Mit Robotik, Digitalisierung, softwaregesteuerten Präzisionsinstrumenten und hochkomplexen Simulationsverfahren wird heute Technik zur treibenden Kraft der wissenschaftlichen Forschungspraxis. Gleichzeitig sieht sich die universitäre Forschung wachsenden gesellschaftlichen Einflüssen ausgesetzt und nähert sich selbst immer mehr der Industrieforschung an, woraus sich neue Fragen nach den Werten und der Objektivität der Wissenschaft ergeben. Derartig weitreichende Veränderungen haben zahlreiche Spekulationen darüber provoziert, ob sich in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte gegenwärtig ein Epochenbruch vollzieht. Dieser Sammelband setzt sich aus philosophischen, historischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen Perspektiven mit den Epochenbruchthesen (...) auseinander, bestätigt und bestreitet ihn. Die Beiträge in diesem Band setzen sich mit der These vom Epochenbruch vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener Disziplinen auseinander, darunter Wissenschaftsphilosophie und -geschichte, sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen über Wissenschaft sowie kultur- und medientheoretische Studien zu Wissenschaft und Technik. Die erste Gruppe der Beiträge versucht, die These von einem Epochenbruch im Ganzen zu beurteilen. Den Anfang bilden mehrere Beiträge, die die Debatte eröffnen, indem sie starke Thesen für oder gegen die Vorstellung vorlegen, dass sich das wissenschaftliche Unterfangen in den letzten Jahrzehnten völlig neu orientiert hat. Die Autoren in der zweiten Gruppe setzen sich unter einem spezifischen Gesichtspunkt mit der These auseinander. Sie stellen bestimmte Konzepte in den Mittelpunkt, greifen spezifische technische Entwicklungen heraus oder betrachten einzelne Praktiken und Anwendungskontexte. Diese spezifischen Konzepte, Technologien und Praxisbereiche dienen als Testfeld für die umfassendere These. (shrink)

The concept of well-being is increasingly gaining acceptance as an object of science, and many different types of well-being measures have been developed. A debate has emerged about which measures are able to capture well-being successfully. An important underlying problem is that there is no unified conceptual framework about the nature of well-being—a hotly debated topic of philosophical discussion. I argue that while there is little agreement about the nature of well-being in philosophy, there is an important agreement on (...) some important principles relevant for its measurement. I argue that well-being science has good reasons to accommodate these principles, but currently fails to do so. (shrink)

Rational agents are important objects of study in several research communities, including economics, philosophy, cognitive science, and most recently computer science and artificial intelligence. Crudely, a rational agent is an entity that is capable of acting on its environment, and which chooses to act in such a way as to further its own best interests. There has recently been much interest in the use of mathematical logic for developing formal theories of such agents. Such theories view agents as (...) practical reasoning systems, deciding moment by moment which action to perform next, given the beliefs they have about the world and their desires with respect to how they would like the world to be. In this article, we survey the state of the art in developing logical theories of rational agency. Following a discussion on the dimensions along which such theories can vary, we briefly survey the logical tools available in order to construct such theories. We then review and critically assess three of the best known theories of rational agency: Cohen and Levesque's intention logic, Rao and Georgeff's BDI logics, and the KARO framework of Meyer et al. We then discuss the various roles that such logics can play in helping us to engineer rational agents, and conclude with a discussion of open problems. (shrink)

We identify two aspects of the problem of maintaining perceptual stability despite an observer's eye movements. The first, visual direction constancy, is the (egocentric) stability of apparent positions of objects in the visual world relative to the perceiver. The second, visual position constancy, is the (exocentric) stability of positions of objects relative to each other. We analyze the constancy of visual direction despite saccadic eye movements.Three information sources have been proposed to enable the visual system to achieve stability: the structure (...) of the visual field, proprioceptive inflow, and a copy of neural efference or outflow to the extraocular muscles. None of these sources by itself provides adequate information to achieve visual direction constancy; present evidence indicates that all three are used.Our final question concerns how information processing operations result in a stable world. The three traditionally suggested means have been elimination, translation, or evaluation. All are rejected. From a review of the physiological and psychological evidence we conclude that no subtraction, compensation, or evaluation need take place. The problem for which these solutions were developed turns out to be a false one. We propose a “calibration” solution: correct spatiotopic positions are calculated anew for each fixation. Inflow, outflow, and retinal sources are used in this calculation: saccadic suppression of displacement bridges the errors between these sources and the actual extent of movement. (shrink)

Die Arbeit betrachtet die verschiedenen Ansichten, die über wissenschaftliche Objektivität bestehen: Etwa als Charakteristik einer gesamtwissenschaftlichen Praxis, als Gesamtfortschritt, der durch die Struktur der Institution bestimmt ist, oder als etwas, was auf subjektivem Glauben, subjektivem Verfahren und kollektiven Meinungen begründet ist. Sie betrachtet die Objektivität der Wissenschaft auch in bezug auf den Sinn wissenschaftlicher Behauptungen und bezüglich des allgemeinen erkenntnistheoretischen Hintergrundes. Mit Blick auf einige neuere Thesen innerhalb der Quantenphysik und in der Sprache der Quantenphysik versucht die (...) Arbeit herauszustellen, daß die Praxis der tatsächlichen Wissenschaft über historische und logisch-methodologische Rechenschaftsablegung hinausgeht, um ihre Glaubwürdigkeit in einer kontinuierlich sich erweiternden Erfahrung unter Beweis zu stellen. Wissenschaft als ein systematisches öffentliches Unternehmen, dessen Zweck es ist, Behauptungen über die Natur zu formulieren, erreicht dies durch einen Bedeutungswandel von Objektivität und indem sie neue "Sprachen" übernimmt, die durch solchen Wandel erfordert werden. (shrink)

As we owe the division of ecology into autecology and synecology to botanists, the arguments for this subdivision and also the definitions and contents of both subsciences as given bySchröter, Flahault &Schröter, Gams andDu Rietz are communicated in full. The same is the case with the division of ecology given by the zoologistsAdams andChapman. Moreover the opinions of these authors in this respect are critisized in detail as well as in their general aspects. This critique is connected with the author's (...) own positive opinion, which is given at the end of the paper, where also the remarks covered by the first two papers of this series are summarised.In ecology as a biological science either the individual or the complex of individuals has to occupy a central position. Therefore science about the environment, especially the abiotic one, as well as science about a definite region or spot of the earth ought not to be incorporated in biology.In autecology the individual occupies a central position, it is one of the subsciences of idiobiology, it is a science about the relations to environment, taken in the broadest sense. Dependent upon the contents of this we have many definitions of ecology, the most important ones being: 1) ecology is a biogeographical subscience; 2) ecology is taken in the sense of ethology; 3) ecology is taken as a science of the teleological relations of the individual to its environment and the objects in it, thus of the non-causal relations, the causal ones being assigned to physiology. These non-causal relations appear under four aspects, all called teleological, i.e. the true purpose-notion, relation in the sense of requirement, that in the sense of wholeness, and of adaptation and the degree of adaptation. Adaptation is taken in a broad sense, covering as well the degree of adaptation , as the latitude of the possibility of adaptation and the degree of variability of the individual to adapt itself. The proposal is made to confine the term autecology to this teleological aspect of the relations of the individual, i.e. of all its characters, not of the epharmonic ones only, to environment.In synecology the complex of individuals, showing direct real connections during individual life, occupies a central position, with equal scientific interest for all members of the complex. Synecology contains all biological scientific contents about this matter. The application ofTschulok's system of subsciences to synecology is critisized and the development of the system of these subsciences is left to its developmental fate in time. Considering the importance of the knowledge of the tendencies of thought for the development of synecology an attempt is made to state those already applied in synecology; author distinguishes the systematical, the mathematical, the causal, the historical, the teleological and the essential tendency of thought. Also the difference in the tendencies of thought shows that autecology and synecology are to be separated in a logical system of biological subsciences.Puisque c'est aux botanistes que nous devons la division de l'écologie en autécologie et synécologie, l'auteur passe en revue tous les arguments qui ont amené les biologistes à faire cette subdivision, ainsi que les définitions de ces deux subsciences et les matières qu'elles comprennent, comme elles sont données parSchröter, Flahault &Schröter, Gams etdu Rietz. Il en fait de même pour la division de l'écologie faite par les zoologistesAdams etChapman. En outre il discute les opinions de ces auteurs sous ce rapport, dans leurs détails aussi bien que dans leurs aspects généraux. Cette discussion est en rapport avec l'opinion positive de l'auteur, qu'il expose à la fin de l'article, où se trouvent résumées également les remarques qui se trouvaient déjà dans les deux premiers articles de cette série.Dans l'écologie, en tant que science biologique, l'individu — ou bien l'ensemble des individus — doit occuper une position centrale. C'est pourquoi ni la science qui concerne le milieu, en particulier le milieu abiotique, ni la science qui se rapporte à une région ou un endroit défini de la terre, ne devrait être incorporée dans la biologie.Dans l'autécologie l'individu occupe une position centrale. Cette science est une des subsciences de l'idiobiologie; elle se rapporte aux relations entre le sujet et son milieu — „milieu” pris dans le sens le plus large du mot. Selon les significations diverses qu'on peut attacher aux termes „relations” et „milieu”, nous avons plusieurs définitions de l'écologie, parmi lesquelles les plus importantes suivent ci-dessous:1)L'écologie est une subscience biogéographique; 2) le terme „écologie” est pris dans le sens d'éthologie; 3) l'écologie est considérée comme la science des relations téléologiques entre l'individu et son milieu et les objets se trouvant dans ce milieu; elle est donc considérée comme la science des relations non-causales, les relations causales étant conférées à la physiologie. Ces relations non-causales se présentent sous quatre aspects, tous appelés téléologiques, c. à. d. la vraie notion de but, les relations dans le sens de besoins, les relations dans le sens de „tout” et les relations dans le sens d'adaptation et de degré d'adaptation.Le mot „adaptation” est pris dans un sens étendu, comprenant aussi bien le degré d'adaptation que l'amplitude de la possibilité d'adaptation et le degré de variabilité dans l'adaptation de l'individu à son milieu. L'auteur propose de restreindre le terme „autécologie” à cet aspect téléologique des relations entre l'individu et son milieu; il s'agit ici, bien entendu, de toutes les qualités de l'individu et non seulement des qualités epharmoniques.Dans la synécologie l'ensemble des individus montrant des rapports directs et réels durant la vie individuelle occupe une position centrale et offre un intérêt scientifique pareil pour tous les membres de l'ensemble. La synécologie comprend tout ce qu'il y a à dire sur cette matière par rapport à la science biologique. L'application du système des subsciences deTschulok à la synécologie est critiquée par l'auteur, qui juge prématuré de s'occuper déjà d'un tel système de subsciences: l'avenir seul nous apprendra quel système se développera ici. Vu l'importance d'une connaissance exacte des différentes tendances de penser pour le développement de la synécologie, l'auteur s'efforce de rassembler celles qui ont déjà été appliquées dans la synécologie; il distingue les tendances de penser systématique, mathématique, causale, historique, téléologique et essentielle . En outre les différences entre ces tendances de penser démontrent, que l'autécologie et la synécologie doivent être séparées dans un système logique de subsciences biologiques. (shrink)

Entanglement theory posits that the interrelationship of humans and objects is a delimiting characteristic of human history and culture. This edited volume of original studies by leading archaeological theorists applies this concept to a broad range of topics, including archaeological science, heritage, and theory itself. In the theoretical explications and ten case studies, the editors and contributing authors: build on the intersections between science, humanities and ecology to provide a more fine-grained, multi-scalar treatment emanating from the long-term perspective (...) that characterizes archaeological research; bring to light the subtle and unacknowledged paths that configure historical circumstances and bind human intentionality; examine the constructions of personhood, the rigidity of path dependencies, the unpredictable connections between humans and objects and the intricate paths of past events in varied geographic and historical contexts that channel future actions. This broad focus is inclusive of early complex developments in Asia and Europe, imperial and state strategies in the Andes and Mesoamerica, continuities of postcolonialism in North America, and the unforeseen and complex consequences that derive from archaeological practices. This volume will appeal to archaeologists and their advanced students. (shrink)

The impending missions to exploit natural resources of celestial bodies may at some point start interfering with the scientific interests, including those of astrobiology, in these bodies. While the legal status of celestial bodies at the highest level is clear, uncertainty has arisen as to the extent private property rights over such objects or over their resources are legally acceptable, legally impossible, or potentially legal. This also provides for a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding how the legal framework could or (...) may need to be changed to accommodate private interests. The article analyzes the two main international treaties relevant from this perspective, as well as their backgrounds, in order to outline the current legal status of celestial bodies and the resulting legal rights and obligations pertinent to both private exploitation and exploration. Based on such an analysis, it concludes by highlighting an approach that could actually incentivize the private sector and the science community to work together in a manner conducive to their interests in exploitation and exploration respectively. (shrink)

This article challenges the general thesis that an unconditional basic income, set at the highest sustainable level, is required for maximizing the income-leisure opportunities of the least advantaged, when income varies according to the responsible factor of labor input. In a linear optimal taxation model (of a type suggested by Vandenbroucke 2001) in which opportunities depend only on individual productivity, adding the instrument of a uniform wage subsidy generates an array of undominated policies besides the basic income maximizing policy, including (...) a “zero basic income” policy which equalizes the post-tax wage rate. The choice among such undominated policies may be guided by distinct normative criteria which supplement the maximin objective in various ways. It is shown that most of these criteria will be compatible with, or actually select, the zero basic income policy and reject the basic income maximizing one. In view of the model's limited realism, the force of this main conclusion is discussed both in relation to Van Parijs' argument for basic income in Real Freedom for All (1995) and to some key empirical conditions in the real world. Footnotes1 I am grateful for useful comments on various stages of this paper by Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, Mathias Hild, Dirk Van de gaer, Frank Vandenbroucke, Alex Voorhoeve, Roland van der Veen, Andrew Williams, Chris Woodard and an anonymous referee. Above all I thank Loek Groot for his contribution. The research has also been supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and the Social and Political Theory Program of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. (shrink)

If the theme of this special edition can be reformulated as a question (what was and is the current use of the Bible in theology?), it would be challenging and very difficult to answer the question because of a diverse usage of the Bible throughout history and today, stretching in a continuum of both vertical and horizontal probabilities: vertically, theism vs. atheism and horizontally, worldliness vs. holiness. The objective of this essay is to argue for the incorporation of the ‘spiritualities’ (...) of divine immanence and divine transcendence in the composition of theologies, facilitated by a comprehensive and multidimensional reading of the Bible and the acknowledgement of contributions from the sciences. In this research, the reasoning will address the following relevant aspects: (1) taking into account the epistemology of the ‘Bible’ and ‘Theology’; (2) the consideration of postmodernity, post-secularism and spirituality and (3) the composition of neo-theologies. Contribution: This article pleads that biblical analyses should play a more comprehensive and determinative role in the composition and formulation of theology, pointing more explicitly to the transcendence and immanence of God. The reading of such theologies then must create different lived experiences of the immanence and transcendence of God. (shrink)

The book "Wer hat das Wissen in der Wissenschaft versteckt?" [Who had hidden knowledge in science?] is about the organisational character of science - "science" as understood in continental Europa as social & natural sciences. The reason for this interest is that, as it is the case with other things, human beings undertake scientific enquiries because they, as individuals, have certain interests related to the content of their activities, they want to know certain things. Then, when (...) an activity is organised, the organisation (or organisational structure) itself develops own interests and imposes them on the individuals. Soon, the individuals do not follow anymore (so much) their own interests but the interests of the organisation. This phenomenon is exemplarified by an analysis of the foreword of Wilhelm Schmid's book: "Philosophie der Lebenskunst" (1998) [Philosophy of the art of living], his habilitation at the University of Erfurt: The analysis shows how Schmid in this foreword is trying hard to present the art of living (which is first and foremost useful for the individual human person) as something which is useful for society because this is what science, represented by the academic environment in which we are socialized requires. In total, the book comprises 12 individual studies of which the analysis of the foreword of Schmid's "Philosophie der Lebenskunst" is one. The other 11 studies analyse texts by: Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, Sandra Beaufays, andreas Hütig, Carl Djerassi, Monika Wogrolly, Friedericke Hassauer, Michel Foucault, John Stuart Mill, Erich Visotschnig & Siegfried Schrotta, Gordon A. Frutschnigg, and Oliver Sacks. One important aspect of the book is the relationship between philosophy and science, analysed e.g. with the help of Gordon A. Frutschnigg's diploma theses on the diploma theses completed at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Vienna between 2005 and 2007: Can philosophy, which primarily serves for the orientation of the individual in life be scientific in the sense of the organisational character of science (which tries to exclude individual interests as best as it can for they are deemed to bring subjectivity into science striving for objective truth). The choice of the books/texts which are analyzed in this study was partly (admittedly) random; however, they bear a common characteristic which is: these are texts which show/make visible the organisational character of science. The character of the studies in this book is phenomenological because they provide a close look at 12 texts/books and their use of language, supported by extensive quotes. (shrink)

Advancements in computing, instrumentation, robotics, digital imaging, and simulation modeling have changed science into a technology-driven institution. Government, industry, and society increasingly exert their influence over science, raising questions of values and objectivity. These and other profound changes have led many to speculate that we are in the midst of an epochal break in scientific history. -/- This edited volume presents an in-depth examination of these issues from philosophical, historical, social, and cultural perspectives. It offers arguments both (...) for and against the epochal break thesis in light of historical antecedents. Contributors discuss topics such as: science as a continuing epistemological enterprise; the decline of the individual scientist and the rise of communities; the intertwining of scientific and technological needs; links to prior practices and ways of thinking; the alleged divide between mode-1 and mode-2 research methods; the commodification of university science; and the shift from the scientific to a technological enterprise. Additionally, they examine the epochal break thesis using specific examples, including the transition from laboratory to real world experiments; the increased reliance on computer imaging; how analog and digital technologies condition behaviors that shape the object and beholder; the cultural significance of humanoid robots; the erosion of scientific quality in experimentation; and the effect of computers on prediction at the expense of explanation. -/- Whether these events represent a historic break in scientific theory, practice, and methodology is disputed. What they do offer is an important occasion for philosophical analysis of the epistemic, institutional and moral questions affecting current and future scientific pursuits. (shrink)

This paper argues, first, that biological evolution can be both random and divinely guided at the same time. Next it discusses the idea that the claim that evolution is unguided is not part of the science of evolution, and defends it against a number of objections.

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 237-240.

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 293-302.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer Beitrag schlägt einen Begriff der Wirklichkeit als Willensphänomen vor, der es erlaubt, nicht nur die auf den objektivierbaren Außenaspekt beschränkte Wissenschaft, sondern auch Kunst und Religion, die den Innenaspekt der Dinge als intentionale Aktivität empathisch erfassen, als authentische Formen von Vernunft oder Rationalität zu verstehen.Von hier aus erschließt sich im Blick auf Grundzüge der Spätphilosophie Schellings ein Verständnis der Religionsgeschichte als Rationalitätsgeschichte, angefangen vom Sündenfall über die heidnischen Religionen samt deren unterschiedliche Götter und humanitätszerstörende Opfer, bis hin zur (...) Erlösung durch Jesus Christus, durch welche erst freie, von der Götterangst unbelastete, Erkenntnis möglich wurde.Die geschichtlich auftretenden und menschlich möglichen Formen von Philosophie erweisen sich so als Vorstadien eines erst eschatologisch realisierbaren vollkommenen Verstehens, wie es bei Platon, Thomas und Schelling als Grenzidee in den Blick kommt, während Hegel es, hybrider und absurder Weise, als innergeschichtlich erreichbar und in seinem Denken tatsächlich erreicht in Anspruch zu nehmen scheint. SUMMARYThe paper suggests a concept of reality as a phenomenon of willing. This enables it to not only encompass science, which is restricted to objective external verification, but also art and religion, which empathically understand the inner aspect of things as intentional activity and authentic forms of reason or rationality.From this point an analysis of the basic tenets of Schelling's later philosophy provides the history of religion as a history of rationality, beginning from Fall of Man via the pagan religions with their various gods and humanity-destroying sacrifices to the redemption by Jesus Christ, which for the first time enabled free perception, uncompromised by the fear of gods.All historical forms of philosophy, that may be realized through human thought, thus appear as preludes to a perfect understanding that can only be realized eschatologically, and which is considered by Plato, Thomas and Schelling as a limiting idea. This article then turns to Hegel's hybrid resistance to this understanding in his argument for an internally realizable philosophy, and his absurd claim that this is realized in his own philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues, first, that biological evolution can be both random and divinely guided at the same time. Next it discusses the idea that the claim that evolution is unguided is not part of the science of evolution, and defends it against a number of objections.

Summary For Imre Lakatos hismethodology of scientific research programmes was not only a philosophical theory of science and scientific change but also the conceptual foundation of empirical and historical studies of science. At least terminologically this view is today widely accepted: The concept of aresearch programme is used in all sorts of literature on science. In the present paper I argue that this concept can lead to serious distortions of empirical and historical studies of science if (...) it is not detached from the Lakatosian philosophical framework. Themethodology of scientific research programmes has three main pitfalls, which may lead to disorientations of empirical and historical studies of science: (1) Contrary to what the term research programme may suggest, it offers no perspective on scientific research as an object of analysissui generis; (2) its concept of science is too narrow and covers only minor parts of what counts as science in the real world; (3) it reduces history of science to a mere sequence of research programmes and thereby eliminates the fact that there is an evolution of the structure of research programmes, too. (shrink)

Im Zentrum des Bandes steht die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Rezeption der Texte des Aristoteles an Hof und Universitäten, und dabei insbesondere der für die Epistemologie einschlägigen Passagen in De anima und in den Zweiten Analytiken sowie ihre spätantike und arabische Vermittlung. In diesem komplexen Rezeptions- und vor allem Transformationsprozeß werden zugleich die wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlich-institutionellen Grundlagen für den okzidentalen Prozeß der Rationalisierung und der Aufklärung gelegt, deren "Dialektik" nicht nur die Geschichte (...) Europas bis zum heutigen Tag bestimmt. Die Beiträge des Bandes vermitteln damit nicht nur einen umfassenden und bisher in der Forschung in dieser Form nicht geleisteten Überblick über Reichweite und Grenzen der epistemologischen Debatten im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert sowie ihren jeweiligen historischen Ort in der Wissenskultur des Mittelalters, sondern stellen darüber hinaus in ihrer Gesamtheit auch einen Beitrag dar zu Fragen der Epistemologie der Gegenwart, etwa zum Problem der Axiomatik der Wissenschaften. Die Publikation schließt damit nicht nur ein Desiderat in der Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, sondern bildet zugleich einen genuinen Beitrag zu gegenwärtigen Fragestellungen der Epistemologie. (shrink)

Im Zentrum des Bandes steht die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Rezeption der Texte des Aristoteles an Hof und Universitäten, insbesondere der für die Epistemologie einschlägigen Passagen in "De anima" und in den "Zweiten Analytiken" sowie ihre spätantike und arabische Vermittlung. In diesem komplexen Rezeptions- und vor allem Transformationsprozeß werden zugleich die wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlich-institutionellen Grundlagen für den okzidentalen Prozeß der Rationalisierung und Aufklärung gelegt, deren "Dialektik" nicht nur die Geschichte Europas bis zum (...) heutigen Tag bestimmt. (shrink)

Summary The instrumentalistic conception of science underlying the thesis of the „finalization of science is shown to be at the roots of Lyssenkoism.

In his book from 1799 "Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie" Schelling defines philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) as science of nature (Wissenschaft der Natur) a priori but emphasises nonetheless the importance of experience to develop such a science of nature. This raises the problematical question of how this science of nature as an science a priori that has concrete phenomena (Naturerscheinungen) as it's objects can be possible. In this text the author argues that (...) it is Schelling's critical concept of system respective systematicity of nature itself that allows him to develop a (philosophical) system of nature that for us might be known through experience but - as systematical knowledge - must be considered as necessary and therefor a priori. (shrink)

II у a une unité du langage scientifique : les concepts des diverses branches de la science peuvent se réduire à une base commune, à savoir au « langage de choses » de la vie quotidienne. Mais il n’existe pas présentement de système unique des lois de la science : c’est là un but auquel tend la science, sur le fondement de l'unité présente du langage scientifique.

Der Beitrag vertritt die These, dass die Fröhlichen Wissenschaft von einer Metaphorik der Seefahrt strukturiert wird: Sie liefert Nietzsche die Dramaturgie zur Entwicklung der zentralen Themen seines Buches. Zunächst wirft der Aufsatz im Anschluss an Hans Blumenberg und Manfred Frank einen Blick auf die Meerfahrt als Topos der Daseinbeschreibung insbesondere der romantischen Literatur. Dann zeigt er auf, wie Nietzsche den "Tod Gottes" und die Figur des "Schaffenden", die Kritik der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis und des traditionalen Subjektbegriffs mithlife der Seefahrtsmetaphorik entfaltet. (...) Abschließend werden noch zwei Strategien betrachtet, die Nietzsche zur Überwindung des Subjekts verfolgt, und mit Paul de Man und Michel Foucault als 'rhetorische' und 'somatische' charakterisiert.The following essay argues that the Gay Science is structured through the imagery of a sea voyage. This imagery provides the dramaturgy for the development of the book's central themes. In its first part, the essay examines, with reference to Hans Blumenberg and Manfred Frank, the sea voyage as a topos for the description of the human condition, as it can be found particularly in the literature of the Romantic period. The essay then shows how Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the sea voyage to unfold the theme of the "death of God" and the figure of the "creator", to question the objectivity to scientific knowledge and to criticize the traditional concept of the subject. It finally discusses the two main strategies Nietzsche operates to overcome the Cartesian subject and characterizes them, with reference to Paul de Man and Michael Foucault, as 'rhetorical' and 'somatic'. (shrink)

Datafizierung, Publizierung, Metrisierung – unter diesen Stichpunkten untersuchen die AutorInnen des vorliegenden Bandes die Auswirkungen der zunehmenden Digitalisierung auf die Erzeugung, Auswahl, Bereitstellung und Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. Wie wird Wissen aus den Weiten des digitalen Raums herausgefiltert? Wie wird es generiert? Was wird als Wissen verfügbar gemacht – und was nicht? Wie und von wem wird das digital erfasste Wissen evaluiert? Diese den Wissenschaftsbetrieb herausfordernden Fragen diskutieren ExpertInnen aus Philosophie, Informations- und Bibliothekswissenschaft sowie Informatik. Ihre Beiträge reflektieren in kritischer und (...) konstruktiver Weise die Gestaltung und Folgen der digitalisierten Wissenschaftspraxis. (shrink)

I identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist’s selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen’s original and K. Brad Wray’s newer interpretation. In Wray’s version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community – viz. scientists’ interests, goals, and preferences – explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray’s version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change (...) over time. Theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science are however not faddish. They are mostly stable; that is, long-lived and consistent over time. This is because scientists (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to what I will call the testability norm: scientific theories must make falsifiable claims about the external physical world. The testability norm and not psycho-sociology explains the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science. Contra Wray, scientific anti-realists can then maintain that the external physical world (as expressed in the testability norm) explains theory-success. (shrink)

Science is considered as an open system that constitutes a sub-entity of the total system "society" and whose functions include the production, systematization, communication and application of knowledge. Since this system is made up of individuals and groups, its functions are dependent on psychological factors. This fact serves as a starting point for a psychology of science, which can contribute to optimizing scientific practice by treating the heuristic, organizational, technological, and normative aspects of scientific activity.

On 27 September 1943, Hans-Georg Gadamer published a brief but significant article in the conservative newspaper Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten und Handels-Zeitung, entitled ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf. Über den Ruf und Beruf der Wissenschaft in unserer Zeit’ (Science as Vocation: On the Calling and Profession of Science in Our Time). The article, which addressed the problem of the value and status of science and philosophy in the midst of the Second World War, was never reprinted in Gadamer’s (...) work, neither in the ten volumes of his collected writings published by Mohr Siebeck, nor separately in books or journals. I offer here a critical introduction to the context and main contents of this text due to its philosophical, political, and historical relevance. In particular, the introduction analyses Gadamer’s confrontation with his own time through explicit and implicit references to Max Weber’s 1917 lecture, ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ (Science as Vocation), and traces echoes in Gadamer’s later works that bear on contemporary challenges. Following that, I present the first English translation of Gadamer’s original German text. (shrink)

Paul Cilliers has developed a novel post-structural approach to complexity that has influenced several writers contributing to the current complexity literature. Concomitantly however, Cilliers advocates for modelling complex systems using connectionist neural networks (rather than analytic, rule-based models). In this paper, I argue that it is dilemmic to simultaneously hold these two positions. Cilliers’ post-structural interpretation of complexity states that models of complex systems are always contextual and provisional; there is no exclusive model of complex systems. This sentiment however appears (...) at odds with Cilliers’ promotion of connectionist neural networks as the best way to model complex systems. The lesson is that those who currently follow Cilliers’ post-structural approach to complexity cannot also develop a preferred model of complex systems, and those who currently advocate for some preferred model of complex systems cannot adopt the post-structural approach to complexity without giving up the purported objectivity and/or superiority of their preferred model. (shrink)

In his last major work, the posthumously published Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl presented what he described as a new path into transcendental phenomenology: the path through the "life-world" on which objective science is founded. To make objective science intelligible, Husserl held, we must inquire back into the world of everyday involvement and experience from which it emerges; this inquiry leads in turn to a thematization of the subjective structures through which the always "pre-given" life-world is itself constituted. (...) Husserl’s demand for a return to the life-world has been the subject of much discussion in the twenty-five years since the publication of the Crisis. Yet debate over the precise sense and ultimate significance of the demand continues. In this most recent contribution, E. Ströker has gathered ten essays originally presented at a 1978 conference of prominent German and American scholars. At least some of the essays should prove helpful to Husserl specialists and others interested in Husserl’s concept of the life-world. (shrink)

Abstract in English: The short essay is about impressive philosophical ideas of the great German dramatist Friedrich Schiller (1749-1805). In his “letters on the aesthetic education…” he critisizes, with respect to human behaviour, too much reason and too stringent principles, leading to a neglect of positive emotions such as empathy; he argues in favour of an aesthetic lifestyle. This is supported by biological as well as mental aspects of human self-understanding. My article follows these lines of thought in a sequence (...) of sections: The nature of human beings – a permanent topic of science, philosophy and the arts. The professional dramatist as temporary philosopher- Schiller’s “Letters on the aesthetic education…”. Against an “egoism of reason”, in favour of empathy. Basic human capabilities allow for an objective view on nature. Positive versus negative effects of the division of labour…and thoughts on a new “wholeness” with an aesthetic lifestyle. After Schiller’s philosophical phase, back to new dramas on stage – Wallenstein’s fragile sense of empathy. Evolution, empathy and the “art of living” – survival of the fittest or survival of the nicest? Self-contradictory self-images – Demetrius the illusiory tsar as rival of Boris Godunow. -/- Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Für uns Menschen gehört zum „guten Leben“, dass wir uns sowohl als Natur- wie auch als Kulturwesen nicht nur erkennen, sondern wirklich annehmen. Dazu spricht sich Schiller besonders für einen Vorrang der Empathie vor Grundsätzen der Vernunft und für eine ästhetisch begründete Lebenskunst aus. Mein Essay folgt solchen Denklinien in einer Sequenz der Abschnitte: Die Natur des Menschen – Dauerthema der Wissenschaft. Der Berufsdramatiker als Philosoph - Schillers Briefe zur ästhetischen Erziehung. Gegen den Egoismus der Vernunft, für den Vorrang der Empathie. Grundfähigkeiten des Menschen: Die Natur betrachten, die Natur denken. Segen und Elend der Arbeitsteilung…und Hoffnung auf neue Ganzheit in Formen ästhetischen Lebens. Zurück zur dramatischen Dichtung - Wallensteins brüchiges Verhältnis zur Empathie. Evolution, Empathie und Lebenskunst - „Survival of the fittest“ oder „Survival of the nicest“? Selbstbilder der Seele im Widerspruch - Der falsche Zar Demetrius als Rivale von Boris Godunow. -/- . (shrink)

Inspired by Bas van Fraassen’s Stance Empiricism, Anjan Chakravartty has developed a pluralistic account of what he calls epistemic stances towards scientific ontology. In this paper, I examine whether Chakravartty’s stance pluralism can exclude epistemic stances that licence pseudo-scientific practices like those found in Scientology. I argue that it cannot. Chakravartty’s stance pluralism is therefore prone to a form of debilitating relativism. I consequently argue that we need (1) some ground or constraint in relation to which epistemic stances can be (...) ranked by degrees, and (2) some way to demarcate science from pseudo-science so that we know what epistemic stances are about. Regarding (1), I argue that empirical detectability can serve as the ground in relation to which epistemic stances are ranked by degrees. Regarding (2), I argue for ranking sciences on a continuum according to established institutional criteria, rather than attempting to draw a strict demarcation. (shrink)

This book gives a systematic account of Martin Heidegger’s methodology. Contrary to the widespread conception that Heidegger’s (late) philosophy is lacking any kind of verifiable, provable insights, the author shows that a rejection of the scientific method does not imply a rejection of methodological, rigorous thinking. In fact, it can be shown that the method of Heidegger’s philosophy is more rigorous, more strict and more radical than the scientific method. But because the scientific method is conceived of as the non-plus-ultra (...) even within philosophy, in order to outline Heidegger’s methodology we have to give an account of his criticism of the scientific method. By showing the limitations of modern science, we can unfold the possibilities of philosophy. -/- The book consists of four parts: The first part is about Heidegger’s concept of subjectivity and his criticism of the Cartesian subject-object-dichotomy. The main argument of the first part is that the ‘subject’, inasmuch as it is understood ontologically, is essential for philosophy. We outline this – following Steven G. Crowell – as the philosophical significance of the first-person-perspective (Heidegger’s early philosophy between 1919 and 1927). -/- The second part is about what we call an ontological theory of constitution: A radicalization of the Kantian transcendental philosophy which does not orbit around transcendental subjectivity, but rather around concrete subjectivity (Dasein vs. the transcendental ego). We take a closer look on what Heidegger has written between 1927 and 1930. -/- The third part is about Heidegger’s late philosophy. The main topic of this third part is Heidegger’s “seynsgeschichtliche Besinnung auf das machenschaftliche Wesen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft“ – which is in essence a closer look on what modern science is, on its relation to technology, and on its very own historicality. We discuss the most famous published texts and lectures between 1930 and 1976, but focus on Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures and his second magnus opus: the Contributions to Philosophy. -/- This criticism of modern science is the stepping stone for the fourth and final part, in which we take all the pieces and put them together by giving a systematic account of Heidegger’s methodology. In this final part we take a step back from Heidegger’s texts (and from his language) and confront Heidegger with the most famous criticism by Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Jürgen Habermas. -/- This allows us to give an account of the central concepts of Heidegger’s methodology: truth, knowledge and validity. We also talk about the status of philosophical concepts and in general: philosophical language, about Heidegger’s theory of philosophical conceptualization, which is known as the method of formal indication and about the possibility of an ontological foundation of modern science and epistemology. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GERMAN------------------------------------------------- -/- Der methodische Status insbesondere der Spätphilosophie Heideggers ist ein Problem: Mit den Mitteln der traditionellen Methodenlehre können die Aussagen dieser Philosophie nicht ausgewiesen und auch nicht begründet werden. Mit der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und ihrer Methode hat sie nichts mehr gemein. Aber muss dies heißen, dass diese Philosophie ihre Erkenntnisse überhaupt nicht mehr ausweisen kann? -/- Ich habe in dieser Arbeit versucht zu zeigen, dass auch die späte Philosophie Heideggers Methode hat. Auch wenn Heidegger in fast an den Mythos erinnernder Art und Weise über die Verbergung und das Sich-entziehen des Seyns spricht, handelt es sich um methodisch überprüfbare, ausweisbare Aussagen. Nur wird in Heideggers Methodologie Ernst gemacht mit dem Gedanken, dass die Philosophie eine eigene Methode braucht und sich nicht wie blind an der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft orientieren dürfe. Eine Methode, die sie zum Teil für sich erst entwickeln muss. -/- Die Grundbegriffe dieser ‚neuen Methodologie‘ zu klären, war das Hauptanliegen dieser Arbeit. Es ging um den Wahrheits-, Erkenntnis- und Geltungsanspruch dieser Philosophie. -/- Dafür habe ich einen Blick geworfen insb. auf die frühe Philosophie Heideggers (1. Teil: 1919-1927), auf die wichtigen Texte und Vorträge im Kontext von Sein und Zeit (2. Teil: 1927-1930) und auf die Texte zu Nietzsche, zu den Beiträgen und zu Wissenschaft und Technik (3. Teil: 1930-1976). In einem vierten Teil habe ich die Grundzüge dieser Methodologie skizziert. Ich habe mich dabei an der Kritik von Jürgen Habermas orientiert, der am bekanntesten und am stärksten die These vertreten hat, dass die Spätphilosophie Heideggers irrational sei. Auch hier kam ich zu dem Schluss, dass Heideggers Kritik an dem okzidentalen Rationalismus nicht in die Irrationalität führen muss, wie Habermas nahelegt, sondern dass dadurch ein kritisches Verständnis von Rationalität möglich wird. (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine (...) does not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation - as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance - presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. (shrink)

Epistemic pluralists in the philosophy of science often argue that different epistemic perspectives in science are equally warranted. Sandra Mitchell – with her Integrative Pluralism (IP) – has notably advocated for this kind of epistemic pluralism. A problem arises for Mitchell however because she also wants to be an epistemological pluralist. She claims that, not only are different epistemic perspectives in science equally warranted in different contexts, but different understandings of these epistemic perspectives in science are (...) also equally warranted in different contexts. The problem is that Mitchell argues that her understanding of epistemic perspectives in science (IP) is the correct one, and it is dilemmic to then claim that there is more than one such understanding. As solution, I suggest that we abandon epistemological pluralism and instead follow Feyerabend in being opportunistic pluralists. We can adopt pluralism as a short-term strategy in the pursuit of a long-term unitary goal. This unitary goal is what philosophers of understanding call objectual understanding, the kind of understanding that Integrative Pluralism tacitly aspires to anyway. (shrink)

The paper deals with the beginning and the main properties of the science of nature (he peri physeos historiê). According to Themistius (DK 12 A 7), the founder of this kind of Ionic philosophy is Anaximander of Miletus because he was the first who wrote about nature (especially a cosmography and a cosmogony) and developed three main principles of nature: 1. Nature has a mathematical structure (Arist. De coelo I3 295b10-14.32); 2. nature has a physical structure (DK 12 A (...) 10-11); and 3. nature follows natural laws (DK 12 A 9). The origin of this introduction lies in the prolongation of primitive expectations of constancy. It is especially argued that the shift from mythos to logos is characterized by the depersonalization of nature and the introduction of theoretical terms. In fact, the "apeiron" of Anaximander seems to be something similar to a theoretical term, because Anaximander seems to have realized that the explanans of nature cannot be one of its explananda like water (Thales) or air (Anaximenes). (shrink)

Book Review K. Brad Wray: Resisting Scientific Realism. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2018, xii + 224 pp, £ 75.00 (Hardcover), ISBN: 9781108231633. By Ragnar van der Merwe. In The Journal for the General Philosophy of Science.

The concept of sciences holds a central place in the early philosophy of Ernst Cassirer and it provides a conceptual framework even for the philosophy of symbolic forms. This paper identifies Cassirer's concept of sciences as a double barrelled reconstructive approach, which allows to understand not only the constitution of actual scientific semantics but at the same time the transformation of the scientific mode of thought. It is shown, that these principles of transformation are indeed the very form of form, (...) referring to which the transformation of a mode of thought is to be considered as a process of self-determination and self-development, a process that can only be understood re-constructively. It is this reconstructive approach of Marburgian Neokantianism which provides a specific culturalist point of view on the status of sciences and their formal, theoretical and experimental modes of world-making. (shrink)