This paper investigates the little-known reception of Thomas Hobbes, Henry More, Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, and John Locke in the Scottish universities in the period 1660–1700. The fortune of the English philosophers in the Scottish universities rested on whether their philosophies were consonant with the Scots’ own philosophical agenda. Within the established Cartesian curriculum, the Scottish regents eagerly taught what they thought best in English philosophy and criticised what they thought wrong. The paper also suggests new sources and (...) perspectives for the broader discussion of the ‘origins’ of the Scottish Enlightenment. (shrink)

In the manuscript Idea philosophiae moralis, James Dundas, first Lord Arniston, a Presbyterian, a judge and a philosopher, makes extensive use of Stoic themes and authors. About one third of the manuscript is a close reading of Seneca. Dundas judges Stoicism from the perspective of Calvinism: the decisive complaint is that the Stoics are ‘prideful’ when they consider happiness to be within the grasp of fallen human reason. However, pride aside, Dundas is willing to recover some Stoic insights for his (...) Calvinist faith. In what ways? The promise of the practical rewards of Stoicism drives Dundas's interest in arguing that Stoicism can play a crucial psychological and moral contribution to a Christian's life. The investigation of Stoicism in the Idea philosophiae moralis sheds new light on the backdrop of the Scottish Enlightenment's relationship with Stoicism, commonly characterised as ‘Christian Stoicism’, as well as on the variety of the early modern Christian-Stoic syntheses, such as the Religio Stoici by George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, a friend of Dundas's. (shrink)

In the second half of the seventeenth century, philosophy teaching in the Scottish universities gradually moved from scholasticism to Cartesianism. Robert Forbes, regent at Marischal College and King's College, Aberdeen, was a strenuous opponent of Descartes. The analysis of the philosophy of Forbes and of his teacher Patrick Gordon sheds light on the relationship between Scottish Reformed scholasticism and the reception of Descartes in Scotland.

In 1685, during the heyday of Scottish Cartesianism, regent Robert Lidderdale from Edinburgh University declared Cartesianism the best philosophy in support of the Reformed faith. It is commonplace that Descartes was ostracised by the Reformed, and his role in pre-Enlightenment Scottish philosophy is not yet fully acknowledged. This paper offers an introduction to Scottish Cartesianism, and argues that the philosophers of the Scottish universities warmed up to Cartesianism because they saw it as a newer, better version of their own traditional (...) Reformed scholasticism, chiefly in metaphysics and natural philosophy. (shrink)

This paper wishes to make a contribution to the study of how seventeenth-century scholasticism adapted to the new intellectual challenges presented by the Reformation. I focus in particular on the theory of accidents, which Reformed scholastic philosophers explored in search of a philosophical understanding of the rejection of the Catholic and Lutheran interpretations of the Eucharist. I argue that the Calvinist scholastics chose the view that actual inherence is part of the essence of accidents because it was coherent with their (...) theology. In this paper, I bring to attention the Reformed scholastic philosophy which was taught in the Scottish universities in the first half of the seventeenth century, an area so far neglected by scholars. In so doing, I compare Scottish scholasticism with coeval Calvinist sources, and highlight the differences from authoritative Catholic and Lutheran philosophers. The conclusion is that Calvinist scholasticism, both Scottish and Continental, brought about fundamental changes in seventeenth-century metaphysics, which are coherent with a humanist interpretation of Aristotle, and anticipate some themes of early modern philosophy. (shrink)

The graduation theses of the Scottish universities in the first half of the seventeenth century are at the crossroads of philosophical and historical events of fundamental importance: Renaissance and Humanist philosophy, Scholastic and modern philosophy, Reformation and Counterreformation, the rise of modern science. The struggle among these tendencies shaped the culture of the seventeenth century. Graduation theses are a product of the Scholasticism of the modern age, which survived the Reformation in Scotland and decisively influenced Scottish philosophy in the seventeenth (...) century, including the reception of early modern philosophy. We can therefore speak of a ‘Scottish Scholasticism’, characterised by an original reception and interpretation of the long traditions of Scholastic philosophy and Aristotelianism. The aim of the thesis is the analysis of the general physics of the graduation theses: the two central theories are prime matter and movement. Natural philosophy is a particularly interesting case, and the main features of the graduation theses are the reception of Scholasticism alongside innovation within Scholasticism. Graduation theses adhere to the Scholastic tradition, especially Scotism, while being innovative in their opposition to Catholic forms of Scholasticism. Scottish Scholasticism can be then further qualified as an example of ‘Reformed Scholasticism’. (shrink)

In the Dutch debates on Cartesianism of the 1640s, a minority believed that some Cartesian views were in fact Calvinist ones. The paper argues that, among others, a likely precursor of this position is the Aristotelian Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), who held a reductionist view of accidents and of the essential extension of matter on Calvinist grounds. It seems unlikely that Descartes was unaware of these views. The claim is that Descartes had two aims in his Replies to Arnauld: to show (...) the compatibility of res extensa and the Catholic transubstantiation but also to differentiate the res extensa from some views of matter explicitly defended by some Calvinists. The association with Calvinism will be eventually used polemically against Cartesianism, for example in France. The paper finally suggests that, notwithstanding the points of conflict, the affinities between the theologically relevant theories of accidents, matter and extension ultimately facilitated the dissemination of Cartesianism among the Calvinists. (shrink)

This paper investigates aspects of the philosophy curriculum that Thomas Reid studied during his student years in Aberdeen. In order to assess the nature of philosophy teaching in early eighteenth-century Aberdeen, the graduation theses of the Scottish universities must be read with an eye to the long tradition of university teaching, which reaches back into the seventeenth century. I will seek to show how seventeenth-century Scottish Reformed scholasticism is the backdrop of the Scottish Enlightenment.

This article is an introduction to a special issue on ‘Contexts of Religious Tolerance: New Perspectives from Early Modern Britain and Beyond’, which contains essays on the contributions to the debates on tolerance by non-canonical philosophers and theologians, mainly from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotland and England. Among the studied authors are the Aberdeen Doctors, Samuel Rutherford, James Dundas, John Finch, George Keith, John Simson, Archibald Campbell, Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull and John Witherspoon. The introduction draws attention to several methodological points (...) connected to the decision to look at the debates on tolerance through the prism of rarely studied authors. It then presents the essays, which offer novel perspectives by analysing and contextualising political, religious and moral treatments of tolerance. These are tied especially to debates on the articles of faith and on their status, on confessions of faith and their role in the quest for orthodoxy, on liberty of conscience, and on the relation between church and state. (shrink)

How can we better understand and treat those suffering from schizophrenia and manic-depressive illnesses? This important new book takes us into the world of those suffering from such disorders. Using self descriptions, its emphasis is not on how mental health professionals view sufferers, but on how the patients themselves experience their disorder. A new volume in the International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry series, this book will be of great interest to all those working with sufferers from such disorders - (...) helping them to better understand their mental lives, and providing important insights into how best to treat them. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between basic and higher cognition. In this (...) paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (Sect. 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one’s engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (Sect. 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological (...) devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (Sect. 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, _allusion_, which means that the subject acts _as if_ the virtual experiences are real (Sect. 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind—given the current state of technology—between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

The notion of being a burden to others is mostly discussed in the context of care‐intensive diseases or end‐of‐life decisions. But the notion is also crucial in decision‐making at the beginning of life, namely regarding prenatal testing. Ever more sophisticated testing methods, especially non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), allow the detection of genetic traits in the unborn child that may cause disabilities. A positive result often influences the decision of the pregnant women towards a termination of the pregnancy. Thus, critics claim (...) that these testing methods send a negative message to people with disabilities. At the core of this is what we call the burden assumption. This assumption claims that children with disabilities are necessarily a burden to others, especially to their parents and other family members. In this paper, we discuss what being a burden to others means in this context and how such an attitude can be avoided without restraining reproductive autonomy. A closer examination shows that the burden assumption is mostly based on misinformation and a false model of disability. Empirical studies as well as narrative evidence from parents who raise a child with disabilities show that the burden assumption is wrong. Raising a child with disabilities does not necessarily mean a decrease in the quality of life. We show how the burden assumption can be challenged through an advanced genetic counselling that combines empirical evidence with narratives from a first‐person perspective. (shrink)

Richard Owen has been condemned by Darwinians as an anti-evolutionist and an essentialist. In recent years he has been the object of a revisionist analysis intended to uncover evolutionary elements in his scientific enterprise. In this paper I will examine Owen's evolutionary hypothesis and its connections with von Baer's idea of divergent development. To give appropriate importance to Owen's evolutionism is the first condition to develop an up-to-date understanding of his scientific enterprise, that is to disentagle Owen's contribution to the (...) modernization of typology and morphology. I will argue that Owen's Platonic essentialism is rhetorical and incongruous. On the contrary, an interpretation of the archetype based on Aristotle's biological works makes possible a new conception of type, based on a homeostatic mechanism of stability. The renewal of morphology hinges on homological correspondences and a homeostatic process is also the origin of serial and special homology. I will argue that special homology shows an evolutionary orientation insofar as it is a typically inter-specific character while serial homology is determined through an elementary usage of the categories of developmental morphology. (shrink)

The aims of my paper are to set out Aquinas’s arguments in favour of the thesis of God as Subsistent Being itself; set out the arguments against; and propose a fresh reading of that thesis that takes into account both Thomistic doctrine and the criticisms of it. In this way, I shall proceed as in a medieval quaestio, with arguments in favour, sed contra and respondeo.

The paper reconstructs the concept of culture that emerges from Heinrich Rickert?s neo-Kantianism, uncovering its major historical-problematic, methodological, and philosophical implications. The central theme of the first section is the idea that modern culture is uniquely characterized by?fragmentation?. It also unpacks the programme of Rickert?s philosophy of culture, which pursues the task of reconstructing the lost unity of culture. The second section explains the methodological implications of the problematic relationship between value and reality established in cultural goods and evaluations. Finally, (...) the third section reconstructs the Rickertian system of values, with its peculiar effort to reconcile historicity and value absoluteness. The last part develops a critical discussion of the Rickertian project. (shrink)

This article examines Jacobi's two novels, Allwill and Woldemar indirectly showing how much Allwill prefigures Kierkegaard's Seduce in Either/Or and the plot of Woldemar Hegel's final scene of Section VI of his Phenomenology of Spirit.

Digital technologies have become a crucial factor in nursing. Given the fact that many tasks could also be done by robots or AI systems, the place for the nurse in this scenario is unclear. In what way and to what extent will the implementation of ever more sophisticated technology affect nursing practice? It is the aim of this paper to analyse the potential challenges of nursing practice in the digital age. The analysis is conducted through the lens of new materialism, (...) a set of theoretical models that understand the relationship between humans and technology as dynamic and performative. According to this view, there is no prefixed essence of technology. Rather, the meaning of technology is enacted in concrete practice. The analysis shows that in past debates on technology use in nursing, the nurses’ role has been defined as guardians of humanity, defending the patient against the dehumanizing effects of technology. This role has been transferred to the digital age, where it is the duty of nurses to cushion the negative effects of digital technology. As an alternative to this outdated role, nurses should be included in processes of technology design and policymaking. Enabling nursing professionals to shape the circumstances of a digitally enhanced holistic practice may empower their status within the healthcare system and also benefit the patient by contributing to a more person‐centred care. (shrink)

In this commentary, I focus on Jones' suggestion of a close connection between the domain of space and that of kinship. I expand on that suggestion by introducing the concept of frame of reference and show how it can possibly participate to the generation of kinship systems.

The Article addresses three main questions. First: Why do some scholars and decision-makers take evidence assessment criteria as standards of proof and vice versa? The answer comes from the fact that some legal systems are more concerned with assessment criteria and others with standards; therefore jurists educated in different contexts tend to emphasize what they are more familiar with, and to assimilate to it what they are less familiar with. Second: Why do systems differ in those respects? Here the answer (...) stems from the historical, institutional and procedural differences that explain why some systems are more concerned with assessment criteria and others with standards of proof. And third, assuming that both criteria and standards are necessary to legal decision-making about facts: How can a system work if it neglects one of these things? Here the Article argues that there is a functional connection between criteria and standards. The functional connection account is distinguished from a functional equivalence account, and some systems and jurisdictions are referred to in greater detail to support the functional connection claim. (shrink)

The meeting was held in Chicago from Friday, October 7 to Sunday, October 9, 1988, and was hosted by Loyola University. About 80 members and friends of the Society attended. The topic of discussion was the greater Logic.

The article tries to retrace the emergence of kant's "critique of pure reason". Already in the sixties, Kant faced the problem of metaphysics and came to the result that the conclusions of pure reason have only a subjective value. Hereby the material content of transcendental dialectic was reached. Only afterwards kant examined the underlying ontology and came to his transcendental idealism. On this new base kant should have had to revise his former critique of special metaphysics. However, He did this (...) only partially. (shrink)

AgeTech involves the use of emerging technologies to support the health, well-being and independent living of older adults. In this paper we focus on how AgeTech based on artificial intelligence (AI) may better support older adults to remain in their own living environment for longer, provide social connectedness, support wellbeing and mental health, and enable social participation. In order to assess and better understand the positive as well as negative outcomes of AI-based AgeTech, a critical analysis of ethical design, digital (...) equity, and policy pathways is required. A crucial question is how AI-based AgeTech may drive practical, equitable, and inclusive multilevel solutions to support healthy, active ageing. In our paper, we aim to show that a focus on equity is key for AI-based AgeTech if it is to realize its full potential. We propose that equity should not just be an extra benefit or minimum requirement, but the explicit aim of designing AI-based health tech. This means that social determinants that affect the use of or access to these technologies have to be addressed. We will explore how complexity management as a crucial element of AI-based AgeTech may potentially create and exacerbate social inequities by marginalising or ignoring social determinants. We identify bias, standardization, and access as main ethical issues in this context and subsequently, make recommendations as to how inequities that stem form AI-based AgeTech can be addressed. (shrink)

In March 2019, the German Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss (G‑BA; Federal Joint Committee) presented the result of the method assessment process on non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT). The aim of this method assessment process was to decide whether NIPT should become a publicly funded procedure of routine prenatal care. The G‑BA decided in favor of NIPT, making the implementation of NIPT very likely, provided that other healthcare and political institutions also agree. This development could be interpreted as empowering from the perspective of reproductive (...) autonomy, since NIPT allows pregnant women to obtain valuable information on the health of the fetus in a fast and easy manner and without the risks of invasive methods. However, the routinization of NIPT also implies ethical challenges. Will the routinization lead to a normalization of prenatal quality control? Will it lead to an expansion to women outside the high-risk group? What would be the ethical implications of such a development? How should physicians, geneticists, and patients deal with the increased amount of obtainable information? What are the implications for choice and decision-making in the prenatal care context? In this paper, we analyze the ethical aspects of the routinization of NIPT, focusing on information and the counseling process, the burden of choice, and the threats to reproductive autonomy by societal interests linked to NIPT. (shrink)

Gli antichi Greci la chiamavano métis. Parola comune e anche nome mitologico di divinità. Se consultiamo il vocabolario, ne troviamo due significati: "saggezza" ispirata a "prudenza" e "disegno", nel senso di "piano" concepito da qualcuno. La flessibilità ha a che fare soprattutto con il secondo significato, perché è razionalità strategica e agonistica, in cui la duttilità è insieme ragion d'essere, modo di operare e scopo. Giovanni Bottiroli sostiene da tempo la necessità di elaborare una filosofia di tipo modale, che (...) apra le categorie della logica classica alla coppia rigido/flessibile. In questo saggio porta a compimento una teoria estremamente articolata degli stili di pensiero, la sola che giudica in grado di comprendere l'eterogeneità della mente, il pluralismo logico e semantico, l'identità come polisemia. Se definiamo "rigido" ogni soggetto il cui modo d'essere è la coincidenza con se stesso, la flessibilità non può ridursi infatti a una rigidità indebolita: è inclusiva e avvolgente e le spetta il primato sul piano logico, etico ed estetico. Perché è la flessibilità a renderci liberi. (shrink)

The paper defends the theoretical strength and consistency of Rawls's constructivism, showing its ability to articulate and convincingly weave together several key ethical ideas; yet it questions the political relevance of this admirable normative architecture. After having illustrated Rawls's conception of moral agency and practical reason, the paper tackles two criticisms raised by Scheffler. First the allegation of naturalism based on Rawls's disdain of common sense ideas on desert is rebutted. It is then shown that, contrary to Scheffler's contention, Rawls (...) takes proper account of our moral sentiments in the process of constructing his normative theory. Finally, the second criticism is assessed, namely the inability of Rawls's theory to increase consent around liberal policies. Despite disagreement with details of Scheffler's argument, it is suggested that the failure of recent normative liberal theories to have a political impact belies their inability to take into proper consideration the reality of politics. A more realistic appraisal of political life and of historical events and developments are called for if political philosophy wants to be something more than an academic exercise. (shrink)

Reid’s rejection of the “theory of ideas” implies that sensations are not copies of external qualities such as extension and figure. Reid also says that not even the order of sensations is spatial. However, in his early manuscripts Reid did not deny that sensations are arranged spatially. He simply denied that our ideas of extension and figure are copied from any single atomic sensation. Only subsequently did Reid explicitly reject the view that sensations are arranged spatially. The question of the (...) spatiality of color sensation was a central concern of early interpreters of Reid, like Dugald Stewart, John Fearn, and William Hamilton. In particular, John Fearn thought that the denial of the spatiality of color sensations is the result of Reid’s commitment to the immateriality of the soul. Against Reid’s view, Fearn argued that the perception of visible figure necessarily implies the spatiality of color sensations. (shrink)

Philosophy of Mind is usualy seen as the theoretical field in which theories about the functioning of the mind are elaborated, to be afterwards empirically tested through Artificial Intelligence. But this empirical approach does not fit the human mind which is not simply a machine. It is therefore possible to see Philosophy of Mind as a necessary creation to empty AI of its philosophical charge.

In his writings about hypergeometric functions Gauss succeeded in moving beyond the restricted domain of eighteenth-century functions by changing several basic notions of analysis. He rejected formal methodology and the traditional notions of functions, complex numbers, infinite numbers, integration, and the sum of a series. Indeed, he thought that analysis derived from a few, intuitively given notions by means of other well-defined concepts which were reducible to intuitive ones. Gauss considered functions to be relations between continuous variable quantities while he (...) regarded integration and summation as appropriate operations with limits. He also regarded infinite and infinitesimal numbers as a façon de parler and used inequalities in order to prove the existence of certain limits. He took complex numbers to have the same legitimacy as real quantities. However, Gauss’s continuum was linked to a revised form of the eighteenth-century notion of continuous quantity: it was not reducible to a set of numbers but was immediately given. (shrink)

The discussion and debates around Ethical AI cannot simply ignore the fact that ethics is not a self-standing discipline by is part of Philosophy and can only be approached as such.

The paper argues that it is the rise of Artificial Intelligence as a concrete possibility (the idea of a thinking machine) that favoured the growth of interest in Cognitive Science within the academic community. This puts the history and the definition of AI in a different light, as it can be seen and understood as "a continuation of Philosophy by other means" (Landi, 2020) and not merely as a technology or a sum of technologies.

Some philosophical considerations over Yann LeCun’s position paper “A Path Towards Autonomous Machine Intelligence”.

What is the epistemological status of Big Data? Is there really place for them in a scientific search for new empirical laws?