This volume is about moral judgment, especially its exercise in selected social settings.

Innerhalb der Psychologie herrscht Uneinigkeit darüber, ob die Psychologie eine Naturwissenschaft oder eine Kulturwissenschaft sei. In Bezug auf diesen Streit wird gezeigt, dass dieser auf einer falschen Alternative beruhe. Die Psychologie ist beides. Insofern sie die Pharmakotherapie stützt verwendet sie naturwissenschaftliche Methoden und insofern sie Psychotherapie stützt verwendet sie kulturwissenschaftliche Methoden. Durch eine Diskussion des vermeintlich eine Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Psychologie darstellenden Kausalprinzips wird gezeigt, dass man dieses nicht benötigt, um Verlaufsgesetze zu etablieren. Des Weiteren wird gezeigt, dass wissenschaftliche (...) Aussagen über subjektives Erleben möglich sind. (shrink)

Excerpt from Hartmann, Duhring und Lange: Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie im XIX. Jahrhundert; Ein Kritischer Essay Zu dem Bedeutendfien nun, was auf diefem Gebiet feit einem Decennium zu Tage gefordert worden ift, gehoren die Werke von Hartmann, Duhring und Im Folgenden werde ich Hartmann und Duhring, die beiden fyftematifehen Dogma tiker, gegenuberf'cellen, um fie fo gegenfeitig in moglichfl fcharfes Licht zu bringen und fie als Extreme aufzuweifen, zwifchen denen Lange wahrhaft vermittelnd, nicht charakterlos lavirend, als Kri (...) ticift und Relativift und gleichfam als Correctiv mitten innen fieht; er verzichtet darauf, mit einem neuen Syflem die Welt zu beglucken und fieht den Fortfchritt der Wiffenfchaften weniger in voreiligen Lofungsverfuchen, als in immer exacterer F ormuli rung der Probleme im Anfchlufs an Kant, deffen Syfiem nicht veraltet if'c, weil man es jetzt erft ganz und voll verficht. Alle drei erheben den gewichtigen Anfpruch, auf der vollen Hohe der Gegenwart zu ftehen; und insbefondere glaubt jeder, dafs die fo heifs und feit langer Zeit erfehnte Vermahlung von Philo fophie und Naturwiffenfchaft in feinem Syf'tem gefeiert fei. Dies ift ihre gemeinfame Tendenz, dies ihr gemeinfames Pro gramm, das freilich dann jeder auf feine eigenthumliche Weife' zu erfullen fucht. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology – purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones – connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary In 1919 Nicolai Hartmann convincingly justified that there cannot exist a “general law of causation” as A. Meinong had in mind. For him Meinong’s understanding of causation was bound on the region of the physical layer of being, simultaneously postulating it as the only possible causation there. This is the starting point of the comparison between N. Hartmann‘s understanding of causation and that of the Gestalt Theory, for which neither in psychic nor in natural context linear-successive causality (...) plays a part. Therefore NH’s conception of 1919 was still completely incompatible with that of the Gestalt Theory despite the fact that he was distancing himself from the “general law of causation” sensu Meinong. 20 years later he changed this by adding the “Wechselwirkung” to the linear successive causation in the physical layer. In doing so he approached the Gestalt theoretical position but failed it insofar as for it his linear-successive understanding of causation generally has had its day with regard to natural processes, also consequently for the physical. Thus the term “causation“ had become free for a dynamic concept of causation which is equally appropriate for the physical and the psychic. NH makes this move not until 1949, shortly before his death, by writing:.... It is the opinion of the author of this work that the ingenious systematics of NH‘s Critical Ontology should make it possible to execute the necessary corrections in some details of his theory of layers without questioning the structure of his systematics, thus carrying out what NH was not able to do himself due to his death. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck, Edmund Husserl : on the historicity of scientific knowledge -- Gaston Bachelard : the concept of "phenomenotechnique" -- Georges Canguilhem : epistemological history -- Pisum : Carl Correns's experiments on Xenia, 1896-99 -- Eudorina : Max Hartmann's experiments on biological regulation in protozoa, 1914-21 -- Ephestia : Alfred Kähn's experimental design for a developmental physiological -- Genetics, 1924-45 -- Tobacco mosaic virus : virus research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biochemistry and Biology, 1937-45 -- The concept (...) of the gene : molecular biological perspectives -- The liquid scintillation counter : traces of radioactivity -- The concept of information : the writings of François Jacob -- Intersections -- Preparations -- The economy of the scribble. (shrink)

Barion, J. Was es heisst, ein Philosoph zu sein.--Flach, W. Die Objektivität der Erkenntnis.--Schmidt, G. Die Transzendentalität des Seingedankens.--Winterhager, E. Das Sich-Haben des Subjekts.--Hartmann, K. Analytische und kategoriale Transzendentalphilosophie.--Marx, W. Systemidee und die Problematik ihrer Begründung.--Röd, W. Transzendentalphilosophie und deskriptive Philosophie als wissenschaftliche Theorien.--Vuillemin, J. Caractères et fonctions des signes.--Ritzel, W. Zur Theorie praktischer Wissenschaft.--Hufnagel, E. Relationen--zum Streit um die pädagogische Anthropologie.--Derbolav, J. Politik und Moral.--Wolandt, G. Standpunkte der Kunstphilosophie.

Science presents us with a variety of accounts of the world. While some of these accounts posit deep theoretical structure and fundamental entities, others do not. But which of these approaches is the right one? How should science conceptualize the world? And what is the relation between the various accounts? Opinions on these issues diverge wildly in philosophy of science. At one extreme are reductionists who argue that higher-level theories should, in principle, be incorporated in, or eliminated by, the basic-level (...) theory. According to this view, higher-level theories do not ultimately exhibit conceptual integrity or provide genuine explanations. At the other extreme are pluralists who take higher levels of description and explanation seriously and argue for their independence and indispensability. It was the aim of the first Sydney–Tilburg conference on “Reduction and the Special Sciences”, which took place at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in Tilburg, The Netherlands, over the 10–12th April 2008, to bring researchers working on these questions together and provide a platform to discuss them in a focused way. The papers in this special issue were presented at this conference. We would like to thank the Royal Netherlands Academy of Art and Sciences (KNAW), the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science at the University of Sydney and TiLPS for financial and institutional support. We also thank the authors and referees of the papers for their work, and Hans Rott for his support of this project. (shrink)

Science presents us with a variety of accounts of the world. While some of these accounts posit deep theoretical structure and fundamental entities, others do not. But which of these approaches is the right one? How should science conceptualize the world? And what is the relation between the various accounts? Opinions on these issues diverge wildly in philosophy of science. At one extreme are reductionists who argue that higher-level theories should, in principle, be incorporated in, or eliminated by, the basic-level (...) theory. According to this view, higher-level theories do not ultimately exhibit conceptual integrity or provide genuine explanations. At the other extreme are pluralists who take higher levels of description and explanation seriously and argue for their independence and indispensability. It was the aim of the first Sydney–Tilburg conference on “Reduction and the Special Sciences”, which took place at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in Tilburg, The Netherlands, over the 10–12th April 2008, to bring researchers working on these questions together and provide a platform to discuss them in a focused way. The papers in this special issue were presented at this conference. We would like to thank the Royal Netherlands Academy of Art and Sciences (KNAW), the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science at the University of Sydney and TiLPS for financial and institutional support. We also thank the authors and referees of the papers for their work, and Hans Rott for his support of this project. (shrink)

Hartman, Duhring und Lange Zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie im XIX. Jahrhundert by Hans Vaihinger. This book is a reproduction of the original book published in 1876 and may have some imperfections such as marks or hand-written notes.".

The concept of embryological “exactness” is introduced; it becomes rather complicated if a called interaction of embryological parts is in question. From the point of view of the biological mechanist “exactness” is ultimately founded upon a given material structure. The experiment is the only possible way to decide, whether the mechanistic view is right or not; mere description does not suffice here. The decision is in favor of so called vitalism. The “harmonious-equipotential system” implies “exactness”. The “genes” are not the (...) ultimate foundation of morphogenesis and heredity; they are nothing but a material, with which the immaterial vital factor is working.Max Hartmann's views about the genes are refused. The new concepts “merogen” and “hologen” are introduced; and in connection with them the concepts of “the normal” and of regulation are discussed. Morphogenesis is a phenomenon of nature that is absolutely unique; the author speaks of the “singularity” of morphogenesis. Its chief feature is “insertion”; i.e. spatial and temporal localisation. Finally the author refers toAdolf Meyer's “Holism” once more. He is not of opinion thatMeyer's concept of “Simplification” is tenable; and he is unable to concede thatDonnan's mathematical formules imply a real progress of our understanding of biological facts. La conception de “l'exactitude” embryologique est admise; elle n'est pas sans difficulté quad il s'agit de l'action réciproque parmi les organes de l'embryon. Pour le mécaniste „l'exactitude” doit être fondée sur une structure matérielle donnée. L'expérience seule peut décider, si la théorie du mécanisme est exacte ou non; la description seule ne suffit pas. La décision est en faveur du vitalisme. Le „système harmonique-equipotentiel” comprend en effet „l'exactitude”. Les „gènes” ne sont pas le fondement essentiel de la morphogénèse et de l'hérédité. Ils ne sont qu'une matière avec laquelle l'agent immatériel vital travaille. Les opinions deMax Hartmann sur les gènes sont refutées. Les conceptions „mérogène” et „hologène” sont admises; par rapport à ces conceptions „le normal” et la régulation sont discutés. La morphogénèse est un phénomène absolument unique de la nature; l'auteur parle de la „singularité” de la morphogénèse. Son caractère principal est „l'insertion”, c'est à dire la localisation dans l'espace et dans le temps. Finalement l'auteur s'occupe de nouveau de l' „holisme” deAdolf Meyer. Il ne croit pas que la conception de „simplification” deMeyer puisse être soutenue; en outre il lui est impossible de voir un véritable progrès intellectuel dans les formules mathématiques établies parDonnan. (shrink)

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has confronted us with constantly new challenges. We need to browse new inventories of scientific knowledge to reflect on previous experiences and thus facilitate societal learning. In line with the first volume on the COVID-19 pandemic in this series, contributions from different disciplines and fields of practice create an awareness of the complexity of this crisis and help us to understand the diversity of challenges it poses. The first part focuses on philosophical, sociological and psychological problem (...) diagnoses, the second on reactive strategies in the fields of medicine, nursing care, the economy and law. After taking a look at religious contexts and fields of practice, leading experts from the healthcare sector share their experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic. With contributions by Mahmoud Abdallah, Désirée Amschl-Strablegg, Cornelia Baptist-Kröpfl, Herbert Beiglböck, Ulrike Berdnik, Alois Birklbauer, Anneliese Derkits, Reinhold Esterbauer, Franziska Grossschädl, Katharina Heimerl, Andreas Heller, Marie-Christin Hinteregger, Hartmann Jörg Hohensinner, Elisabeth Horvath, Isabella Jonveaux, Anna-Christina Kainradl, Ulla Kriebernegg, Wolfgang Kröll, Ulrike Kylianek, Martin M. Lintner, Saskia Löser, Christa Lohrmann, Sandra Müller, Gerold Muhri, Manfred Novak, Sabine Petritsch, Eva Peyker, Michaela Pfadenhauer, Barbara Pichler, Johann Platzer, Lisa Pongratz, Maria Puntigam, Elisabeth Reitinger, Hans-Walter Ruckenbauer, Hellmut Samonigg, Walter Schaupp, Georg Tafner, Christa Tax, Wolfgang Toller and Jürgen Wallner. (shrink)

Most scholars dealing with neo-Kantianism emphasize the existence of an explicit origin that characterizes neo-Kantianism as a clearly defined ‘movement’ with certain objects. In spite of the fact that differences between various neo-Kantian authors are mentioned in the current discourse (e. g. ‘Südwestdeutsche’ and ‘Marburger Schule’) scholars claim a singular unity of all neo-Kantian debates represented in the problem of ‘Geltung’. This is used to construct a certain relevance of neo-Kantianism in today’s philosophy. My contribution will pursue a historical approach (...) following Klaus Christian Köhnke’s and Ulrich Sieg’s demands. Instead of sketching systematic topics I pay further attention to the context in which an essence of neo-Kantianism was claimed or rejected. In doing so I will examine the discussions on the doctrine of postulates in Kant’s philosophy mainly led by Hans Vaihinger’s ‘Philosophy of As If’ and the impact of Eduard von Hartmann on the genesis of neo-Kantianism. I conclude that the definition of a consistent neo-Kantian ‘movement’ was an effect of rejecting spiritualist interpretations of the doctrine of postulates and in the following a rejection of the whole doctrine as ‘mysticism’ in canonical Kant interpretations. (shrink)

English title: Gadamer's interpretation of the Aristotelian Protrepticus. -/- Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present and analyse the main hypotheses of Hans-Georg Gadamer in his 1928 essay Der aristotelische Protreptikos und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik, emphasizing the Gadamerian reception of the notions of phrónēsis, hēdonḗ and, to a lesser extent, phýsis. It will be attempted to show that in this early work of Gadamer there is more than a methodological and interpretative debate regarding the (...) Protrepticus and the Aristotelian ethics. Lastly, the paper argues that it is possible to read in the main arguments of this early essay the first intellectual maturation of relevance of Gadamer, expressed in the form of a critical dialogue with his great masters (Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Paul Friedländer), departing from the new interpretative possibilities that philology and phenomenology opened to his studies on the ethical-political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The theoretical consequences of this early article would have both paved the way of Gadamer’s next theoretical interventions regarding Platonic political philosophy as well as for the future developments of philosophical hermeneutics. /// -/- Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es presentar y analizar las principales hipótesis de Hans-Georg Gadamer en su ensayo de 1928 Der aristotelische Protreptikos und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik, poniendo énfasis en la recuperación gadameriana de las nociones de phrónēsis, hēdonḗ y, en menor medida, phýsis. Se intenta demostrar que en este trabajo temprano de Gadamer hay, en términos metodológicos e interpretativos, más que una discusión con Werner Jaeger con relación al Protréptico y a la ética aristotélica. Finalmente, este artículo sostiene que es posible leer en las principales argumentaciones del ensayo la primera maduración intelectual de relevancia de Gadamer, expresada en forma de diálogo crítico con sus grandes maestros (Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Paul Friedländer), a partir de las nuevas posibilidades interpretativas que la filología y fenomenología le abrieron para el estudio de la filosofía ético-política de Platón y Aristóteles. Las consecuencias teóricas de este temprano artículo habrían signado tanto el camino de sus siguientes intervenciones teóricas en tono a la filosofía política platónica como también los futuros desarrollos de la hermenéutica filosófica. (shrink)

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field—Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner—represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology, the contemporary American generation addresses (...) concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues’ work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann’s engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus’s work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg’s perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde’s explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner’s fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn. Contributors are Hans Achterhuis, Philip Brey, René Munnik, Martijntje Smits, Pieter Tijmes, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. (shrink)

Alles, was der Mensch von sich wissen kann, lässt sich an den Werkzeugen und Medien ablesen, die er gebraucht. Diese These steht im Mittelpunkt des Werks von Ernst Kapp (1808-1896), Gymnasiallehrer für Geschichte und Erdkunde, Technikphilosoph und Farmer in Texas. Obwohl Ernst Kapp unbestritten als Begründer der modernen Technikphilosophie gilt, ist sein anthropologischer Ansatz bislang kaum systematisch rezipiert worden. Zwar wird sein Werk in Überblicken meist als wichtiger Ausgangspunkt für die Technikphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts genannt, sein heuristisches Theorem der Organprojektion (...) wird dabei jedoch oft falsch als Vorläufer der Prothesentheorie von Freud bis McLuhan eingeordnet und nicht als kulturhistorische Erkenntnistheorie verstanden. Bei dem vorliegenden Buch handelt es sich um den ersten Forschungsband zum Werk von Ernst Kapp. Mit Beiträgen von Suzana Alpsancar, Christine Blättler, Lorenz Engell, Volker Gerhardt, Frank Hartmann, Christoph Hubig, Friedrich A. Kittler, Harun Maye, Alfred Nordmann, Birgit Recki, Hans-Martin Sass, Leander Scholz, Johanna Seifert, Christiane Voss und Niels Werber"--Back cover. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's remarks about family resemblance in the Philosophical Investigations should not be construed as implying a comprehensive theory of universals. They possess, rather, a defensive function in his exposition. The remarks allow one, nevertheless, to draw certain general conclusions about how Wittgenstein thought about concepts. Reflection on the notion of family resemblance reveals that kinship and similarity considerations intersect in it in a problematic fashion.

One of the most important issues in public and academic debate is the concept of value and the difficulty in defining it. In this new book, the leading social theorist Hans Joas explores the nature of values in relation to some of the leading figures of twentieth-century philosophy and social theory. Seeking to synthesize utilitarian and normativist approaches, Joas argues that only by appreciating the creative nature of human action can we understand how values and value commitments arise. Values, (...) Joas suggests, arise in experiences of self-formation and self-transcendence. He arrives at this thesis by tracing the tensions in the work of thinkers including Friedrich Nietzsche, William James, Max Scheler and John Dewey. He goes on to explore the work of Charles Taylor, and concludes with an examination of postmodern challenges to the concept of identity and with a provocative critique of Habermas's treatment of the relation between the right and the good. Throughout the book, Joas differentiates between values, norms and desires. He clarifies their respective role in the dynamics of human action, and explores how the ways we acquire values relate to the other ways in which we understand the world and ourselves. This important book will be of great interest to students and scholars of sociology, social theory and philosophy. (shrink)

We argue that social deliberation may increase an agent’s confidence and credence under certain circumstances. An agent considers a proposition H and assigns a probability to it. However, she is not fully confident that she herself is reliable in this assignment. She then endorses H during deliberation with another person, expecting him to raise serious objections. To her surprise, however, the other person does not raise any objections to H. How should her attitudes toward H change? It seems plausible that (...) she should increase the credence she assigns to H and, at the same time, increase the reliability she assigns to herself concerning H. A Bayesian model helps us to investigate under what conditions, if any, this is rational. (shrink)

Schopenhauer was the first, and to the end the greatest philosophical influence on Nietzsche, who said it was Schopenhauer who had turned him into a philosopher. For many years the young Nietzsche was a thoroughgoing Schopenhauerian; but then he rebelled against this influence, attacked it and tried to overthrow it. Other substantial intellectual figures of the nineteenth century who were significantly influenced by Schopenhauer include the historian Jacob Burckhardt, author of The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy; Hans Vaihinger, (...) author of The Philosophy of ‘As If’; Edward von Hartmann, author of The Philosophy of the Unconscious; and Sigmund Freud. (shrink)