Search results for 'truth-bearers' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  15
    Laura Perini (2012). Truth-Bearers or Truth-Makers? Spontaneous Generations 6 (1):142-147.
    One way visual representations might function in scientific reasoning is to convey content that is true or false, analogous to making a claim. An alternative way that visual representations might function is as an object that may make statements true or false, but is not itself true or false, analogous to a scientific model. In this paper I evaluate the most recent and extended defense of this latter position and show that the case study involved does not in fact support (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  68
    Manuel García-Carpintero (2011). Truth-Bearers and Modesty. Grazer Philosophische Studien 82:49–75.
    In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Gheorghe Clitan (2010). Serban Leoca, Purtãtori de adevãr/ Truth-bearers. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 4 (12):135-138.
    Serban Leoca, Purtãtori de adevãr Napoca Star, Cluj-Napoca; Galaxia Gutemberg, Tg. Lãpus, 2005.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  92
    Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  9
    Shapiro St E. Wa Rt (2005). Gurus, Logical Consequence, and Truth-Bearers: What Is It That Is True? In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court 153.
  7. Mark Richard (2015). Truth and Truth Bearers: Meaning in Context Volume Ii. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This book collects nine seminal essays by Mark Richard published between 1980 and 2014, alongside four new essays and an introduction that puts the essays in context. Each essay is an attempt, in one way or another, to understand the idea of a proposition. Part I discusses whether the objects of thought and assertion can change truth value over time. Part II develops and defends a relativist view of the objects of assertion and thought; and Part III discusses issues having (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  52
    Laurence Goldstein (2001). Truth-Bearers and the Liar – a Reply to Alan Weir. Analysis 61 (2):115–126.
  9. John Bigelow (2009). Truth-Makers and Truth-Bearers. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  5
    L. Goldstein (2001). Truth-Bearers and the Liar - a Reply to Alan Weir. Analysis 61 (2):115-126.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  8
    Y. Bar‐Hillel (1973). Primary Truth Bearers. Dialectica 27 (3‐4):303-312.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Jan Wole'nski & Artur Rojszczak (2005). From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers From Bolzano to Tarski. Springer.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  50
    James F. Thomson (1969). Truth-Bearers and the Trouble About Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 66 (21):737-747.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  4
    Avrum Stroll (1976). Truth‐Bearers, Propositions and the Problem of Universals. Dialectica 30 (1):17-34.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  1
    Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Paul K. Moser (1982). Bibliography on Propositions and Truth-Bearers: From Frege to 1981. Philosophy Research Archives 8 (9999):57-72.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Artur Rojszczak (1998). Truth-Bearers From Twardowski to Tarski. In Katarzyna Kijania-Placek & Jan Woleński (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers 73--84.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  29
    Peter Hanks (2014). What Are the Primary Bearers of Truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):558-574.
    (2013). What are the primary bearers of truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 558-574.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19. Wolfgang Künne (2008). Frege on Truths, Truth and the True. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.
    The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  16
    Luiz H. A. Dutra (2004). A Pragmatic View of Truth. Principia 8 (2):259-277.
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  8
    Desmond Paul Henry & Gabriel Nuchelmans (1974). Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (96):274.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  8
    Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra (2010). A Pragmatic View of Truth. Principia 8 (2):259-277.
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  24
    Norman Swartz, The Bearers of Truth-Values.
    Thesis: Such things as beliefs, statements, assertions, remarks, hypotheses, and theories are those things that are true or false . (Example: we do say such things as "Her belief that her mother had phoned was false." Or, "His assertion that Alberta is smaller than British Columbia is true.").
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  34
    Elia Zardini (2015). The Opacity of Truth. Topoi 34 (1):37-54.
    The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. Fraser MacBride (2013). For Keeping Truth in Truthmaking. Analysis 73 (4):686-695.
    Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong introduced the truthmaker principle to us, but Lewis (2001. Forget about the ‘correspondence theory of truth’. Analysis 61: 275–80.) influentially argued that it is neither a correspondence theory nor a theory of truth. But the truthmaker principle can be correctly understood as a development of the correspondence theory if it’s conceived as incorporating the insight that truth is a relation between truth-bearers and something worldly. And (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27.  15
    Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Robert James M. Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela & Victorino Raymundo Lualhati (2013). The Nature of Truth. In Leni Garcia (ed.), Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E Publishing, Inc. 38–50.
    This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth. I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and draw some lessons for the soundness of its conception of truth.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Scott Soames (1998). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Scott Soames illuminates the notion of truth and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part I addresses crucial background issues, including the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions (like certainty, with which it is often confused), and the formulation of positive responses to well-known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Part II explicates the formal theories of Alfred (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   69 citations  
  30. Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.
    The weak deflationist about truth is committed to two theses: one conceptual, the other ontological. On the conceptual thesis (what might be called a ‘triviality thesis’), the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the ‘truth-schema’. On the ontological thesis, truth is a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I focus on weak deflationism’s ontological thesis, arguing that it generates an instability in its view of truth: the view threatens to collapse (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  76
    Richard Fumerton (2010). Partnership in Truth-Making. Topoi 29 (2):91-98.
    After arguing that truth-making is properly construed as a partnership between truth bearers and truth-makers, I focus on two prominent arguments against the category of fact as one of the key relata in the truth-making relation. After rejecting those arguments, I go on to examine a more difficult issue, one that might force us to appreciate more fully the robust role that thought has in “creating” truth.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  44
    Paul Saka (2010). Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth. Topoi 29 (2):125-135.
    Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  39
    Lawrence E. Johnson (1992). Focusing on Truth. Routledge.
    Focusing on Truth explores the question of what truth is, balancing historical with issue-orientated discussion. The book offers a comprehensive survey of all the major theories of truth. Lawrence Johnson investigates a number of closely related matters of truth in his inquiry, such as: What sorts of things are true or false? What is attributed to them when they are said to be true or false? What do facts have to do with truth? What can we learn from previous theories? (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34. Katalin Farkas (2008). Time, Tense, Truth. Synthese 160 (2):269 - 284.
    Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  5
    Susana Badiola (2006). Notas sobre una verdad evidente en tributo a P. F. Strawson. Notes on a Self-evident Truth in Tribute to P. F. Strawson. Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 39:143-160.
    In his intellectual autobiography, P. F. Strawson singles out one particular truism as fundamental to his entire philosophical career. The deceptively simple truth is twofold: first, that the bearers of truth and falsity are not linguistic elements, and second, that what is at stake in our use of language is not the words that we use, but what we mean them to say. This essay, written as a tribute to the late Strawson, explores the theoretical implications of this self-evident truth, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  27
    Brian A. Ball, Dorothy Edgington & John Hawthorne, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology: A Critique of the Method of Truth in Metaphysics.
    In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Andrea Iacona (2002). Propositions. Name.
  38.  53
    Diego Marconi (2006). On the Mind Dependence of Truth. Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.
    The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  19
    Arindam Chakrabarti (2001). Truth, Recognition of Truth, and Thoughtless Realism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:41-59.
    Witnessing the fate of the various definitions of truth, Donald Davidson has recently called the very drive to define truth a “folly.” Before him, Kant and Frege had given independent arguments why a general definition of truth is impossible. After a quick summary of their arguments, I recount several reasons that Gangeśa gave for not counting truth as a genuine natural universal. I argue that in spite of defining truth as a feature of personal and ephemeral awareness episodes, the Nyāya (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  3
    Artur Rojszczak (1999). Why Should a Physical Object Take on the Role of Truth-Bearer? Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 6:115-125.
    The topic of this paper I would like to divide into two other questions than that of its title. The first question is the historical one and sounds like this: Why had Tarski chosen physical objects as truth-bearers in his original work from 1933 about truth in formalized languages?1 This historical problem may be still of importance not only from a historical point of view. Tarski’s truth-definition is still seen as one of undeniable importance for any contemporary philosophical analysis (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  4
    Dirk Greimann (ed.) (2007). Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth. Rodopi.
    In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word “true”? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  17
    Teresa Marques (2004). Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps. Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Scott Soames (1998). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In this book, Scott Soames illuminates the notion of truth and the role it plays in our ordinary thought as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Soames aims to integrate and deepen the most significant insights on truth from a variety of sources. He powerfully brings together the best technical work and the most important philosophical reflection on truth and shows how each can illuminate the other. Investigating such questions as whether we need a truth predicate at (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  44.  13
    Gerald Vision (1997). Why Correspondence Truth Will Not Go Away. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1):104-131.
    From the popular view that the property of truth adds nothing not already inherent in its bearers it has been inferred that classical theories of truth are thereby refuted. Taking as representative a version of deflationism based on a certain way of interpreting the Tarskian schema convention T–and popularly called "disquotational"–I argue that the view is beset by fatal difficulties. These include: an unavoidable awkwardness in handling indexicals; an inability to accept anything more than a too anemic notion of a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45.  45
    David Simpson (2007). Truth, Truthfulness and Philosophy in Plato and Nietzsche. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):339 – 360.
    Even those aware of Nietzsches ambivalent (rather than purely negative) attitude to Plato, tend to accept Nietzsches account of Plato and himself as occupying the poles of philosophy. Much that Nietzsche says supports this view, but we need not take him at his word. I consider Nietzsche and Plato on three planes: their view of truth, their view of philosophy, and their use of certain emblematic figures (the New Philosopher, the Philosopher King) as the bearers of philosophys future. On these (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  10
    John Peterson (1988). Direct Realism, Skepticism and Truth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:147-150.
    If (1) a person's knowing a proposition P implies that P is true and if (2) facts are unidentical with true propositions then in knowing P a person does not know a fact. Unless the correspondence view of truth is abandoned, this skepticism as regards facts cannot be answered by denying (2). If facts are identical with true propositions then facts are (trivially) true. But if truth consists in a correspondence to fact then every fact, being true, corresponds to a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  21
    Charles Travis (1981). The True and the False: The Domain of the Pragmatic. Benjamins.
    The main thrust of the present work is to show why truth and truth bearers lie essentially beyond the descriptive reach of semantics, and to outline a theory of ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  48.  93
    Anssi Korhonen (2009). Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions. Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
    In Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. In the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument. In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers
    Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  63
    Nicola Ciprotti (2012). Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.
    The paper presents an argument for the conclusion that a certain conception of truth, according to which truth is timeless, truth-values are just two and the primary truth-bearers are propositions, leads to a kind of inevitabilism here labelled Metaphysical Fatalism. After the presentation of the argument for Metaphysical Fatalism, three objections to it are discussed and rebutted.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000