, the focus must be set on the management level. It is the management that shoulders the chief responsibility for designing collective actions, such as decisions. Our propositions indicate that the following measures must be taken in order to improve the quality of organizational (...) decisions: 1. The identity of the people, involved in organizational decision making, affects the quality of decisions and should be taken into account in the design of decisions. 2. The decision maker or designer of decisions should engage the members of an organization to create a shared vision. 3. Getting the members of an organization to express and share common values should improve the decision making process. 4. Being able to socially influence the members of an organization, or other stakeholders involved, as well as letting them participate in the process, should improve the quality of decisions. (shrink)

My paper provides reasons in support of the view that vague identity claims originate from a conflict between rigidity and precision in designation. To put this stricly, let x be the referent of the referential terms P and Q. Then, that the proposition “that any x being both a P and a Q” is vague involves that the semantic intuitions at work in P and Q reveal a conflict between P and Q being simultaneously rigid and precise designators. After having (...) shortly commented on an example of vague identity claim, I make the case for my proposal, by discussing how reference by baptism conflicts with descriptive attitudes towards understanding conceptual contents. (shrink)

Este artigo tem com pano de fundo a controvérsia entre criacionismo e evolucionismo que ainda captura a imaginação de amplos segmentos religiosamente orientados, sobretudo nos Estados Unidos. Aqui destacamos as proposições elaboradas pela chamada Teoria do Design Inteligente (TDI). Essa teoria, que se apresenta como científica e desprovida de qualquer compromisso religioso, propõe demonstrar empiricamente que a complexidade observada na natureza, no universo e na vida, é resultante de um design genuíno, ou seja, produto de uma inteligência organizadora, e não (...) produto de processos puramente materiais e aleatórios, isto é, decorrentes do acaso, ou da seleção natural, tal como sugere o darwinismo. Neste artigo trataremos da emergência da Teoria do Design Inteligente e de seus principais argumentos, tal como elaborados por seus proponentes, estudados pelos seus analistas e confrontados pelos seus críticos, a fim de verificar se ela é considerada teoria científica ou uma variante mais sofisticada e atual do criacionismo cristão. Palavras-chave: Religião; Ciência; Criacionismo; Design Inteligente.This article has as a backdrop the controversy between creationism and evolutionism that still captures the imagination of large religious segments, especially in the USA. This text highlights the propositions drawn up by the so called Intelligent Design Theory. Such theory, which is presented as scientific and devoid of any religious commitment aims to demonstrate empirically that the complexity observed in nature, in the universe and in the life, is a the result of a genuine design. In this sense, it would be a product of an organizing intelligence and not a product of purely material and random processes resulting from chance, or from natural selection, as suggested by Darwinism. In this article, we will deal with the emergence of Intelligent Design and its main arguments, such as elaborated by its proponents, studied by its analysts and confronted by critics, to verify if it is considered a scientific theory or a more sophisticated variant of Christian creationism. Key-words: Religion; Science; Creationism; Intelligent Design. (shrink)

This paper aims to connect Stiegler’s reflections on theoretical computer science with his practical propositions for the design of digital technologies. Indeed, Stiegler’s theory of exosomatization implies a new conception of artificial intelligence, which is not based on an analogical paradigm (which compares organisms and machines, as in cybernetics, or which compares thought and computing, as in cognitivism) but on an organological paradigm, which studies the co-evolution of living organisms (individuals), artificial organs (tools), and social organizations (institutions). Such a (...) perspective does not compare human capacities to machine performances but studies the way in which the evolution of material and technical supports affects and transforms psychological, cognitive or noetic faculties (intuition, memory, understanding, imagination, sensibility, reason, etc.), as well as the constitution of different kinds of knowledge. This new theoretical paradigm implies a new ‘design’ for digital technologies, which considers their social role and their impact on psychological, cognitive or noetic faculties. (shrink)

Some of the most interesting recent work in philosophy of language and metaphysics is focused on questions about propositions, the abstract, truth-bearing contents of sentences and beliefs. The aim of this guide is to give instructors and students a road map for some significant work on propositions since the mid-1990s. This work falls roughly into two areas: challenges to the existence of propositions and theories about the nature and structure of propositions. The former includes both a (...) widely discussed puzzle about propositional designators as well as direct and indirect arguments against the existence of propositions. The latter is dominated by what is currently the central debate about the metaphysics of propositions, i.e. whether they are structured, composite entities or unstructured ontological simples. This issue has eclipsed older debates about whether propositions can be identified with sets of possible worlds or other kinds of sentence intensions. Author Recommends 1. Soames, Scott. 'Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.' Philosophical Topics 15 (1987): 47–87. Reprinted in Propositions and Attitudes . Eds. N. Salmon and S. Soames. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 197–239. Essential groundwork for more recent work on propositions. Soames gives a careful and exacting presentation of the case against identifying propositions with sets of possible worlds or other truth-supporting circumstances. Also contains a detailed statement of the Russellian conception of propositions on which propositions are ordered sets of objects, properties and relations. 2. King, Jeffrey. 'Designating Propositions.' The Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 341–71. Sometimes substituting a definite description for a corresponding 'that'-clause can lead to bizarre changes in truth-conditions: compare 'Bill fears that Hillary will be president' with 'Bill fears the proposition that Hillary will be president'. This puzzle about propositional designators threatens the relational analysis of propositional attitude reports, the view that 'believes' expresses a relation to the proposition designated by its 'that'-clause, and thereby poses an indirect threat to the existence of propositions. King's solution posits an ambiguity in verbs like 'fear' that embed both 'that'-clauses and definite descriptions. 3. Jubien, Michael. 'Propositions and the Objects of Thought.' Philosophical Studies 104 (2001): 47–62. A direct attack on the existence of propositions. Jubien deploys an analogue of the problem that Paul Benacerraf raised for set-theoretical reductions of numbers against metaphysical reductions of propositions. Just as numbers can be reduced to sets in many different ways, any reduction of propositions brings with it equally good variants, thus making any such reduction arbitrary and unmotivated. The only alternative is to treat propositions as abstract metaphysical primitives. As Jubien argues, however, abstract primitive entities are incapable of doing what propositions must do, i.e. represent objects and states of affairs on their own, without the input of thinking subjects. The upshot is the propositions cannot be reduced and they cannot be primitive, and so they must not exist. 4. Hanks, Peter. 'How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.' Synthese 154 (2007): 121–46. Scepticism about propositions has recently led some philosophers, Jubien included, to resuscitate Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment, the idea that judgment is a many-place relation to objects, properties and relations. This paper explains why Russell himself abandoned that theory, and why the theory is still refuted by an objection due to Wittgenstein. 5. Hofweber, Thomas. 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions.' Oxford Studies in Metaphysics . 2 vols. Ed. D. Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 155–206. An indirect attack on the existence of propositions. Hofweber argues that sentences like 'Bill believes something that Hillary asserted' do not commit us to the existence of propositions. His view is that propositional quantification is an instance of what he calls 'internal' or 'inferential role' quantification, a kind of quantification that carries no ontological implications. 6. Schiffer, Stephen. The Things We Mean . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. esp. chs 1–2. Schiffer defends his theory of pleonastic propositions, on which propositions are unstructured, have no parts, and are very finely grained. 7. Bealer, George. 'Propositions.' Mind 107 (1998): 1–32. Bealer defends his algebraic theory of propositions, which, like Schiffer's pleonastic account, treats propositions as unstructured metaphysical simples. 8. King, Jeffrey. The Nature of and Structure of Content . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. The best developed current theory of the structure in structured propositions. King identifies propositions with certain kinds of facts in which objects, properties and relations are bound together by amalgams of syntactic and semantic relations. 9. Hanks, Peter. 'Recent Work on Propositions.' Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 1–18. A survey of work on propositions since the mid-1990s that complements this teaching and learning guide. Contains responses to Jubien's and Hofweber's arguments against propositions and critical discussions of Schiffer's pleonastic propositions and King's theory of propositional structure. Online Resources 1. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ Propositions (Matthew McGrath) 2. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-structured/ Structured Propositions (Jeffrey King) 3. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-singular/ Singular Propositions (Greg Fitch) Sample Partial Syllabus The following partial syllabus can be used as a unit on recent work on propositions in graduate level courses in philosophy of language or metaphysics. Week 1: A Substitution Puzzle About Propositional Designators King, Jeffrey. 'Designating Propositions'. Moltmann, Friederike. 'Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions.' Synthese 135 (2003): 77–118. Week 2: The Benacerraf Problem and Propositional Representation Benacerraf, Paul. 'What Numbers Could Not Be.' Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 47–73. Jubien, Michael. 'Propositions and the Objects of Thought.' Week 3: Propositional Quantification Hofweber, Thomas. 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions'. Hofweber, Thomas. 'A Puzzle about Ontology.' Noûs 39 (2005): 256–83. Week 4: Schiffer on Pleonastic Propositions Schiffer, Stephen. 'Language-Created Language-Independent Entities.' Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 149–67. Schiffer, Stephen. The Things We Mean , chs 1–2. Week 5: King on Structured Propositions King, Jeffrey. 'Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates.' Noûs , 29 (1995): 516–35. King, Jeffrey. The Nature and Structure of Content , chs 1–3. Focus Questions 1. Why does identifying propositions with sentence intensions, e.g. sets of possible worlds, 'require the attitudes to have a particular sort of closure under logical consequence, which they clearly don't have' (Mark Richard)? 2. How does the difference between (a) and (b) pose a threat to the existence of propositions? (a) Bill fears that Hillary will be president. (b) Bill fears the proposition that Hillary will be president. 3. What is the Benacerraf problem for metaphysical reductions of propositions? 4. Why must a proposition represent 'on its own cuff' (Michael Jubien)? Why is this a problem for the view that propositions are primitive abstract entities? 5. What does it mean to say that propositions are structured ? Give two different accounts of what propositional structure might be. (shrink)

This paper argues for the proposition that there is fundamental incoherence in the idea of a divine designer. Such a being would have to have intentions and thoughts prior to designing and making a world. But it is a necessary truth that thought – of the complex and articulated kind necessary for the design of a cosmos – presupposes possession of language. It is further necessarily true that language is impossible, save for beings who inhabit a public world containing other (...) linguistic subjects. The divine designer would be the impossible exemplar of the private language, whose incoherence was demonstrated by Wittgenstein. Objections to this line of argument are noted and rebutted. Even God can't whisper in His own ear.Isaak Babel (Published Online February 17 2004). (shrink)