Search results for 'truth-bearers' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP.score: 192.0
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  2. Manuel García-Carpintero, Truth-Bearers and Modesty.score: 180.0
    In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept (...)
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  3. Laura Perini (2012). Truth-Bearers or Truth-Makers? Spontaneous Generations 6 (1):142-147.score: 180.0
    One way visual representations might function in scientific reasoning is to convey content that is true or false, analogous to making a claim. An alternative way that visual representations might function is as an object that may make statements true or false, but is not itself true or false, analogous to a scientific model. In this paper I evaluate the most recent and extended defense of this latter position and show that the case study involved does not in fact support (...)
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  4. Gheorghe Clitan (2010). Serban Leoca, Purtãtori de adevãr/ Truth-bearers. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 4 (12):135-138.score: 162.0
    Serban Leoca, Purtãtori de adevãr Napoca Star, Cluj-Napoca; Galaxia Gutemberg, Tg. Lãpus, 2005.
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  5. Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.score: 156.0
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...)
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  6. Shapiro St E. Wa Rt (2005). Gurus, Logical Consequence, and Truth-Bearers: What Is It That Is True? In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court. 153.score: 156.0
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  7. James F. Thomson (1969). Truth-Bearers and the Trouble About Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 66 (21):737-747.score: 150.0
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  8. Laurence Goldstein (2001). Truth-Bearers and the Liar – a Reply to Alan Weir. Analysis 61 (2):115–126.score: 150.0
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  9. Y. Bar‐Hillel (1973). Primary Truth Bearers. Dialectica 27 (3‐4):303-312.score: 150.0
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  10. John Bigelow (2009). Truth-Makers and Truth-Bearers. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.score: 150.0
     
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  11. Artur Rojszczak (1998). Truth-Bearers From Twardowski to Tarski. In. In Katarzyna Kijania-Placek & Jan Woleński (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 73--84.score: 150.0
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  12. Avrum Stroll (1976). Truth‐Bearers, Propositions and the Problem of Universals. Dialectica 30 (1):17-34.score: 150.0
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  13. Jan Wole'nski & Artur Rojszczak (2005). From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers From Bolzano to Tarski. Springer.score: 150.0
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  14. Peter Hanks (2014). What Are the Primary Bearers of Truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):558-574.score: 144.0
    (2013). What are the primary bearers of truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 558-574.
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  15. Wolfgang Künne (2008). Frege on Truths, Truth and the True. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.score: 120.0
    The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend (...)
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  16. Norman Swartz, The Bearers of Truth-Values.score: 120.0
    Thesis: Such things as beliefs, statements, assertions, remarks, hypotheses, and theories are those things that are true or false . (Example: we do say such things as "Her belief that her mother had phoned was false." Or, "His assertion that Alberta is smaller than British Columbia is true.").
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  17. Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra (2010). A Pragmatic View of Truth. Principia 8 (2):259-277.score: 120.0
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
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  18. Desmond Paul Henry & Gabriel Nuchelmans (1974). Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (96):274.score: 120.0
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  19. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.score: 114.0
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans (...)
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  20. Elia Zardini (forthcoming). The Opacity of Truth. Topoi:1-18.score: 96.0
    The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions (...)
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  21. Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.score: 80.0
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  22. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.score: 72.0
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is a transparent concept but not a property). I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and draw some lessons for the soundness (...)
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  23. Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.score: 72.0
    The weak deflationist about truth is committed to two theses: one conceptual, the other ontological. On the conceptual thesis (what might be called a ‘triviality thesis’), the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the ‘truth-schema’. On the ontological thesis, truth is a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I focus on weak deflationism’s ontological thesis, arguing that it generates an instability in its view of truth: the view threatens to collapse (...)
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  24. Richard Fumerton (2010). Partnership in Truth-Making. Topoi 29 (2):91-98.score: 72.0
    After arguing that truth-making is properly construed as a partnership between truth bearers and truth-makers, I focus on two prominent arguments against the category of fact as one of the key relata in the truth-making relation. After rejecting those arguments, I go on to examine a more difficult issue, one that might force us to appreciate more fully the robust role that thought has in “creating” truth.
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  25. Paul Saka (2010). Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth. Topoi 29 (2):125-135.score: 72.0
    Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not (...)
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  26. Lawrence E. Johnson (1992). Focusing on Truth. Routledge.score: 72.0
    Focusing on Truth explores the question of what truth is, balancing historical with issue-orientated discussion. The book offers a comprehensive survey of all the major theories of truth. Lawrence Johnson investigates a number of closely related matters of truth in his inquiry, such as: What sorts of things are true or false? What is attributed to them when they are said to be true or false? What do facts have to do with truth? What can we learn from previous theories? (...)
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  27. Katalin Farkas (2008). Time, Tense, Truth. Synthese 160 (2):269 - 284.score: 66.0
    Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary (...)
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  28. Scott Soames (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 66.0
    In this book, Scott Soames illuminates the notion of truth and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part I addresses crucial background issues, including the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions (like certainty, with which it is often confused), and the formulation of positive responses to well-known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Part II explicates the formal theories of Alfred (...)
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  29. Susana Badiola (2006). Notas sobre una verdad evidente en tributo a P. F. Strawson. Notes on a Self-evident Truth in Tribute to P. F. Strawson. Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 39:143-160.score: 66.0
    In his intellectual autobiography, P. F. Strawson singles out one particular truism as fundamental to his entire philosophical career. The deceptively simple truth is twofold: first, that the bearers of truth and falsity are not linguistic elements, and second, that what is at stake in our use of language is not the words that we use, but what we mean them to say. This essay, written as a tribute to the late Strawson, explores the theoretical implications of this self-evident truth, (...)
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  30. Diego Marconi (2006). On the Mind Dependence of Truth. Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.score: 60.0
    The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...)
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  31. Fraser MacBride (2013). For Keeping Truth in Truthmaking. Analysis 73 (4):686-695.score: 60.0
    Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong introduced the truthmaker principle to us, but Lewis (2001. Forget about the ‘correspondence theory of truth’. Analysis 61: 275–80.) influentially argued that it is neither a correspondence theory nor a theory of truth. But the truthmaker principle can be correctly understood as a development of the correspondence theory if it’s conceived as incorporating the insight that truth is a relation between truth-bearers and something worldly. And (...)
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  32. Arindam Chakrabarti (2001). Truth, Recognition of Truth, and Thoughtless Realism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:41-59.score: 60.0
    Witnessing the fate of the various definitions of truth, Donald Davidson has recently called the very drive to define truth a “folly.” Before him, Kant and Frege had given independent arguments why a general definition of truth is impossible. After a quick summary of their arguments, I recount several reasons that Gangeśa gave for not counting truth as a genuine natural universal. I argue that in spite of defining truth as a feature of personal and ephemeral awareness episodes, the Nyāya (...)
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  33. Teresa Marques (2004). Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps. Dissertation, Stirlingscore: 60.0
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I (...)
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  34. Andrea Iacona (2002). Propositions. Name.score: 60.0
  35. David Simpson (2007). Truth, Truthfulness and Philosophy in Plato and Nietzsche. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):339 – 360.score: 54.0
    Even those aware of Nietzsches ambivalent (rather than purely negative) attitude to Plato, tend to accept Nietzsches account of Plato and himself as occupying the poles of philosophy. Much that Nietzsche says supports this view, but we need not take him at his word. I consider Nietzsche and Plato on three planes: their view of truth, their view of philosophy, and their use of certain emblematic figures (the New Philosopher, the Philosopher King) as the bearers of philosophys future. On these (...)
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  36. Gerald Vision (1997). Why Correspondence Truth Will Not Go Away. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1):104-131.score: 54.0
    From the popular view that the property of truth adds nothing not already inherent in its bearers it has been inferred that classical theories of truth are thereby refuted. Taking as representative a version of deflationism based on a certain way of interpreting the Tarskian schema convention T–and popularly called "disquotational"–I argue that the view is beset by fatal difficulties. These include: an unavoidable awkwardness in handling indexicals; an inability to accept anything more than a too anemic notion of a (...)
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  37. John Peterson (1988). Direct Realism, Skepticism and Truth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:147-150.score: 54.0
    If (1) a person's knowing a proposition P implies that P is true and if (2) facts are unidentical with true propositions then in knowing P a person does not know a fact. Unless the correspondence view of truth is abandoned, this skepticism as regards facts cannot be answered by denying (2). If facts are identical with true propositions then facts are (trivially) true. But if truth consists in a correspondence to fact then every fact, being true, corresponds to a (...)
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  38. Ernesto Perini-Santos (2008). John Buridan on the Bearer of Logical Relations. Logica Universalis 2 (1):59-70.score: 52.0
    . According to John Buridan, the time for which a statement is true is underdetermined by the grammatical form of the sentence – the intention of the speaker is required. As a consequence, truth-bearers are not sentence types, nor sentence tokens plus facts of the context of utterance, but statements. Statements are also the bearers of logical relations, since the latter can only be established among entities having determined truth-conditions. This role of the intention of the speaker in the (...)
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  39. Artur Rojszczak (2006). From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Truth-Bearer and the Objectivisation of Truth. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 89 (1):401-419.score: 50.0
     
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  40. Anssi Korhonen (2009). Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions. Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.score: 42.0
    In Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. In the (...)
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  41. Nicola Ciprotti (2012). Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.score: 42.0
    The paper presents an argument for the conclusion that a certain conception of truth, according to which truth is timeless, truth-values are just two and the primary truth-bearers are propositions, leads to a kind of inevitabilism here labelled Metaphysical Fatalism. After the presentation of the argument for Metaphysical Fatalism, three objections to it are discussed and rebutted.
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  42. Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument. In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers.score: 42.0
    Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion (...)
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  43. Charles Travis (1981). The True and the False: The Domain of the Pragmatic. Benjamins.score: 42.0
    The main thrust of the present work is to show why truth and truth bearers lie essentially beyond the descriptive reach of semantics, and to outline a theory of ...
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  44. Jay Newhard (2004). Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):61 - 86.score: 42.0
    Recently, Paul Horwich has developed the minimalist theory of truth, according to which the truth predicate does not express a substantive property, though it may be used as a grammatical expedient. Minimalism shares these claims with Quine’s disquotationalism; it differs from disquotationalism primarily in holding that truth-bearers are propositions, rather than sentences. Despite potential ontological worries, allowing that propositions bear truth gives Horwich a prima facie response to several important objections to disquotationalism. In section I of this paper, disquotationalism (...)
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  45. Mark Roberts (1994). The Bearer of Truth and Falsity. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):59-67.score: 40.0
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  46. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.score: 36.0
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...)
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  47. Berit Brogaard, Perspectival Truth and Color Perception.score: 34.0
    Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color discourse. The (...)
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  48. Berit Brogaard (2010). Perspectival Truth and Color Primitivism. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 34.0
    Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker, assessor, or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming a). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color (...)
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  49. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Propositions and Attitudinal Objects. Oxford UP.score: 30.0
    Preprint of Chapter 4 of 'Abstract Objects and The Semantics of Natural Language', Oxford UP 2013). -/- Propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language since Frege. Propositions are generally taken to be the objects of propositional attitude, the meaning of sentences, the primary bearers of truth and falsehood, and the kinds of things that quantifiers in sentential position range over. As objects of propositional attitudes, propositions can be shared by different agents and moreover can be represented in (...)
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  50. John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.score: 30.0
    In recent work on truth and truthmaking, D. M. Armstrong has defended a version of 'truthmaker necessitarianism', the doctrine that truths necessitate truthmakers. Truthmaker necessitarianism, he contends, requires the postulation of 'totality facts', which serve as ingredients of truthmakers for general truths and negative truths, and propositions, which function as the fundamental truth bearers. I argue that neither totality facts nor propositions need figure in an account of truthmaking, and suggest that both are artifacts stemming, albeit in different ways, from (...)
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