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The relation between knowledge and action has been a lengthy debate in philosophy which traces back to Descartes and Locke. Purism holds that the practical factors related to action are fundamentally independent of the standard of knowledge, while pragmatic encroachment argues that practical considerations about action can impact judgments about knowledge. This traditional debate was put front and center recently by discussions on some knowledge attribution cases and relevant empirical studies. This (...) paper reports three empirical studies based on three pairs of classic knowledge attribution cases on Chinese participants. The results indicate that folk's understanding of knowledge is more compatible with purism and suggest a conversational implicature account of the connection between judgments about knowledge and action. (shrink)

There are marked similarities between Confucian ideas about the relationship between action, knowledge and learning, and contemporary educational thinking about action research. Examples can be seen in the relationship between action and research. First, Confucius emphasized the importance of ‘action’ which was different from ‘research’. The Confucian view of action implies that one should engage in a research process of deliberation in advance and then decide whether to take action or (...) not. This kind of researched action is refined by the process of deliberation which could be called ‘research pre action’—the first stage of action research. Second, Confucius emphasized the importance of knowledge, and this reveals that Confucius emphasized the importance of knowledgeable action. This view of the relationship between knowledge and action inspires an insight into the relationship between knowledge, action, and action research. This competence to research and acquire new understanding in action could be called ‘research in action’—the second stage of action research. Third, Confucius emphasized the importance of learning to connect the relationship between knowledge and action. According to Confucius, learning is an important medium to accumulate knowledge, enable action, and improve the relationship between knowledge and action. And it might enable the possibility of a set of relations in which ‘action’ and ‘research’ might no longer be segregated in their traditional dichotomy. This relationship could be called ‘research on action’ in the third stage of action research. These observations of the Confucian view show a new direction in action research. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyse the phenomenology of the interdependence of national and cultural identity in Croatian society and present how the empowerment of national and cultural identity in the Croatian society generates an individual expression of being Croatian. To be able to speak about this process, it is essential to define the relationship between cultural and national identity in the Republic of Croatia. A duality of influence characterises this relationship. Cultural identity is an essential element of the construction (...) of a national, which determines the direction of cultural dynamics. The phenomenological level of theoretical analysis of the mentioned phenomenon places the internalisation of the identity constituents into the focus. As consciousness is always intentional, or intent on an object, it is necessary to study the ways of understanding the building of an individual’s identity throughout the collectively provided stocks of knowledge. Such type of construction or internalisation of collective assumptions presupposes the relative independence of the actors in the construction of their reality. Relative independence as a term stems from the inability to separate the action from the structural frameworks on issues of identity. An individual is free to form the meaning, but that meaning is created within a particular context and frame. This context inherently creates the essence of available knowledge. The basic problem with the knowledge of national and cultural identity is that this knowledge is enabled in two dominant polar variants. An individual constructs his identity through a variety of knowledge supply, dominant through his life. Such a process of realising a person dispels a national identity. In the phenomenological sense, the very conception of Croats and being Croatian at the individual level is plural and ambiguous. (shrink)

It has been claimed that a sense of us is presupposed for shared intentions to be possible. Searle introduced this notion together with the notion of the sense of the other. in joint action. It argues that the sense of the other is a necessary condition for a sense of us. Whereas thisarticle distinguishes between the “sense of the other” and the “sense of us” and elaborates on their role the sense of the other is immediate and automatic, (...) the sense of us can (but need not) arise between people and can (a) develop over time, (b) depend on the situation, and (c) involves several sufficient but not necessary processes. The article relies on research on core knowledge to better understand the sense of the other. It elaborates the sense of us using insights from cognitive science and social psychology. The article shows that the sense of the other and the sense of us can contribute to our understanding of the perception of possibilities for joint action and how individuals can come to experience actions and intentions as shared, even if the participants lack common knowledge. This leads to the conclusion that people are ordinarily socially oriented rather than individually. (shrink)

This article is an extension of my previous article, which describes pure knowing as the ability and criteria for making moral judgment.1 Due to apparent contradictions among Wang Yangming's statements, there are controversies over the evaluation and interpretation of Wang's idea of the relation between moral knowledge 2 and moral action. Generally, on the one hand, Wang admits that there are people who commit wrong actions even though they recognize that these actions are wrong. He claims (...) not only that sages possess pure knowing, but also that robbers feel ashamed to be called "robbers" through the working of pure knowing.3 On the other hand, he explicitly states that "There have never... (shrink)

What is the relation, in Plato, between the account of knowledge and the account of inquiry? Is the account of knowledge independent of the account of inquiry? These strike me as important, even pressing, questions. While so much work has been done on Plato’s account of knowledge, and quite a lot is being done on his account of inquiry, I know of only the odd critic who has considered the two together. It is remarkable that (...) critics have generally treated of the two topics—Plato’s account of knowledge and his account of inquiry—as if they were separate. This suggests critics have been tacitly supposing that, for Plato, the account of knowledge is independent of the account of inquiry. In this paper, I pose these questions, and take them up for investigation. I argue that Plato’s account of knowledge is not independent of his account of inquiry; on the contrary, Plato’s account of knowledge cannot be understood if separated from his account of inquiry. I do so, in this paper, with reference to the Phaedo exclusively. (shrink)

In this thesis, I explore a number of epistemological issues concerning the relations between knowledge, belief and practical matters. In particular, I defend a view, which I call credal pragmatism. This view is compatible with moderate invariantism, a view that takes knowledge to depend exclusively on truth-relevant factors and to require an invariant epistemic standard of knowledge that can be quite easily met. The thesis includes a negative and a positive part. In the negative part I (...) do two things: i) I critically examine some moderate invariantist accounts of the intuitive influence of practical factors on knowledge ascriptions, and ii) I provide a criticism of the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. In Chapter 1, I provide a general overview of the issues that constitute the background for the views and arguments defended in my thesis. In particular, I provide a thorough discussion of two aspects of the relation between knowledge and practical matters: one is constituted by the practical factors’ effects on knowledge ascriptions; the other is the intuitive normative role of knowledge in the regulation and assessments of action and practical reasoning. In Chapter 2, I consider and criticize Timothy Williamson’s account according to which an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between knowing and knowing that one knows generates the intuition that knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to practical factors. In Chapter 3, I argue against the idea that practical reasoning is governed by a knowledge norm. The argument generalizes to other candidate epistemic norms of practical reasoning. In Chapter 4, I criticise a number of accounts which explain effects of practical factors on knowledge ascriptions in terms of the influence of practical factors on belief. These include the accounts of Brain Weatherson, Dorit Ganson, Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel. In the positive part of the thesis, I develop and argue for credal pragmatism, an original account of the nature and interaction of different doxastic attitudes and the role of practical factors in their rational regulation. On this view, given a certain fixed amount of evidence, the degree of credence of an adaptively rational agent varies in different circumstances depending on practical factors, while the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief remains fixed across contexts. This account distinguishes between two kinds of outright belief: occurrent belief, which depends on the actual degree of credence, and dispositional belief, which depends on the degree of credence in normal circumstances. In Chapter 5, I present the view and I show how credal pragmatism can explain the practical factors’ effects on knowledge ascriptions. In Chapter 6, I develop a fallibilist account of several features about knowledge ascriptions including i) why in folk epistemological practices knowledge is often taken to be a necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for relying on a proposition in practical reasoning; ii) concessive knowledge attributions and related data; and iii) the infallibilist intuition that knowledge excludes error possibilities. (shrink)

The Rockefeller Foundation played a key role inthe shift from `isolationism' to globalism inUS foreign policy between 1939 and 1945. TheFoundation utilised its considerable financialresources in a conscious and systematic attemptto assist official policymakers and academicsto build a new globalist consensus within thestate and public opinion. The article testsfour theoretical models that have been used todescribe Rockefeller initiatives. It concludesthat a Gramscian analysis provides the mosthelpful way of understanding the Foundation'srole in American foreign affairs.

A number of researchers have begun to demonstrate that the widely discussed ?Knobe effect? (wherein participants are more likely to think that actions with bad side-effects are brought about intentionally than actions with good or neutral side-effects) can be found in theory of mind judgments that do not involve the concept of intentional action. In this article we report experimental results that show that attributions of knowledge can be influenced by the kinds of (non-epistemic) concerns that drive the (...) Knobe effect. Our findings suggest there is good reason to think that the epistemic version of the Knobe effect is a theoretically significant and robust effect, and that the goodness or badness of side-effects can often have greater influence on participant knowledge attributions than explicit information about objective probabilities. Thus, our work sheds light on important ways in which participant assessments of actions can affect the epistemic assessments participants make of agents? beliefs. (shrink)

“Knowledge” in Islam, Muslim culture and philosophy is considered as the key to understanding Muslim civilization, the formation of which took place in interaction with the cultures of peoples of the eastern and western parts of the former Roman Empire. The Byzantine theology and philosophy were of great importance for the points of contact and mutual enrichment of Muslim and Christian cultures in the Middle Ages, influencing the formation of Christian orthodox doctrine and the worldview of the ethnically diverse (...) peoples of the Byzantine oikumene. The phenomenon of “knowledge” in Muslim culture is presented in the article in connection with some contexts of Byzantine culture. “Knowledge”, as well as the categorical space of Muslim culture as a whole, on the one hand, allows us to understand the spirit of Islam as a phenomenon of religion, culture and civilization, and on the other hand, to determine the role and significance of this space in the formation and development of the main directions of Arab-Muslim philosophy formed in the “golden era” of Islam. The article considers the spiritual attitude to the “search for knowledge” in Islam: in the Koran and the Sunnah. Particular attention is paid to the concept of “knowledge” in the Arab-Muslim culture, while it is noted that written culture, book knowledge and education in general were the property of not only a narrow circle of rulers and religious figures in the Arab Caliphate. Within the framework of the categorical space of the Arab Muslim culture and philosophy, it should be borne in mind that the categories of “knowledge” (‘ilm) and “action” ('amal) constitute an inseparable unity within the framework of the Arab Muslim spiritual tradition in the context of the relationship between “theoretical” and “practical” mind. The role of “knowledge” and “action” within the framework of the Arab Muslim philosophical tradition is considered on the example of the teachings of al-Ghazali, who had a huge impact on the development of philosophy both in the Arab East and the European West. Being a key figure in the spiritual history of Islam and Muslim civilization, al-Ghazali considered knowledge not just as a value, but also as a virtue. An ardent champion of the role of reason, he connected theoretical reason with the understanding of spiritual realities that give us various systems of knowledge called sciences. The area of competence of practical reason, which should be based on the theoretical, al-Ghazali associated with human behavior. Practical reason directs human actions based on the will, based on and guided by a moral ideal. Al-Ghazali’s teachings are considered in notions and terms formed and developed in the Middle Ages within the Arab-Muslim culture and reflecting some meanings of such historical type of philosophical culture as the Greek-Byzantine classical Patristics. Al-Ghazali and the Byzantine Church Fathers shared a philosophical and theological understanding of man in his relation to the Creator and the phenomenon of “knowledge”. (shrink)

Perhaps it is a pity that the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Conduct have fallen into separate compartments. (It certainly was not so in Socrates’ time, as his interest in the relation between eidos and technê bears witness.) If we studied them together, perhaps we might have a better understanding of both. H.H. Price, Thinking and Representation..

John Hyman explores central problems in philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. His approach to the dimensions of human action culminates in an original analysis of the relation between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.

The central subject of Aristotle's ethics is happiness or living well. Most people in his day (as in ours), eager to enjoy life, impressed by worldly success, and fearful of serious loss, believed that happiness depends mainly on fortune in achieving prosperity and avoiding adversity. Aristotle, however, argues that virtuous conduct is the governing factor in living well and attaining happiness. While admitting that neither the blessings not the afflictions of fortune are unimportant, he maintains that the virtuous find life (...) more satisfying than other people do and, with only modest good fortune, they lead happy, enjoyable lives. Combining philological precision with philosophical analysis, the author reconstructs Aristotle's defense of these bold claims. By examining how Aristotle develops his position in response to the prevailing hopes and anxieties of his age, the author shows why Aristotle considers happiness important for ethics and why he thinks it necessary to revise popular and traditional views. Paying close attention throughout to the internalist dimension of Aristotle's approach - his emphasis on how the virtuous view their own lives and actions - the author advances new interpretations of Aristotle's accounts of several major virtues, including temperance, courage, liberality, and 'greatness of soul'. This work sets Aristotle in the broader cultural context of his time, tracing his attemps to accommodate and amend rival views. The author examines literary and historical sources as well as philosophical texts, showing the inherited values and traditional ideals that inform Aristotle's discussions and provide some of the basis for his conclusions. Presupposing no knowledge of Greek or specialized philosophical terminology, the book is designed to be accessible to all students of philosophy or classical antiquity. All quotations from ancient texts are translated. (shrink)

John Dewey's Gifford Lectures, given at Edinburgh in 1929.

Unethical acts and reported cases of corruption and commercial crimes in South African business are increasing. Literature studies showed that risk groups (for instance South African managers in affirmative action positions) are functioning in a stressful environment which can give rise to unethical acts. Results pointed out that high stress correlates substantially with: to claim credit for a subordinate's work; to fail to report a co-worker's violation of company policy, to offer potential clients fully paid holidays; and to purchase (...) shares upon hearing privileged company information. In the light of this a number of recommendations were made. (shrink)

Around 1970, high numbers of traffic casualties among cyclists led to the creation of numerous local protest movements in the Netherlands. While activists employed protest strategies, their main interest lie in the way they exemplify a highly successful instance of “lay expertise”; the idea that users of a technology have a fundamentally different and valuable perspective on a technology than experts or system-builders. Specifically, cyclists claimed to be more knowledgeable about cycling conditions and safety than the state-employed engineers and traffic (...) experts who built the roads and cycling path network. A key actor in this story is the Dutch Cyclists’ Union, a national platform of local action groups formed in 1975. These activists used the cycling experience of everyday utilitarian cyclists to compile maps and blacklists of locations where cycling was dangerous, unpleasant, uncomfortable, or otherwise discouraging. In doing so, they successfully claimed legitimacy as a valuable knowledge partner for local engineers and policymakers. As a result, they gained some level of influence within local governments, a relation which in the intervening years has only grown stronger. This case study shows how users can shape socio-technical systems bottom-up, and can therefore to an extent be seen as a successful example of co-construction of technology. (shrink)

By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects (...) only within that pretense-episode (e.g. the child does not expect that ‘spilling’ ( pretend) ‘tea’1 will result in the table really being wet), or more generally, to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the pretended state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world. Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (e.g. the child does expect that if she up-ends the teapot above the table, then the table will become wet in the pretense), or, more generally to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content. (shrink)

I argue in favor of a certain connection between knowledge and the permissibility of action. On this approach, we do not think of the relation between those notions as reflecting a universal epistemic principle. Instead, we think of it as something resembling a platitude from folk psychology. With the help of some elementary tools from the logic of normativity and counterfactuals, I attempt to establish the connection by deriving it from more elementary principles. The new (...) formulation involves a ceteris paribus clause. Though it is often difficult to specify the exact content of a ceteris paribus clause, we will see that our clause is derived from a descriptive generalization with independent motivation. (shrink)

Possibilistic logic and modal logic are knowledge representation frameworks sharing some common features, such as the duality between possibility and necessity, and the decomposability of necessity for conjunctions, as well as some obvious differences since possibility theory is graded. At the semantic level, possibilistic logic relies on possibility distributions and modal logic on accessibility relations. In the last 30 years, there have been a series of attempts for bridging the two frameworks in one way or another. In this (...) paper, we compare the relational semantics of epistemic logics with simpler possibilistic semantics of a fragment of such logics that only uses modal formulas of depth 1. This minimal epistemic logic handles both all-or-nothing beliefs and explicitly ignored facts. We also contrast epistemic logic with the S5-based rough set logic. Finally, this paper presents extensions of generalized possibilistic logic with objective and non-nested multimodal formulas, in the style of modal logics KD45 and S5. (shrink)

Epistemic Contextualism is generally treated as a semantic thesis that may or may not have epistemological consequences. It is sometimes taken to concern only knowledge claims (as the assertion that the word “know” means different things in different contexts of use). Still, at other times it is taken to regard the knowledge relation itself (as the assertion that knowledge itself has no single univocal nature). Call the former view Semantic EC, the latter view Substantive EC, and (...) the idea that the plausibility of Semantic EC presupposes that of Substantive EC, the “Presupposition Thesis.” Numerous authors argue against the Presupposition Thesis on the grounds that an understanding of the nature of knowledge is no more required to understand the meaning of knowledge assertions than an understanding of the self, for instance, is needed to understand the meaning of sentences containing “I.” These authors then offer additional arguments for the same conclusion, using further comparisons between “know” and other indexicals, as well as between “know” and quantifiers, gradable and modal adjectives. Herein, I defend the Presupposition Thesis by arguing against these authors’ claims (based as they are on these types of comparisons) that Semantic EC is plausible without the supposition of Substantive EC. (shrink)

Around 1970, high numbers of traffic casualties among cyclists led to the creation of numerous local protest movements in the Netherlands. While activists employed protest strategies, their main interest lie in the way they exemplify a highly successful instance of “lay expertise”; the idea that users of a technology have a fundamentally different and valuable perspective on a technology than experts or system-builders. Specifically, cyclists claimed to be more knowledgeable about cycling conditions and safety than the state-employed engineers and traffic (...) experts who built the roads and cycling path network. A key actor in this story is the Dutch Cyclists’ Union, a national platform of local action groups formed in 1975. These activists used the cycling experience of everyday utilitarian cyclists to compile maps and blacklists of locations where cycling was dangerous, unpleasant, uncomfortable, or otherwise discouraging. In doing so, they successfully claimed legitimacy as a valuable knowledge partner for local engineers and policymakers. As a result, they gained some level of influence within local governments, a relation which in the intervening years has only grown stronger. This case study shows how users can shape socio-technical systems bottom-up, and can therefore to an extent be seen as a successful example of co-construction of technology.ZusammenfassungUm 1970 führte die hohe Zahl von Verkehrsunfällen unter Radfahrern zur Gründung zahlreicher lokaler Protestbewegungen in den Niederlanden. Obwohl die Aktivisten auch Proteststrategien einsetzten, besteht das Hauptinteresse dieses Artikels in der Art und Weise, wie sie ein äußerst erfolgreiches Beispiel für „Laienkompetenz“ darstellen. Die Idee dahinter ist, dass Nutzer eine wertvolle und grundlegend andere Perspektive auf eine Technologie haben als Experten oder Systembauer: Radfahrer gaben in Umfragen an, mehr über die Bedingungen und die Sicherheit von Fahrrädern zu wissen als die staatlich angestellten Ingenieure und Verkehrsexperten, die die Systeme des Straßen- und Radwegenetzes gebaut haben. Ein Hauptakteur dieser Geschichte ist der Fietsersbond [Radfahrerbund], eine nationale Plattform lokaler Aktionsgruppen, die 1975 gegründet wurde. Diese Aktivisten nutzten die Mobilitätserfahrung täglicher Radfahrer, um Karten und Liste von Orten zusammenzustellen, an denen das Radfahren gefährlich und unangenehm oder auf andere Weise beschwerlich war. Damit beanspruchten sie erfolgreich Legitimität als wertvoller Wissenspartner für lokale Ingenieure und politische Entscheidungsträger. Infolgedessen gewannen sie einen gewissen Einfluss auf die Kommunalverwaltung; eine Beziehung, die seitdem immer stärker geworden ist. Diese Fallstudie zeigt, wie Nutzer sozio-technische Systeme „von unten“ gestalten können; sie kann daher in gewissem Maße als erfolgreiches Beispiel für die kooperative Konstruktion von Technik angesehen werden. (shrink)

Cet article propose une analogie entre la problématique du « vouloir dire » et celle du « vouloir faire » en utilisant la question de l'intentionalité telle qu’elle est traitée par la philosophie de l'action post-wittgensteinienne d'Elizabeth Anscombe. L’enjeu est de déterminer à quelles conditions nous pouvons appliquer une philosophie de l’action au langage. S’il ne s’agit pas de réduire toute analyse du langage à une philosophie de l’action, il s’agit néanmoins de montrer qu’il existe entre langage (...) et action une relation à double sens. D’une part, comme le montrent les travaux d’Anscombe et de John L. Austin, l’analyse du langage (et en particulier des concepts d’intention, de volontaire, etc.) sert au philosophe à rendre compte de la notion d’action. D’autre part, comme l’a montré Austin, parler, utiliser le langage, c’est agir, faire des actions. En examinant cette relation, cet article examine la façon dont le concept d’intentionalité intervient dans la logique de l’action et dans celle du langage en tant qu’action. Dans ce cadre, le problème de l'intentionalité surgit de la possibilité logique d'un décalage (qui n’est pas la règle) entre ce qu'une personne dit ou fait et ce que cette personne veut dire ou veut faire. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer qu'il est possible de penser l'intentionalité sans penser ce décalage sur le modèle d'une inadéquation entre un dire ou un faire et une sorte de doublon mental qui y correspondrait plus ou moins. Il s’agit de penser l’intentionalité en dehors du dualisme de l’esprit et du monde, tout en conservant intacte, non seulement la possibilité du décalage, mais également la pertinence de la distinction conceptuelle entre le vouloir dire/faire et le dire/faire dans les cas sans décalage. Le parallèle proposé vise avant tout à suggérer que, s'il est possible de concevoir les rapports entre le dire et le vouloir dire en termes d'intentionalité au même titre que les rapports entre le faire et le vouloir faire, c'est que certains traits logiques ou grammaticaux caractéristiques de l'intention ou de la visée s'appliquent dans les deux cas. (shrink)

하버마스/루만 논쟁의 쟁점들 중 비판이론 대 체계이론이라는 오래된 대립구도를 확인하는 것은 큰 의미가 없다. 오늘날 더 중요한 쟁점들은 두 학자가 논쟁 이후에 이룬 성과와 관련된 것이다. ‘소통적 행위’와 ‘토의’가 그런 쟁점들이다. 이 쟁점들로부터 출발해 하버마스는 소통적 행위 이론을 정립했고, 루만은 사회적 체계들의 요소를 소통으로 간주하고 행위를 자기관찰의 요소로 간주했다. 특히 소통을 일차적 개념으로 간주하고, 행위를 행위자에 대한 귀속결과로 본 루만의 작업은 행위이론 중심의 사회학 전통에 도전한 매우 생산적인 전환이었다. 그럼에도 이 전환에는 귀속 갈등이 심화될 경우에 대한 고민이 결여되어 있다. 나는 (...) 무한 귀속 갈등의 문제를 해결하기 위해서는 하버마스의 소통적 행위 개념에 들어있는 ‘이해시키기’를 주목할 필요가 있다고 본다. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to discuss a theoretical explanation for the positive relationship between patients’ knowledge and their trust in healthcare personnel. Our approach is based on John Dewey’s notion of continuity. This notion entails that the individual’s experiences are interpreted as interrelated to each other, and that knowledge is related to future experience, not merely a record of the past. Furthermore, we apply Niklas Luhmann’s theory on trust as a way of reducing complexity and enabling (...) action. Anthony Giddens’ description and analysis of the high modern society provides a frame for discussing the preconditions for patient-healthcare personnel interaction. High modernity is dominated by expert systems and demands trust in these. We conclude that patient knowledge and trust in healthcare personnel is related because both knowledge and trust are future- and action-oriented concepts. The traits of high modernity provides opportunities and challenges as the personnel can and must perform discretion. This discretion must be made in a context where knowledge is considered uncertain and preliminary. (shrink)

Today it is widely recognized that we face urgent and serious environmental problems and we know much about them, yet we do very little. What explains this lack of motivation and change? Why is it so hard to change our lives? This book addresses this question by means of a philosophical inquiry into the conditions of possibility for environmental change. It discusses how we can become more motivated to do environmental good and what kind of knowledge we need for (...) this, and explores the relations between motivation, knowledge, and modernity. After reviewing a broad range of possible philosophical and psychological responses to environmental apathy and inertia, the author argues for moving away from a modern focus on either detached reason and control or the natural, the sentiments, and the authentic, both of which make possible disengaging and alienating modes of relating to our environment. Instead he develops the notion of environmental skill: a concept that bridges the gap between knowledge and action, re-interprets environmental virtue, and suggests an environmental ethics centered on experience, know-how and skillful engagement with our environment. The author then explores the implications of this ethics for our lives: it changes the way we think about, and deal with, health, food, animals, energy, climate change, politics, and technology. (shrink)

Knowledge how to do things is a pervasive and central element of everyday life. Yet it raises many difficult questions that must be answered by philosophers and cognitive scientists aspiring to understand human cognition and agency. What is the connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is knowledge how simply a type of ability or disposition to act? Is there an irreducibly practical form of knowledge? What is the role of the intellect in intelligent action? (...) This volume contains fifteen state of the art essays by leading figures in philosophy and linguistics that amplify and sharpen the debate between "intellectualists" and "anti-intellectualists" about mind and action, highlighting the conceptual, empirical, and linguistic issues that motivate and sustain the conflict. The essays also explore various ways in which this debate informs central areas of ethics, philosophy of action, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Knowing How covers a broad range of topics dealing with tacit and procedural knowledge, the psychology of skill, expertise, intelligence and intelligent action, the nature of ability, the syntax and semantics of embedded questions, the mind-body problem, phenomenal character, epistemic injustice, moral knowledge, the epistemology of logic, linguistic competence, the connection between knowledge and understanding, and the relation between theory and practice. This is the book on knowing how--an invaluable resource for philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and others concerned with knowledge, mind, and action. (shrink)

The paper uses the Offenders' Social Reintegration Project, run between 1988 and 1998 by the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece, to discuss the characteristics of new forms of action research and to reflect on the main debates within action research literature. Firstly, new forms of action research dealing with community issues tend to take place within complex systems, aiming to bring potential partners together and to facilitate the development of networks of organisations. Networking presupposes a more (...) open-ended mode of research and opens the question of participation of the social groups concerned. The varying and changing degrees of participation within the Project are described with reference to the role of the researchers and the discrepancy between formal and informal partnerships. Secondly, the relation between research and action is dealt with via a discussion of the different types of knowledge produced in the course of the Project and their appropriateness for informing and evaluating practice. The implications of these arguments for the scientific status of action research and the paradigm within which it can be located are also addressed. Thirdly, the paper discusses the role of the various institutional contexts in shaping and constraining possible types of research and action. Finally, the type of change pursued by action research projects is considered with reference to the ongoing debate within action research literature on the role of politics, leading to the acknowledgement of the inevitable implication of political negotiations and power in any initiative towards social change. (shrink)

Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...) generalizes: there exists no local function from degrees of belief to binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions of rationality and non-triviality. “Locality” means that the binary belief in each proposition depends only on the degree of belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. One might think that the impossibility can be avoided by dropping the assumption that binary beliefs are a function of degrees of belief. We prove that, even if we drop the “functionality” restriction, there still exists no local relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions. Thus functionality is not the source of the impossibility; its source is the condition of locality. If there is any non-trivial relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs at all, it must be a “holistic” one. We explore several concrete forms this “holistic” relation could take. (shrink)

What is the relation between moral reasons and moral requirement? Specifically: what relation does an action have to bear to one’s moral reasons in order to count as morally required? This paper defends the following answer to this question: an action is morally required just in case the moral reasons in favor of that action are enough on their own to outweigh all of the reasons, moral and nonmoral, to perform any alternative. I argue (...) that this decisive moral reason view satisfies three key desiderata: it is compatible with either affirming or denying the existence of moral options; it vindicates moral rationalism, the thesis that an action can be morally required only if one ought to do it all things considered; and most distinctively, it explains why unexcused moral wrongdoing necessarily shows disregard for moral reasons. (shrink)

Unethical acts and reported cases of corruption and commercial crimes in South African business are increasing. Literature studies showed that risk groups (for instance South African managers in affirmative action positions) are functioning in a stressful environment which can give rise to unethical acts. Results pointed out that high stress correlates substantially with: to claim credit for a subordinate's work; to fail to report a co-worker's violation of company policy, to offer potential clients fully paid holidays; and to purchase (...) shares upon hearing privileged company information. In the light of this a number of recommendations were made. (shrink)

One of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century, Sir Karl Popper here examines the problems connected with human freedom, creativity, rationality and the relationship between human beings and their actions. In this illuminating series of papers, Popper suggests a theory of mind-body interaction that relates to evolutionary emergence, human language and what he calls "the three worlds." Rene; Descartes first posited the existence of two worlds--the world of physical bodies and the world of mental states. Popper argues (...) for the existence of "world 3" which comprises the products of our human minds. He examines the interaction between mental states--hopes, needs, plans, ideologies or hypotheses--and the physical states of our brain. Popper forcefully argues against the materialism forwarded by many philosophers which denies the existence of mental states. Instead, he demonstrates that the problem of the interaction between mental and physical states remains unresolved. Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem is based on Popper's never-before published lectures at Emory University in 1969. Popper has extensively revised the lectures but has retained their accessible format. He has also incorporated some of the discussions which followed the lectures, providing an engaging exchange between the philosopher and his audience. (shrink)

In the Concept of Mind from 1949 Gilbert Ryle distinguished between knowing how and knowing that. What was Ryle’s basic idea and how is the discussion going on in philosophy today? How can sport philosophy use the idea of knowing how? My goal in this paper is first to bring Ryle and the post-Rylean discussion to light and then show how phenomenology can give some input to the discussion. The article focuses especially on the two main interpretations of knowing (...) how, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. In the second part of the article I discuss how views from phenomenology and philosophy of mind can enrich and widen our understanding of what knowing how means in relation to sport practices. It is argued that knowing how is not limited to athletic abilities but includes knowledge of how the environing world operates in relation to athletic action. (shrink)