A number of philosophers uphold a metaphysical symmetry between time and hypertime, in this sense: in so far as hypertime exists, the nature of hypertime should agree with the nature of time. Others allow that we can mix and match the metaphysics of time and hypertime. Thus, it may be that time really passes, but hypertime does not or vice versa. In this paper, we provide a preliminary defense of the mix and match approach. We outline a number of arguments (...) for the claim that time and hypertime must share a common nature and find them all wanting. (shrink)

Nae ka kanŭn mumyŏng ŭi to -- Manyak insaeng i ssaum iramyŏn yonggi rŭl kajyŏra -- To ŭi mal ŭl ch'ajasŏ.

언제까지 답 없는 삶을 살 것인가! 인류의 위대한 스승에게 묻고, 대한민국 대표 지성이 답하다! ◎ 출판사 서평 위대한 스승, 퇴계에게 묻고 싶은 삶에 대한 질문과 답 29 누구나 인생을 살다 보면 삶에 대한 본질적인 질문들을 품게 된다. 이러한 고민들을 인류의 위대한 스승 퇴계에게 묻는다면, 그는 우리에게 어떤 대답을 해줄 수 있을까? 『인생교과서 퇴계』(21세기북스 펴냄)는 퇴계에게 묻고 싶은 29개의 질문을 통해 그의 삶과 철학을 살펴보고, 현대를 살아가는 우리에게 필요한 퇴계의 정신이 무엇인지 알아보고자 한다. ‘퇴계’ 하면 고지식한 유학자, 건조하기 짝이 없는 이기심성론의 (...) 철학자라는 이미지가 있다. 그래서 지금 시대와는 불협화한 인물이라는 선입견을 갖기 쉬우나 그가 강조하는 외경의 정신은 오늘에도 칼날처럼 삶의 본질을 꿰뚫는 성성함을 지니고 있다. 그야말로 ‘어짊’을 삶으로 실천한 그의 면면을 돌이키는 일은 산만 방종하여 공허하고 들뜬 우리들 삶을 치유하는 매우 효과적인 처방책이 될 수 있는 것이다. 사람됨의 크기와 삶의 깊이는 수양 정도에 따라 달라질 것이니, 일상생활에서 마음을 샘물처럼 ‘맑고 깨끗하게’ 유지할 것을 당부한 퇴계가 우리들에게 간곡히 들려주고 싶은 바가 이 책 속에 들어 있다. 퇴계와의 만남이 ‘뜻밖의 나’를 향하는 길이 될 수 있을 것이다. 퇴계가 생각한 인간의 ‘도’란 무엇인가! 사랑과 공경의 정신으로 ‘사람 된 도리’를 밝혀야만 한다! 사람으로 태어났다 해서 모두 사람이 아니다. 퇴계에 따르면 ‘하늘의 소명’을 받들어 실천하려는 노력 속에서만 사람이 될 수 있다. 그러므로 자신의 내면 깊은 곳에서 울려나오는 참자아의 목소리에 귀를 기울여야 한다. 사람됨의 차이가 여기에서 결정난다. 이것은 물론 좌선하듯 가만히 앉아서 되는 일은 아닌바 밥을 먹고 출근길에 나서는 등 일상생활의 모든 자리가 다 수양의 도량이다. 사람됨은 바로 거기에서 드러나기 때문이다. 그리하여 자기 안에 갇혀 입신출세와 부귀영화의 욕망만을 추구하려는 이기심을 ‘닦아내고’, 남들을 나의 품안에 아우르며 그들을 보살피려는 마음을 ‘길러야’ 한다. 이것이 평생에 걸쳐 수행해야 할 사람됨의 과제다. 이러한 사람됨의 과제를 모두가 소중히 여기게 될 때 현대사회의 많은 병폐들이 해소될 수 있을 것이다. 그러니 우리는 퇴계의 정신을 역사의 화석이 아닌 오늘의 문제를 치유하는 자기성찰과 자아향상의 자료로 삼을 필요가 있다. 나는 과연 무엇을 위해 살고 있는가, 근본적으로 인간이란 어떠한 존재인가? 하는 등의 물음을 자신에게 수시로 던져보아야 한다. 거기에는 고통과 방황이 뒤따르겠지만, 그것은 아름다운 인생의 좋은 자양분이 될 것이다. 같은 질문, 다른 해석! 대한민국 대표 학자들이 빚어내는 통찰의 향연 이 책은 삶과 죽음, 나와 우리, 생각과 행동, 철학과 사상이라는 4개의 키워드와 29개의 질문으로 구성되어 있다. 1부는 ‘산다는 것은 무엇인가’, ‘행복이란 무엇인가’ 등의 질문을 통해 퇴계가 바라본 인간 삶의 의미와 죽음에 관한 그의 철학 등을 살펴보고, 2부는 ‘나는 누구인가’ ‘이웃이란 누구인가’의 질문을 중심으로 존재의 근원과 공동체정신에 대해 살펴본다. 3부는 ‘바른 직업윤리는 무엇인가’, ‘의로움이란 무엇인가’ 등 구체적인 삶 속에서의 인간 행위에 관한 퇴계의 생각을 들여다보고, 4부에서는 ‘왜 자기성찰이 필요한가’, ‘윤리란 무엇인가’ 등의 질문을 통해 퇴계가 생각한 삶의 질서에 대해 살펴본다. 이 책의 독특한 점은 같은 질문에 대한 두 저자의 다른 해석을 비교하며 살펴볼 수 있다는 것이다. 퇴계에게 묻고 싶은 29개의 질문 중 한 질문에 두 저자가 답한 경우도 있고, 한 저자가 답한 경우도 있다. 퇴계를 오랜 시간 연구해온 두 저자는 각자의 관점을 반영하여 삶에 대한 통찰과 지혜를 풀어내고 있다. 우주적인 심흉 속에서 사랑과 공경의 정신으로 삶을 산 위대한 인격, 퇴계와의 만남은 분명 독자 여러분들 삶에 적지 않은 울림을 줄 것이다. 『인생교과서』 시리즈 위대한 현자 19人의 삶과 철학을 대한민국 각 계의 대표 학자들이 풀어낸 총 19권의 시리즈이다. 인생을 살면서 누구나 한번쯤은 고민하게 되는 본질적인 질문에 대해 현자들은 어떻게 생각했는지 비교하며 살펴볼 수 있다. 역사상 가장 위대한 멘토 19명의 치열한 사유와 통찰은 삶과 죽음에 대한 질문을 자아내고, 시대를 넘어 현답의 길로 안내할 것이다. 『인생교과서』 시리즈는 호메로스 | 플라톤 | 아리스토텔레스 | 아우구스티누스 | 장자 | 이황 | 간디 | 데카르트 | 니체 | 칸트 | 헤겔 | 미켈란젤로 | 베토벤 | 톨스토이 | 아인슈타인 편으로 총 19권이 발간될 예정이다. 01 예수 | 차정식, 김기석 지음 | 15,000원 | 2015년 7월 10일 02 부처 | 조성택, 미산 스님, 김홍근 지음 | 15,000원 | 2015년 7월 15일 03 공자 | 신정근, 이기동 지음 | 15,000원 | 2015년 7월 15일 04 무함마드 | 최영길 지음 | 13,000원 | 2015년 7월 10일 05 퇴계 | 김기현, 이치억 지음 | 15,000원 | 2015년 12월 28일 14 칸트 | 김진, 한자경 지음 | 15,000원 | 2015년 11월 3010일 ◎ 본문 중에서 우리는 퇴계를 도덕적으로 완벽한 위인으로 상정하는 경향이 있다. 그러나 그의 위대함은 도덕성보다는 오히려 절대자유의 경지에서 자연과 하나 되어 분수를 지킨, 그의 일관된 삶에 있는 것 같다. 그것이 우리로 하여금 삶의 진정한 의미를 더 곰곰이 생각하게 하는 것이 아닐까. - 33쪽 아무리 험한 상황을 만나더라도 자기성찰 속에서 겸손하게 세상사를 배우면서 자신의 존재를 “옥과도 같이 아름답게 성취”하려는 뜻을 버려서는 안 된다. “하늘을 원망하지도 않고 사람들을 탓하지도 않으며, 아래로 세상사를 배워 위로 하늘의 이치를 깨친다”는 공자의 삶의 자세를 배워야 한다. 사람이 꽃보다 아름답다면 그러한 노력 때문일 것이다. - 60쪽 퇴계뿐만 아니라 모든 유학자들 사상에 따르면, 불행에서 벗어날 수 있는 근본적인 능력은 모든 사람의 내면에 갖추어져 있다. 사람은 누구나 우주적 대아의 씨앗을 타고난 존재이기 때문이다. 우리 마음속에 간직된 본성, 어떻게 보면 그것의 다른 이름은 ‘희망’이 아닐까? 그렇다. 불행의 반대말은 ‘행복’이라는 완료형이기보다 ‘희망’이라는 진행형이 가까울 것 같다. - 67쪽 갖가지 욕망으로 ‘흐려진’ 마음이 수많은 번민과 괴로움, 고통을 지어내는 것과 달리 맑은 마음은 깊은 샘의 깨끗하고 시원한 물처럼 삶의 희열을 누리게 해줄 것이다. 우리는 여기에서 퇴계의 좌우명을 큰 교훈으로 삼아봄직도 하다. “생각을 조금도 불순하게 갖지 말고, 마음을 경건하지 않음이 없게 하라.” - 119쪽 즉 나의 근원이 리理임을 알고, 학문을 통해 그것을 이 세상에서 실현하는 일이 바로 나를 알고 삶을 아는 것이 아니었을까? 그렇다면 이로 인해 퇴계는 죽음조차도 극복할 수 있었을 것이다. 대아大我인 나는 시작도 끝도 없이 흘러가는 시간의 어떤 한 시점에 태어나서 살다가 죽어서 사라지는 사람이 아닌, 영원을 사는 사람이기 때문이다. - 146~147쪽 타인의 의견에 뇌동하지 않고 스스로의 생각을 충분히 펼쳤을 때 그것이 모여 옳은 의견이 된다. 그 독립된 생각들이 모였을 때 그것이 세상을 움직이는 가장 정당하고 강한 힘이 된다. 그렇기 때문에 더더욱 자기의 목소리를 내는 것이 중요한 것이다. 옳은 목소리를 낼 수 있도록 나의 수신修身이 바탕이 되어야 함은 물론이다 - 201쪽 모두가 잘사는 세상은 누가 만들어주는 것이 아니라 내가 만드는 것이다. 그렇게 깨어 있는 사람들이 밝힌 빛으로 인해 이 세상은 밝아져왔다. 그러니 앞으로의 세상을 밝히는 것은 또 우리들에게 넘겨진 숙제다. 이는 퇴계가 가장 간절히 바라던 일이기도 하다. - 209쪽 그는 단순히 ‘착한 사람’에 그치지 않고 ‘하늘’이 인간에게 부여한 사람됨의 뜻을, 인간의 고결한 정신을 자신의 삶과 사회에서 밝히려 했다. 오늘날 사람들이 자신의 생명을 보전하고 이익을 쟁취하기 위해 ‘야수’와도 같이 살아가는 ‘정글’사회에서 그의 삶이 위대하게 여겨지는 까닭이 여기에 있다. - 254쪽. (shrink)

1. Tan'gun sinhwa ŭi wŏnhyŏngjŏk segyegwan kwa p'ungnyu chŏngsin -- 2. Wŏnhyo ŭi hwajaeng sasang kwa muaehaeng ŭi silch'ŏn -- 3. Ŭisang ŭi 'Hwaŏm ilsŭng pŏpkyedo' e nat'anan Hwaŏm sasang -- 4. Chinul ŭi Tono chŏmsu wa Chŏnghye ssangsu sasang -- 5. Sambong Chŏng To-jŏn ŭi Pulgyo paech'ŏk ŭi naeyong kwa sŏngkyŏk -- 6. T'oegye Yi Hwang ŭi ch'ŏrhakchŏk ipchang kwa 'Kyŏng' sasang -- 7. Kobong Ki Tae-sŭng ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Ugye Sŏng Hon ŭi Tohakchŏk (...) sam kwa hangmun yŏnwŏn -- 9. Yulgok Yi I ŭi Taedong sahoeron kwa ch'ŏrhakchŏk chihyang -- 10. Sŏgye Pak Se-dang ŭi Sirhakchŏk sayu ŭi kich'o -- 11. Namdang Han Wŏn-jin ŭi yŏksa insik kwa Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi -- 12. Sŏngdam Song Hwan-gi ŭi 'T'aegŭk tosŏl' haesŏk ŭi kibon ipchang -- 13. Kanjŏng Yi Nŭng-hwa 'Chosŏn Togyosa' ŭi haksulsachŏk ŭiŭi wa han'gye -- 14. Manhae Han Yong-un i pon chuch'e ŭi munje wa minjok chagyŏl ŭi wŏnch'ik -- purok. T'algyŏnggye sidae ŭi Han'guk ch'ŏrhak ŭi inmunhakchŏk ŭiŭi wa chŏnmang: Yulgok ŭi ch'ŏrhak. (shrink)

Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...) of error. Sometimes, it is more normal for reality and appearance to diverge than to match. We show that this simple idea has dramatic consequences for the theory of knowledge and justification. Among other things, we argue that a proper treatment of The Preface requires a departure from the internalist idea that epistemic justification supervenes on the appearances and the widespread idea that one knows most when free from error. (shrink)

In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that free will is an illusion but that this truth should not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom; indeed, this truth can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.

Inquiry aims at knowledge. Your inquiry into a question succeeds just in case you come to know the answer. However, combined with a common picture on which misleading evidence can lead knowledge to be lost, this view threatens to recommend a novel form of dogmatism. At least in some cases, individuals who know the answer to a question appear required to avoid evidence bearing on it. In this paper, we’ll aim to do two things. First, we’ll present an argument for (...) this novel form of dogmatism and show that it presents a substantive challenge. Second, we’ll consider a way those who take knowledge to be the aim of inquiry can mount a response. In the course of doing so, we’ll try to get clearer on the normative connections between inquiry, knowledge and evidence gathering. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 19-49, January 2022.

In non‐literal uses of language, the content an utterance communicates differs from its literal truth conditions. Loose talk is one example of non‐literal language use (amongst many others). For example, what a loose utterance of (1) communicates differs from what it literally expresses: (1) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock. Loose talk is interesting (or so I will argue). It has certain distinctive features which raise important questions about the connection between literal and non‐literal language use. This paper aims to (i.) (...) introduce a range of novel data demonstrating certain overlooked features of loose talk, and (ii.) develop a new theory of the phenomenon which accounts for these data. In particular, this theory is motivated by the need to explain minimal pairs such as (2)-(3): (2) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock, but she did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly. (3) ?? Lena did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly, but she arrived at 9 o'clock. (2) and (3) agree in their truth conditions. Yet they differ in felicity. As such, they constitute a problem for any account which hopes to predict the acceptability of the loose use of a sentence from its truth conditions and the context of utterance alone. Instead, it will be argued, to explain loose talk phenomena we must posit an additional layer of meaning outstripping truth conditions. This layer of meaning is shown to exhibit a range of properties, all of which point to its being semantically encoded. Thus, if correct, the theory provides a new example of how semantic meaning must extend beyond literal, truth‐conditional content. (shrink)

1. Yŏn'gyŏngjae Sŏng Hae-ŭng. "Yŏn'gyŏngjae chŏnjip", innŭn sasil ŭl kŭdaero kirok hada -- 2. P'ungsŏk Sŏ Yu-gu. "Imwŏn kyŏngjeji", hŭlkuk kwa chongittŏk in hangmun ŭn anŭrira -- 3. Oju Yi Kyu-gyŏng. "Ojuyŏn munjang chŏnsan'go", pakhak kwa kojŭnghak ŭro modŭn kŏt ŭl pyŏnjŭng hara -- 4. Tasan Chŏng Yag-yong. "Mongmin simsŏ", sidae rŭl ap'ahago paeksŏngdŭl ŭi pich'am han sam e punno haeya handa -- 5. Ch'ujae Cho Su-sam. "Ch'ujae chip", nara ka mangharyŏmyŏn pandŭsi yomul i naonda -- 6. Nakhasaeng Yi Hak-kyu. (...) "Yŏngnam akpu", mal hanŭn cha nŭn choe ka ŏpta -- 7. Kuhwajae Hong Sŏng-mo. "Tongguk sesigi", sot e kadŭkhan kuk ŭl han sutkal ro mat poda -- 8. Hosan Cho Hŭi-ryong. "Sŏgu mangnyŏllok", hanŭl arae kajang t'ongk'wae han il ida -- 9. Sŏp'a Yu Hŭi. "Munt'ong", ilsaeng ŭl nŭl sibi sok esŏ saranne -- 10. Hyegang Ch'oe Han-gi. "Kihak", taedong ilt'ong ŭi isang segye rŭl kuhyŏn hada -- 11. Kosanja Kim Chŏng-ho. "Taedong yŏjido", chido ro ch'ŏnha ŭi hyŏngse rŭl salp'il su itta -- 12. Paegun Sim Tae-yun. "Pongni chŏnsŏ", mani ilgŭlsurok pongni ka tŏuk manajinda -- 13. Suun Ch'oe Che-u. "Tonggyŏng taejŏn", hangmun ŭro marhajamyŏn 'tonghak' irago haeya handa -- 14. Tongmu Yi Che-ma. "Kyŏkch'igo", i ch'aek i ch'ŏllima ka toeji ank'ennŭn'ga? (shrink)

Predictive processing accounts of neural function view the brain as a kind of prediction machine that forms models of its environment in order to anticipate the upcoming stream of sensory stimulation. These models are then continuously updated in light of incoming error signals. Predictive processing has offered a powerful new perspective on cognition, action, and perception. In this chapter we apply the insights from predictive processing to the study of emotions. The upshot is a picture of emotion as inseparable from (...) perception and cognition, and a key feature of the embodied mind. (shrink)

Standard approaches to counterfactuals in the philosophy of explanation are geared toward causal explanation. We show how to extend the counterfactual theory of explanation to non-causal cases, involving extra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts by mathematical facts. Using a structural equation framework, we model impossible perturbations to mathematics and the resulting differences made to physical explananda in two important cases of extra-mathematical explanation. We address some objections to our approach.

Suppositional theories of conditionals take apparent similarities between supposition and conditionals as a starting point, appealing to features of the former to provide an account of the latter. This paper develops a novel form of suppositional theory, one which characterizes the relationship at the level of semantics rather than at the level of speech acts. In the course of doing so, it considers a range of novel data which shed additional light on how conditionals and supposition interact.

On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals possess a “number sense,” or approximate number system, that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has been subject to numerous critiques that question whether the ANS genuinely represents number. We distinguish three lines of critique – the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision – and show that none succeed. We then provide positive reasons to think that the ANS genuinely represents numbers, and not just non-numerical confounds or exotic substitutes for (...) number, such as “numerosities” or “quanticals,” as critics propose. In so doing, we raise a neglected question: numbers of what kind? Proponents of the orthodox view have been remarkably coy on this issue. But this is unsatisfactory since the predictions of the orthodox view, including the situations in which the ANS is expected to succeed or fail, turn on the kind of number being represented. In response, we propose that the ANS represents not only natural numbers, but also non-natural rational numbers. It does not represent irrational numbers, however, and thereby fails to represent the real numbers more generally. This distances our proposal from existing conjectures, refines our understanding of the ANS, and paves the way for future research. (shrink)

I give a new argument for the moral difference between lying and misleading. First, following David Lewis, I hold that conventions of truthfulness and trust fix the meanings of our language. These conventions generate fair play obligations. Thus, to fail to conform to the conventions of truthfulness and trust is unfair. Second, I argue that the liar, but not the misleader, fails to conform to truthfulness. So the liar, but not the misleader, does something unfair. This account entails that bald-faced (...) lies are wrong, that we can lie nonlinguistically, and that linguistic innovation is morally significant. (shrink)

In an interesting experimental study, Bonini et al. (1999) present partial support for truth-gap theories of vagueness. We say this despite their claim to find theoretical and empirical reasons to dismiss gap theories and despite the fact that they favor an alternative, epistemic account, which they call ‘vagueness as ignorance’. We present yet more experimental evidence that supports gap theories, and argue for a semantic/pragmatic alternative that unifies the gappy supervaluationary approach together with its glutty relative, the subvaluationary approach.

The curriculum design, faculty characteristics, and experience of implementing masters' level international research ethics training programs supported by the Fogarty International Center was investigated. Multiple pedagogical approaches were employed to adapt to the learning needs of the trainees. While no generally agreed set of core competencies exists for advanced research ethics training, more than 75% of the curricula examined included international issues in research ethics, responsible conduct of research, human rights, philosophical foundations of research ethics, and research regulation and ethical (...) review process. Common skills taught included critical thinking, research methodology and statistics, writing, and presentation proficiency. Curricula also addressed the cultural, social, and religious context of the trainees related to research ethics. Programs surveyed noted trainee interest in Western concepts of research ethics and the value of the transnational exchange of ideas. Similar faculty expertise profiles existed in all programs. Approximately 40% of faculty were female. Collaboration between faculty from low- and middleincome countries (LMICs) and high-income countries (HICs) occurred in most programs and at least 50% of HIC faculty had previous LMIC experience. This paper is part of a collection of papers analyzing the Fogarty International Research Ethics Education and Curriculum Development program. (shrink)

Bestselling author Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith-that a moral system cannot be based on science.

This paper refines a controversial proposal: that core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked out by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they don’t, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, (...) and avoids otherwise troubling objections. (shrink)

There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favour, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some (...) noteworthy consequences for the wider theory of knowledge. First, it implies that an agent cannot be justified in believing a set of mutually inconsistent claims. Second, it implies the existence of a kind of epistemic blindspot: it is not possible to know that one’s evidence is misleading. (shrink)

This paper offers a new account of metaphysical explanation. The account is modelled on Kitcher’s unificationist approach to scientific explanation. We begin, in Sect. 2, by briefly introducing the notion of metaphysical explanation and outlining the target of analysis. After that, we introduce a unificationist account of metaphysical explanation before arguing that such an account is capable of capturing four core features of metaphysical explanations: irreflexivity, non-monotonicity, asymmetry and relevance. Since the unificationist theory of metaphysical explanation inherits irreflexivity and non-monotonicity (...) directly from the unificationist theory of scientific explanation that underwrites it, we focus on demonstrating how the account can secure asymmetry and relevance. (shrink)

According to a number of approaches in theoretical physics, spacetime does not exist fundamentally. Rather, spacetime exists by depending on another, more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure. A prevalent opinion in the literature is that this dependence should not be analyzed in terms of composition. We should not say, that is, that spacetime depends on an ontology of non-spatiotemporal entities in virtue of having them as parts. But is that really right? On the contrary, we argue that a mereological approach to dependent (...) spacetime is not only viable, but promises to enhance our understanding of the physical situation. (shrink)

Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith--that a moral system cannot be based on science.

It is often claimed that pre-attentive vision has an ‘iconic’ format. This is seen to explain pre-attentive vision's characteristically high processing capacity and to make sense of an overlap in the mechanisms of early vision and mental imagery. But what does the iconicity of pre-attentive vision amount to? This paper considers two prominent ways of characterising pre-attentive visual icons and argues that neither is adequate: one approach renders the claim ‘pre-attentive vision is iconic’ empirically false while the other obscures its (...) ability to do the explanatory work, which motivates positing pre-attentive visual icons in the first place. With this noted, I introduce the notion of an ‘Analogue Map’ and argue that it provides a superior characterisation of pre-attentive vision's iconicity. I then argue that this forces a reassessment of debates which have traditionally presupposed the iconicity of pre-attentive vision, emphasising ramifications for the viability of a format-based perception-thought border. (shrink)

Time is woven into the fabric of our lives. Everything we do, we do in and across time. It is not just that our lives are stretched out in time, from the moment of birth to the moment of our death. It is that our lives are stories. We make sense of ourselves, today, by understanding who we were yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that; by understanding what we did and why we did it. Our memories (...) shape our present selves, since we are the product of who we were, and who we remember being. Yet who we are lasts for but a moment. It is who we will be that demands attention. We are forever projecting ourselves into the future. We painstakingly plan for the needs of our future selves, all the while knowing that while what we do will make those future selves who they are, still, our future selves are elusive. So it is not simply that we happen to live our lives in time, the way, say, one might happen to live in Australia, or Singapore. It is hard to fathom how things could be otherwise. What would it be to live a life without time? Yet time itself is intangible. Though we are keenly aware of what has been ‒ of pain and loss, regret and pride ‒ and of what might be ‒ of anticipation, and dread, and longing ‒ time itself seems unaffected by anything we do. Though we can anticipate a future birthday cake, time itself cannot be tasted. Though we can dread a future dentist’s appointment, time itself cannot be touched. Though we remember the crunching of leaves this past autumn, time itself cannot be heard. How can it be that something so central to each of us, to who we are, and what we care about, can be so spectral? What, in the end, is time? Is time real, like a substance in which each of us, like insects in amber, finds ourselves trapped? Is time a dimension through which we can move? Is time not a thing at all, but some connection between events? If time is real, what is it like? Does it flow like a river, taking each of us prisoner in its current, washing us ever closer to the end of our lives? Is time like a cresting wave, coming ever closer to each of us from the future, engulfing us, and then receding into the past? Or is time static? Like a one-way road that each of us might wander, with no chance to turn back? Or perhaps time is like none of these things. Perhaps time is more like space; something we can navigate freely, so that we can visit different times just like we visit different places. Perhaps we can we travel in time the way we can travel in space. These questions, and many more, are the focus of this book. Now, you might wonder what philosophers are doing writing a book about time. Surely that’s a job for physicists! It is true: a great deal of what we know about time stems from our understanding of physics. However, even in physics we find that there are questions about time that go unanswered. Moreover, increasingly, physicists are turning to philosophers for help in understanding the role that time plays in current physical theories. Our goal is to get the reader up to speed on some of the central issues that influence our understanding of time so that they too may play a role in this ongoing discussion between science and philosophy. We hope that in doing so it will become clear what philosophy can bring to the study of time. There is a natural narrative in philosophy regarding the study of time, and we have chosen to organise this book according to that narrative. However, the book may also be approached in a ‘choose-your-own adventure’ spirit. While later chapters build on material introduced in earlier chapters, you can skip around, reading the book in any order you choose. For the instructor, this means that she can design her course around this book in any number of ways, depending on the particular topic she wishes to focus on. (shrink)

Call an explanation in which a non-mathematical fact is explained—in part or in whole—by mathematical facts: an extra-mathematical explanation. Such explanations have attracted a great deal of interest recently in arguments over mathematical realism. In this article, a theory of extra-mathematical explanation is developed. The theory is modelled on a deductive-nomological theory of scientific explanation. A basic DN account of extra-mathematical explanation is proposed and then redeveloped in the light of two difficulties that the basic theory faces. The final view (...) appeals to relevance logic and uses resources in information theory to understand the explanatory relationship between mathematical and physical facts. 1Introduction2Anchoring3The Basic Deductive-Mathematical Account4The Genuineness Problem5Irrelevance6Relevance and Information7Objections and Replies 7.1Against relevance logic7.2Too epistemic7.3Informational containment8Conclusion. (shrink)

Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...) whom these properties belong. However, it is impossible to explain the generation of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, as I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world’s ultimate material constituents are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of giving up her explanatory ambitions, or of giving up the claim that the ultimates are subjects. I argue that the latter option is preferable, leading to neutral monism, on which phenomenal qualities are irreducible but subjects are reducible. So panpsychists should be neutral monists. (shrink)

The theoretical virtue of parsimony values the minimizing of theoretical commitments, but theoretical commitments come in two kinds : ontological and ideological. While the ontological commitments of a theory are the entities it posits, a theory’s ideological commitments are the primitive concepts it employs. Here, I show how we can extend the distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony, commonly drawn regarding ontological commitments, to the domain of ideological commitments. I then argue that qualitative ideological parsimony is a theoretical virtue. My (...) defense proceeds by demonstrating the merits of qualitative ideological parsimony and by showing how the qualitative conception of ideological parsimony undermines two notable arguments from ideological parsimony: David Lewis’ defense of modal realism and Ted Sider’s defense of mereological nihilism. (shrink)