A recently emerging view in music cognition holds that music is not only social and participatory in its production, but also in its perception, i.e. that music is in fact perceived as the sonic trace of social rela- tions between a group of real or virtual agents. While this view appears compatible with a number of intriguing music cognitive phenomena, such as the links between beat entrainment and prosocial behaviour or between strong musical emotions and empathy, direct evidence is lacking (...) that listeners are at all able to use the acoustic features of a musical interaction to infer the affiliatory or controlling nature of an underlying social intention. We created a novel experimental situation in which we asked expert music improvisers to communicate 5 types of non-musical social intentions, such as being domineering, dis- dainful or conciliatory, to one another solely using musical interaction. Using a combination of decoding studies, computational and psychoacoustical analyses, we show that both musically-trained and non musically-trained listeners can recognize relational intentions encoded in music, and that this social cognitive ability relies, to a sizeable extent, on the information processing of acoustic cues of temporal and harmonic coordination that are not present in any one of the musicians’ channels, but emerge from the dynamics of their interaction. By manipulating these cues in two-channel audio recordings and testing their impact on the social judgements of non-musician observers, we finally establish a causal relationship between the affiliation dimension of social behaviour and musical harmonic coordination on the one hand, and between the control dimension and musical temporal coordination on the other hand. These results provide novel mechanistic insights not only into the social cognition of musical interactions, but also into that of non-verbal interactions as a whole. (shrink)

Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...) process? I argue that answers to these questions point to a picture of distal conscious intending as a form of self-programming. The metaphor of ?self-programming? will be elucidated by using a distinction between ?structuring? and ?triggering? causes. Though the self-programming metaphor does not amount to a full theory of conscious intending, I argue that it may be a useful heuristic in developing such a theory. I also argue that the metaphor is phenomenologically plausible. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the view defended by Manuel Rebuschi, Maxime Amblard, and Michel Musiol that schizophrenia is not entirely irrational but that the rationality of disordered discourse can be accounted for from the first-person point of view—which, by their account, is not wholly introspective but is rather defined by a certain use of the charity principle, by contrast with what they call third-person approaches. I argue in favor of the idea of continuity between the two points of view: (...) ordinary and schizophrenic. On the basis of this claim, I propose a hypothesis for understanding what Rebuschi et al. call the interactional deficiency of schizophrenic conversations, and I make further exploratory suggestions of ways of understanding the so-called rationality of schizophrenic discourse, notably in relation to the complex notions of “context” and “meaning”. (shrink)

La philosophie de l’action wittgensteinienne, par sa clarification conceptuelle, permet une critique radicale de la métaphysique dualiste impliquée par la psychologie empirique. Si le psychologique est constitué concrètement par nos pratiques, une philosophie wittgensteinienne de l’action peut aider la psychologie à sortir des impasses dues à ses confusions sur la nature de son objet, en substituant à la notion réductrice de comportement le concept d’action.

In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all. Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression (...) of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening. Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest are rampant in the American medical community. Today it is not uncommon for doctors to refer patients to clinics or labs in which they have a financial interest (40% of physicians in Florida invest in medical centers); for hospitals to offer incentives to physicians who refer patients (a practice that can lead to unnecessary hospitalization); or for drug companies to provide lucrative give-aways to entice doctors to use their "brand name" drugs (which are much more expensive than (...) generic drugs). In Medicine, Money and Morals, Marc A. Rodwin draws on his own experience as a health lawyer--and his research in health ethics, law, and policy--to reveal how financial conflicts of interest can and do negatively affect the quality of patient care. He shows that the problem has become worse over the last century and provides many actual examples of how doctors' decisions are influenced by financial considerations. We learn how two California physicians, for example, resumed referrals to Pasadena General Hospital only after the hospital started paying $70 per patient (their referrals grew from 14 in one month to 82 in the next). As Rodwin writes, incentives such as this can inhibit a doctor from taking action when a hospital fails to provide proper service, and may also lead to the unnecessary hospitalization of patients. We also learn of a Wyeth-Ayerst Labs promotion in which physicians who started patients on INDERAL (a drug for high blood pressure, angina, and migraines) received 1000 mileage points on American Airlines for each patient (studies show that promotions such as this have a direct effect on a doctor's choice of drug). Rodwin reveals why the medical community has failed to regulate conflicts of interest: peer review has little authority, state licensing boards are usually ignorant of abuses, and the AMA code of ethics has historically been recommended rather than required. He examines what can be learned from the way society has coped with the conflicts of interest of other professionals --lawyers, government officials, and businessmen--all of which are held to higher standards of accountability than doctors. And he recommends that efforts be made to prohibit and regulate certain kinds of activity (such as kickbacks and self-referrals), to monitor and regulate conduct, and to provide penalties for improper conduct. Our failure to face physicians' conflicts of interest has distorted the way medicine is practiced, compromised the loyalty of doctors to patients, and harmed society, the integrity of the medical profession, and patients. For those concerned with the quality of health care or medical ethics, Medicine, Money and Morals is a provocative look into the current health care crisis and a powerful prescription for change. (shrink)

Sam Harris (2010) argues that, given our neurology, we can experience well-being, and that seeking to maximize this state lets us distinguish the good from the bad. He takes our ability to compare degrees of well-being as his starting point, but I think that the analysis can be pushed further, since there is a (non-religious) reason why well-being is desirable, namely the finite life of an individual organism. It is because death is a constant possibility that things can be assessed (...) as “for” or “against” one (Champagne 2011a; Smith 2000). Such an account lets us objectively adjudicate moral questions, as Harris desires. However, by anchoring itself in the mortal body as a whole and not just the brain, such an account dampens the claim that neuroscience would have all the answers. Moreover, it pivots on an affirmation of one’s life that can seem mysterious by regular scientific standards. This chapter thus explains why the trade-off is worthwhile. (shrink)

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed (...) out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that ‘constraints’ constrain (and thereby explain) by virtue of being modally stronger than ordinary laws of nature. In this way, a constraint applies to all possible systems, for a variety of possibility that is broader (that is, more inclusive) than the variety we employ when we say that the ordinary laws of nature apply to all physically possible systems. Explanations by constraint are thus more broadly unifying than ordinary causal explanations. Philosophical examples of good candidates for (...) constraints have heretofore been drawn almost exclusively from fundamental physics. This paper argues for the existence of such constraints (even multiple levels of them) in at least one human science (linguistics), not just in physics. (shrink)

Cet article propose une analogie entre la problématique du « vouloir dire » et celle du « vouloir faire » en utilisant la question de l'intentionalité telle qu’elle est traitée par la philosophie de l'action post-wittgensteinienne d'Elizabeth Anscombe. L’enjeu est de déterminer à quelles conditions nous pouvons appliquer une philosophie de l’action au langage. S’il ne s’agit pas de réduire toute analyse du langage à une philosophie de l’action, il s’agit néanmoins de montrer qu’il existe entre langage et action une (...) relation à double sens. D’une part, comme le montrent les travaux d’Anscombe et de John L. Austin, l’analyse du langage (et en particulier des concepts d’intention, de volontaire, etc.) sert au philosophe à rendre compte de la notion d’action. D’autre part, comme l’a montré Austin, parler, utiliser le langage, c’est agir, faire des actions. En examinant cette relation, cet article examine la façon dont le concept d’intentionalité intervient dans la logique de l’action et dans celle du langage en tant qu’action. Dans ce cadre, le problème de l'intentionalité surgit de la possibilité logique d'un décalage (qui n’est pas la règle) entre ce qu'une personne dit ou fait et ce que cette personne veut dire ou veut faire. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer qu'il est possible de penser l'intentionalité sans penser ce décalage sur le modèle d'une inadéquation entre un dire ou un faire et une sorte de doublon mental qui y correspondrait plus ou moins. Il s’agit de penser l’intentionalité en dehors du dualisme de l’esprit et du monde, tout en conservant intacte, non seulement la possibilité du décalage, mais également la pertinence de la distinction conceptuelle entre le vouloir dire/faire et le dire/faire dans les cas sans décalage. Le parallèle proposé vise avant tout à suggérer que, s'il est possible de concevoir les rapports entre le dire et le vouloir dire en termes d'intentionalité au même titre que les rapports entre le faire et le vouloir faire, c'est que certains traits logiques ou grammaticaux caractéristiques de l'intention ou de la visée s'appliquent dans les deux cas. (shrink)

En affirmant que « l'essence est exprimée par la grammaire », c'est-à-dire que c'est au sein des usages du langage qu'il faut chercher à découvrir l'essence des choses, Wittgenstein semble adopter une posture qui pourrait s'apparenter à une forme d'idéalisme linguistique. Cet idéalisme considèrerait que le langage est la seule structure à travers laquelle nous pouvons appréhender le monde et que par conséquent nous ne touchons jamais la véritable réalité du monde, mais nous sommes prisonniers des catégories linguistiques à travers (...) lesquelles nous l'appréhendons. Nous essayons de récuser une telle lecture de Wittgenstein en faisant appel à une forme de réalisme ordinaire, socle nécessaire de la constitution du sens. (shrink)

At Oxford University, in the context of WW2, when men were largely obliged to abandon the university benches to take part in the war effort, four women philosophers, Iris Murdoch (1919-1999), Mary Midgley (1919-2018), Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) and Philippa Foot (1920-2010), formed a group of philosophical reflections that would become a competitor, after the war, to John L. Austin’s famous ‘Saturday Mornings’. At the heart of the concerns of this ‘wartime quartet’: putting the importance of being human back at the (...) centre of ethics. They opposed “modern moral philosophy” and its many presuppositions, including the claim that ethical questions are independent of the facts of human life or concern a purely rational subject abstracted from everyday issues and from its belonging to the human species. By putting the importance of being human back at the heart of their ethical reflections, these philosophers came to reflect on issues that directly concern human life, far from the philosophical abstractions that interested their men homologues. In this paper, I explore the extent to which this re-inscription of philosophy into everyday life and into ordinary human concerns, opens the way to a feminist philosophy and ethics. (shrink)

This article is an examination of killing in war in its moral and normative dimension – with attention given to how killing affects the acting agent. The author argues against the commonplace belief – often tacitly held if not consciously asserted – among academics, the general public, and even – if surprisingly – military professionals, that killing, including in a justified war, is always morally wrong – even when legally sanctioned and necessary to avert a greater moral wrong. This critique (...) of the “killing is wrong but in war it is necessary” trope is motivated in part by the large numbers of psychiatric battle casualties (specifically moral injury) suffered during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and which have attended military activity throughout history. The article approaches the issue through the field of Christian ethical reflection on just war. In building a moral framework for killing in combat, the article explores a typology of homicide, intention, double effect, love, and whether the attitudinal expectations of just warriors in the Christian tradition is realistic in combat. With this moral framework for killing in hand, this article concludes by drawing a critical distinction between moral injury and moral bruising. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved---what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals (...) are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body-ness‘ or “mine-ness‘ but not a sense of “I-ness.‘ Darwin’s ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense‘) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected. (shrink)

What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation? According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first-personal deliberation. When we deliberate, we should merely care about the reasons or evidence we have for our attitudes. So, considerations of coherence should not show up in deliberation. In response to this argument, Worsnip (2021) argues that considerations of coherence matter for how we structure deliberation. For him, we should treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as (...) off-limits in deliberation. Some important questions are left unanswered by both camps. What do we mean by considerations of coherence “showing up” in first-personal deliberation? How do we interpret the divide between reasons-responsiveness and coherence? How should we interpret cases in which considerations of coherence interact with other norms or requirements? In this paper, I show how Haack’s (1993) crossword puzzle analogy sheds light on these questions. Also, the crossword puzzle analogy allows us to evaluate Kolodny’s objection and identify promising avenues for future research. (shrink)

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the (...) debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems. (shrink)

Crise de l'art ou consensus culturel? Aujourd'hui, l'important n'est plus, semble-t-il, que la critique esthetique ait encore a dire sur Josef Beuys mais que le Centre Pompidou puisse faire croire qu'il dit tout de lui. Le culturel, dans son mecanisme institutionnel et mediatique bien huile, apparait comme l'ultime parade que l'ordre social ait su trouver pour conjurer sa peur - ou sa haine - de l'art. Cependant la critique n'a pas a se laisser abuser ni intimider par l'artifice du consensus (...) culturel qui regne actuellement. Il lui revient de continuer a evaluer les oeuvres, pour autant que le jugement sur l'art engage aussi la societe et l'epoque dans lesquelles cet art se deploie. La reflexion esthetique ne se reduit pas au jugement de gout, elle commence avec lui et se poursuit apres lui. (shrink)

Genocide is a matter of law. It is also a matter of history. Engaging some of the most disturbing responses to the Armenian genocide, Marc Nichanian strikingly reveals the complex role played by law and history in making this and other genocides endure as contentious events. Nichanian's book argues that both law and history fail to contend with the very nature of events for which there is no archive (no documents, no witnesses). Both history and law fail to address (...) the modern reality that events can be—and are now being—perpetrated that _depend_ upon the destruction of the archive, turning monstrous deeds into nonevents. Genocide, this book makes us see, is in one sense the _destruction_ of the archive. It relies on the historiographic perversion. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals (...) are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body-ness” or “mine-ness” but not a sense of “I-ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

Alexander Pho and Benjamin A. White respond to Nicolas Dixon’s critique of mixed martial arts (MMA) through a ‘companions in innocence’ argument. Taking up a counterexample that Dixon is quick to dismiss, the authors argue that MMA techniques are on a par with the ‘pain-leveraging’ tactics used by cyclists and that pressing for a moral distinction between cycling and MMA leads to absurd conclusions about other practices. So, because cycling is morally permissible, MMA is morally permissible. This companions in innocence (...) argument fails. But cycling can be used to develop a better, though only partial, defense of MMA. (shrink)

Dieser Text geht der Frage nach, ob und, wenn ja, inwieweit sich Gedankenexperimente in der praktischen Philosophie in ihrer Struktur und ihrer epistemischen Signifikanz von Gedankenexperimenten in der theoretischen Philosophie oder in den Naturwissenschaften unterscheiden. Anhand einer allgemeinen Strukturanalyse von Gedankenexperimenten wird dabei aufgezeigt, dass bei Gedankenexperimenten in der praktischen Philosophie zwar häufig die angemessene Bewertung eines zugrunde gelegten Szenarios im Zentrum steht und nicht, wie zum Beispiel in theoretischen Philosophie oft, dessen angemessene Beschreibung, dass dieser Unterschied aber kaum Auswirkungen (...) hat auf die prinzipielle Anwendbarkeit – abgesehen von einer bisher übersehenen Konsequenz: Man darf in einem Gedankenexperiment nicht annehmen, dass moralische, ästhetische oder entscheidungstheoretische Prinzipien in unterschiedlichen möglichen Welten verschieden sind. Andernfalls käme dem Gedankenexperiment keinerlei epistemische Signifikanz zu. (shrink)

Trente-cinq ans après le numéro d'hommage que lui consacrait à sa mort La Nouvelle Revue française, cet ouvrage rassemble une matière inédite sur le philosophe, écrivain et éditeur Brice Parain. Il s'agit, d'une part, de textes et témoignages prononcés lors d'une journée d'études en juin 2002 organisée par la Bibliothèque nationale de France, détentrice de ses archives personnelles. On y a joint, d'autre part, un ensemble de documents éclairant d'un nouveau jour le parcours singulier d'une des grandes figures intellectuelles françaises (...) du siècle dernier. Les analyses des historiens se mêlent ici, documents et archives à l'appui, aux travaux des philosophes et des critiques pour porter un regard plus renseigné sur ses multiples interventions dans la vie intellectuelle, littéraire et politique du pays : son rapport au communisme et aux communistes français, son rôle exact dans l'histoire éditoriale de la NRF, son dialogue avec les nouvelles figures dominantes de la vie intellectuelle de l'après-guerre son célèbre affrontement avec Jean-Paul Sartre est l'épisode le plus souvent cité ; mais il y en aura d'autres... Et voilà bien sûr que, par d'autres voies, on interroge à nouveau, en s'efforçant de la saisir sous tous ses aspects et variations et dans sa grande profondeur, ce qui demeure la grande question de sa vie : qu'est-ce qu'un langage à la mesure et au service de l'homme? Homme de courage et de cœur autant qu'homme de lettres, Parain tire sans doute son opiniâtreté d'une enfance paysanne où l'on ne se payait pas de mots. Les témoignages abondent pour dépeindre la gentillesse, l'ouverture d'esprit, l'obstination aussi du " philosophe paysan " qui n'a jamais rien oublié de la campagne de son enfance. Ni de la Russie, d'ailleurs, qu'il connaissait intimement et dont il contribua à faire connaître les grands auteurs passés et contemporains en menant une politique active de publications et de traductions - des grandes traductions données par la " Pléiade " au Docteur Jivago de Boris Pasternak. Un Français à l'âme slave, donc. Et une personnalité très attachante. (shrink)

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period (...) – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward. (shrink)

Dans un monde en transformation accélérée, un changement d'échelle affecte et réoriente nos existences individuelles et collectives. Dans ce nouvel environnement, l'anthropologie a dorénavant la tâche immense de critiquer l'ensemble encore protéiforme que nous appelons le monde global. Marc Augé revient ici sur les catégories de l'espace et du temps, notamment à travers la notion de temps mort dans sa relation à celle de non-lieu, pour s'interroger sur les rapports entre sens social et liberté individuelle dans le monde contemporain. (...) L'anthropologue contribue ainsi à l'effort de lucidité critique dont l'humanité a plus que jamais besoin si elle veut pouvoir se dire un jour, non plus globale, mais totale, au sens de Mauss, c'est-à-dire intelligente, lucide, ambitieuse et solidaire. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Introduction. Marc SLORS: Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Michael PAUEN: Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Sven WALTER: Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Achim STEPHAN: Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Carl GILLETT: The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Wim DE MUIJNCK: Causation by Relational Properties. Albert NEWEN & Rimas ČUPLINSKAS: Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Bernd LUDWIG: Warum kommen „mentale Ursachen“ physikalischen Erklärungen eigentlich nicht (...) in die Quere? Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur Verwendung des Ausdrucks „A verursacht B“ im Umkreis moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Theorien. Besprechungen/Review Articles. Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being inconsistent. I argue that accuracy-dominance (...) arguments for consistency support the latter view, but not necessarily the former. I also argue that the distinction between these two theses matters in the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. Specifically, the distinction suggests that there are interesting alternatives to vindicating the strong claim that one ought to be consistent. (shrink)

Partant des diverses facons dont se decline le probleme de l'intentionalite - celui de la nature des objets intentionnels (Comment est-il possible d'avoir quelque chose a l'esprit, de voir ou de penser a quelque chose sans que cette chose soit materiellement presente dans notre esprit?) et celui de la nature de l'esprit (Comment caracteriser cette capacite specifique de l'esprit a se rapporter a quelque chose?) -, cet ouvrage vise a comprendre cette specificite du mental sans retomber dans un dualisme cartesien. (...) Faut-il alors naturaliser l'intentionalite, c'est-a-dire l'envisager comme un phenomene naturel dont nous devons specifier la nature et les lois qui le regisse? Ne peut-on apprehender l'intentionalite autrement, comme constituee par la relation teleologique d'un etre vivant (et pas seulement d'un esprit) a son environnement? (shrink)

English summary: This collection offers an epistemological and historic approach to psychoanalysis centered on the fundamental concepts and debates that characterized the field during the first half of the twentieth century. The collected texts demonstrate how Freud developed his theories and how new approaches emerged in response, from infantile sexuality to the pathogenic character of certain structures of society. French description: Ce recueil aborde la psychanalyse d'un point de vue epistemologique et historique. Il est centre sur l'elaboration des concepts fondamentaux (...) de la psychanalyse tels que Freud les a definis et sur les debats qu'ils ont suscites a l'interieur du mouvement psychanalytique au cours de la premiere moitie du siecle dernier. La reunion de ces textes vise a montrer comment ces debats ont pu conduire Freud a reformer certains concepts de sa theorie mais aussi a en creer de nouveaux. Ces textes montrent egalement comment de nouvelles approches (qui ont parfois fait ecole) ont pu emerger des desaccords avec Freud: comment la question de la libido et celle de la sexualite infantile ont-elles declenche les dissidences d'Adler puis de Jung et comment Freud y a-t-il repondu? Pourquoi Rank a-t-il considere le traumatisme de la naissance comme plus fondamental pour le psychisme que le complexe d'OEdipe? Comment Freud a-t-il reagi aux theses deReich sur la pulsion de mort et le caractere pathogene de certaines structures de la societe? Ce recueil se termine en 1937 avec le dernier grand texte de Freud sur l'analyse interminable, qui souleve l'un des enjeux majeurs de la clinique aujourd'hui. (shrink)

Esquisses, plans, documents et photographies présentent l'exposition en cours de construction. Un texte explicatif donne les principales clés de lecture du poème de Rimbaud "Après le déluge", extrait des "Illuminations", et de la scénographie adoptée pour le mettre en scène.

Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. (...) Furthermore, we argue that these difficulties derive from their exclusive reliance on the notion of information, so we suggest that pure informational accounts should be complemented with functional approaches. (shrink)